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ABSTRACT 
This study seeks to examine the specific circumstances surrounding the development 
of a trade in alfa, or esparto, grass, between Britain and southern Tunisia in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Beginning abruptly in 1871, within the space of ten years alfa grass had became not 
only the principal item of foreign trade in the south but also one of the whole country's 
most important exports. What differentiates the alfa trade from existing commercial 
activities in Tunisia at the time is that it was carried on between European merchants 
and the inhabitants of districts which were only marginally integrated into the political 
structures of the central government and the externally orientated market economy of 
the coastal and urban regions. A mainly pastoral and overwhelmingly subsistence 
orientated population, the tribes of south and central Tunisia were, on the surface, an 
unlikely labour force for the collection and sale of a plant which was laborious and 
time consuming to gather, and whose sale offered what were often extremely meagre 
returns. In attempting to understand and explain how and why a people, hitherto 
largely unconnected with and uninterested in direct, market orientated transactions 
within Tunisia, should enter into economic relations of such magnitude with European 
industrialists, the study has highlighted a number of interesting issues relating to the 
penetration of capitalism into what is commonly termed the periphery. Although many 
of the findings may be specific to Tunisia it is clear that the alfa trade there emerged 
as a result of a complex interplay of local, regional and international factors which had 
some surprising origins and some interesting results. 
Although fulfilling many of the criteria for Myint's "vent-for-surplus" theory of 
international trade, the alfa trade in Tunisia neither caused any far reaching social 
change nor did it result in any independent and self-sustaining economic development 
in the south of the country. Indeed the alfa trade helped mask, and undoubtedly 
prolonged, the growing economic and social crisis in southern Tunisia as the region 
underwent a painful integration into the developing national economy. With little to 
offer the country in terms of natural resources southern Tunisia was sucked dry of its 
surplus wealth yet deprived of any corresponding investment. 
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Preface 
The inspiration for this research was kindled during my days as an undergraduate at 
Glasgow University where I took a joint honours degree in geography and economic 
history. Although the range of topics covered was broad and general, the courses 
which interested me most were those which focused on the economic and social 
development of non-European countries, particularly in Africa. Of greatest interest to. 
me was the period immediately before and during the colonial era of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries a time of such fundamental political, social and economic 
change both for Africa and Europe. I was eager to find out more about the nature of 
pre-colonial Africa, its society and internal dynamics and how these were influenced 
by greater integration into the developing world political economy. The immense 
volume and breadth of coverage of the available literature was fascinating and exciting: 
so many countries, such varied topics and viewpoints. But it was also frustrating. 
Many of the studies I read seemed to follow rigid linguistic and/or nationalistic 
boundaries. British and American researchers concentrated on British colonial 
possessions while French Africa appeared to be the preserve of French researchers. 
Translations, at least into English, seemed to be few and far between. 
In addition I began to feel strongly that much of the available work was written by 
Europeans from a standpoint of what Europe (or capitalism) did to Africa, whether 
positive or negative. Often little or no history was granted to African countries prior 
to the European advance of the nineteenth century and the dynamic of change was 
almost exclusively provided by Europe. Although there could be little doubt as to the 
significance of the European side of the equation I wanted to ensure that local factors 
were given equal weight in any of my own research. 
The initial research topic began quite simply, and quite vaguely, as a study of British 
capitalism in a French colonial territory. Although unable to speak French I was 
determined to steer clear of British colonial possessions in Africa. I chose Tunisia 
partly because of the importance of British trade along the southern shores of the 
Mediterranean and partly because the prospect of researching in Libya seemed 
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somewhat less than inviting. In addition few books I had read mentioned Tunisia at all 
As time went by and I became clearer on what primary material was likely to be 
available I focused more on the British traders in the south of the country where 
Maltese (officially under British jurisdiction) influence was strong. Later it became 
apparent from reading through British Foreign Office records that during the mid to late 
nineteenth century British traders predominated in the south of the country most 
particularly in a new trade which developed from 1870 in alfa or esparto grass. 
Importantly from my point of view this trade was carried on with the tribes of the south 
and central interior of the country. This I found extremely interesting since the only 
knowledge I had of north African tribes came from E. E. Pritchard's works which had 
highlighted the inherently egalitarian aspects of their social structure. This puzzled me 
and made me determined to find out not only how and why the trade in alfa grass 
developed in the first place, but also what impact this had on existing social structures 
of the indigenous, nomadic populations of the country. I therefore refined the research 
topic to be a study of the tribes of south and central Tunisia with particular reference 
to the trade in alfa grass from its inception until the 1940's. Although I would have 
preferred to go beyond 1940 this end date was dicatated by the fact that after this date 
material on alfa grass in the Tunisian Government Archives at the Dar el Bey can no 
longer be found in discrete files. Given the time constraints of my research it became 
impossible to extend the study by attempting to review information across a whole 
series of files which were poorly indexed. 
The study was to be broadly an analysis at a national and international level examining 
the relations of the government of Tunis with the major Powers on a political and 
economic level and geographically how this influenced local level integration into the 
world economy. Also of interest was what underpinned Tunisian society in the 
pre-colonial era, and how this changed as a result of foreign intervention. 
The best starting point for primary source material in English, at least for the period 
prior to 1900, is without doubt the Foreign Office archives at Kew in London. The 
Consular records are comprehensive and well maintained. The most useful sources 
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were the commercial records FO 335 and the political memoranda FO 102. These 
included reports from the main Consulate in Tunis to the Foreign Office in London as 
well as a wide variety of reports and submissions from the vice-consulates and consular 
offices around the country to the Consul General in Tunis. Most of the trade and 
commercial reports are also found reprinted in British Parliamentary Papers (BPP) 
which are readily available on microfiche. The comprehensive and wide ranging 
archives of the French Foreign Office held at the Quai d'Orsay in Paris are also well 
maintained and of easy access although time constraints meant that this author was 
unable to extract the maximum value from this source. 
A further useful source of background information on the tribes at the time of the 
establishment of the French Protectorate are held in the archives of the Service 
Historique de 1'Armee de Terre at Vincennes on the outskirts of Paris. 
The records of the French army and Bureau des Affaires Indigenes in Aix-en-Provence 
provided little information of direct benefit to this research topic although they would 
serve a study of the alfa trade in Algeria . 
The final source of primary data, and of particular use in the later period were the 
Archives Generales Tunisiennes at the Dar el Bey in Tunis which also contain copies 
of correspondence and reports of the French Administration in Tunisia. These, 
however, were the least well organised archives consulted and the most difficult in 
which to work efficiently. The Israeli bombing of the PLO headquarters in Tunis 
followed by American air raids of Libya, both of which occurred during my research 
in Tunisia, made working in the Dar el Bey considerably more difficult. 
The trade in alfa grass is without doubt one of the least researched topics in Tunisian, 
indeed of north African history in general. One of the reasons for this soon became 
apparent during my work. There is a great dearth of useful information on the subject, 
particularly during the early period of the nineteenth century. It may be that the subject 
was not considered worthy of keeping records and in at least one case whole files 
concerning Perry Bury in the AGT are empty. Furthermore as the trade was carried 
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on with Britain and by British subjects in the main documentary evidence in French and 
Tunisian archives is sparse until the twentieth century. A great deal of reliance was 
perforce given to British Foreign Office records. 
Attempts to contact descendants of Maltese traders and in particular those of William 
Galea, British Vice-Consul in Sousse and principal trader in the material on his own 
account and for that of Perry Bury, via advertisements in Maltese and Israeli 
newspapers proved sadly fruitless. I do however remain convinced that such an avenue 
of research could prove useful in the future. 
Although the books of sederunt of Perry Bury are available at the Board of Trade 
archives in London, they contain little of interest to researchers of the Company and 
the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce was unable to provide any information relating 
to the company's activities. Although the author made frequent use of a number of 
British periodicals, principally The Times and several trade journals of the British paper 
industry, a great deal of information remains to be culled from these sources and 
further research may well uncover much more information on the economics of British 
demand for alfa grass and of individual paper manufacturers which used the material. 
While the author has tried to offer some data and interpretation of the alfa trade in the 
other supplier countries of Spain, Algeria and Tripolitania (Libya), it has been of a 
relatively superficial nature. Little has been published on the alfa trade in these 
countries and the scope for a broader comparative analysis of the trade offers 
tremendous potential for future research. 
In the text of this thesis the spelling of the names of places and tribes may vary. 
Sousse, for example, also appears as Susa and the Fraichice tribe is sometimes spelled 
as Frechich. Where possible I have used the spelling in source material of those which 
were used most commonly in the context of time. Thus while Susa was widely used 
prior to 1881, after the establishment of the French Protectorate the town was almost 
universally referred to as Sousse. 
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Introduction 
The study of the impact on non-capitalist societies of greater integration into the world 
capitalist economy has been a fundamental preoccupation of both historians and social 
scientists, particularly since the second world war as decolonisation stimulated a much 
greater interest in what has become known as the Third World. This has not simply 
been an academic pursuit. Policy makers have leant heavily on the practical case 
studies and the theoretical propositions which have emerged from these enquiries to 
establish and implement economic and development strategies. Obviously there is no 
one correct solution to the economic and social problems of the less developed 
countries today but without a strong grounding in theory or a clear understanding of the 
past any decisions regarding current or future actions on the part of Governments or 
policy makers are unlikely to meet with success. 
Modernization Theory and Dualism 
During the 1950's and 1960's much of the research on development conducted within 
the social sciences and often implicitly accepted by historians, was predicated upon the 
assumption that the Third World presented an image of the advanced countries' past. 
All countries could be placed on a linear continuum of development through stages 
ranging from undeveloped (backward or traditional) to developed (modern). 
Progression through successive stages could be achieved by the simple acquisition of 
characteristics of modernity upon which development in the advanced countries had 
been based. ' Throughout the social sciences studies were undertaken to identify 
traditional and modem characteristics of societies, and confirming how the diffusion of 
modernization would lead to development. Arising at a time when positivism was 
strong in the social sciences, the use of models and quantitative methods imbued much 
of their work with a "value free" veneer to its methodology. 
' Bernstein, H. -(1971) "Modernization Theory and the Sociological Study of 
Development", Journal of Development Studies, 7, pp. 141-170. 
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Geographers though, as ever it seems, belatedly adopted modernization theories 
enthusiastically, finding in them an opportunity for returning to the fold of mainstream 
social science and a "suitable" scientific alternative approach with which to lay to rest 
the ghost of the old regional geography. Maps were produced showing the evolution 
of urban hierarchies and transport networks through which development diffused and 
in which it could be measured by the use of a number of indices of modernization. ' 
In economics, participation in international trade was seen as one important way by 
which Europe could contribute to economic growth and development in the Third 
World. Drawing on classical and neo-classical theories of economic growth, it was 
argued that the creation of a demand for raw materials provided the impetus to the 
greater use of under-utilized factors of production and/or the exploitation of those 
resources for which the country holds a comparative advantage, enabling it to break out 
of the restrictions imposed by a narrowness in the domestic market. 
One such theory, which has direct relevance to the subject of this study, is the 
vent-for-surplus theory. Although dating back to Adam Smith, it has found more 
recent prominence in the works of Hla Myint and has been used in a number of studies 
concerning the origins of international trade in west Africa. 
In contrast to the comparative-costs theory which assumes that the resources of a given 
country are fully employed before it enters into international trade, the vent-for-surplus 
model assumes that a previously isolated country about to participate in foreign trade 
possesses a surplus productive capacity over domestic demand whether it be land or 
labour. The creation of an export opportunity can, by absorbing some of this excess 
capacity, provide a means of expanding production without affecting the production 
requirements of the domestic (usually subsistence) sector. Furthermore the venting of 
that surplus through international trade provides "a virtually `costless' means of 
acquiring imports which did not require a withdrawal of resources from domestic 
Z Most famous are E. W. Soja (1968), P. R. Gould (1970), J. B. Riddell (1970) and J. R. P. Friedmann (1966). 
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production but merely a fuller employment for their semi-idle labour". ' 
Several studies have used the vent-for-surplus theory as an explanation for the 
origins and benefits of international trade in Africa. Tosh has recently argued that in 
the forest zones of west Africa indigenous peasants were able to substantially increase 
their production of cash crops such as cocoa, coffee and cotton without adversely 
affecting subsistence production requirements. 4 
Both modernization theories and international trade theories of economics have a very 
positive view on the nature of development in the less developed countries. Both 
emphasize the backwardness of these "traditional" societies and the internal factors 
which limit their development potential. Development then is seen as a result of the 
breaking down of these barriers to progress whether it be by diffusion of such 
"modern" characteristics as education, political emancipation, technology and finance, 
or by the provision of export market opportunities for the development of productive 
forces and the creation of wealth. 
However they have also been the subject of intense and widespread criticism in recent 
years covering nearly all aspects of their theories, their methodologies and their policy 
implications for the less developed countries. In particular was the artificial theoretical 
dichotomy of traditional and modern societies as two opposite poles of a single linear 
continuum of development and the arrogant ethnocentrism which promoted the idea that 
one was dynamic and superior, the other stagnant and inferior. As a result little 
attention was paid to the societies themselves before European colonization, indeed little 
penetrating work was carried out on understanding how the societies in the less 
developed countries functioned. 
3 Myint, H. (1970) p. 141. 
4 He does however, say it is not applicable elsewhere. In Senegal for example, by the 
1910's groundnuts took up two-thirds of available cultivable land and the country became 
dependent on imported rice. Labour was the limiting factor (Tosh, J. (1980)). Hogendorn 
(1970) also found the theory applicable in Nigeria with the development of groundnut 
production. 
8 
Criticized also was the overwhelming tendency, particularly in geographical studies, to 
focus on patterns rather than processes of development. Above all perhaps, was the 
notion that increased links with the advanced countries could not but develop the less 
developed countries. 
Dependency and World-Systems Approaches 
During the 1960's doubts about the possibilities of development in the Third World 
began to grow as it became increasingly evident that many of the less developed 
countries were not experiencing significant economic growth, indeed the gap between 
the rich and poor countries seemed to be growing wider. More fundamental questions 
began to be realized regarding not only the appropriateness of existing development 
theories and policies but also about the nature of capitalism itself and the structures and 
processes which determine the relationships between the developed and less developed 
countries. Much of this work falls within what can be broadly termed a Marxist 
perspective, which encompasses a number of divergent approaches. 
Marx himself paid little attention to the specificities of capitalist development outside 
the European heartland and did not distinguish between capitalism arising naturally 
from inherent contradictions within a feudal mode of production and that which was 
implanted within pre-capitalist modes of production by expansion from the core 
countries. While emphasising that the precise nature of capitalist development in the 
periphery would vary from country to country according to the strength of existing 
pre-capitalist social formation, he nevertheless stressed the progressiveness of capitalism 
as a force leading to the destruction of those social formations and their replacement 
with capitalism. Later, theories of imperialism during the monopoly stage of capitalism 
by Lenin and Luxembourg amongst others, followed Marx's closely, yet held that 
contradictions within monopoly capitalism in the advanced countries would tend to 
hinder industrial development in the colonies until colonial links were broken, at which 
point true bourgeois revolution could occur as Marx had predicted. 
This focus on monopoly capitalism as a barrier to development had a very significant 
influence, particularly through the works of Paul Baran on the approach to capitalist 
9 
development in the less developed countries during the 1960's. But, while earlier 
theories of monopoly capitalism had an essentially progressive view of industrial 
development in the periphery, Baran argued that the advanced capitalist countries could 
not permit such development which would compromise their rapacious need for outlets 
to investment which under-consumption in the capitalist core necessitated. To preserve 
their own interests the advanced countries would form an alliance with traditional elites 
in less developed countries to block development. Surpluses which were not transferred 
to the capitalist core would be spent by the traditional elites on conspicuous 
consumption rather than on investment in production which would only undermine their 
own position of local power. 
Baran's theory of monopoly capitalism, which diverges sharply from Marx's own 
writings and those of the "classical" theories of imperialism, was to have a profound 
influence on the work of neo-marxism scholars from the early 1960's. Perhaps the 
most famous of these is Andre Gunder Frank, whose dependency theory owes much to 
Baran's analysis of capitalism. Although Frank's work has been strongly criticized in 
recent years, there is no doubt that his study of capitalism in Latin America revitalized 
the field of development theory after the widespread disillusion with modernization 
theory set in. 
Frank explicitly attacked the modern-traditional dichotomy, whether in the progressive 
view of development propounded by modernization theorists via their "stages" model, 
or in dualist notions of separate development and non-development within a country. 
Quite to the contrary, Frank believed that the less developed countries were part of a 
unified whole, the capitalist system, whose only interest was the extraction of surplus 
to feed its own development. Following Baran, this was aided by an alliance with local 
elites which, in their exploitation of the indigenous population, would in turn be 
exploited by the capitalist classes in the advanced countries to whom would be 
transferred the "primitive" accumulation which would have stimulated sustained 
development in the periphery. The extraction of surplus, upon which continued 
development of the advance countries depended, created the conditions of 
underdevelopment in the peripheral countries by denying them a source of primitive 
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accumulation. 
Underdevelopment was thus seen as a process of exploitation and not a beginning, or 
stage, of development. Development of the core and underdevelopment of the 
periphery were therefore two sides of the same coin. While the advanced countries 
could be considered undeveloped before capitalism was born from the womb of 
feudalism, the periphery where capitalism was imposed from the outside could only 
become underdeveloped: 
"Underdevelopment, far from constituting a state of backwardness prior to 
capitalism, is rather a consequence and a particular form of capitalist 
development known as dependent capitalism... dependence is a conditioning 
situation in which the economies of one group of countries are conditioned by 
the development and expansion of others. A relationship of interdependence 
between two or more such economies and the world trading system becomes a 
dependent relationship when some countries can expand through self-impulsion 
while others, being in a dependent position, can only expand as a reflection of 
the expansion of the dominant countries, which may have positive or negative 
effects on their immediate development. In either case, the basic situation of 
dependence causes these countries to be both backward and exploited. 
Dominant countries are endowed with technological, commercial, capital and 
socio-political predominance over dependent countries - the form of this 
predominance varying according to historical moment - and can therefore 
exploit them and extract part of the locally produced surplus". 5 
This process of exploitation is achieved in Frank's analysis through a uniform hierarchy 
of metropolis-satellite relations extending from the core to the furthest corner of the 
periphery in which each successive level expropriates surplus from below and transfers 
it ever upwards to be appropriated ultimately by the capitalist classes of the core 
countries, the over-arching metropolis. 
"Thus the metropolis expropriate economic surplus from its satellites and 
appropriates it for its own economic development. The satellites remain 
underdeveloped for lack of access to their own surplus and as a consequence of 
the same polarization and exploitative contradictions which the metropolis 
introduces and maintains in the satellite's domestic economic structure". 6 
Dos Santos, T. (1969) cited in Todaro, M. (1979) p. 79. 
6 Frank, A. G. (1971) p. 33. 
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But Frank's theory is as much a political statement as a theory of underdevelopment. 
At a time when many academics and politicians in Latin America on the left saw 
development as arising from stronger support of the local bourgeoisie, i. e. as a means 
of instigating a bourgeois revolution which would create the conditions, according to 
classical theories of imperialism, for capitalist development. Frank saw the Cuban 
revolution as a sign that socialism could be achieved directly. Frank posited that 
development in Latin America could not be achieved by supporting a bourgeois 
revolution since this class was in alliance with the capitalist classes of the advanced 
countries and it was in neither of their interests to instigate a break which would drain 
their lifeblood upon which their position of dominance was maintained. The only 
possible answer was a radical and clean transition to socialism. 
An important point of Frank's thesis is that the world is a unified whole, a capitalist 
system, of which Latin America and later Asia and Africa were later to form a part, 
from the time when capitalism first penetrated. Thus from 
"... the time of Cortez and Pizarro in Mexico and Peru, Clive in India, Rhodes 
in Africa, the `Open Door' in China - the metropolis destroyed and/or totally 
transformed the earlier viable social and economic systems of these societies, 
incorporated them into the metropolis dominated worldwide capitalist system 
and converted them into sources for its own metropolitan capital accumulation 
and development. The resulting fate for these conquered transformed or newly 
established societies was, and remains, their decapitalization, structurally 
generated unproductiveness, ever increasing poverty for the masses - in a word 
their underdevelopment". ' 
If capitalism was the heart of this capitalist system, its lifeblood was the accumulation 
of capital through the exploitation of the periphery by means of unequal exchange. 
Dependency theory has had a profound impact on the theorizing of the nature of 
development in the periphery. Its most important contribution has been to highlight the 
inadequacies of the traditional-modern dichotomy by emphasizing the interrelatedness 
of structures and processes throughout the world economy. In terms of Marxist 
' Frank, A. G. (1969) p. 225. 
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analysis it sought to go beyond the legacy of the orthodox approaches by focusing on 
the impact of capitalist penetration in the periphery. 
For geographers it brought home the methodological limitations of analysis based on 
ideal type models and lack of explanatory power inherent in studies of patterns rather 
than processes. Although perhaps its direct influence on geographical research was not 
as profound as might have been expected, it nevertheless stimulated the search for new 
perspectives on development issues. 
Yet dependency theory has been the butt of intense criticism almost since its inception. 
It has been attacked for the tautology of its argument that underdevelopment = 
dependency = underdevelopment. Critics have pointed out that dependent relations are 
not simply confined to links between the core and periphery but also relate to 
international relations amongst countries within the core. Thus Canada is highly 
dependent on the United States, but could not be classified as underdeveloped. 
Similarly the notion that relations between core and periphery is necessarily a zero-sum 
game in which there is one winner and one loser sits uneasily with the historical 
evidence of many countries in today's Third World. The newly industrializing 
countries in Pacific Asia and Brazil and Chile in Latin America show that impressive 
rates of economic growth and development can be achieved within the capitalist 
system. 8 Perhaps the most vigorous condemnation of dependency theory has come in 
recent years from more orthodox Marxists and these will be examined below. 
In sum the greatest impact on the development literature has been its negation of 
modernization and dualist concepts of development through stages in which change is 
seen to follow the breakdown of "traditional" barriers to development existing within 
individual countries. More important however, has been its negative contribution to 
development studies in stimulating interest in the nature of the capitalist system, its 
structures and processes, of which nation-states are merely a part. 
8 See Browett, J. (1985). 
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Although dependency theory is now dead, or at least mortally wounded, as an approach 
to the study of underdevelopment in the social sciences, many of its central tenets live 
on having been incorporated into a "world systems" approach associated with writers 
such as Amin and particularly Immanuel Wallerstein. But the world systems approach 
is altogether of much broader scope than dependency theory seeking not only to provide 
a framework for understanding the functioning of the modem world capitalist system, 
but also its historical origins. 
Moreover it seeks to overcome the analytic rigidity imposed on research by the 
artificial boundaries of social science disciplines not by promoting what is regarded as 
an equally artificial multi-disciplinary synthesis, but by an holistic, unidisciplinary 
approach which asserts that: "There is no such thing as sociology; there is no such 
thing as history; there is no such thing as economics, political science, anthropology 
or geography". 9 It is an ambitious attempt to understand social change by the creation 
of an `historical social science. ' Moreover world systems theory was conceived as a 
rejection of the tendency of modernization theory to apply models to regions or 
processes out of the theoretical and historical context in which they were created. 
It also arose from a profound disagreement with social scientists prevalence for a 
reification of the nation state as the principal unit of analysis. To world systems 
theorists the nation-state (and the state itself) was but one part of a functionally wider 
whole, the social system, or entity, which is self contained and based on "an extensive 
division of labour" and which contains "a multiplicity of cultures". " The 
world-system then was "a unit of analysis to replace the state. But it was an integral 
unit and it therefore makes no epistemological sense whatsoever to distinguish a "logic" 
of the world economy from a "logic" of the interstate system. Indeed it is barely 
possible to talk about one even provisionally without talking about the other. To try 
to do so is simply to return to the premises against which world-systems analysis was 
9 Wallerstein, I. (1983) p. 300. 
'o Wallerstein, I. (1974) p. 348. 
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a protest. What should be compared or analyzed are historical systems". " 
"... it is contended here that most entities usually described as social 
systems-tribes, communities, nation-states-are not in fact total systems". " 
The unit of analysis, then, is the social system, of which Wallerstein identifies three 
as existing in the history of the world: mini-systems which are local subsistence 
economies where exchange is reciprocal and which is bereft of an organized central 
state, world-empires which are defined by the extraction of "tribute" by a centralized 
bureaucracy which produces an inequality lacking in mini-systems; and finally the 
world economy which is defined by the capitalist mode of production where 
"production is for profit in the market and where profit is the result of an unequal 
exchange between two parts". " 
The history of the world to c. 1500 AD is one in which mini-systems, world-empires 
and world economies co-existed but world-empires were the "strong" forms which 
"expanded and contracted following a logic internal to them". " During periods of 
eruption they absorbed mini-systems and world-economies while in periods of 
contraction these would re-emerge. From 1500, however, a world-economy emerged 
as the "strong" from which "as it expanded, regularly but discontinuously. 
... incorporated the world empires and mini-systems it found at the edges, until by the 
twentieth century it had incorporated the whole globe, and created an historically new 
situation, the existence of a singular world system". " 
As with Frank, this capitalist system which emerged from the shackles of western 
European feudalism in the sixteenth century, is defined by world systems theorists as 
" Wallerstein, I. (1983) p. 305. 
lZ Wallerstein, I. (1974) p. 348. 
13 Navarro, V. (1982) p. 78. 
la Wallerstein, I. (1983) p. 305. 
15 Wallerstein, I., Decdeli, H. and Kasaba, R. (1987) p. 88. 
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being based on a single division of labour but with multiple forms of labour control the 
nature of which varied from region to region and country to country according to what 
was "best suited for particular types of production". " Thus while free wage labour 
may have best served capitalist interests in the core, coerced or slave labour was often 
found to be more appropriate in the periphery. No matter what form of labour control 
was established, they were all considered capitalist since they were all created to serve 
the needs of the capitalist core: 
"the relations of production that define a system are the relations of production 
of the whole system, and the system in this point is time in the European world 
economy. Free labour is indeed a defining feature of capitalism, but not free 
labour throughout the productive enterprises. Free labour is the form of labour 
control used for skilled work in core countries whereas coerced labour is used 
for less skilled work in peripheral areas. The combination thereof is the essence 
of capitalism". 17 
All forms of labour control within the system are linked by market exchange the 
benefits of which are unequally distributed according to the strength of the capitalist 
classes in each country and the strength of the state structures which represent and 
reinforce those class interests: 
"... those countries which are generally referred so as `core' are the recipients 
or beneficiaries of the capital accumulation; moreover it is the capital 
accumulation in these core countries that dominates and shapes the development 
of the system as a whole. `Peripheral' countries are those which generate but 
do not accumulate capital at an equal rate, and which are systematically 
disadvantaged with respect to the benefits of capital accumulation". " 
This combination of "strong" states and "strong" capitalist classes in the core countries 
affects the current of unequal exchange flowing from the periphery to the core and 
thereby further enhances the domination of the latter over the former. The difference 
with Frank's analysis on this point is not great, capital accumulation through the 
exploitation of the periphery simultaneously produces development and 
16 Wallerstein, I. (1974) p. 87. 
" Wallerstein, I. (1974) p. 127. 
'$ Jonas, S. and Dixon, M. (1980) p. 226. 
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underdevelopment in a causal relationship. Wallerstein does, however, refine the 
bi-polar metropolis-satellite relations by introducing a third category of states, the 
semi-periphery, which "are in between the core and the periphery on a series of 
dimensions such as the complexity of economic activities strength of the state 
machinery, cultural integrity". " States within the semi-periphery are both exploited 
by the core countries and in turn exploit the periphery. They are a necessary structural 
element in the world economy as a whole particularly during periods of stagnation 
when capital accumulation in the core becomes more restricted. This results in a 
"redistribution of surplus more to the bourgeoisie of the semi-peripheral zones.. . which 
effectively expands world monetary demand enough to revive the inherent expansionist 
tendencies of the capitalist world-economy". " During such periods it is possible for 
countries in the semi-periphery to rise to core status and vice versa. Clearly the 
world-systems perspective goes beyond dependency theory in a number of ways. 
The essence of the world-systems approach is its focus on the social system and the 
singular set of processes which stimulate change within that system as a whole. Thus 
the nation-state, region or a people cannot provide a legitimate unit of analysis because 
they are integrated parts of a wider whole. 
The Mode of Production School 
An alternative Marxist literature on underdevelopment emerged during the 1970's. 
Although born of dissatisfaction with liberal theories in economic anthropology, the 
work of the mainly French scholars working within what has been termed the mode of 
production school has since come to exert a considerable influence on the debate 
concerning the nature of the incorporation of pre-capitalist (or non-capitalist) societies 
into the world economic system. 
In sharp contrast with the works of Frank and Wallerstein, the researchers within the 
mode of production school explicitly reject the idea that the establishment of exchange 
19 Wallerstein, I. (1974) p. 350. 
20 Wallerstein, I. (1980) p. 168. 
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relations with the capitalist core automatically, or necessarily, results in the dissolution 
of the existing mode of production in the periphery. Indeed, quite to the contrary it 
often consolidated it. Thus, Laclau in discussing the beginnings of trade relations 
between Europe and Latin America notes: 
"Now this pre-capitalist character of the dominant relations of production in 
Latin America was not only not incompatible with production for the world 
market, but was actually intensified by the latter. The feudal regime of the 
haciendas tended to increase its servile exactions on the peasantry as the 
growing demands of the world market stimulated maximising their surplus. 
Thus, far from expansion of the market acting as a disintegrating force on 
feudalism, its effect was rather to accentuate and consolidate it. X21 
One of the major reasons for this fundamental difference lies in their respective 
definitions of capitalism. Both Frank and Wallerstein see commodity exchange as being 
the decisive determinant for the existence of capitalism hence their belief that "the 
modern history of capitalism begins with the creation, in the sixteenth century, of world 
trade and the world market ...... 
Z2 
To Frank and Wallerstein then, the incorporation of pre-capitalist modes of production 
in the periphery to the world capitalist system created a single mode of production 
throughout the world, a capitalist one. 
The mode of production school on the other hand deny that the simple existence of 
market relations was enough to characterize a particular society as being capitalist. To 
them it is relations of production which ultimately determine the existence of capitalism 
and those by their very nature must be socially based. The implanting of a capitalist 
mode of production within the periphery based on exchange does not necessarily mean 
the alteration of production relations or the destruction of the pre-capitalist mode(s) of 
production. Different modes of production can co-exist within a single social formation 
not in a "dualist" sense but as part of "a structured and differentiated whole, the 
21 Laclau, E. (1971) p. 30. 
22 Idem, p. 27. 
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'economic system"'. " There is then a period of transition during which the capitalist 
mode eventually asserts its dominance over pre-capitalist modes of production. The 
precise nature and duration of this transition is dependent not only on the needs of the 
capitalist mode but also to the resistance of the pre-capitalist modes. 
Rey, one of the principal theoreticians of this approach, has a also provided what is, 
perhaps, its best practical example in research done on the slave-based lineage society 
in Congo-Brazzaville. 24 
Before the establishment of trade with European capitalism the lineage society was 
characterised by two classes, the elders, and the juniors. The relationship between the 
two was, according to Rey and Dupre, one based on the exploitation of the latter by 
the former. The surplus labour of the juniors was transformed into prestige goods 
which were controlled by the elders. These prestige goods were then exchanged for 
other goods, for women, and also for slaves which exchanges were also controlled by 
the elders who thus were able to consolidate their own authority over the juniors. ' 
Rey and Dupre posit a three stage transition from this lineage mode of production to 
capitalism. In the first phase the lineage mode of production remains dominant. 
Capitalism is supplied with slaves but this exchange does not promote capitalist 
relations of production because the lineage society is already geared to the production 
of slaves and the traditional means of exploitation of juniors by elders is maintained: 
".. the European market economy got its supplies [of slaves] essentially by 
playing on the internal contradictions of the lineage social formations.... and in 
particular by playing on the contradiction between the social functions of the 
circulation of men and its control by the leaders". " 
23 Foster-Carter (1978) p. 213. 
24 Dupre & Rey (1973) p. 131. 
25 Dupre & Rey (1978) p. 190. 
26 Dupre & Rey (1978) p. 156. 
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In the second, what Dupre and Rey call the "transitional stage"" with the elimination 
of the slave trade European capital turns to the export of other raw materials for which 
the lineage society is not geared to. The traditional hierarchy of control is broken as 
commodities by-pass the elders and the lineage mode of production begins to, but does 
not yet entirely, break down. 
In the third stage, which has yet to be reached in the third world, capitalism is firmly 
in place and the old modes are eliminated. 28 
In theorizing about the nature of the transition, Rey believes the stages to be replicated 
in the transition from feudalism to capitalism in the capitalist heartland. Here, 
however, unlike in the periphery where capitalism is implanted from the outside, the 
transition is easier "because feudal landlords acting in their own interest simultaneously 
serve the interests of the emerging capitalist class, so that an alliance between the old 
and the new ruling class is possible". " In the periphery, by contrast, the interaction 
of the pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of production actually strengthens the existing 
productive relations. In this latter case capitalism can only become dominant through 
the effect of state violence and coercion. 
Others within the mode of production school have stressed the persistence of the 
pre-capitalist modes of production in the periphery as being in the interests of 
metropolitan capitalism. 
Conclusion 
This study of the trade in alfa grass in Tunisia exhibits, in many ways, the classic 
characteristics of capitalist penetration in a non-capitalist society. When the trade 
started in 1870 the nomadic and semi-nomadic population of the south of the country 
had few dealings with the Government in Tunis and only very weak relations with the 
Z' Dupre and Rey (1978) p. 202. 
28 Foster-Carter (1978 p. 223. 
29 Corbridge, S, (1986) p. 54. 
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sedentary populations in the towns, villages and countryside of the coastal belt and the 
northern, grain growing districts. While private property ownership, market principles 
and even foreign trade were of long standing (though not necessarily either universal 
or highly evolved) amongst the latter, the tribes of the south were organised along 
kinship lines, social and economic action was collective in nature and production, 
strongly influenced by environmental conditions, was subsistence based. Yet within the 
space of a very few years many of these tribes became directly involved in the market 
economy by collecting and selling grass to merchants on the coast to meet the demands 
of the British paper industry. The scale of the tribes' involvement in the alfa trade was 
remarkable the material quickly establishing itself as one of the country's principle 
exports. In the twentieth century alfa exports increased sharply as the country was 
transformed into the major supplier of grass to the British market. 
Within the terms of the vent-for-surplus theory of international trade this dramatic 
attention to the collection and sale of alfa grass on the part of the tribes could have 
been achieved without impacting the production capacity of traditional subsistence 
economic activities. Under-utilised or idle land and labour in tribal society may simply 
have been brought into use. This would imply that surplus income was being generated 
which could have been used to improve efficiencies in traditional activities or for 
changes in consumption patterns towards more luxury items. Excess value retained in 
the supplier regions would provide the means for self-sustaining economic development. 
Dependency theory would, by contrast, focus on the fact that as the tribes devoted more 
and more time to the alfa trade they would beome increasingly dependent on the income 
from the sale of the grass thus placing them firmly at the mercy of foreign business 
interested solely in securing raw materials at the lowest price. Once this unequal 
relationship was established it would be self perpetuating since the British paper 
industry would be able to further exploit its dominance by setting both the terms and 
conditions of trade between the two parties. Thus the surplus value would accrue 
disproportinately to Metropolitan capital which would ensure its own continued 
development at the expense of the tribes on the periphery of the capitalist system. 
21 
Unlike Frank and Wallerstein writers within the Mode of Production school of thought 
view capitalism as a progressive force for development. While the former argue that 
the world capitalist system is characterised by having a single mode of production, the 
latter hold not only that many modes of production can co-exist within capitalism as a 
whole but that the existence of capitalism is not determined solely by the appearance 
of market exchange. Indeed to writers such as Rey the establishment of market 
relations may even consolidate the existence of other, non-capitalist, modes of 
production and prolong the transition to capitalism. The capitalist mode may dominate 
but does not immediately destroy the other modes of production. 
22 
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Chapter One 
Tunisian Politics and the Economy to 1881 
1.1 Introduction 
The incorporation of Tunisia into the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century presaged 
the beginning of a long and turbulent period in the country's history culminating in the 
establishment of a French protectorate over the country in 1881. The intervening 
period was one wracked by internal strife as ties with Constantinople gradually 
weakened, and constant change as the government and state structures evolved and the 
state's power waxed and waned. 
It would be impossible to discuss the political and economic developments of the 
nineteenth century Tunisian state and economy without reference to earlier historical 
periods when these structures were formed and during which they evolved. Of 
particular importance is the country's position within, and relationship with, the 
Ottoman Empire which strongly influenced both internal change and the country's 
relations with Europe. 
1.2 Tunisia under Turkish Rule 1574-1881 
Tunis became a Regency of the Turkish Empire in 1574 with the installation of a 
beylerbey, or provincial governor, with the rank of pasha of two horsetails. ' The 
administration of the province was supported by a council, or diwan, comprising the 
senior army officers of the 4,000 Turkish soldiers stationed in the country, the 
Janissary corps. 2 Besides Tunis, where the main military garrison was established, 
smaller outposts were maintained at strategic, urban locations throughout the country, 
including Sousse (Susa), Monastir, Mahdia and Sfax along the coast, and Kef, Beja and 
Gafsa in the interior. 
The Regency was, however, a distant outpost of the Ottoman Empire and the lack of 
1 Abun-Nasr, J. (1975) p. 70. 
2 Ibid., p. 7 1. 
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any direct involvement in the Regency's government on the part of the Porte led, 
almost immediately, to the eruption of hostility within the Turkish occupying force. 
In 1591 the Janissaries rebelled against ill-treatment on the part of their senior officers, 
who formed the ruling majority on the diwan. They were replaced by a number of 
junior officers called deys, each of whom headed and were supported by a faction of 
the regular Turkish militia. The troops then forced the pasha to appoint one of the deys 
to regulate their lives and supervise security in the capital. 
"Because to these troops the country was merely an extension of their garrison 
post, giving a dey authority over the capital and the troops in it, meant 
surrendering to him the administration of the country". ' 
After the uprising the pasha became simply an honorific function without any executive 
control over the Regency's administration. The diwan itself was transformed into 
nothing more than a body to sanction the decision of the deys. 
The next seven years, however, were dominated by factional in-fighting amongst the 
deys for the supreme control of the diwan. It was not until 1598 with the accession of 
Uthman Dey that a single leader emerged with sole power. ' Yet his control and that 
of his successor, Yusuf Dey (1600-1637), was fragile despite the move to raise a unit 
of troops recruited from the Kabylie tribe, the Zwawas; the deys hoped to 
counterbalance the power of the Janissaries with these troops, whose number was never 
allowed to exceed that of the Janissaries. 
Although Uthman and Yusuf Deys used the Zwawa troops to curb the rivalry of the 
3 Ibid., p. 71. 
I The rebellion all but destroyed any remaining authority the pasha held, his title 
becoming largely honorary, though retaining nominal authority through the sultan's 
continued sanction as his legally chosen representative in the province. At the same 
time, the diwan was relegated to secondary importance in the administrative affairs of 
the province being merely a committee with power only to endorse decisions taken by 
the deys. 
5 See Morsy, M. (1984). 
25 
other Janissary chiefs, their regime represented the interests of the Ottoman military 
class in the country. Both of them were Janissary officers before they became deys, 
Ottoman Turkish was the official language of the state and "a dey could only rule when 
he imposed his will on the Janissary troops and the diwan in whose name he ruled. "' 
Nevertheless, unlike Algeria, where Ottoman Turks retained control at all major levels 
of the administrative structure, in Tunis the majority of the executive functions of the 
administration were assigned not to Turks, but to European slaves (mamluks), ' or 
renegades, who 
"... even penetrated the Janissary corps to the extent that at the time of the 
Algero-Tunisian war of 1628, out of thirteen army chiefs designated by the 
diwan to defend the country, twelve were renegades. "' 
One of the most important of these executive functions of administration was that of 
bey. It was during Yusuf Dey's reign in particular that the office of bey increased 
markedly in stature. Previous to Yusuf Dey's reign, Othman Dey had attempted to 
subjugate the population of the interior by himself leading punitive expeditions against 
the tribesmen. Yusuf Dey, however, sent his bey, Mourad, out into the countryside, 
collecting taxes by means of two annual army-caravans, or mahalla, one crossing the 
south of the country; the other, the north. As the payment of taxes were the only 
tangible proof of allegiance of the tribes towards the government, Mourad used his 
position as tax-collector to strengthen his office and in 1631 was rewarded with the 
position of Pacha to add to his existing responsibilities. 
6 Abun-Nasr, J. (1975) p. 73. 
' Indeed, shortly after Yusuf Dey's death in 1637, the renegades used their 
dominant population in the state to serve the deyship for themselves. Mami Ferrarese 
wanted the deyship and had enough wealth and influence to have claim, but he feared 
Turkish troops. So he used his influence in favour of another prominent renegade, 
Ustä Murrad "Genovese, " thinking that once the Turks were used to the notion of a 
renegade dey, Ferrarese would usurp the deyship from him. The plot backfired: 
"Genovese" had Ferrarese sent to Zaghouan and killed. When the renegade dey died 
in 1640, the deyship was once again dominated by the Turks. Ibid., p. 74. 
8 Ibid., p. 74. 
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Although it is perhaps an exaggeration to say that Mourad was stronger than Yusuf 
Dey, he was no doubt an important functionary of the state, a position he consolidated 
with the marriage of two of his sons to daughters of the former dey, Uthman. 
Subsequently, Mourad made his two sons beys in his place: the elder son, Hammouda, 
was to control the mahalla, while the younger became Caid of Sousse, Sfax and 
Monastir. 
Under Hammouda, the prestige and influence of the bey increased greatly, to the point 
where it "eclipsed the deyship". 9 At a time when Turks and renegades were involved 
in a bitter struggle for the deyship, Hammouda consolidated his economic and political 
power base by assuring the security of Tunis subduing the increasingly hostile warrior 
tribes of the interior which had at one point even reached the gates of the capital 
itself. 10 
The reputation Mourad had gained for himself amongst the ordinary citizens of the 
country was thus confirmed by his son Hammouda; the peasant and urban societies 
were grateful for the protection against the marauding tribesmen of the interior and the 
stability that result-ed. After 1637, the dey, theoretically still ruler, was reduced to 
maintaining affairs in the capital, Tunis. 
"Under Yusuf Dey the beys had been the executive officers through whom the 
dey controlled the interior. As the beylicate became hereditary in the Nwradist 
family, and the beys' power increased, they cut off the deys from the 
interior". " 
The limit of the dey's control became even more apparent later, when Hammouda, like 
his father-given title of Pasha, divided his functions as bey between his eldest son 
Mourad, who was to take control of the mahalla, and his younger son, Muhammad, 
who became governor of the three important towns of the Sahel: Susa, Sfax and 
9 Ibid., p. 77. 
'o Ibid., p. 78. 
11 Ibid., p. 79. 
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Monastir. 12 
It was only in 1673, however, that the political power struggle of the beys and deys 
broke out into open warfare. After the death of their father in 1666 Mourad and 
Muhammed took a more aggressive stance with regards the Dey. They deposed a 
succession of Deys replacing them with old men unwilling and unable to oppose their 
authority. In 1673, however, while the beys were fighting in Tripoli, a group of army 
officers who had served in Algiers where the Turks had retained full political control 
installed a noted warrior, Ali Laz as dey in open defiance of the Beys. On their return 
to Tunis the beys' forces, composed mainly of native troops, inflicted a resounding 
military defeat on the Turks who had sought the support of some of the tribes which 
the beys had been attempting to pacify. 13 Abun-Nasr has depicted the struggle 
between the deys and the beys as essentially one of "native" Tunisians who were seen 
to uphold order against "foreigners" who promoted disorder: 
"The reliance of the deys on these tribesmen, who had scourged the countryside 
on several occasions in the past, and who could be restrained only by the bey, 
had an important significance. The conflict appeared as a result of this 
development as one between the productive part of the country which included 
the fertile lands and the towns (other than Tunis) which backed the beys, and 
the groups - Turkish troops and nomadic tribesmen - who lived in the margin 
of the country's productive parts and subsisted by exploiting them. The beys 
defended stability, order and prosperity, while the Turks undermined all these 
by their cooperation with the marauding tribesmen. The Turks who were 
considered aliens and suspected as such, could no longer justify their presence 
in terms of giving the country the benefit of stability and order". 14 
By the end of the eighteenth century Tunis was a Regence of the Ottoman Empire in 
name only. Although allegiance to the Porte was officially recognized, and given 
legitimacy through the annual payment of a tribute, real power lay with the beys. 
While not natives of the land they had battled against Turkish influence, carefully 
cultivating alliances with the local populations. 
12 Ibid., p. 80. 
13 Cherif, M. (1984) vol. 1, p. 94. 
14 Abun-Nasr, J., op. cit. , p. 82. 
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1.3 The Husseinite Dynasty 
In July 1705, Hussein bin Ali took power, creating thereby a dynasty which was to rule 
the country for two and a half centuries, ending only with the creation of a Tunisian 
Republic in 1957. Under Hussein ben Ali and his successors, the deturquification of 
the administration was extended and links with Constantinople correspondingly 
weakened. 15 The son of a Turkish Janissary from Crete, Hussein held only tenuous 
links with the traditional Turkish elite. His mother was a native Tunisian and he had 
only a rudimentary knowledge of Turkish. 
Under the Husseinist rule during the eighteenth century, ambitious attempts to expand 
the state's administrative apparatus were undertaken and achieved by cementing ties 
with the indigenous elite. Many of the economic and administrative functions of the 
beylicate were farmed out under contract to the highest bidder. These lizma, or tax 
farms, were purchased by local notables and mamluks under a system beneficial as 
much to the bey as to the lezzam. They became closely, though by no means 
exclusively, linked to the position of Caid, or regional governor. The functions of the 
caid, as well as being administrative (he effectively acted as bey within his own district 
including having his own armies), involved the collection of fiscal revenue from the 
population and products of his region. Many of the taxes owed by the populations to 
the bey, were paid in kind and, in return for organizing the collection of these taxes, 
the caid retained a portion for his own account. Thus the bey (who retained most of 
the taxes) and the caid obtained significant resources at a relatively low cost and were 
able to sell them on the open market for their own account, or to local merchants 
(native and European), normally at a great profit. 
Thus the position of Caid, particularly in those areas most agriculturally productive and 
with closest links to national and international trade, was extremely lucrative. Many 
of these were, like the lizma, farmed out under an institution known as Ittifak, either 
to the highest bidder or by special prerogative of the bey to those he favoured most. 
15 See especially Cherif, M. (1981). 
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During the eighteenth century the great families of Caids/Lezzam were established, 
many of which were to retain their influence in some cases until the present day. Most 
prominent amongst these were the Bin Ayyad family who controlled amongst others, 
the Caidats of Djerba, and Cap Bon, together with their customs duties, the Jalluli, 
Caids of Sfax, the Sahel ports and important lezzams at Tunis, and the Mrabit of the 
Kairouan region. Mahmoud Jalluli, for example, bought the position of Caid at Sfax 
and Sousse in 1801 for 225,000 piastres. 16 These families exploited the populations 
and produce of the country in close association with the beylicate to their mutual 
benefit. 
During the eighteenth century the urban and sedentary populations of Tunis were 
integrated into the political structures of the state (the position of the nomadic and 
semi-nomadic tribal populations of the south of the country will be discussed below). 
They recognized and identified with the primacy of Beylical authority. This evolution 
of relations between the central government and the sedentary populations influenced, 
and was influenced by, the growing commercialization of the economy as the country 
was opened up to foreign trade. 
Europe had established trade relations with Tunis long before its incorporation into the 
Ottoman Empire in 1574 but these were poorly developed until the beginning of the 
seventeenth century. " In part this reflects the existence of better commercial 
opportunities elsewhere in the Mediterranean but it was also a result of extreme 
insecurity within the country and around its coast. Piracy, a principal source of wealth 
for the Turkish rulers of the newly established Regencies of the Ottoman Empire, made 
maritime trade with and around the Barbary coasts difficult and dangerous: 
16 Cherif, M. (1986) tome II, p. 190. 
17 See especially Sayous, A. (1929). 
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"As corsairs they infested the whole of the Mediterranean preying upon 
commerce and upon the coastal populations of France, Spain and Italy and 
enslaving all Christian captives. It was brigandage at its worst: organised, 
ruthless and bloody with no discrimination of race, rank or sex, no respect for 
treaties or capitulations and from the very opening of the Levant trade English 
shipping had suffered at the hands of these freebooters". 18 
British efforts to develop a trade with the Barbary Coast 
"... had soon to be abandoned, for a brief experience of intercourse with the 
three pirate states of Algiers, Tripoli and Tunis, proved the impracticability of 
doing any stable business among people who lived by plunder and rapine". " 
The French consulate, established in 1585, was staffed by Lazarist monks whose chief 
occupation was to negotiate the release of Christian slaves. 20 
In 1665 however, the French, backed by military threat, induced the Tunisian 
authorities to sign a treaty preparing the way for the expansion of commerce at the port 
of Tunis. It was agreed that French nationals were to be taxed at 10% on imports and 
5% on exports. 21 Simultaneously, Britain and Holland were permitted to establish 
consular representatives in Tunis. 
Twenty years later, in 1685, at the height of the civil war in Tunis between the beys 
and the deys, Louis XIV sent a naval squadron to force them to agree to a new treaty 
which went even further in encouraging the promotion of European commercial links 
with the state. Under the terms of this treaty duties on imports and exports by French 
merchants were reduced to a uniform rate covering of 3% ad valorem. " At the same 
18 Wood, A. (1964) p. 59. 
19 As early as 1584, the English Queen Elizabeth wrote to the sultan protesting 
against the depredations of his nominal subjects. Between 1609 and 1616,466 English 
ships alone were captured and their crews enslaved. Ibid., pp. 59-60. 
20 Abun-Nasr (1975) p. 87. 
21 They were also given the privilege of practising their religion. Ibid., p 87. 
22 Ibid., p. 87. 
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time the French negotiator, Marschal d'Estrees, achieved a considerable coup in 
obtaining for La Compagne Gautier, the concession of a trading monopoly in a region 
centred on Cap Negre, in the north of the country, the principal exports being grains, 
wool, horses and leather. Although the extent of the trade expansion which followed 
is not known, Abun-Nasr points out that French activities were sufficiently important 
for a French royal order of December 1685 to request the election of two deputies from 
amongst the community, to regulate their activities in the country. 23 
Around the same time, Genoese. merchants obtained a similar concession at Tabarka, 
close to the border with Algeria. The commercial activity of these two areas was 
considerable and Cap Negre and Tabarka became "... des points d'aboutissement des 
pistes traversant les plains cerealieres. "24 This resulted in "... l'integration de 
1'economie agricole d'une vaste region de la Regence dans le mercantilisme 
europeen". 25 
But commercial activity, and the agricultural development upon which it was largely 
dependent, was far from being limited to the northern grain-producing regions. During 
the eighteenth century trade expanded in all the coastal towns of the Regency. Exports 
of grain, olive oil, wool and woollen goods, chechias (fez caps), hides, skins, dates and 
sponges were matched by imports of cloth and manufactured goods. The principal, but 
by no means the only motor to this process, was European trade. Although the number 
of European merchants was small and largely confined to the capital, they operated 
through local intermediaries extensively throughout the country. Apart from the French 
who traded principally with Marseilles, and Italians in correspondence with Genoa, the 
principal traders were an influential group of Livornese Jews (Giorna) who, despite 
being hampered by a duty levied on all their imports and exports of 11 %, accounted 
for a significant proportion of the Regency's trade. The latter also held the monopoly 
of trade in certain branches of commerce, most notably in the collection, sale and 
23 Ibid., p. 87. 
24 Boubaker, S. (1978) cited by Chater, K. (1984) p. 170. 
25 Ibid., cited in Chater (1984) p. 170. 
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exports of hides throughout the Regency. Known as the Giornata, the Jews bought this 
privilege at a high cost, but with commensurate returns to their investment. The 
importance of European connections with the Regency is attested by the prevalence in 
commercial transactions from 1630-1640 of the Spanish piastre which had superseded 
the pre-Ottoman dinar and dirham of the Hafsid regime. 26 
But the expansion of European, and particularly French, trade and influence in the 
Regency suffered a serious setback during the years of the Napoleonic wars. Although 
this had much to do with the effects of war itself it was equally the result of a 
new-found confidence in Tunis which enjoyed a prolonged period of agricultural 
prosperity until the end of the wars in 1815. During this period Beylical policies were 
largely aimed at exploiting the weakness of Europe by diverting the economic benefits 
to Tunisian subjects. 
1.4 Tunis under Hammouda Pacha 
Remarkably long by Tunisian standards, the peace and stability of Hammouda's reign 
brought the country instilled a new confidence amongst Tunisian merchants and 
agriculturalists. Zouari notes that during the eighteenth century the agricultural lands 
around Sfax were expanded from a little more than one kilometre from the town walls 
to more than seven kilometres. At the same time contracts of association with the 
Methalith tribe which inhabited the region inland from Sfax, once fervent enemies of 
the sedentarists of the town, increased, giving rise to the further exploitation of wheat, 
barley, and live-stock. The olive forest also expanded and provided the resources for 
a considerable trade in oil. 27 
Hammouda attempted to promote indigenous participation in the economy and curb the 
excessive influence of European traders in the country by withdrawing their right to 
26 See Cherif, M. H. (1968). Valensi notes the irony of the use of Christian 
coinage in a Moslem state pointing out that at the beginning of the seventeenth century 
the Spanish piastre was still accompanied by the legend: "Minted by the enemy of the 
religion, the Christian, may God destroy him", Valensi (1977) p. 211. 
27 Zouari, A. (1977) p. 18. 
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purchase goods directly from the local populations; this forced them to apply for export 
bonds or "teskeres" from government officials. Moreover, Hammouda encouraged the 
role of Tunisian merchants in the country's external trade by reducing the duties on 
goods exported to Europe by native Tunisians to 5.5 % from 11 % which had previously 
prevailed. Chater clearly shows the extent to which these measures had on Tunisian 
participation in maritime commerce (Table 1.1). 
Table 1.1 Tunisian Exports, 24 December, 1813 - 13 December 1814 
Exporters Olive oil 
(Metars) 
Per cent Wheat 
(Kfiz) 
Per cent 
Tunisian 
moslems 
11,875 55.74 2,280 40.24 
Jews 9,220 43.28 250 4.41 
Europeans 206 0.96 2,760 48.72 
Total 
:1 
21,303 99.98 5,665 93.37 
Source: French National Archives, no. 385, cited by Chater, K. (1984) pp. 185-6. 
Native Tunisian Moslems and Jews controlled the commerce in oil during this period 
with Europeans accounting for less than one percent of exports of the material. 
Although their participation in the grain trade was greater, European merchants played 
a secondary role in the trade of these, the country's principal exports. A similar 
situation was evident at Sfax where of the 264,675 piastres worth of trade between 
1806 and 1815,124,214 piastres, or 48% was engaged by Sfaxian merchants. 28 
It was particularly French and Italian trade which suffered from the combined effects 
of war and Hammouda's policies. MacGill notes that: 
28 Ibid., p. 47. 
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In place of twelve respectable houses which carried on a lucrative trade in 
1781 and also several Italian establishments of some consideration, we find in 
1808, only two French houses which combined hardly do as much business as 
one of the former did in a month... X29 
Trade between Malta and Tunis, however, increased markedly after the expulsion of 
the Knights of the Order of St John from the island in 1798. 
Although trade had existed before this date it had to be undertaken by ships of other 
nations which naturally limited the scale of commercial relations between the two 
countries. 31 The end of Christian piracy and the establishment of British naval 
squadrons on the island increased commercial relations, mainly in foodstuffs, with 
Tunis and Tripoli. 31 
Trade with neighbouring states and the Levant was also strongly encouraged by 
Hammmouda. In this caravan transportation was of major importance although not 
without its difficulties: 
"Il n'y avait pas dans le pays ni fleuves navigables ni canaux, ni meme des 
routes normales. Pour ces raisons, il etait tres difficile de transporter les 
produits des riches regions vers les zones deeficitaires. Ce transport de 
marchandises, etait meme impossible durant l'hiver quand les routes etaient 
impracticables a cause de la bourbe...... 32 
Despite its many problems, the caravan networks linked the productive regions of the 
country with the coast and beyond, and put the Regency in close and profitable 
connection with neighbouring states, including Tripoli, Algiers, the Sahara to the south, 
and also the Levant. The overland trade with Algeria was particularly important. 
MacGill notes during his stay in Tunis in 1813 that one caravan a month arrived in that 
29 MacGill, T. (1811) p. 126. 
30 See Valensi, L. (1963) pp. 71-83. 
31 Joffe, E. (1984). 
32 Bayram, M. cited by Kraiem, M. (1973) tome 2, p. 32. 
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city from Constantine in Algiers, bringing 100,000 Spanish dollars. 33 
Further south, Sfax was at the centre of a radial network of five caravan routes linking 
it to: 
1. Tunis via El Djem and Sousse 
2. The Sahel via Mahdia and Monastir 
3. Kairouan 
4. The Jerid via Gafsa 
5. Gabes and Tripoli via Malta. " 
The most regular of these was that which brought to Sfax the important date harvests 
of the Jerid, in the far south of the country. Muhammad an-Nuri wrote to brother, 
Muhammad Hamid at a caravan station in 1834: 
"Les autres villages qu'on traversait c'etaient sans doute aussi, c'etait dans ces 
stations que les commercants sfaxiens en activite dans le Sahel contractaient les 
gens de la caravane: caravaniers, commissionnaires et commercants voyagers, 
aupres desquels ils venaient chercher leurs courriers et leurs marchandises". 3s 
Further south still, Gabes was the head of a route to Tebessa and Souf in Algeria, as 
well as one putting it into contact with Black Africa via Ghadames, and with Tripoli 
and Egypt. It was this latter route that extended as far as Tunis that was undoubtedly 
the most lucrative. 
The Regency lay at the eastern edge of the great transaharan caravan network, which 
linked the whole of north Africa, from Morocco to Egypt, with the interior of Africa. 
Large caravans made their way via Ghadames through the coastal ports of Gabes and 
Sfax, to Tunis bringing with them the riches of the African interior, particularly ostrich 
feathers, gold and slaves. 
33 MacGill, T. (1816) p. 126. 
34 Zouari, A. (1977) p. 126. 
31 Ibid., p. 248. 
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As late as 1813, MacGill puts at three, the number of such caravans arriving at Tunis 
each year bringing up to 200 slaves each to be sold in the "souk des esclaves" of 
Tunis. 36 Though dominated by a few Ghadamesian merchants, the trade profited a 
broader spectrum of Tunisian society from merchants to local traders dealing with the 
passing traffic. 
"Le marche destine a ce genre de commerce est, en effet, garni toute l'annee 
de cette marchandise humaine.... Celui qui veut en acheter examine avant tout, 
avec le soin le plus minutieux, leurs qualites et leurs defauts physiques. 
L'acheteur fait d'abord une offre preliminaire approximative, suivant le taux du 
prix ordinaire. Un courtier (dellal) prend 1'esclave en vente et le promene dans 
le marche proclamant a haut voix l'offre qui en a ete faite et recoit les 
encheres.... ". 37 
Table 1.2 Tunis: Ratio of Exports to Imports, 1755-1792 
Year Ratio (per cent) 
1755 100 
1766 126 
1781 163 
1785 197 
1789 87 
1792 120 
Source: Chater, K. (1984) p. 207. 
Tunis also benefitted from the commercial activity resulting from the pilgrimage to 
Mecca, as it became the meeting place for Moroccans, Algerians, and Tunisians 
returning from Arabia. Toward the beginning of the nineteenth century, pilgrims 
numbered around 2,000.38 They would leave Tunis with chechias, saffron, craftwork 
and articles of gold, and return with musk, herbs and spices, fine fabrics, and other 
11 MacGill, T. (1816). 
37 Frank, L. (1850) p. 128, cited in Chater, K. (1984) p. 146. 
38 Raymond, A. (1959) p. 337, cited in Chater, K. (1984) p. 157. 
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lightweight articles from the Orient. However, with time, more and more pilgrims left 
by sea: European ships would leave Tunis, Sousse and Sfax with 150-200 pilgrims. 39 
The Levant trade was extremely profitable to Tunis, showing a clear surplus in the late 
eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries (see Table 1.2). 
1.5 The Resurgence of the Corsairs during the Napoleonic Wars 
The French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars opened up other avenues for profitable 
gain, notably in piracy, which flourished once more. Although never reaching the 
levels of the mid-seventeenth century when it was at its peak, the pre-occupation of the 
British and French navies and the end of the threat from Christian pirate ships after 
1798 gave a strong impetus to Tunisian piracy. The number of corsair campaigns 
organised in the Regency reached 97 in 1898 and remained high until 1805 (see Table 
1.3). 
Table 1.3 Corsair Campaigns Organized by the Regency of Tunis 
Year Number Year Number Year Number Year Number 
1764 24 1785 23 1797 87 1806 18 
1765 40 1786 12 1798 97 1807 1 
1766 32 1787 40 1799 34 1808 6 
1767 33 1788 24 1800 44 1809 32 
1768 44 1792 34 1801 60 1810 18 
1769 47 1793 67 1802 54 1811 29 
1777 1 1794 42 1803 72 1812 23 
1783 3 1795 71 1804 76 1813 12 
1784 46 1796 70 1805 79 1814 1 
Source: Grandchamp, P. (1957) 
39 Chater, K. (1984) pp. 157-8. 
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While during its peak in the mid-sixteenth century, piracy was dominated by the 
Turkish army officers, by the late 18th century it was closely associated with the 
legitimate commercial activities of the Tunisian elite and the beylicate. The bey 
himself was involved in piracy directly by arming his own ships, or working in 
association with merchants. He further extracted 10% on all prizes won by the corsairs 
in their operations and earned a tribute from a number of states the payment of which 
was supposed to ensure free passage for their ships. 
Piracy developed as a complement to, and not in opposition with, legitimate 
commercial business. Thus Mohammed Jalluli Caid, an important merchant on the 
southern coast, armed thirteen boats in 1789 alone, eleven of which left Sfax, one 
Sousse, and one from La Goulette. 4° The use of ships switched easily from trade to 
piracy. All the country's most important merchants and functionaries participated in 
piracy, including Yusif Sahib at-Taba and other Tunisian dignitaries and businessmen, 
large and small. 
The financial stability and economic prosperity of the beylicate during this period is 
attested by the composition of the state's revenues. Cherif estimates that between 1799 
and 1800 income from piracy and maritime trade provided over two fifths of the 
Tunisian government's revenues with a further one fifth coming from sale of 
government positions, such as the caid under Ittifak, and rights of taxation of markets. 
Income from the countryside in the form of taxes on crops and people accounted for 
barely 40% of the Bey's total income a remarkably small proportion. 41 The question 
of government taxation on rural Tunisia will be addressed below. Here it is useful to 
note that Valensi has shown that the real burden of taxation on the rural population 
actually declined during the eighteenth century . 
42 Easier profits and revenues were 
to be had elsewhere, most notably in trading activities. 
40 Zouari, A. (1977) p. 48. 
41 Cherif, M. (1972) pp. 14-15. 
42 Valensi, L. (1977) p. 233. 
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It is important not to overstate the rise of the indigenous mercantile population of the 
Regency during this period and the concomitant decline in the position of European 
merchants. In particular despite the wars the Tunisian merchant marine was unable to 
assert itself to any great extent during this period. Tunisian ships still encountered 
discrimination in European ports, particularly at Marseilles. Only six of 78 ships 
entering the port of Tunis during the second trimestre of 1814 were Tunisian, and only 
five of the 80 ships which departed. British shipping alone easily surpassed these totals 
with 29 ships entering and 25 leaving Tunis port. 43 
Nevertheless, the state and its close associates profited greatly from the 
commercialisation of the sedentary regions of the country during Hammouda's reign. 44 
The increased authority of the bey in the domestic economy and its relations with 
European trade reflects too, a growing stature in international political affairs. Cherif 
points out that the 1769-1770 Franco-Tunisian war ended in compromise and the 
1784-1792 Venitio-Tunisian war "showed the impossibility of imposing a unilateral 
peace on the bey". as 
Although it is easy to overstate the country's new found economic prosperity and 
political authority it is difficult to find fault with MacGill's view that: 
"The state of Tunis never was in so respectable a footing as it is at present; and 
the subjects never before enjoyed such independence and protection from 
external enemies.... ". 46 
To Cherif the period of Hammouda's reign was the "golden age" of Tunisian 
history. 47 
a3 Chater (1984) p. 177. 
as Cherif quotes Bin Dhiaf in noting that the wealth of Yousif Sahil at-Tabaa was 
equal to the total annual receipts of the government. Cherif, M. (1970) p. 716. 
45 Ibid., p. 724. 
46 MacGill, T. (1816) p. 17. 
47 Cherif, M. (1970) p. 714. 
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1.6 Tunis 1815-1830: European Economic Expansion and the Beginnings of Private 
and Public Indebtedness 
The resumption of peace in the Mediterranean with the end of the Napoleonic wars in 
1815 marked the beginning of a new era in international affairs which was to be 
dominated by enhanced economic aggressiveness and political competitiveness on the 
part of European countries. Industrialization in continental Europe gathered pace giving 
rise to a greatly increased competition, both for export markets for manufactured 
output, and for the food and raw materials to supply it, and the burgeoning urban 
populations dependent on it. The search for new markets and raw materials moved to 
other parts of the world as yet largely untouched by European trade and industry. 
One of the fundamental prerequisites for the expansion of mercantile activity in the 
Mediterranean was the abolition of piracy, which was perceived as a major stumbling 
block not just to European trade with North Africa, but with the rest of the 
Mediterranean. On this point the European nations and the U. S. A. were in agreement. 
The need for commercial expansion, together with the increasingly vociferous 
denunciation of slavery on humanitarian grounds, forced the major powers to attempt 
to abolish piracy, the institution of slavery and slave traffic. The harbinger of more 
strident efforts in this regard was the U. S. A. 's successful raid on the notorious Algerian 
pirate, Hamidou on June 17,1815.48 The death of Hamidou during the battle 
together with a display of naval force, forced the dey of Algiers to sign a peace treaty 
with the U. S. A. on July 7,1815. 
The following year Lord Exmouth at the head of a fleet of ships from various countries 
set sail for the north African Regencies of the Ottoman Empire with the express aim 
of ending piracy in the western Mediterranean and the practice of slavery. The display 
of military might was sufficient to force the bey to agree to a treaty which abolished 
corsair activity, although the closure of the slave market in Tunis and the abolition of 
the institution of slavery was not finally achieved until the early 1840's. The treaty 
delivered the coup de grace to an activity which had provided important revenues to the 
48 Chater, K. (1984) p. 239. 
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bey and the major functionaries and associates of the state in Tunis. 
The end to piracy in the western Mediterranean49 paved the way for an expansion in 
European commerce in the Mediterranean, free from the threat of piracy. Between 
1816 and 1830, the Regency's external trade almost doubled from 8,559,675 francs to 
16,453,666 francs (Table 1.4). 
Table 1.4 Development of the Regency's Exterior Commerce 1816-30 
Imports Exports 
Year Value 
(Francs) 
Index Value 
(Francs) 
Index % 
Exports 
1816 3,942,682 100 4,616,993 100 54.00 
1826 6,238,811 158 5,893,981 128 48.50 
1827 8,787,895 223 8,820,270 191 50.09 
1828 8,091,740 205 5,086,585 110 38.59 
1829 8,078,592 205 4,807,366 104 37.30 
1830 8,598,136 218 7,836,530 170 47.68 
Source: Chater (1984) p. 318. 
The most striking fact from this table is the greater absolute and relative rise in the 
importance of imports to the Regency's foreign trade which increased by over 100% 
during this period. Of this, manufactured goods played an increasingly important part. 
Cherif notes that of the 6,608,000 F of European exports to Tunis in 1826, over one 
half was accounted for by manufactured goods. Textiles and haberdashery, which 
together made up one-third of total European imports valued at 2,129,000 F, dominated 
this traffic. s° Moreover, these figures are undoubtedly underestimates as they exclude 
" Which, however, did not collapse immediately, especially in Algiers. 
so Orsay, Correspondance Consulaire, tome 45, Etat du commerce fait a Tunis par 
les Francais et les Etrangers (Europeens) en 1876, cited in Cherif (1970) p. 727. 
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the jewels destined for the beylical court, which were not entered into customs returns. 
The Regency's exports suffered greatly after the end of the Napoleonic wars from a 
decline in the value of primary products on the world market and from competition 
from alternative sources of supply. This was particularly true of the grain trade, 
hitherto the country's principal export. The trade in grain with France and the Italian 
states never recovered its pre-war levels as these countries turned increasingly to the 
Black Sea ports of Odessa and Taganrong to satisfy their demands' Indeed between 
1818 and 1822 Tunis became an importer of grain. 
The increases in the country's exports during this period were largely due to the 
expansion in production of olive oil the bulk of which was shipped to Marseille for use 
in the soap industry. Exports of oil, which had only rarely reached 10,000 hectolitres 
during the eighteenth century, rose to 50,000 hectolitres in 1817. In 1827 olive oil 
exports to Marseilles alone were 76,000 hectolitres. 52 But the rapid increase in the 
oil trade made the economy vulnerable to fluctuations in the international market price 
for the product. From 1820 the price of oil fell almost continuously from 30 francs per 
metal to only 8.75 francs in 1827-1828.53 
Deprived of the revenues formerly obtained from the corsairs and the traffic in slaves, 
the growing trade deficit placed an increasing strain on the bey's finances resulting in 
a monetary crisis in 1824 when the Tunisian piastre was devalued by one third. 54 In 
an effort to improve his ailing financial situation the Bey attempted to assert his 
dominance in the olive trade by abolishing the system whereby merchants simply 
bought export rights, or "teskeres", for the exportation of oil which they had purchased 
51 Valensi, L. (1977) p. 223. Between 1820 and 1829, of 555 ships arriving at the 
port of Marseille from Tunis, only 22 ships or 4%, carried grain compared with nearly 
75% of ships between 1771 and 1778. 
52 Ibid., p. 224. 
53 Cherif, M. (1970) p. 723. 
54 Ibid., p. 730. 
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from the local population. Henceforth the Bey was to be the sole intermediary between 
producer and merchant through the operation of "slam" in which the Bey bought the 
oil from the producers, and sold to the merchants, at agreed prices in anticipation of 
the harvest. In the event this policy proved disastrous both to the Bey and the 
producers. 
In 1828, for example, the olive crop was very poor and entirely insufficient to fulfil the 
pre-arranged contracts with merchants. The merchants demanded the oil which they 
had already bought. After negotiations with the French consul de Lesseps, the Bey 
agreed to repurchase at 12 piastres per metal (the price reigning in Marseille) the oil 
which he had agreed to sell to French merchants at 7 piastres resulting in a cost of 2 
million piastres to the Bey. The Bey, however, demanded payment from the peasantry 
who, lacking the resources to do so, were forced to contract loans with European 
merchants at high rates of interest. The resulting indebtedness of the producers was 
to have a cumulative effect since in 1830-1831 the harvest was again severely deficient 
and once more the populations of the Sahel, the region around Sousse, and of Sfax, the 
other main olive growing region, found themselves unable to supply the oil which the 
Beylicate had bought from them. Since the Bey demanded the right to the oil which 
had been produced the peasantry were forced to take on more loans from the European 
merchants who accepted property and the rights to future harvests as collateral. ss 
Europeans came to dominate the trade in oil. Even at Sfax where their influence was 
traditionally weak, European traders accounted for 17,500 out of the 19,000 metaux of 
oil which the government had at its disposal between 1820 and 1822.56 
Between 1814 and 1830, then, the stability and equilibrium of the economy was broken. 
The decline of the caravan trade, of piracy and of traditional trading links with the 
Levant, all of which had provided considerable revenues for the state and its principal 
associates, was matched by a greater rise in links with Europe from which Europe and 
55 Valensi, L. (1877) p. 226. 
56 Cherif, M. (1970) p. 728. 
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not Tunis, was to benefit. The emergence of a sizeable trade deficit and the increasing 
commercialization of the economy resulted in the beginnings of public and private 
indebtedness in the country which European merchants exploited to the full with the 
support of their consular representatives. 
1.7 Political Developments 1820-1830 
The increased commercial activity of European merchants in the Maghreb during this 
period was matched by the greater political interest of the European powers in the 
affairs of the three north African regencies of the Ottoman Empire. As with trade, 
French aspirations were to dominate the country's external relations. 
In September 1827, the French council at Alexandria, Drovetti, presented to the 
Egyptian government a plan which envisaged the establishment of Egyptian authority 
in Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, for which France would furnish Mehemet Ali (Egypt's 
pacha) with 28 million francs, four men of war and full diplomatic protection. " The 
programme formed initially in secret for fear of British opposition, by the collaboration 
of the French, Mehemet Ali and the Ottoman sultan, was designed ostensibly to put an 
end to Christian slavery and other activities hindering European commercial activity. 
At the root of the plan, however, were French political ambitions in north Africa which 
envisaged a French hegemony stretching from Algiers to Egypt. Using Mehemet Ali 
as the intermediary, it was hoped that traditional ties linking the Regencies to 
Constantinople would decline, paving the way, at minimal financial and military 
expense, to complete French political control. 
Britain, however, soon learned of the plan and, although favouring certain of its 
aspects, ultimately feared it would be the back door to French political and economic 
ambitions in the region. Britain also feared a too powerful Mehmet Ali. Under British 
pressure the sultan's earlier enthusiasm soon waned and project was dropped. French 
officials were already doubting the feasibility of such an approach. It did not though, 
end the country's political ambition in the region. In January 1830, a new plan was 
11 Raymond, A. (1950) p. 39. 
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placed before the Conseil du Roi, in which France would occupy Algiers, and Mehmet 
Ali would be given control of Tunis and Tripoli, with a correspondingly reduced 
support of metropolitan resources. While Britain trimmed her opposition to the new 
proposals, Mehmet Ali, who learned of them only the day after he had signed the 
original agreement, rejected them out-right, and abandoned all claims to the Regencies. 
The French occupation of Algiers in July 1830 did not however, signal the end of her 
political ambitions in Tunis and Tripoli; rather, British and Turkish opposition to the 
expansion of her empire eastward necessitated a more subtle approach. De Lesseps, 
French Consul in Tunis, put before the bey of Tunis, Moustapha, a treaty ostensibly 
designed to procure similar benefits to those with which France had sought to justify 
her action in Algiers, i. e., the abolition of piracy, Christian slavery, and the practice 
of tribute. But the treaty went much further: these articles were included merely to 
forestall European hostility to the other, more important articles of the treaty which 
guaranteed commercial privileges to European merchants, including the abolition of 
many of the bey's monopolies over certain sectors of the economy. The treaty also 
held substantial benefits to French nationals in the country, including the concession of 
coral fishing at Tabarka without the need for payment. 
To encourage the bey's signature, Paris dispatched a naval force to Tunis. Anxious not 
to provoke a similar attack to that which had proved so disastrous for the dey of 
Algiers, the bey of Tunis duly signed on August 8,1830. With French preponderance 
now established at the beylical court, French officials sought a closer dependence of the 
country on France. In an effort designed both to reduce the military and financial 
burden which the occupation entailed outside Algiers, and to strengthen Tunisian ties 
with France (and thereby weaken links with the Porte), the bey was offered the control 
of both Constantine and Oran (on payment of a large tribute initially set at 1,200,000 
francs). " 
Until 1833, the British position was to promote a strict neutrality in Tunis's external 
58 Chater, K. (1984) p. 384. 
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relation; as a result, her influence in the Regency declined. The British Consul at 
Tunis wrote: 
"... since the treaties of Constantine and Oran ... I have experienced every difficulty in the most common affairs... . The Tunisian government have become 
exceedingly difficult and, I may add, insolent". 59 
British attitudes towards Tunis, however, were to harden considerably thereafter. The 
collapse of the short-lived alliance between Mehemet Ali of Egypt and the French 
government, which resulted in the occupation of Algiers, also forced Ali to turn his 
own political aspirations eastward, thereby forcing a major change of the political 
balance in the Mediterranean. 
1.8 Britain's Position in the Mediterranean 
British interest in the eastern Mediterranean until the 1820's was relatively restrained, 
it being still a minor market for British exports. Politically, activity centred mainly on 
maintaining what commercial privileges she could obtain. As Bailey notes, however: 
"The constant increase in exports after 1825 to Constantinople, Smyrna, Beirut, 
Salonica and Trebizond, to mention only the most important ports under Turkish 
control - compelled even the most conservative Britons to recognise the 
significance of the sultan's dominion to the economic prospects of the British 
Isles". 60 
Technical advances in steam transport encouraged the development of trading links with 
the Middle and Far East, notably India, for which a shorter route with many coal stops 
was a necessary prerequisite: 
"The perfection of ocean steam ships, steam-powered boats and the railroad, 
combined to make the Near East a half way house to India". " 
A stable and secure Turkey, through which the favoured overland routes to India 
passed, was useful for the commercial well-being of Britain. It became increasingly 
59 Raymond, A. (1954) p. 49. 
60 Bailey, F. (1942) p. 40. 
61 Ibid., p. 41. 
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apparent, however, particularly after the crushing defeat of the sultan's forces at the 
Battle of Navarino that Turkey was 
"... not a powerful empire, but a weak disintegrating state, with corruption, 
stricken with poverty, disorganised and disunited and incapable of any long or 
consistent course of action. The Ottoman Empire had become little more than 
a loose confederation, although its tradition still gave its government a prestige 
quite out of proportion to its real strength". 62 
Nevertheless, Britain's political hegemony in the east was not seriously threatened until 
the French occupation of Algiers in 1830. Although of no direct consequence to the 
political status quo in the Levant, the removal of Egyptian involvement only served to 
focus Mehemet's territorial ambitions towards the east. In mid-1832, Ali sent his son 
Ibrahim to take Syria, defeating Mahmoud's forces and creating the pashalik of Acre 
and incorporating it into the Egyptian Empire. As Bailey writes, "Had he stopped 
there, the European powers would not have got involved. "" But Ibrahim continued 
to march through Syria as far as Koniah, where the sultan's forces were convincingly 
defeated. With Mehemet's forces threatening the very heart of the Turkish Empire, the 
Sultan Mahmoud appealed for British and French support in halting the further 
progression of the Egyptian forces. They refused, apparently unaware of the gravity 
of the situation. 
The intervention of Russia, which dispatched a force of 40,000 men and seven ships 
to the sultan's aid, forced British and French involvement in the eastern Mediterranean. 
The strengthening of Russia's hand with the Porte was a major threat to the political 
status quo in the east upon which Britain's commercial expansion in the Levant and 
beyond, had come to rely. British and French mediation however, proved unacceptable 
to Egypt and, as a result, the two powers sent a naval force to push the sultan into 
concessions, the result of which was his acceptance of the Peace of Kitalia (3 May 
1833) whereby Adana and Syria were relinquished to Mehemet's control. " 
62 Ibid., p. 42. 
63 Ibid., p. 48. 
64 Ibid., p. 49. 
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Although the subsequent withdrawal of Russian forces seemed straightforward at the 
time, it soon became clear that two days before the pull out, the sultan had agreed to 
sign the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (8 July 1833) which considerably enhanced the 
Tsar's position with the Porte by agreeing to mutual support if either country was 
attacked and by giving Russia the right to close the Dardanelles at her command. It 
was the threat to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire by a potentially hostile major 
power that forced Britain's greater involvement in the future of the Ottoman Empire. 
Thus was created the Eastern Question which was to dominate British policy in the 
Mediterranean for the next 40 years. It had two main aims: first, to preserve the 
territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire; and second, to encourage the development 
of the Turkish state so that it would become free and independent. As a result, the 
position of Tunis and the other Ottoman dominions became of major significance. 
While Britain had no political or economic pretensions in north Africa, she could not 
support or ignore French ambitions there. This would have negated the whole basis 
of her position in the Levant where the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was now of 
the utmost importance. France, whose political intentions with regard to Tunis were 
not in doubt, could not fulfil them without provoking the hostility of Britain. 
Henceforth, the future of Tunis was inextricably linked with the global political 
" strategies of the European powers and in particular, to the outcome of the Eastern 
Question. 
During the next half-century, France sought to enhance the bey's political independence 
from the Porte and at the same time promote her own political and economic influence 
in the Regency. By contrast, Britain's policy depended on the maintenance of the 
sultan's suzerainty over Tunis. The resulting conflict of interests was to maintain the 
Regency's formal independence from European control, but only at the expense of a 
grave and continuous deterioration in the bey's authority over external affairs and the 
domestic economy. Dependent on the maintenance of a delicate equilibrium of power 
amongst the European nations the Bey was continuously forced to agree to the 
numerous commercial concessions demanded by the foreign consular officials on behalf 
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of their citizens. 
1.9 Tunisian Attempts at Reform and the Lengthening Shadow of Financial 
Collapse 
The events of the years following the end of the Napoleonic wars had a tremendous 
impact on the Regency of Tunis. The rise of a new aggressiveness on the part of 
Europe in the Mediterranean highlighted the extent to which the Moslem world had 
fallen behind the west in economic as much as political terms. The once mighty 
Ottoman Empire had been shown to be entirely incapable of meeting threats from 
within its vast empire, as well as those from Europe. Indeed, after a catalogue of 
disastrous military defeats, its continued existence had become merely a function of 
European global political strategies. The bey of Tunis, however, did not view the 
Ottoman Empire in such a light. To him the re-establishment of direct Turkish 
authority over Tripoli in 1835 was a sign of the Porte's desire, and ability, to 
strengthen the Empire. Threatened from the west by France in Algiers and from 
Turkey in the east the bey's immediate priority was military reform. Egypt, the only 
Moslem country which had displayed the remotest capacity to deal with Europe, and 
the Porte, on level terms, was the model which the country sought to follow. Although 
military reform had begun under his predecessor, Moustapha, it was under Ahmed Bey 
(1837-1856) that the attempts reached their apogee. 
Ahmed's policy of reform was also deeply influenced by a journey to France in 
1838.65 What he saw during the visit was a profound shock. The economic 
prosperity and general advance of French society contrasted sharply with his own 
country. During his visit Ahmed came to believe that the only way to develop as a 
nation was to follow the western path. His military reforms, therefore, which were 
intended to form the basis of the country's political independence, were closely linked 
65 He was also asked to visit Britain, but as it had been decided that he should be 
treated as a governor of an Ottoman Province, which meant that he would meet the 
prime minister or minister of foreign affairs rather than Queen Victoria herself, Ahmed 
declined at the last moment, viewing it as an affront to his dignity and sovereignty. In 
line with French policy, he was greeted there by the head of state, a calculated political 
move which was designed to show the Bey's independence from Constantinople. 
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to the desire for economic advancement along European lines 
Almost all the major industrial projects created were to service the military. In both 
cases, Ahmed brought in a number of European, mainly French, technical advisors to 
ensure rapid success. Powder mills were set up in the kasba at Tunis and at El Djem. 
Tanneries and factories to manufacture saddles and other leather goods were 
constructed in Tunis. Ahmed also created a small arms factory located next to the 
artillery barracks of Sidi Ismail. There, under the direct supervision of French 
craftsmen, Ahmed installed companies of state workers, with their special officers, the 
workers and officers drawn from different guilds of the country. The factory produced 
pistols, swords, carbines, bayonets and axes. As Brown notes, the most ambitious 
project undertaken by Ahmed was the creation of a textile factory at Tebourba, to 
provide the army's uniforms and clothing requirements. 66 In all, the industrial efforts 
during Ahmed's reign introduced over a dozen European technical experts to assume 
important supervisory functions, plus several times that number of skilled workers who 
served as foremen providing on-the-job training for the Tunisian workers. 
However, Ahmed's attempts at reform, designed to reinforce Tunisian independence 
from external control, whether it be from Turkey or Europe, could not but rely 
fundamentally on the continuance of the conflicting political goals of the major powers. 
To work effectively the exploitation of conflicting European goals necessitated the 
maintenance of a delicate equilibrium of their interests. Yet to curry favour with 
France, for example, by granting political or economic concessions, provoked an 
inevitable demand from Britain for reciprocal treatment and, of course, vice versa. The 
overriding need for a balance of these opposing forces meant that the bey had little 
option but to accede to the demands made of him. 
This chronic weakness of the bey's position was fully exploited by the European 
powers, whose consular representatives, seeking to advance the prestige and influence 
of their respective governments, came to wield more and more power in the beylical 
66 See Brown, L. (1974). 
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court. Increasingly, it was on the economic plane that their growing dominance was 
manifested. 
1.10 Economic Expansion and the Increasing Dominance of European Interests 
The re-establishment of peace, the abolition of piracy and slavery, together with the 
ascension of European political influence created the stable and favourable conditions 
for an expansion of the European population of Tunis. From a few hundred at the 
beginning of the century, the number of Europeans in the Regency had grown to an 
estimated 8,000 by 1834, and to 12,300 by 1856.67 Mainly Maltese and Italian, they 
consisted almost entirely of the impoverished peasantry and urban poor fleeing the 
overpopulation and economic problems of their home countries. b$ Initially a transit 
point on the migration route to Algiers, the new conditions of peace encouraged many 
to remain in the Regency where they formed a proletarian mass in the country's main 
towns. 69 Ferriere, the British vice-consul at Tunis described them thus: 
"The greater number of them are of the worst class, disgorged from the Gaols 
of Malta, expelled from the island and cast off destitute on the coast of Barbary 
they literally swarm in the small quarter of the town allotted to Christians". 70 
At Tunis, where the majority of the immigrants settled, 71 they inhabited the narrow 
stretch of land between the Arab medina and the sea in conditions of unmitigated 
squalor: 
67 Ganiage, J. (1955) p. 389. 
68 Some too were political and criminal refugees seeking to escape prison, military 
conscription or persecution for their beliefs. 
69 Sammut, C. (1972) p. 434. 
'° FO 335/96/10 Ferriere to Foreign Office, Tunis, 28 June 1847. 
" Ganiage gives the following figures: 9,150 out of 12,064 in 1856; 11,000 out 
of 14,585 in 1870. Ganiage, J. (1955) p. 390. 
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"Envahi 1'ete par la puanteur du lac et les egouts, par la poussiere, par les 
moustiques, le quartier franc etait inonde l'hiver par les eaux devalant de la ville 
haute.... Les rues etaient en toute saison d'une salete repoussante. Des pores, 
par centaines, vagabondaient en liberte, fouillant egouts et tas d'ordures. De 
jour et nuit les voitures et les chevaux des cochers maltais embarrassaient 
ruelles et impasses.... "72 
At an estimated 7,000 of the 12,300 Europeans in the Regency in 1856, the Maltese 
were a constant thorn in the flesh of Britain's consular representatives under whose 
jurisdiction they came. Coming and going at will (only a small fraction were registered 
at the British consulate), they were difficult to keep track of and control, giving rise 
to interminable problems of public order with the local authorities and indigenous 
populations when trouble flared. 
Nevertheless, many of them maintained or established links with Malta with whom 
there quickly developed a small-scale but important trade by individuals. Exporting all 
the agricultural products of the Regency, Malta now became a principal source of 
British exports to the country which had previously been channelled through Italy and 
even Marseilles. The Sicilian population performed a similar function in expanding 
commercial ties with the Regency. 
European trade, however, continued to be dominated by a small number of French and 
Italian merchants, some of whom, like Greno, were descended from the important 
families of traders established in Tunis since the eighteenth century. 73 Often dealing 
in hundreds of thousands of piastres per annum, these Genoese and Marseille merchants 
had close links with government officials, and enjoyed great prosperity during the 
mid-nineteenth century. 
The interests of the Europeans in Tunis were looked after by the various consulates 
72 FO 102/155 Wood to Malmesbury, Tunis, September 3,1858, cited in Ganiage 
(1955) p. 391. 
73 Ganiage, J. (1955) pp. 392-399. 
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which numbered fourteen in the capital by the mid-nineteenth century. "' Most had 
consular offices elsewhere in the country and in the case of Britain, France and the 
Italian states, these were sometimes extensive. Britain alone maintained a network of 
vice-consuls and counsular agents in the main towns of the country, which numbered 
nine in 1877. The majority were agents performing their consular functions without 
pay and generally greatly involved in trading activities on their own account. 71 Their 
duties included the administration of justice to the European populations who, by virtue 
of the Capitulations, avoided the jurisdiction of local authorities. Through them also, 
the Europeans had a powerful voice with the beylical government and its local 
representatives. 
At the start of his reign, Ahmed Bey refused to accord privileges to European traders 
in the country believing that everyone, Moslem and Christian alike, should submit to 
the country's laws. 76 But the consuls pressed him relentlessly, seeking various 
advantages for their respective populations. 
On the commercial plane, the Europeans enjoyed a variety of privileges over native 
Tunisians including the right of a customs duty of only 3% on imports and exports; 
Moslems had to pay 8%. By virtue of the French treaty of 1830, they also enjoyed the 
ability to participate in many areas of the economy previously closed to them by the 
bey's monopoly. Thus, although the value of Tunisian foreign trade declined 
substantially from an annual average of 27,890,505 F between 1832-1835 to only 
12,440,770 F average in each of the years between 1846 and 1848, the European share 
increased from 70% to 82% between 1838 and 1847. Moreover, the trade with " 
74 France, Great Britain, Spain, Austria, Sardinia, Tuscany, Naples, Sweden/ 
Norway, Denmark, Prussia, Belgium, Holland, Russia, U. S. A. Ibid., p. 397. 
75 Nor were they necessarily British. Four were Maltese, one Algerian (in 
Djerba), and another Italian (J. Conversano at Galippa); while (Cubinol) at Goulette 
represented Britain as well as a number of other countries. FO 335/140/5 List of 
British Consular Agents in Tunis, January 9,1877. 
76 Chater, K. (1984) p. 520. 
" Ibid., p. 571. 
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black Africa, Turkey and the Levant, which had previously been very profitable to 
Tunis, declined to a fraction of its former size. 78 More importantly, the trade balance 
continued to be severely deficient during these years (See Table 1.5). 
Table 1.5 Tunis: the ratio of exports to imports, 1838-47 
1838 68.0% 1843 112.0% 
1839 66.0% 1844 70.0% 
1840 108.0% 1845 - 
1841 56.0% 1846 44.4% 
1842 76.0% 1847 64.5% 
Source: Chater, K. (1984) p. 574. 
The bey's financial position was becoming increasingly precarious. The heavy cost of 
Ahmed's military reform and industrial expansion was exacerbated by the continued 
large trade deficit. Unable, because of European pressure, to significantly alter the 
customs and excise duties, the only option open to the Bey to shore up his ailing 
finances was to raise the level and effectiveness of taxation on the native population. 
State monopolies on leather, salt and tobacco were introduced. 79 
The old tithe on olive production, which at 10% of the harvest resulted in lower 
revenues to the state in years of poor crops, was replaced by the kanoun which was 
paid at a set rate for each producing tree. This fixed rate now had to be paid 
irrespective of the yield of oil achieved. The institution of the kanoun was preceded by 
a careful census of the olive groves of the Sahel, and later other regions, which meant 
that non-payment became virtually impossible. Valensi points out that after 1840 the 
people of Msaken, in the Sahel, paid three times the amount of taxes on their oil 
78 Exports to Egypt which had accounted for 14% of Tunisian exports in 1838, had 
fallen to only 3.6% of the total by 1847. Trade with Turkey declined from 10% of the 
total in 1838-1839 to only 1.3% in 1847. Ibid., p. 572. 
79 Henia, A. (1980) p. 105. 
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production compared to that collected under the tithe. 80 In 1852 the kanoun levied for 
the first time on the important date producing region of the Djerid in the far south of 
the country. 81 Taxes on commerce were also introduced throughout the country the 
most notable being the mahsoulat, a duty paid on all produce brought to the rural and 
urban markets. But perhaps the most controversial and most far reaching fiscal 
measure of the period was the raising of a capitation tax (known as the medjba) 
introduced the year after Ahmed's death in 1855. To be paid by all adult males it was 
widely opposed as being in breach of Muslim law. The medjba became by far the most 
important revenue earner for the government. At 36 piastres per head per year it was 
also the heaviest tax on the population. The repercussions of the tax will be examined 
below. 
The collection of the taxes was assured by the extension of the system of Lezzam under 
which the right to collect the dues was farmed out to the highest bidder at auction. 
While this assured relatively stable revenues to the government it also encouraged 
abuses on the part of the collectors who retained a percentage of that collected. The 
burden of higher taxes which the population had to bear was increased immeasurably 
by the illegal exactions of the tax farmers and Caids. 
Despite the fiscal reforms the financial state of the government continued to deteriorate 
to such an extent that in 1850 the Bey gave serious consideration to the offer of a 
French loan. The Marseilles businessman Eugen Pastre offered to provide 15 million 
F to be repaid over five years in return for which the bey would guarantee permits for 
the exportation of Tunisian olive oil. This provoked an immediate angry response from 
Britain, which regarded it not only as financially ruinous but also politically and 
economically dangerous in that it would have given French traders a monopoly of one 
of the country's most important branches of commerce and pushed the Bey into an 
80 Valensi, L. (1977) p. 236. 
81 Henia, A. (1980) p. 111. 
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excessive dependence on France. 82 
In order to forestall the French from attempting to exploit the country's financial 
problems, and to strengthen the bey's economic base the British consul, Baynes, now 
actively promoted the urgent need for greater fiscal liberation and the dismantling of 
such barriers to trade as the state monopolies. ß3 Although this would benefit the 
British position in Tunis both politically and economically, it would also, and more 
importantly, provide a stimulus to agricultural regeneration from which the treasury 
would derive substantial benefit. This could profitably be used to avoid the need to 
contract a foreign loan on onerous terms thereby preventing an increased dependence 
on France and putting the country's independence from external intervention on a 
firmer footing. 
Despite French support for his position, the bey, after intense lobbying by Baynes, 
finally agreed to lighten the existing customs duties and abolish some of the state's 
monopolies. 84 These promises, however, were never carried out. The loss of such 
important revenues would have gravely prejudiced the treasury's extremely delicate 
position. The root of the country's problems were left untouched as the country slid 
towards financial disaster. The situation worsened in 1854 with Ahmed's decision to 
despatch a military contingent to the Crimea, the cost of which was only met by the 
disposal of much of the bey's personal wealth. At his death in May 1855, Ahmed left 
a budget deficit of almost 1.5 million piastres and a country on the verge of internal 
collapse, with little hope of solution. 85 
1.11 The Attempt at Constitutional Reform and the Fundamental Pact 
The conclusion of the Crimean War (1856) brought a rapprochement in relations 
RZ FO 102/37 Baynes to Palmerston, October 3,1850, cited in Raymond, A. 
(1954) pp. 206-207. 
e3 Ibid. p. 207. 
84 Ibid., p. 208. 
85 Chater, K. (1984) p. 582. 
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between France and Britain on eastern affairs and with it the revival of hopes of 
far-reaching reform in Tunis. Essentially attention was focused on the need for reform 
of the Ottoman Empire of which the Katti Humayun (21 February 1856) was the 
precursor. 86 In Tunis the ascension to power of Mohammed Bey and the arrival of 
new British and French consuls, Richard Wood and Leon Roches resuscitated the hopes 
for reform in the Regency along the lines of the Katti Humayun. 
But while Mohammed Bey saw the need for substantial administrative and economic 
reform, his general philosophy was at once more Moslem in outlook and less 
westernized. Thus any change would have to conform to the Islamic religious, social 
and political traditions of Tunis. 
In this schema, the absolutism of the state and the return to prominence of the Ulama 
from whom he drew considerable support, were central to his beliefs. " 
Mohammed did however, go some way to easing the country's administrative 
heavy-handedness and economic problems. Greater attempts were made to curb the 
excessive exactions of the tax collectors, and some taxes were reduced to more realistic 
levels. Wood however, sought further encouragement of commercial liberalization and 
also, greater administrative reform, particularly the promotion of constitutional 
government. Although having the support of Roches, Wood's plans now met with 
strident opposition from the French government, for whom a stronger, more 
independent Tunis was hardly in its own interest. 
With neither the support of the bey nor that of France, Wood was in no position to 
enforce his proposals. 88 At this point, however, occurred what on the surface seemed 
86 Raymond, A. (1954) p. 228. 
R' Ibid., pp. 231-232. 
88 In fact, he was not even supported by the Foreign Office, which continued to 
state that the continuance of ties which bound Tunis to the Ottoman Empire were 
central to its policies in the east. The promotion of Tunisian independence necessarily 
threatened this. Ibid., p. 245. 
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a minor incident concerning public order between a Jew and an Arab in Tunis, but 
which came radically to alter the political state of affairs in the Regency. A Tunisian 
Jew, Batto Slem, was accused of having insulted a Moslem in the streets of Tunis while 
drunk. But instead of judging the incident himself, as was normal practice in legal 
proceedings involving a Jew, the bey acceded to pressure from the Ulama to have the 
case heard by a sharia court, which pronounced the death sentence on the Jew. The 
execution was hastily carried out without the bey's intervention and despite strong 
European protests. 89 
The event provoked uproar amongst the European population of the Regency for whom 
it typified the barbarity of beylical absolutism and its total disregard for civil liberties. 
The European consuls immediately demanded the creation of new treaties which would 
guarantee the sanctity of human life and property; indeed, they went further to include 
the liberalizing of trade and the abolitions of state monopolies. 
The arrival of a French squadron at Tunis in August 1857 was designed to persuade the 
bey to accede to mixed courts and the enforcement of the commercial treaties. Beyond 
this, the French were unwilling to go. They remained hostile to reform in Tunis along 
the lines of the Katti Humayun. Remarkably, however, it was the arrival of the French 
fleet, sent to ensure Mohammed's signature to the treaty, which brought about 
Mohammed's agreement to far more extensive reform. These reforms Paris did not see 
in its interest. 
Wood, without the approval of his Foreign Officer, took the opportunity of informing 
the bey (falsely) that the French intention in despatching the naval force was to enforce 
his submission to reform for which he claimed, (again, falsely), that they had full 
British support. More remarkably still, Roches, in clear contradiction of his 
government's policies, supported Wood's statements and the bey had little alternative 
but to accede to their demands. The result was the signing of the Fundamental Pact 
(Ahd el Aman) on September 9,1857, which embodied the main articles of the Katti 
89 Ibid., pp. 245-246. 
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Humayun: 
1. Creation of criminal tribunals for cases involving Jews. 
2. Creation of mixed commercial tribunals. 
3. Civil and religious equality. 
4. Absolute free trade and right to hold property. 
5. Equality in eyes of government. 90 
Aspirations of constitutional reform were not limited to the European consuls. A small 
clique of government functionaries, mainly mamluks, had for many years supported the 
liberalization of trade and in particular, constitutional reform, to limit the powers of the 
absolutist state and encourage more freedom and stability before the law. This small 
group of reformers, led by General Kherreddine, was most exposed to western ideals 
and thought, Kherreddine himself having been Tunisian Ambassador in London, and 
voyaged extensively throughout Europe and Turkey where the introduction of the 
Tanzimat was having a profound impact on the intellectual elite. " The French 
government in Paris, despite its opposition, found it impossible to oppose reform in 
Tunis which it had promoted in Turkey. 
The Fundamental Pact was only the beginning of further, more extensive change. With 
it, the indigenous reform movement of Kherreddine and his associates were in the 
ascendancy in the government. Profoundly pro-western in outlook, they received the 
full support of British officials in the Regency and the search began in earnest for ways 
in which to end the autocratic and corrupt government, and turn around the country's 
rapidly declining fortunes. 
90 Ibid., pp. 257-258. 
91 Kherreddine received a western education in contact with military instructors 
recruited by Ahmed to organize his new army. Reinforced by his long stay in France 
to defend Tunisian interests there in the affairs of Ben Ayyad, Kherreddine only 
returned to Tunis in 1857 to the post of minister of the marines, convinced of the need 
for adopting European organization and institutions to ensure freedom and justice, 
thereby generating progress and civilization. Kraiem, M. (1973) tome 2, chap. 9. 
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These efforts bore fruit in the declaration of the Tunisian Constitution in 1861.92 The 
constitution effectively replaced the absolutist monarchy with a form of parliamentary 
monarchy dividing power between the bey and Grand Council composed of 60 members 
drawn from amongst the high government functionaries and notables of the country. 93 
The state's administrative framework was greatly altered with the creation of the 
Grand Minister, under whom and directly responsible to, were the various Ministries 
of Foreign Affairs, Finances and War. 
The Judiciary too, was overhauled with the establishment of a Supreme Council to 
judge and mediate between the important legal disputes of the country, creating 
precedents in cases where none existed for decisions in the lower courts. 94 Other 
tribunals were set up in the major towns with the task of hearing cases among 
individuals of criminal acts, public disorder, violence and murder. 95 To regulate 
commercial litigation, a separate tribunal was created which was composed of Tunisians 
and foreigners. 
As part of the new constitution the European consuls had to agree to the abolition of 
consular jurisdiction in cases involving foreigners who would henceforth be subject to 
the same laws and conditions of the Tunisians and judged by the same courts. ' 
The proclamation of the Fundamental Pact and the framing of the Constitution were 
dramatic signs of the decline in the authority of the bey in the face of strenuous and 
92 Green, A. H. (1970) p. 226. 
93 The bey was given a civil list of 1.2 million piastres with stipends allocated to 
the princes of his family. Kraiem (1973) tome 2, p. 267. 
9' It acted on a final court of appeal in disputes at all levels, and had final decision 
on all cases involving the death penalties. 
95 Kairouan, Sousse, Sfax, Aradh, Djerba, Beja, Le Kef, Bizerte, Djerid. Ibid., 
Chap. 9. 
96 This drew widespread criticism, particularly from the Italian and French consuls 
who were not convinced of the impartiality and capability of these courts. 
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concerted European activity. The breach firmly established, the European Powers now 
set about exploiting the situation. Having achieved the recognition of civil and equal 
rights under law, the liberalizing of the oppressive administrative and fiscal systems, 
and the supremacy of the rights of free trade, the foreign consuls now sought to 
consolidate their influence in the beylical court with the aim of enhancing their 
respective government's political prestige and maximising the economic benefit which 
could be extracted for their nationals. Britain received the right of a cotton growing 
concession, the creation of the country's first bank, and in 1864 the construction of a 
railway between Tunis and La Goulette. For its part France obtained in 1859 the 
monopoly of telegraph services in the country. 97 More importantly for his finances, 
the Bey was induced to finance the rebuilding, by French contractors, of the aqueduct 
between Tunis and Zaghouan at a cost of 12m francs. 9S He also agreed to build a new 
French Residency at a cost of 680,000 Francs, in response to which Britain demanded 
a new Residency at La Marsa. 99 
The cost of such projects were unsupportable and financial collapse now imminent. In 
1861 the Beylicate's public debt amounted to 12 in francs. By 1862 this had risen to 
28m francs10° and the need to take on a loan became unavoidable. There were no 
shortages of sources of funds but, under the influence of the corrupt Treasury Minister, 
Khaznader, the Bey ignored the less onerous offers from such reputable banking houses 
as Rothschild in favour of those offered by the Parisian banker Erlanger. In 1863 an 
arrangement with Erlanger was reached providing for a loan of 35m francs at 7% 
interest. Of this however, thanks to the collusion of Khaznader and Erlanger the Bey 
received only 5.6m francs. Yet the state was now faced with the repayment of 65m 
francs over fifteen years. Within months the Treasury was forced to find 4.2m francs, 
amounting to one third of the Tunisian budget, simply to repay the interest due on the 
97 Harber, C. (1970) p. 31. 
98 Ibid., p. 49. 
99 The combined total cost for the projects being 2m francs. Ibid., p. 49. 
100 Raymond, A. (1954) p. 336. 
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loan. 101 
It was not just the state which was becoming increasingly indebted to foreign interests. 
The Fundamental Pact and constitution unleashed the full forces of European merchant 
capitalism throughout the commercialized regions of the country. Worst hit were the 
olive growing regions of the Sahel. Greater freedom to trade enabled European 
merchants to fully exploit their dominant position in the market place. 1°2 Their 
speculation in teskeres of oil heightened the instability of the market place and 
increased the indebtedness of the peasantry. For those who defaulted on their 
obligations, there was, since the Constitution, the threat of legal action which often 
resulted in the seizure of their lands by Europeans now able to hold property. 
Discontent with the expansion of European influence and the decline of the local 
authority's ability to control it, became wide-spread among the population of the Sahel. 
There seemed little protection from the merchants' avarice, even from the new local 
courts which were equally despised for their slow and cumbersome attribution of 
justice. 103 
Faced with the prospect of impending financial ruin, the Bey resorted to the 
time-honoured practice of passing on the burden to the Tunisian population. In 
December 1863 the widely despised capitation tax, or medjba, was doubled from 36 
piastres to 72 piastres, and the exemptions of the towns and government functionaries 
was lifted. 
The result was widespread and open rebellion against the government and the European 
inhabitants. The sedentary populations at first opting for passive resistance by refusing 
'o' Ibid., p. 337. 
X02 Movement of Ships at Sousse: 1857,110 ships, of which 10 French; 1858, 
158 ships, of which 33 French, 43 British; 1859 335 ships, of which 45 French and 
45 British. Source: Chater, K. (1984) p. 37. 
'03 Raymond, A. (1954) p. 340. 
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to pay their taxes and disregarding the teskere system for the purchase and exportation 
of oil, were soon caught up in the general revolt amongst the tribes of the south and 
centre of the country. What began mainly as a revolt against the medjba was 
transformed into a protest against the advance of European interests and abandonment 
of the traditions of the Islamic state enshrined in the new Constitution. 
With Europeans being openly attacked and the economy in disarray, the Italian and 
French consuls seized the opportunity to impress upon the bey the need to abandon the 
Constitution. The French Consul De Beauval even went as far as contacting the 
revolt's leader, Ali ben Ghedahem in an attempt to encourage his greater hostility to 
force the bey to accede to French demands. 104 Only strenuous efforts by Wood 
averted the landing of both Italian and French troops in the country, ostensibly to 
ensure the safety of their countrymen. " 
Table 1.6 Fines Imposed by the Mehalla on the Towns of the Sahel 
Caidat Amount in piastres 
Sousse 6,500,000 
Monastir 6,486,000 
Mahdia 500,000 
Total 13,486,000 
Source: Chater, K. (1978) p. 176. 
In 1864 the Bey formed a military column, which under General Ahmed Zarrouk, left 
Tunis for the south to put down the revolt. In order to pay for the military column the 
bey sold teskeres for the exportation of the following year's olive harvest. The total 
amount collected thus from local merchants, was 3,654,000 piastres. "' In order to 
104 Ibid., p. 345. 
105 Ibid., p. 349. 
106 Chater, K. (1978). 
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meet the costs of the project, the pacification was followed by a brutal imposition of 
exorbitant fines which were particularly directed at the Sahel of Sousse. The total fine 
in the Sahel amounted to some 13.5 million piastres (Table 1.6) 
Although the brunt of this tax was borne by local notables, one half of those eligible 
to pay the medjba were forced to pay. 107 At the same time, he demanded the 
immediate payment of the medjba, kanoun, mahsoulats and other ordinary taxes due 
for the current year. 
The population of the Sahel, already heavily indebted to local merchants, were forced 
to mortgage their property which Zarrouk then passed to the merchants in return for 
cash. The latter then accepted the future olive harvests as payment for the debts with 
the local population. As the harvest of 1865 was insufficient to meet their obligation, 
the loans were renewed at higher rates of interest to be paid on the succeeding harvests. 
In cases of non-payment their property was sold. 
In effectively ruining the Tunisians of the Sahel, the Bey drew little benefit. The 
revenues gained from the Mehalla, which Chater estimated at over 23 million piastres, 
were not sufficient to avert the need to contract a further loan in 1865 again with 
Erlanger. 108 This time of the 25 million francs agreed the Treasury received only 7.5 
million francs. 109 Having virtually exhausted the resources of the population the 
potential of taxing the Tunisian population was by now extremely limited and 
exacerbated by the fact that the harvest of 1865 was poor. On its arrival at Beja the 
tax caravan found that, "... il n'y avait rien a recouvrir - tout etait ruine". "o 
The Bey now resorted to the coining of copper money which was immediately 
107 Ibid., p. 172. 
108 Ibid., p. 178. 
109 Raymond, A. (1954) p. 402. 
110 FO 102/77, Wood to Stanley. 
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depreciated by 100%, then 300%. "' By 1868 the debt had swollen to 160 million 
francs of which the annual interest, at 19.5 million francs, exceeded the total revenue 
of the state. "' 
Table 1.7 Tunisian Trade, 1861-71 
Year Imports (francs) Exports (francs) 
1861 17,627,334 19,485,614 
1862 17,936,959 18,128,507 
1863 10,378,738 7,984,800 
1864 10,014,250 4,165,420 
1865 9,603,009 10,125,180 
1866 14,920,500 12,087,575 
1867 12,273,520 9,915,830 
1868 12,962,695 7,918,200 
1869 11,488,300 4,443,933 
1870 8,382,295 6,031,980 
1871 9,821,244 9,321,298 
Source: Arnoulet, F. (1947) p. 36. 
In July 1869, the European powers finally stepped in to secure the repayment of the 
debt with the creation of the International Financial Commission, composed of members 
representing France, Britain, Italy and Tunis. This marked the end of the long process 
of subjugation of the political and economic independence of the bey and country of 
Tunis. Henceforth, decisions regarding the administration of the country and the 
economy were taken by European powers, the bey having become merely the nominal 
head of the country. 
111 Arnoulet, F. (1947) p. 35. 
112 Raymond, A. (1854) p. 423. 
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Under the Commission's tutelage the economic penetration of Europeans was completed 
with the introduction of capital destined to public works. The European countries now 
set about the greater exploitation of the country's resources. Wood's views reflect 
those of the Commission and the European population in general: 
"... it is essential with a view to the development of the rich but dormant 
resources of the Regency and the increase of the revenue, that the Tunisian 
Government should encourage the introduction of foreign capital and energy for 
the construction of public works, particularly of railroads, to facilitate the 
transport of the large quantities of grain grown in the interior to the coast for 
exportation". "' 
While Wood, and Britain, continued to regard this as essential to the maintenance of 
Tunisian independence from French, and now Italian, political control, the latter merely 
regarded it as an expedient for the fulfilment of that which Britain feared. The struggle 
for control of Tunisia was largely played out in the competition for innumerable 
concessions of all types, such as banks and railways. 
However, the fate of the country was decided less by the internal struggle for control 
of the country's public works and resources than by an ironic chance of British political 
priorities in the east. The Russian invasion of the Turkish Empire forced Britain to 
react. Without French aid, Britain sought to annex Cyprus as a base from which to 
combat the Russian menace. For this concession, Britain tacitly agreed to leave Tunis 
for France. 
Although the end would not come until 1881, Tunis's fate was sealed at the Berlin 
Conference of 1876, if any doubt as to its eventual fate still existed. 
113 FO 335/127/2 Wood to Granville, Tunis, 19 November, 1872. 
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Chapter Two 
Tribal Tunisia 
2.1 Introduction 
Up to this point Tunisia's history has been discussed only with reference to the urban 
area and sedentarized region, the latter particularly concerning the grain growing 
northern districts and the predominantly olive producing eastern littoral. Here the 
processes of urban specialization, agricultural commercialization and social stratification 
in the modern era began long before the European advance of the nineteenth century, 
its most obvious manifestation, as described above, being the growth of foreign trade 
and the country's greater integration with the rapidly evolving Mediterranean and 
European economy from the sixteenth century at least. It was therefore here that 
increasing European economic penetration and political influence from the seventeenth 
and, most strikingly, during the nineteenth century, had its most immediate impact. 
The European populations settled in the towns from where they gradually assumed the 
dominant role in the country's economic and political development. 
Yet this deals with only a minority of Tunisia's population. Beyond this relatively 
narrow coastal belt in which economic activity was increasingly oriented towards 
production for the urban centres and international commerce, lay the vast domain of 
the tribes which covered the whole of the territory from the mountains in the north to 
the fringes of the Sahara desert in the south (Map 2.1). Living a mainly pastoral and 
subsistence existence, these nomadic and semi-nomadic populations of Tunis, and the 
Maghreb generally, have traditionally been characterized by their apparent political 
autonomy from the central Government which directed the lives of the settled 
populations, and by their perceived internal economic equality and social egalitarianism. 
As a result, tribal Tunisia has generally been studied as an entity existing in a state of 
complete, or near complete, isolation from the wider society and so protected from the 
great political, economic and social changes affecting the coastal populations as outlined 
in the previous chapter. 
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Figure 2.1 Territories of tribal confederations. Source: Mensching, H. (Ed. )(1985) 
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2.2 Physical Geography and Climate 
Although a small country of only 155,000 square kilometres in area, Tunisia is a land 
of striking contrasts in terms of both its physical geography and bio-climatic diversity. 
While the country's situation bordering the Mediterranean to the north and east is a 
moderating influence, the proximity of the Sahara desert to the south and the Algerian 
land mass to the west means that climatic conditions are highly variable and 
environmental conditions often harsh. Rainfall nowhere exceeds 1,500 mm each year 
(Figure 2.2) while temperatures can reach over 55 degrees Celsius in summer months. ' 
The north of the country is most influenced by the Mediterranean climate (Figure 2.3), 
temperatures being more moderate than further south and rainfall at once higher and 
more regular. A mountainous region in which the elevation increases to the south but 
declines towards the east, the northern Tell is dissected by a number of valleys which 
open out into the plains of Bizerte, Mateur, Beja and the Cap Bon peninsula near the 
coast. The prevailing north, north-westerly and north-easterly winds bring copious 
amounts of moisture particularly in the Kroumirie mountains of the north-west where 
the average annual rainfall exceeds 1000mm, reaching as high as 1,500mm in Ain 
Draham. But rainfall declines sharply to the south and to the east in the shadow of 
these coastal mountains, Tunis receiving an average of only 438mm of precipitation in 
the year. Yet relief and the orientation of the mountains give rise to considerable 
regional and local climatic variations. Jendouba at the foot of the middle Medjerda 
valley and only 40 km from Ain Draham, receives only 473 mm of rainfall on average 
each year. 2 Further south at the higher elevations in the high Tell around Thala and 
Maktar, average annual rainfall increases to over 500mm under the influence of 
westerly winds which bring rain especially in the spring and summer months. 3 The 
lower lying land of north eastern Tunisia, while not enjoying the same level of rainfall 
as the north west, benefits from proximity to the sea, the relative humidity of the air 
being higher than the interior while evaporation rates are generally lower. The 
' Kassab, A. and Sethom H. (1980) p. 59. 
Z Ibid., p. 5 1. 
3 Fakhfakh, M. (Ed. )(1979) p. 17-19. 
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Figure 2.4 Physiographic regions 
prevalence of maritime air masses in the north and east throughout the year means that 
absolute temperatures and diurnal variations are lower near the coast than in the 
interior, where altitude and the predominance of continental air masses mean summers 
are generally hotter and winters colder than along the coast, particularly at the higher 
altitudes to the west. Throughout the north, however, annual rainfall exceeds 400mm 
per annum, the minimum required to assure dry cereal cultivation. 
The Dorsale mountain range (Figure 2.4) extending from the Algerian border in a north 
easterly direction from a point immediately north of Thala in the High Tell, towards 
the Cap Bon peninsula, separates the more temperate climate of northern Tunisia from 
the more and steppe and desert regions to the south. The wet season, between seven 
and nine months in the Tell, becomes progressively shorter as the desert approaches 
lasting only three months in the High Steppe while in the far south the dry season is 
prolonged throughout the year. Ain Draham in the north has an average of 118 days 
rain while this is reduced to only 90 days at Maktar in the High Tell and 29 at Kebili 
on the fringes of the northern Sahara. ' 
In the steppe, rainfall averages between 400mm and 200mm per annum, the former 
isohyet marking the southern edge of stable dry cereal cultivation while the latter 
corresponds to the lower limit required for unirrigated olive growing. South of the 
Gafsa chain of mountains the sub-desertic region is defined by average rainfall between 
100mm and 200mm per year only slightly exceeded in the higher altitudes of the 
Matmata mountains. Further inland where the moderating influence of the sea 
disappears rainfall falls to 94mm at Tozeur, 89mm at Kebili and 70mm at Ramada 
close to the Libyan border. ' 
But these averages mask a great unpredictability in both the timing and amount of 
precipitation. In the northern Tell where rainfall varies by only 1: 2.5, in the south this 
4 Kassab, A. and Sethom H. (1980), op. cit., p. 53. 
S Mensching, H. (Ed. )(1985) Klimatographie - Nordafrika, p. 71. 
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becomes 1: 4 and even 1: 5.6 
In the south when the rain does come it is often heavily concentrated in time. While 
in the Tell rainfall is predominantly orographic producing a more constant and fine 
rain, in the south and centre the prevalence of convectional rainfall produces heavy but 
short stormy downpours particularly in autumn with the arrival of the cold front from 
north. These often have a catastrophic impact on agriculture and livestock causing 
severe flooding of wadi (or dry river) bottoms. 
The low level of rainfall, its seasonal and annual unpredictability and the often 
devastating effects of heavy storms make agriculture throughout the south and centre 
of Tunisia an extremely uncertain activity. This is further complicated by temperatures 
which register high seasonal and diurnal variations especially inland and at high 
altitudes. At Gafsa the average temperature in the hottest month, July, is 29.5 degrees 
centigrade while in the coldest month, January, it is only 9 degrees centigrade. The 
hottest, and driest, months of summer are also those which have the greatest 
evaporation rates which reach 1,122mm in the interior at Gafsa although much less on 
the coast, being 836mm at Sfax. 
The effects of the hot dry sirocco winds emanating from the Sahara in spring and 
summer, scorch the lands pushing temperatures up and drying the air considerably. 
The north does not escape the sirocco but while Bizerte endures it on average only 3 
to 10 days a year in the south it blows anything from 5 to 30 days. 
Soils generally follow the cilmate in their adaptability to agriculture. In the north, 
above the 400mm isohyet, there are pedological conditions similar to other coastal 
Mediterranean regions: light brown and greyish brown carbonate soils of medium 
depth, partly relict, comparatively well watered on the mountain slopes and in the 
Medjerda valley. In the steppe the soils are thin and powdery, with a low organic 
content. These are light brown calcareous semi-desert soils, silty and clayey sands with 
6 Kassab, A. and Sethom H. (1980), op. cit., p. 53. 
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an upper horizon removed by wind erosion. In the south, below the 100mm isohyet, 
there are sandy or gravelly soil-like desert sediments, highly saline fringing the chotts. 
2.3 The Population in Pre-Protectorate Tunisia 
Although no general census was undertaken in Tunisia until 1921, Ganiage has 
estimated the population at 1.1 million people in 1861 basing his figure on the registers 
of the poll tax (the medjba) which was reintroduced by the Beylicate in 1856. ' As 
Valensi points out this would ascribe the country an extremely low average population 
density of less than ten inhabitants per square kilometre. 8 
Although the influence of historical and cultural factors in shaping the human 
geography of pre-Protectorate Tunisia is incontestable, environmental and climatic 
factors played a significant role in the spatial distribution and overall size of the 
population. The overwhelming majority of the population was rural, nomads far 
outweighed sedentarists and the urban population was extremely small. Valensi posits 
that the urban population was limited to a maximum of only 16% of the total in the 
mid-nineteenth century, much less when it is considered that many of these urban 
dwellers were also engaged in agriculture and horticulture. ' The towns themselves 
were tiny, often indistinguishable from villages. Even the population of Tunis, by far 
the largest urban centre, is thought to have numbered only 80,000 in the 1860's. 'o 
Ganiage put the entire settled population at a little less than half of the total although 
he clearly includes in that figure a large number of northern inhabitants who were only 
partially settled. " 
Whatever may have been its size in general the settled population was concentrated in 
Ganiage, J. (1964) pp. 165-198. 
8 Valensi, L. (1977) p. 4. 
Valensi, L., op. cit., p. 9. 
10 Ibid. p. 5. 
11 Ganiage, J. (1964) op. cit., p. 171. 
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the regions more favoured by environmental conditions. In the more humid climes of 
northern Tunisia, north of the Dorsale, besides Tunis and the port city of Bizerte were 
located the towns of Kef, Beja, Teboursouk, Mateur, Testour and Tebourba. Around 
them, in what was once the granary of the Roman Empire, cereal cultivation 
predominated supplying the towns and feeding foreign trade. In the and environments 
to the south of the Dorsale the settled population was largely limited to more humid 
coastal regions where the proximity of the sea helped temper the climatic excesses 
which affected the interior. Along the southern coast the towns and villages of 
Monastir, Mahdia, Sousse, Msaken, Sfax and Gabes, were the country's main areas of 
olive and olive oil production. Apart from the eastern littoral their were few settled 
people in the south and centre interior of the country whether in urban areas or not. 
Only Kairouan, an important religious centre in the low steppe, and the well irrigated 
and fertile date producing oases of Tozeur and Nefta in the far south, were centres of 
any importance. Outwith this Gafsa was the only town of size throughout the interior, 
south of the Dorsale mountains. 
The majority of the population consisted of nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoral tribes 
living, in the main, from their animals and engaging in agriculture to an extent which 
varied according to their geographic milieu, prevailing climatic circumstances and their 
ability to procure seed with which to plant. Although the social and historical origins 
of the pastoral tribes were influential, pastoralism was above all else an adaptation to 
the environment. 
With little access to groundwater and rudimentary production techniques agricultural 
production was either impossible or highly risky throughout most of the country 
especially in the semi-arid and and south. In these regions the success or failure of 
cereal harvests depended almost entirely on the capriciousness of rainfall, winds, 
temperatures. Perhaps even more important than quantity, it was the timing of rainfall 
which determined the fate of cereal harvests. Rain was required at critical points in the 
agricultural year, in autumn for the germination of the seed and in the spring during 
the period of growth to allow the young plants to reach maturity. But in the south and 
central regions rainfall was too unpredictable to provide any security over the outcome 
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of sowings. If the rains were late the germination process could be delayed too near 
to the season of frosts. If there was not enough rainfall much of the seed would be lost 
while too much rainfall could wash them away in the fields. But even after the most 
favourable autumn and winter conditions the young plants were at the mercy of the 
devastating effects of spring downpours and hailstorms. If the crops survived intact 
through to late spring when the harvest was completed in most of the south, there 
remained the common and real threat from infestations of locusts which could, in one 
day, destroy the entire crop. 
Under these circumstances agriculture could not be the primary occupation of the vast 
majority of the population in nineteenth century Tunisia. Even in the north of the 
country where cereal cultivation was of much greater significance to the semi-nomadic 
groups animal raising, principally of sheep, was everywhere a basic economic activity 
and the agro-pastoral balance tilted progressively in favour of livestock from the north 
towards the Dorsale although not in a well defined linear gradation. 
The harsher lands to the south of the Dorsale, inland from the coast, was the almost 
exclusive domain of the pastoral nomad and semi-nomad tribes. Throughout the low 
steppe and the high steppe and the entire southern districts the people lived a life of 
constant movement seeking pasture for the animals, particularly in the hot, dry summer 
months when the land became parched due to the lack of rain, the high temperatures 
and the southerly winds from the Sahara. The type of animals kept tended to vary from 
region to region. In the steppe sheep predominated while camels were relatively few. 
Moving progressively southward the number of goats and camels increased, both being 
better able to withstand the more difficult environmental circumstances. In a similar 
direction the distances over which the population moved with their herds also increased 
in a direct relationship with the abundance of natural resources. None of these groups, 
however, lived entirely from their animals. All the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes 
cultivated some land, no matter how limited, cereals providing an important dietary 
supplement, and variety, as well as being a means of exchange. But unlike in the 
north, where wheat was the most commonly sown, in the south the hardier barley crop 
was the rule. The sowing of crops in autumn brought the nomadic tribes back to their 
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own lands after the long wanderings of the summer months where they generally 
stayed, or stayed close by, until the after the harvest in spring. 12 
For a rural society like Tunisia of the nineteenth century, climate was the great dictator 
of the prosperity of the population. Drought was an ever present threat as was the 
often inevitable consequences of famine, particularly after successive years of hardship. 
But a corollary to drought and famine was disease which was almost endemic in Tunisia 
as in the rest of north Africa. Valensi believes, based on contemporary accounts, 
which she admits can only be used as guides, that the population may have varied by 
a factor as much as two, depending on the state of successive harvests, the incidence 
and intensity of disease and the level of Government taxation. 13 While this is 
impossible to verify, environmental conditions in south and central Tunisia were 
extremely difficult and unpredictable and given the rudimentary production techniques, 
available agriculture was entirely marginal and extensive pastoralism was the principal 
economic activity. 
2.4 Social Relations and the Relationship with the State 
Located in the more fertile and climatically more favoured regions, the towns of 
Tunisia and their immediate hinterlands, were centres of urban and agricultural 
specialization, of mainstream religion, government and of trade. 
Although almost entirely bereft of industry despite the, admittedly feeble, attempts 
made to establish modern manufacturing capacity along western lines under Ahmad 
Bey, the economy of these regions was quite strongly commercialized. There was a 
lively and active craft industry, notably chechias in and around Tunis and a variety of 
textiles of which the southern oases of the Djerid were particularly renowned, and 
agricultural production was generally for sale in the market and money was a familiar 
medium of transactions. All the towns and most of the villages had at least one market 
where local and regional specialities, both agricultural and artisanal, were 
12 See Clarke, J. I. (1956). 
13 Valensi, L. (1977), p. 3. 
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commercialized as were those of other regions within Tunisia and those from other 
countries. 
Demand from the towns stimulated production of agricultural produce but so too did 
government taxation and foreign trade. Imports of foreign, mainly manufactured, 
goods both for local consumption and for resale in southern Algeria and the Sahara, 
were offset by exports of primarily agricultural goods, principally cereals from the 
north of the country and olives/olive oil from the towns and villages of the east coast. 
In a country where labour and access to water, rather than land, were the scarce factors 
of production, private and individual or family landownership, legally defined and 
notarized, was only to be found in the settled regions. This was particularly so in the 
olive growing villages of the Sahel where the influence of foreign trade in oil was 
extremely strong. The scarcity of land suitable for horticulture together with the size 
of the investment required and the length of time necessary before the trees came to full 
production, meant that there was a marked degree of private property. Although most 
village dwellers owned at least a small plot of land there were clear disparities in 
economic wealth something which is clearly evident from Valensi's study of Msaken 
in the mid nineteenth century. 14 One of about fifty small villages in the Sahel region 
around Sousse and Monastir, Msaken was both a holy place and one strongly tied to 
foreign trade. Containing about 2,436 individual properties and 236,000 olive trees in 
the 1840's Msaken was the centre of olive production in the Regency. " With the 
average property consisting of about 97 trees, the category of owners with between 81 
and 120 trees was quite small, being only slightly over 10%. The majority of wealth 
was polarized at the two extremes, large property owners (owning more than 120 trees) 
accounting for 20% of all the properties and nearly 70% of the trees. At the other 
extreme 40% of the landowners possessed less than 40 trees. 16 There was a clear and 
close relationship between urban centres and the rural, settled peasant producers in the 
countryside. A sizeable proportion of the larger properties were owned by citizens of 
14 Valensi, L. (1977), op. cit., chapter 3. 
's Valensi, L., op. cit., p. 92. 
16 Ibid., p. 92. 
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Kairouan, Sousse and Tunis. 
In the southern oases of the Djerid, where date production dominated the economy 
despite the presence of an important artisanal textile production, private property was 
also the norm. Land was bought and sold but here access to water for irrigation was 
even more important than land, since the latter was almost worthless in the hot and dry 
climate bordering the desert, without good irrigation. Water rights, therefore, 
developed separately to land rights and as Henia's excellent study shows, there were 
substantial differences in wealth and social standing amongst the inhabitants of these 
oases depending on the quality of the land, the quantity of water rights held, and to the 
different types of date trees owned. " 
Unlike the Sahel and the Djerid, in the north of the country land was more abundant 
and the pressures to take out private property titles much less severe. Nevertheless this 
was, in general, also a very fertile region with good rainfall, ideally suited to cereal 
cultivation. While small in relation to the total land area, private property, which was 
concentrated around the towns such as Beja, Mateur, Bizerte, and the fruit growing 
areas such as the Cap Bon peninsula, was by no means unusual. But here it tended to 
take the form of medium and large properties, or "henchirs", owned by the Bey 
himself, his family, or absentee urban dignitaries and often habous land which had been 
dedicated to some pious foundation either by a previous owner or by the Bey. '8 The 
peasants who worked these henchirs were called "khammes", receiving one fifth of the 
harvest in return for their labour and these were often aided at harvest time by salaried 
labour. Cherif makes clear that in some cases the Bey retained full ownership rights 
to the land which he exploited, under the auspices of a manager, or "waqf", using 
khammes, providing assistance in procuring the seed, the costs of harvesting and in 
transporting the grain to state granaries. In other cases a simple rent, which did not 
necessarily correspond to the production potential of the land, was charged to the 
17 Henia, A. (1980) pp. 81-82. 
'S See Cherif, M. H. (1980) pp. 21-55. 
82 
occupants. 19 More usually, however, the Bey sold, or farmed out, the management 
of the properties under a form of concession known as "iqta" to local notables who in 
turn assumed the rights to a certain proportion of the harvest. 20 
Wealth amongst the urban and settled populations was not evenly distributed. A small 
number of large landowners and a commercial elite composed of native Arabs and 
Jews, together with a European mercantile community which became increasingly 
influential from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, were clearly 
differentiated economically from the mass of small proprietors and producers and from 
those who did not own land but worked as share-croppers. 21 
Despite the clear economic differentiation in the settled regions, Valensi argues that 
there was "a certain unity in the social status" of the inhabitants on the basis that 
whether rich or poor the Tunisian peasant maintained, for the most part, access to land 
and equipment and, therefore, was not dispossessed of ownership of the means of 
production even if the poorer inhabitants were also forced, by economic circumstance, 
to offer their labour to larger landowners. 22 She maintains that the meagre size of 
properties, even those of the larger owners, together with primitive production 
techniques made the development of any agrarian capitalism impossible. 23 While this 
may be true of the peasantry as a whole, we agree with Cherif that the sedentarized and 
urban population can be described as the "zone rurale 'evoluee"', exhibiting a much 
more marked tendency toward social differentiation and economic stratification than 
19 Zghal, A. (1980) pp. 16-17. 
20 Ibid., p. 23. 
21 Valensi points out that the share-cropper, or khammes, on one of the larger 
olive producing properties in the Sahel may well have been better off then the owner 
of a very small property. Valensi (1977), op. cit., p. 90. 
22 Valensi, L. (1977) op. cit., p. 77. 
23 Ibid., p. 77. Valensi argues that even the concept of large property owners is 
deceptive since their lands were, in the villages of the Sahel, widely dispersed in 
fragments. Ibid., p. 76. 
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those of the nomadic populations in the interior. 24 
The distinction between settled and nomadic was more than simply a difference between 
an agricultural population and a pastoral one, between settled and mobile. Unlike the 
western dichotomy which pitched urban against rural social consciousness, north 
African society reflected a cultural difference which united the urban citizen with the 
settled peasantry in contrast with the nomads. As Cherif says, "Les hommes du XVII 
siecle etaient sensibles aux diversites ethniques et culturelles: Turks, citadins (baldi), 
bedouins (arabs). Ce sont.. les realites de 1'epoque". 25 
This cultural distinction between baldi and bedouin is recreated in north African 
political theory which recognizes a parallel variation in the strength of the power of 
central government which Coon describes thus: 
"In the cities and lowland or flatland villages, the government ruled. Out in the 
deserts, or up in the mountains, authority lies in the hands of the tribes .... In 
Morocco these two zones, the closely and the loosely governed, are known by 
the Bled al-Makhzen and Bled es-Siba, meaning literally `Government land' and 
`land of Insolence"'. 26 
In Tunisia the settled regions and towns were where the Beylical government's 
authority was all-pervasive. The sedentary population of Tunisia inhabited a world in 
which order and stability were maintained by the Beylical government and its 
associates, a religious and a commercial/landowning elite. At the head of the political 
hierarchy the Bey had absolute power backed by a standing army based in the main 
towns. Beneath this his authority was dispensed amongst the population by a network 
of caids, or governors, cheikhs and other functionaries chosen from amongst the local 
notables. Although government patronage was fickle, both the appointment and 
derogation of duties being at the will of the Bey, there was a remarkable stability in the 
caidal structure with some wealthy and influential families performing the function from 
24 Cherif, M. H. (1984) p. 55. 
25 Cherif, M. H. (1984) p. 35. 
26 Cited in Anderson, L. (1981) pp. 41-42. 
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generation to generation. 27 In fact the position of caids and cheikhs was somewhat 
ambiguous. While in principle, representatives of the Bey amongst their people, in 
practice they retained a great deal of autonomy within their regions and the relationship 
with the Beylical government in Tunis was often more of an association than one of 
direct government service. 
The principal preoccupation of the Beylical regime and its representatives, was the 
extraction of surplus value from the countryside and towns mainly in the form of 
taxation. The practice of farming out the government positions to the highest bidder 
ensured that only wealthy or socially powerful had access to power. This both 
encouraged stability in the government structure but also left the caids and cheikhs a 
good deal of autonomy with regards the level of taxation since they had to at least 
cover the costs paid to the Bey. 
Henia describes the situation in the Djerid where the complexity of the local tax 
regimes was so great and variable from one village to the next, that the local notables 
were, until the end of the eighteenth century: 
"... beaucoup plus de simples agents du Beylik. Bien au contraire, ils 
constituent une force locale - le pouvoir locale - avec laquelle le beylik est 
oblige de compter". 28 
It is this contradiction between local notables seeking to maintain their control in their 
own region yet aware of the importance of an accommodation with, and patronage 
from, a central government which became increasingly preoccupied with the needs to 
raise more and more revenues from taxation from the early nineteenth century which 
was at the basis of evolving relations between the locality and the central government, 
between local authority and central control. 29 
27 See for example Demmersman, A. (1983) p. 79. The Djelloulis held the 
position of Caid at Sfax and Sousse for many generations the sons being trained for 
their future role. 
28 Henia, A., (1980) op. cit., p. 337. 
29 Ibid., p. 339. 
85 
This contradiction between central and local government is at the heart of the concept 
of makhzen and siba. In the former the government had overriding authority and the 
local notables, however independent in practice, acted within the framework of Beylical 
authority. As the fiscal requirements of the beylical regime increased with the financial 
crises of the nineteenth century, the local power base was eroded as new and 
standardized taxes were introduced in the Djerid, as elsewhere, which de-mystified the 
particularities of local government and brought the central government in more direct 
contact with the population. 
In Tunis the "siba" was limited to the pastoral nomads, tribal groups living beyond the 
immediate control of central government. Major Sir Grenville Temple describing his 
excursion to the small settlement of Feriana near the Algerian border in 1835, wrote: 
"... this place is situated on the frontiers of Algiers and Tunis and the Arabs who 
live near it are of a lawless disposition acknowledging no obedience either to 
the one government or the other" . 
3o 
The cultural divide, which separated the peaceable citizen and peasant protected by and 
subjugated to the Beylical regime, from the dissident and warrior, pastoral and tribal 
populations of the interior, is a reflection of the power of the central government. 
Amongst the tribes, the state's role was essentially limited to the periodic extraction of 
taxes. Lacking either the military capability, the financial means or even the political 
will to effectively control these groups, the despatch of an annual tax gathering 
caravan, or mahalla, was seen as a satisfactory way of ensuring a semblance of tribal 
allegiance to the sovereignty of the Tunisian Bey. 
In such a situation, therefore, it is the state's role as a tax collecting authority which 
is often seen as the principal determinant of relations between the settled zones and the 
nomadic populations: 
30 Temple, Major Sir G. T. (1835) p. 217. 
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"... the difference between mahkzan and siba was essentially one of payment or 
`withholding' of taxes; and the polar relationships between these two concepts 
is without any doubt the central fact of the political sociology of 
pre-Protectorate Morocco". " 
The tribes sought to avoid the payment of any such taxes to an external power whose 
authority they did not recognize, while the Bey's principal aim in attempting to enforce 
their payment was largely based on the desire to strengthen their links to the Regency 
of Tunis rather than to the government of Algiers to the west or Tripolitania in the 
south. This resulted in the apparent division of the country into two almost wholly 
independent states which Blacquiere observed during a journey to Tunis in 1813: 
"South of the range of mountains called Gibbel Mejerdah, which terminates the 
Regency of Tunis, you enter the country of Dates. The limits of this extensive 
and highly productive region are not known; however the Bey draws a very 
considerable revenue from the inhabitants; when the camp is sent out for the 
purpose of collecting the tribute, they only penetrate from one to two hundred 
miles into the interior, and from the inhabitants of a few large towns the 
contribution is extremely productive... it does not appear that they have any 
peculiar attachment to their Tunisian neighbours; but the Bey's superiority 
obliges them to cultivate his friendship. It cannot however be said that the 
country forms an integral part of his Highness's dominion as they are governed 
by their own laws, but subject to his revision and only pay the tribute to avoid 
greater evil". 32 
Lacking any well established network of representation of its authority in the siba 
through which the collection of taxes could be achieved the Government relied not only 
on its own personnel, particularly the army, but recruited help from amongst the tribes. 
Thus certain tribes, such as the Drid in Tunisia, were granted exemption from the need 
to pay some classes of taxes as payment for their help in arranging and organizing the 
tribute from neighbouring tribal fractions. 
Gellner refines the basic dichotomy between makhzen and siba by incorporating the 
central government's association with groups inhabiting the Biba, stating that: 
31 Hart, D. (1972) p. 26. 
32 Blacquiere, E. (1813) p. 139. 
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"... the country could be seen as composed of three concentric circles: the Inner 
Circle of tribes who extracted taxes, the Middle Circle of tribes who had taxes 
extracted from them, and the Outer Circle of tribes who did not allow taxes to 
be extracted from them. In other words, there were the sheep dogs, the sheep 
and the wolves". 33 
This essentially timeless opposition of mahkzen and siba in which neither was willing, 
or able, to gain lasting superiority was seen as the basis of the relationship between the 
state and the tribes over a period of many centuries giving rise to what is described as 
"an oscillating frontier". 
There is little doubt that the influence of central government in Tunis was limited 
amongst the tribal nomads, a situation which is reflected in constitution of the 
Beylicate's income in the early nineteenth century. In 1813-14, revenue from the 
interior of the country accounted for barely two-fifths of the government's total 
income. 34 Of this the contributions of the various regions were unequal the 
overwhelming majority being extracted from the agriculturally advantaged zones, the 
population in the hinterlands of Tunis-Bizerte accounting for 26.39%, the Jerid (land 
of dates), 24.78% and the northwest, 11.57%. Chater notes that only 2.19% of the 
Bey's receipts from the interior came from ethnic caidats amongst the tribes. 35 
To Gellner and writers of Tunisian history such as Valensi, this apparent political 
autonomy of tribal north Africa forms the framework for a deeper understanding of the 
nature of such societies in that it is seen as at one and the same time a product of and 
a reinforcement to, a system of internal social organization which was based on 
fundamentally different principles to those which characterized the settled populations. 
Without the structure and direction provided by the Bey's administration in Tunis, order 
and social cohesion in tribal society was maintained through the mechanical operation 
of a kinship based segmentary lineage system which for its continued existence 
33 Gellner, E. (1972) p. 3. 
34 Chater, K. (1984) p. 90. 
35 ibid. P, 90. 
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demanded and propagated an extreme form of social egalitarianism and economic 
equality. 
2.5 Segmentary Lineage Theory and Tribal Society 
The theory of social relations and political structures of tribal groups in north Africa 
owes much to the work of E. E. Pritchard's amongst the bedouin of Cyrenaica, 36 the 
central theses of which have been taken up and refined to form the core of studies of 
Moroccan tribal society by a number of political scientists, most notably Ernest 
Gellner. 37 
In this literature tribal social relations are defined by kinship ties with groups to which 
an individual belonged being defined by a series of male ancestors from the level of the 
individual to the level of the tribe where all lineages converged on one common 
ancestor. The individual is therefore found at the centre of a series of concentric, 
nested, circles whose boundaries never touch, such that: 
"The innermost circle will consist of the independent household; the next circle 
the group of households sharing a real or supposed common ancestor, and 
defining a little clan; the next circle a bigger clan unit or a whole village, and 
so forth" . 
38 
These concentric circles, or segments, and the kinship ties upon which they rested, 
form the basis of Evans-Pritchard's extremely elegant theory of segmentarity which 
Gellner and others have employed to explain how social cohesion can be maintained, 
almost mechanically, in societies devoid of a centralized, hierarchical form of 
government. Gellner notes that the: 
36 Evans-Pritchard, E. (1949). 
37 Gellner, E. (1969) p. 63. 
38 Ibid., pp. 41-42. 
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"... idea underlying [this] theory is that the functions of maintaining cohesion, 
social control [and] some degree of `law and order'... can be performed with 
tolerable efficiency, simply by the `balancing' and `opposition' of constituent 
groups" . 
39 
Each generation of ancestors i. e., each segment, is at once a point of cohesion between 
clans forming a part of a single tribal unit and also a point of rupture within which 
segmentary disputes can arise. Cohesion is achieved at each level by a threat from 
outside. Thus at the level of a clan a threat from outside will effect the solidarity of the 
units, or segments of which it is composed to meet and balance the opposition. As a 
result, there was no need for a centralized chieftainship. Pritchard sums it up best 
when he writes: 
"Authority is distributed at every point of the tribal structure and political 
leadership is limited to a situation in which a tribe or a segment of it acts 
corporately. With a tribe this only happens in war or in dealings with an 
outside authority which, for its own purposes, recognises the tribe as an 
administrative unit. There cannot obviously be any absolute authority vested in 
a single sheikh of a tribe when the fundamental principle of tribal structure is 
opposition between its segments and in such segmentary systems there is no 
state and no government as we understand these institutions, and criminal law 
is absent and civil law exists only in a very rudimentary form". " 
Although tribal chiefs or sheikhs did exist they were literally merely first among 
equals, " their tenure dependent on the support of his kin group and immediately 
revocable on the decision of the adult males of the tribal unit. The higher the level of 
his responsibility the broader were the groups to which his authority depended and, 
therefore, the less secure his position. As Gellner points out: 
"... the mode of election is such as could hardly be bettered if one wishes to 
prevent the emergence of permanently dominant individuals or subgroups". " 
39 Ibid., p. 63. 
ao Evans-Pritchard (1949) p. 56. 
Valensi, L. (1977) p. 83. 
42 Gellner (1969) p. 82. 
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The social egalitarianism produced in such a segmentary society as that outlined above 
is further enhanced, according to Gellner, by the role of the "Saints" or religious 
lineages. As Gellner accepts, at the lowest level of the individual or family and at the 
highest level of the tribe, there can exist no authority capable of regulating disputes. 
However, Gellner holds that at these margins of a segmentary society cohesion is 
assured by the function of the "Saints" for which the normal rules are, as it were, 
turned on their head: 
".... the relative segmentary purity of the lay tribes is made possible by the 
saints: these inegalitarian, stratified, pacific, "artificial" outsiders perform 
functions which enable the egalitarian, feud-addicted tribesmen to work their 
remarkably pure segmentary system. Here a separation of powers is not merely 
a check on tyranny, as intended in classical political theory, but also as a check 
on inequality. The inegalitarian potential of the society is, as it were, drained 
by the saints". " 
It is important to note, though, that the "inegalitarian potential" of the society in the 
economic sphere was not seen to be great in the first place. The kinship based 
segmentary lineage system, the political and social implications of which have been 
briefly described above, is held to have had equally important ramifications in the 
economic sphere. Indeed the economic organization plays as integral a part in the 
smooth running of the system as a whole as do the social and political underpinnings. 
In tribal society kinship ties and not the hierarchical and exploitative relationships of 
the settled zones are the principal determinants of productive relations, and collective, 
rather than individual rights and responsibilities are emphasised. This is perhaps 
most clearly exemplified with regard to the nature of landownership and usage. 
In contrast to the sedentarized regions where individual, private landownership 
43 Ibid., p. 64. This is achieved at the most basic level through the giving of gifts 
to the religious tribes but it also acts as an integral part of the segmentary system by 
smoothing out problems where the mechanical operation of segmentarity fails. 
44 See Valensi (1977). 
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prevailed, 45 land was held collectively by the tribal units as a whole and recognized 
at each level of the social structure not by titles or deeds, but by custom and historical 
and cultural factors. Within these areas rights to cultivation or occupation of land came 
with usage and were bestowed on individual production units according to need. 
Production for the satisfaction of these needs was not determined primarily by market 
forces but by family consumption requirements. Largely subsistence orientated, these 
nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples lived from a mixture of pastoral and, to a varying 
extent, agricultural activities the precise nature of which was determined by local 
physical and climatic conditions as describes above. 
Little of the product of tribal labour found its way on to the markets of the coastal 
towns. Yet as with any subsistence economy, an exchange of products did exist. The 
vagaries of climate and the different economic specializations within and between 
ecological regions, encouraged the complementary exchange of resources. In Tunisia 
inter-regional exchange essentially took the form of an exchange of surplus grain from 
the tribes of the Tell and the northern High Steppe, with the dates produced in the 
oases of the Djerid, where grain production was almost nonexistent. Thus each winter, 
large camel caravans would leave the north loaded with grain, some of which filtered 
through markets en route, but the majority of which was exchanged for dates in the 
oases. " Such exchanges were replicated between tribes in the same regions to help 
eradicate temporary deficits of subsistence products. 47 
The patterns of the resulting exchanges was strongly influenced by tribal kinship ties 
and were facilitated by a network of daily, weekly and periodic markets often located 
' Either in the form of small, individually owned units (melk) as was common in 
the olive growing coastal regions of the Sahel for example, or of the large government 
controlled estates (iqta) in the grain producing regions north of the Dorsale mountains. 
" The precariousness of grain production for many tribes meant that harvests were 
not always sufficient to provide surpluses with which to exchange for dates. 
Nevertheless transactions were maintained by the provision of credit facilities by the 
sedentarists of the oases to the semi-nomads on the basis of future grain harvests. 
47 M 'Halla, M. (1979). 
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at the confluence of rights of way or of different tribal territories. " As well as being 
an important place of economic interaction these markets also provided the principal 
forum for social and political interaction amongst fractions of the same tribe and 
between tribes, the markets frequented and the exchange relations undertaken being 
largely dictated by kinship or tribal ties. a9 
Kinship ties also provided the basis for the other great form of economic interaction of 
tribal life: the annual transhumance of animal herds in search of pasture. In the 
summer when lack of rainfall made pasture in the south and steppe difficult to find, the 
tribes would move north into the Sahel and the Tell where pasture would usually be 
sufficient to assure the needs of their animals. The reverse would happen in the winter 
when northern tribes sent their animals south or into Algeria. These annual movements 
were on the basis of kinship or other tribal allegiances. Thus the Ouerghemma in the 
far south would find pasture in the Aradh, and with the Neffet and Mehedba in the low 
steppe around Sfax. The Madgeur and Frachiche travelled to the Tell and into 
Algeria. " 
2.6 Criticisms of Segmentary Lineage Theory 
Segmentary lineage theory has played a dominant role in the analysis of the tribal 
populations of north Africa over the last thirty or so years. It has much to commend 
it as its staying power as a framework for analysis would suggest. In an extremely 
elegant way, it has established a framework for understanding how social cohesion can 
be maintained in societies where no central government exists. In doing so it has 
highlighted the political, economic and social underpinnings of a tribal society and thus 
emphasized that it can only be understood as a unified whole. It is to this which 
Valeiisi refers when she writes of Tunisia: 
48 See Benet, F. (1957). 
a9 See Mikesell, M. (1958) and Fogg, W. (1935). 
50 See Clarke, J. I. (1956). 
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"Les tribus tunisiennes constituent bien, pour consequent, une Societe du type 
segmentaire ou la politique, 1'histoire et 1'economie, sont exprimees en termes 
de genealogie; ou les relations politiques son fonction de la distance 
genealogique. Segmentaire egalement, car y fonctionnent conjointement la 
fusion - unite de territoire de filiation - et la fission 1'equilibre West maintenue 
que daps la tension interne, et le groupe se definit et se conserve par son 
hostilite a des groups homologiques". 11 
Nevertheless the adoption or, at the least, the uncritical acceptance of this highly 
schematised model as a true reflection of the reality of Tunisian tribal society is fraught 
with conceptual difficulties. The heavy emphasis on a sharp dichotomy between 
makhzan and Biba, state and tribe, settled and nomadic, in many ways merely 
reproduces the crude division between the "modern" and "traditional" of dualist 
development theories. By characterizing tribal society as politically autonomous, 
socially egalitarian and economically isolated from broader processes of development 
affecting the country as a whole, segmentary lineage theory effectively denies it any 
internal dynamic of change. Those changes wrought in the makhzan by an increasing 
integration into the rapidly evolving world capitalist economy, particularly during the 
nineteenth century, are seen to have little or no effect on the isolated, "backward" tribal 
populations where an "archaic mode of production" persisted. "Z The separation of the 
two sectors is complete. 
Furthermore the time element is eliminated from the study. As Seddon points out with 
regards Moroccan tribal society: 
"... four centuries of Moroccan history can be schematically reduced, without 
doing violence to the evidence, to an essentially stable perpetuum in mobile, or 
oscillating system consisting of .... two elements makhzan and Biba". 
53 
51 Valensi, L. (1977) p. 58. 
52 See Valensi, L. and R. Gallisot (1968). 
53 Seddon, D. (1977) p. 28. 
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To Gellner tribal society was maintained in "a kind of sociological ice-box"54 the 
dissolution of which awaited the political integration of the siba in the makhzan which 
was effected with the establishment of formal political structures by the colonial 
powers. 
From here it is but a short and convenient step to equate the beginnings of economic 
and social change, i. e., the degradation of the pre-capitalist social formation, with the 
sudden establishment of foreign political control. This has led one historian to claim 
recently that within tribal Tunisia, there was "un immobilisme sociale qui se modifie 
peu de 1'Antiquite ä nos jours". 55 
Clearly such a statement exaggerates the extent to which tribal Tunisia was immune to 
change and in recent years support for the need to re-evaluate some of the basic 
precepts of the Gellner thesis has come from a number of scholars critical of the 
ahistorical nature and universal applicability of segmentary lineage theory to the study 
of tribal north Africa. This has specifically centred on the validity of the idea of tribal 
political autonomy and social egalitarianism, the twin pillars upon which the model's 
edifice has been built. 
2.7 The Myth of Egalitarianism 
Abdallah Hammoudi's criticism of segmentary theory rests on the results of his study 
of those same tribal communities in the Moroccan High Atlas upon which Gellner's 
work was based. While acknowledging the importance of genealogy and kinship ties 
in the social fabric of the tribes, Hammoudi nevertheless highlights areas where the 
reality of social relation is too complex to be incorporated within the rigid, simplistic 
sa Gellner (1972) p. 60: The four criteria Gellner posits as determining the erosion 
of tribal cohesion in north Africa are: 
1. The date of colonial conquest. 
2. The type of colonial administration and the policies applied. 
3. The geographic milieu of the tribal group i. e., whether from the plains or the 
mountains. 
4. The extent of economic implantation of the colonial power. 
55 Arnoulet, F. (1984) p. 31. 
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assumptions of the theory. Specifically, he focuses on the position of groups whose 
genealogy is different to that of the larger unit of which it forms a part. This, he 
shows, was an extremely common phenomenon in the High Atlas which can occur 
either by the accretion of groups which have somehow become detached from their own 
lineage or simply by the conquering of one group by a more powerful aggressor. As 
an example he cites the case of the Ait Atta which conquered many of the oases of Dra, 
where they subsequently settled. As a result, the villages were renamed to reflect the 
historical origins of the conquering group. 56 
More importantly the two lineages which divided the population of the villages bore the 
name of their Berber ancestors. The aggressors, however, were Arabs. Under such 
conditions, Hammoudi claims, the "foreign" or dominated groups became clients to the 
dominant lineages. As a result, while sharing the burden of all the main charges and 
responsibilities of the group as a whole, they suffered discrimination over such matters 
as access to water rights. 
Whether temporary or permanent residents, foreign groups lived in a position of 
inferiority in relation to the group to which they were now attached. With regard to 
Tunisia, Baduch has attested the significance of such a basic cleavage within the tribes 
of the south. Many of the lowliest functions within a tribe were performed by 
"foreign" groups. In the Nefzaoua, for example, shepherds (or camelherds) came 
almost entirely from the Rebaia tribe. A lineage of the maraboutic tribe of the 
Merarique, well respected at the oasis of Douz in the Nefzaoua, which had settled 
amongst the Beni Zid, occupied the most menial positions of shepherds and guards for 
the livestock of the Beni Zid. The majority of shepherds of a tribe's animals came 
from such foreign groups. 57 
One of the clearest examples of social division was between black and whites, the 
56 For example, the village of Asrir was taken by Ilemshane and renamed Asrir 
n'Ilemshane. 
57 S. H. A. T. Notes succintes sur le Nefzaoua par M. M. Nancy, Lieutenant du 
Service des Afaires Indigenes, Kebili, November 1,1904, p. 16. 
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former occupying the lowest social category, often with little in the way of land and 
animals, and thus often forced to work as khammes, or salaried labour in agricultural 
activities in village communities. 
Even within lineages, cleavages existed. Baduel gives the example of the distrust 
shown to the Zmazma of the Beni-Zid by others of the same blood. 58 In his study of 
various Tunisian tribes during the eighteenth century, Cherif gives a more detailed 
description of socio-economic differences within and between tribes based on 
documents discovered in the beylical archives in Tunis. 59 Cherif initially focuses on 
more fundamental demographic inequalities which, he suggests, at a time when man is 
the main force of work and combat, were at the root of differences of wealth and 
power at all levels of tribal society. To illustrate this at the level of tribes, he points 
out that the tribe of the Zlass (Djlass) (Figure 2.5) was composed of up to 
30,000-40,000 people; the Wirtaten tribe numbered 10,000-12,000; the Ouled Bou 
Salem, 3,500; the Mehedba 6,000; and the Trud less than 3,000.60 
These basic differences between tribes are just as striking at lower levels of the tribal 
structure, from fractions to the smallest family unit. Thus, amongst the Ouled Sindasen 
of the Zlass tribe, the largest fraction, the Ouled Skhib is subdivided into seven 
sub-fractions of which the average size is 90 males. Yet with the Ouled Yddis fraction 
of the same tribe, the average number of males to each sub-fraction is over 200. By 
contrast, the Ouled Bou Salem, sedentarists of the High Medjerda valley, is divided 
into fifteen fractions and sub-fractions, where the average is 55 men per unit. " The 
Mehedba tribe of the low step in the hinterland of Skira is very different again with 260 
being the average number of males per sub-group. 62 
sR Baduel (1981) p. 7 
59 Cherif, M. H. (1981) pp. 291-310. 
60 Ibid., p. 299. 
61 Ibid., p. 299. 
62 Ibid., p. 300. 
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Even at the smallest unit distinguished by the documents Cherif used, restrained family 
and its family head, the differences are readily apparent. Thus while groups of two and 
three families make up over three-quarters of all groups amongst the Zlass and the 
Ouled Bou Salem, amongst the Mehedba groups comprising four men and over 
constitute a relatively high percentage (43.5 %) of the total. By contrast, the Trud has 
an average of 222 men per family group. 
Aside from these basic demographic differences, Cherif's study also highlights a 
marked degree of economic inequality within and between the tribes examined. 63 The 
total population of the Ben-Salem which amounts to 3,500-4,000, have 1064 mecchias 
at their disposal, the equivalent of over 10,000 hectares. Less than 6% of the 296 
family groups censured had the rights to over half the land area, with each property 
averaging 277 hectares. Properties of between 100 and 200 hectares account for a 
further one quarter of the land controlled by the tribe. So these two categories, making 
up one-eighth of family heads, own 71% of all land exploited by the tribes. ` Once 
again the fortunes of lower order groups vary considerably. 
As an example, Cherif focuses on the largest sub-division of the tribe, the Ouled Bou 
Hafna, comprising 52 families, and totalling 153 adult males. The cheikh of the Yahia 
bin Salah fraction of this tribe, was composed of the very high number of ten adult 
males, exploiting some 400 hectares and disposing of 25 oxen and 50 sheep, equal to 
nearly 40 % of the group's land and 25 % of its animal resources. Cherif noted similar 
divisions within the other fractions of the tribe. The Ouled Bou Salim, however, could 
be regarded as unrepresentative of tribes located further south in the high steppe since 
it occupied a fertile and well irrigated area of land in the climatically favoured high 
Medjerdah, and was heavily engaged in cereal cultivation. Furthermore, part of their 
produce was directed to the Genoese trading station at Tabarka and the French 
equivalent at Cap Negre, both of which were flourishing at this time. As Cherif 
63 Although the documents used only refer to groups holding at least twelve 
hectares of land and a few dozen heads of animals and therefore focus on the wealthier 
sections of tribes, the results nevertheless show the degree of economic differentiation. 
64 Ibid., p. 304. 
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observes, sedentarization and contact with European commercial networks, "... peuvent 
rendre aisement compte des differentiations economiques fort importantes que nous 
avons observees". 65 Yet he goes on to show similar stratification amongst the mainly 
pastoral, semi-nomadic tribes of the Zlass and Mehadba. Taking the example of the 
Mkhalif fraction of the Ouled Khalifa (Zlass), 15 % of the total population owned nearly 
one-half of the animals belonging to the group with an average per unit of 259 sheep. 
By contrast, 44% of the fraction's population accounted for less than 6% of the total 
animal resources of the fraction with an average holding per unit of eleven heads. 
In sum, the social and economic egalitarianism of Gellner's theory, most forcibly 
supported in Tunisia by Valensi's analysis of the populations in the interior of the 
country must be viewed with a degree of scepticism and is, at best, a highly idealized 
reflection of the reality of tribal Tunisia. Social and economic differentiation was 
apparent at all levels of the tribal structure, irrespective of the economic base of tribal 
groups. We do not mean to imply by this either that these differences were as marked 
as those evident in the towns and amongst the settled peasantry or that a primitive 
accumulation of capital was evident amongst the tribes since that is clearly not the case. 
Kinship ties were of primary importance in determining social relations amongst a 
population for whom the economic potential of their land, with the technical means of 
production available, was limited. The social and economic cleavages which existed 
even in the eighteenth century when the weight of government taxation of the tribes was 
light, were to be intensified during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a 
direct result of the increased taxation of tribal Tunisia itself a product of the extension 
of the state's influence in the interior of the country. 
2.8 The Degradation of Tribal Political Autonomy 
There is no question that Tunisian tribes enjoyed a considerable amount of political 
autonomy from Beylical rule particularly those tribes, such as the Ouerghemma, 
Hammama and Beni Zid, more distant from Tunis. As was stated above, the weakness 
of the central authority's influence in these outlying regions is clearly shown in the 
6s Ibid., p. 305. 
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tribes' relatively weak contribution in the form of taxes to the state's treasury. 
Nevertheless, just as the sedentary regions had beylical governors representing the 
state's authority, so too did the tribes. By the beginning of Mohammed Es Sadok's 
reign in 1859 the number of ethnic caidats (i. e. caidats of tribes and not of territories) 
was estimated at forty. 66 Even the most distant and rebellious tribes of the 
Hammamma and Frachiche had governors whose main function was to assure the 
collection of taxes. Moreover, even as early as the late eighteenth century, the 
beylicate appointed Cadis or sharia religious judges to the confederation of the 
Hammama and Ouerghemma tribes. " Although their authority was limited, being 
secondary to internal or community laws, they represented an important extension of 
the central government's influence amongst the tribes. 
The political autonomy of tribal Tunisia came under increasing pressure during the 
1850's, 1860's and 1870's as the beylicate sought to enhance its presence among the 
southern tribes. This was partly borne of political motives to display to the French and 
Ottoman governments in particular its control over the politically sensitive border 
regions. By putting an end to the constant cross-border disputes of the tribes it was 
hoped to eliminate a potential means of legitimizing foreign intervention, though this 
was ultimately unsuccessful. More importantly, however, it reflects the treasury's 
rapidly deteriorating financial position which was posing a very real threat to the 
country's de facto independence. The sharply increased expenses from the reign of 
Ahmed Bey onwards resulting from the modernization of the army and attempts to 
establish western style manufacturing industry had brought mounting debts. This, 
ironically designed to ward off formal annexation by one of the powers, was 
subsequently systematically exploited by the latter, each of which sought to establish 
economic and political preeminence in the country. The mounting public debts and 
continued high levels of imports forced the Beylicate, in the attempt to shore up its 
ailing finances, to raise a greater proportion of income from the more systematic and 
thorough taxation of the population including the tribes. The result, particularly under 
66 Mahjoubi, A. (1977) p. 24. 
67 Cherif, M. H. (1986) tome II, p. 193. 
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Ahmed Bey and his successors, was the strengthening and extension of the caidal 
administration in the interior designed specifically to extract a greater surplus from the 
tribal populations. 68 The most extreme example of the Bey's attempts at extracting 
a greater surplus from the population was the doubling of the medjba (poll tax) in 1864, 
which led directly to a massive revolt, brutally repressed, of which the economic 
repercussions were profound. 
Tribal Tunisia influenced, and was influenced by, the evolution of the central 
government in Tunis. Tribes had, for example, played an integral role in the 
opposition of the beys and the deys in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. 
What is evident is that where the tribes did come into conflict with the interests of the 
state, their attitude towards the letter was essentially manifested in their acceptance of 
a situation of deference towards it, rather than autonomy from it. The plethora of local 
uprisings and regional rebellions which characterised Tunisia under the beys were 
defined by a feeling that the intrusion of the state into their lives was too great, not that 
it was entirely unjustified. 69 Many of these uprisings, particularly during the 
nineteenth century, were protests against the fiscal exactions of the bey's 
representatives. the sentiments expressed were not so much anti-state but rather 
anti-too-much-state. They were, therefore, essentially reactionary movements which 
implicitly accepted the state's rights to extract taxes from them. The rebellion of 1864 
for example, was the direct result of the doubling of the mejba, or poll tax, and the 
imposition by the Bey of Caids originating from without the tribes themselves. 70 
There was no suggestion that the tribes were against the principle of Caidal authority; 
it simply reflected a desire to have local people fill those posts. 
The scale of the revolt provides a clear indication of the potential for tribal solidarity 
68 The number of ethnic caidats created to oversee the tribes (as opposed to 
territorial caidats established amongst the sedentarists) was estimated at forty at the 
beginning of Mohamed Es Sadok's reign in 1859. Mahjoubi, A. (1977) p. 24. 
" See, for example, Cherif, M. H. (1980). 
70 See Chater, K. (1978). 
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in Tunisia. Such was the strength of feeling against the measures that not only were the 
tribes unified in their opposition, but so too were large sections of the sedentary and 
urban population along the southern coast. Indeed the uprising was even supported by 
a large number of beylical representatives, the most famous being its leader Ali ben 
Ghadahem, caid of the Madger tribe, previously renowned as one of the state's 
staunchest allies. 
The events of 1864, however, equally well illustrate the limitations of tribal solidarity 
and in particular the increasing influence of the state's authority and its ability to 
exploit ruthlessly, existing tribal divisions to its own ends. The rebellion was crushed 
by the army within a few months with severe repercussions on the economy of southern 
Tunisia. " 
2.9 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter is not to show that tribal social relations were merely an 
underdeveloped form of those in the sedentarized region. This was clearly not the case. 
Social stratification existed to be sure, but it was hardly based on exploitation of one 
by another. Kinship ties formed the underpinnings of the social fabric and determined, 
to a large extent, political expression. Even in the years immediately prior to the 
establishment of the French Protectorate the tribal populations, particularly those more 
distant from the towns, did enjoy a marked degree of political autonomy. 
Nevertheless it is important not to idealize these. Social and economic inequalities 
existed within and between tribes and these cleavages widened, particularly during the 
nineteenth century, as the increasing pressure on the Bey's finances led him to raise not 
only the general level of taxation but its scope as well. Even some of the remotest 
tribes which had been used to avoiding their payment found, by the 1860's, that their 
fiscal obligations were being more rigorously enforced. Continued tax rises and their 
more systematic collection in the interior, resulting from the expansion of the Bey's 
authority amongst the tribes served to heighten existing inequalities. Taxation, even 
71 Ibid.. 
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amongst the town and peasant populations, was unequal, the rich and better off were 
less heavily taxed than the poor. The result during the mid-nineteenth century was the 
impoverishment of the more disadvantaged sections of tribal society for whom 
resources were too limited, or more correctly, too limited to rely on year after year, 
to be able to meet their obligations to the state. The situation was worsened in the two 
decades before the imposition of the Protectorate by a series of natural disasters, 
famines and plagues, which reduced large sections of the population to near ruin, 
scarcely able to survive let alone pay their taxes. It is this which created conditions 
propitious to the beginnings of the trade in alfa grass from 1870 which for the first time 
and on a large scale, linked the tribes of Tunisia directly with the European economy. 
Alfa grass grew throughout much of the south and centre of the country on land 
belonging to the tribes but until 1870 its use was limited to the fabrication of locally 
used products and for the pasture of animals. An understanding of the trade's origins 
subsequent development and its impact on tribal society requires an examination of 
social, political and economic conditions at a local, national and international level. 
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Chapter Three 
The Origins of the Alfa Trade in the United Kingdom 
3.1 The British Paper Industry 
The significant demand for alfa grass which emerged from the 1860's onwards, sprang 
from serious shortages of raw materials in the world's paper industry. 
Until the late eighteenth century, all paper was made entirely by hand. The marked 
rise of output in Britain during the century, predicated upon industrial expansion and 
population growth was, therefore, achieved not so much by any significant 
technological innovation, but by the construction of an increasing number of paper mills 
throughout the country. ' In Scotland between 1790 and 1823 a doubling in output was 
achieved by the increase in the number of mills from 29 to 74.2 
Although the quality of paper produced in these mills was generally high, output, and 
particularly productivity, were very low. While of no great import in the early decades 
of the century, this technological stagnation became more and more a liability to 
papermakers as the years progressed. The increasing pace of population growth, 3 the 
spread of industrialisation, of urbanism, the expansion of education, together with the 
advance of publishing and the emergence of a daily press, all combined in the latter 
quarter of the eighteenth century and on into the nineteenth, to create a very 
considerable increase in demand for paper products of all kinds. 
This pressure served greatly to intensify existing strains on the supply of paper which 
technological (or technical) limitations to its production had brought about. To ease the 
' By the end of the eighteenth century, there were 416 mills operating in England 
and Wales, 49 in Scotland and 60 in Ireland. Education Committee of the Technical 
Section of the British Paper and Board Maker's Association (1950) p. 16. 
I Thomson, A. (1974) p. 176. 
3 The population of the U. K. doubled to 29 million between 1800 and 1861. 
Coleman, D. C. (1958) p. 207. 
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blockage and meet the rapidly escalating demand for paper, manufacturers devoted a 
much greater amount of time, money and effort on research into more efficient methods 
of production. 
The first significant breakthrough came in 1799 when a Frenchman, Louis Robert, at 
the mill of Didot Freres at Essonne, invented a machine capable of making paper 
continuously, as opposed to the earlier intermittent methods dictated by the hand mould. 
These were troubled times in France and Robert's invention was brought to Britain in 
order to secure the financial backing for its development. It was adopted by the 
London firm of stationers, Henry and Sealy Fourdrinnier, for whom further 
modifications and improvements by the young engineer, Bryan Donkin, made the 
machine a commercial proposition. 
Table 3.1 Number of mills at work in the U. K., 1840-1860 
Year England & 
Wales 
Scotland Ireland Total 
1840 362 48 52 462 
1850 328 48 39 415 
1860 306 52 26 384 
Source: Coleman, D. C. (1958) p. 221. 
Although the firm was pushed into bankruptcy in the process, the machine was to 
revolutionise the paper industry, forming the basis for the rapid rise in output which 
followed, not only in Britain, but throughout the world, during the nineteenth century. 
By 1830 one half the paper made in the UK was produced using Donkin's machine, of 
which 38 had been sold by 1833, and 191 by 18504 out of 407 paper making machines 
of all types in operation in Great Britain. 5 Largely as a result of mechanisation, 
4 Clapperton, R. H. (1952) p. 3. 
5 Munsell, J. (1876) p. 115. Scottish paper producers, perhaps as a result of the 
abundance of water supplies, were quick to realise the potential of the new machines, 
their contribution to paper production in the U. K. rising from 10.7 % in 1824 to 22.2 % 
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British paper production more than quadrupled in the years 1821 to 1857,6 despite a 
sharp fall in the number of paper mills (Table 3.1). 
Hills notes that in Britain in 1851 there were 563 newspapers including 17 dailies. By 
1867 this had risen to 1294 newspapers of which 84 were dailies. 7 The daily print run 
of The Times required 7.5 tons of paper in the 1850's as the circulation continued to 
climb from 2000 copies in 1790 to 65,000 copies in 1861.8 At the same time Hills 
states, The Illustrated London News printed, on one occasion, half a million double 
numbers equivalent to one million sheets, exceeding 70 tons in weight. ' The rapid 
escalation in the number of newspapers and in the volume of sales was matched in 
other areas of printing. The number of letters posted in the U. K., for example, rose 
from about 75 million immediately prior to the introduction of the penny post in 1841 
to 329 million in 1849.10 
Such a steep rate of increase in paper production during the nineteenth century (Table 
3.2), which was matched in the major European countries as well as the U. S. A., could 
not have been achieved without the introduction of papermaking machines. But 
productivity was only one of the problems facing the industry in the mid nineteenth 
century. As demand continued to rise rapidly the availability of raw materials became 
an increasingly important issue to the trade. 
The manufacture of paper had for long relied almost exclusively on cotton and linen 
rags as the primary raw material input. The shortage of these resources had caused 
serious problems in the industry even during the eighteenth century, but these were 
in 1854. See Thomson, A. (1974) p. 192. 
6 Thomson (1974) p. 176. 
Hills (1988), p. 119. 
Ibid., p. 121. 
Ibid., p. 121. 
10 Ibid., p. 123. 
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Table 3.2 British Paper output 1830 - 1605 
Year Amount of 
paper made 
(lbs) 
Year Amount of 
paper made 
(lbs) 
Year Amount of 
paper made 
(lbs) 
1830 62,882,830 1841 97,105,550 1852 154,469,211 
1831 
1832 
62,024,346 
64,935,467 
1842 
1843 
96,693,323 
103,449,627 
1853 
1854 
177,633,010 
177,896,224 
1833 68,418,965 1844 109,495,148 1855 166,776,394 
1834 70,605,889 1845 124,247,071 1856 187,716,575 
1835 74,042,650 1846 127,442,482 1857 191,721,620 
1836 77,692,282 1847 121,965,315 1858 192,847,197 
1837 88,950,845 1848 121,820,220 1859 217,827,197 
1838 93,466,286 1849 132,132,660 1860 223,575,285 
1839 97,646,544 1850 141,032,474 
1840 97,237,358 1851 150,903,543 
Source : BPP (1861) Report from the Select Committee on Paper (Export Duty on 
Rags), Appendix 3, p. 110. 
largely overcome by the rise of textile production, the waste products of which formed 
the source of much of the rags used in paper-making. By the mid-nineteenth century, 
however, the substantial increases in paper production throughout the world had 
engendered a major crisis in the industry as papermakers were thrown into a position 
of greater competition for available rags. Moreover, although textile output continued 
to rise, the level of waste did not increase proportionately : 
"In consequence of improvements in machinery, and the cotton manufacture not 
being so profitable as it used to be, an immense quantity of the waste is used 
up in the (textile) mills where the manufacture took place". " 
i' Select Committee, p. 292. John Evans, partner in the papermaking firm John 
Dickinson and Company, reported to the Select Committee that ".. we have also lost a large quantity of the cotton waste, in consequence of the extension of the railway 
system, for a good deal of it is now taken to clean the railway engines, and so on. Ibid., p. 10. 
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In Britain The Economist claimed that "so great was the consumption of paper by the 
reading and writing population of Great Britain, rags could not be procured in sufficient 
quantity to meet the demand". 12 
Inevitably, in conditions of such scarcity, the price of rags rose sharply. In England, 
for example, top quality rags which were selling for 26 shillings per hundredweight in 
1852, were attracting between 32 and 34 shillings in 1854.13 Similar increases were 
observable for lower quality rags. 14 
3.2 Alternative Sources of Raw Material 
The increased production and consumption of paper products and the resulting acute 
problems in obtaining raw materials during the nineteenth century, particularly in the 
1850's and 1860's, gave an added urgency to the need for research into new production 
methods in general, and a greater priority to the search for alternative sources of raw 
material in particular. " 
Rags were ideal for paper making because they contained up to 90% cellulose, which 
constituted the main ingredient in paper. 16 Yet it was well known that all plant life 
was made up of cellulose to varying degrees. Thus it was that a great number of 
experiments were undertaken all over the world, on a bewildering variety of vegetable 
matter in the hope of finding a suitable alternative to cotton and linen rags. " The 
'Z Ibid., p. 140. 
13 Munsell, J. (1876) pp. 125,136. 
14 Ibid., pp. 125,136. 
is The Times offered a reward of £1,000 in 1854 to anyone who could discover a 
viable and readily available substitute to rags in the production of paper. It was never 
claimed. Evans, J. (1955) p. 109. 
16 Cotton was the purest form of cellulose "requiring practically no preliminary 
treatment to render it fit for paper-making". Clapperton (1952) p. 6. 
" The Times, August 4,1871, reported the British Consul-General of Havana, Mr 
Graham Dunlop's observation that "the papermakers of England should give some 
attention to the enormous quantities of fibrous tropical plants and trees which abound 
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banana plant, tree bark, basswood, bracken, thistles, roots of horseradish, peat, 
bamboo, and the common garden hollyhock were but a few of the materials tried in the 
search for new paper-making materials many of which, together with new processing 
methods, formed the basis for a large number of patents taken out by hopeful 
inventors. 11 Such investigation was by no means limited to Britain. The Times, for 
example, under the headline "New Material for Paper", reported in 1873 that at a 
recent General Assembly of French Papermakers, MM Jourdeuil, Parizot and Gresse 
had submitted samples of a new textile fabric, the sheath of the hop stalk which, by 
removing the outer skin and "submitting it to a certain chemical process, a textile 
substance possessing the qualities which made rags so valuable in papermaking, namely 
length, suppleness and delicacy of texture, has been produced". 19 
The technical feasibility of producing paper from such plants and trees was never in 
question. The real issue in seeking a resource which could make a significant impact 
on the paper trade was finding a resource in sufficient quantity, constant supply and at 
a competitive cost. Most of the materials tried were of no more than local interest to 
paper manufacturers, their limited geographical extent and often isolated location made 
their widespread adoption impossible. Moreover, apart from their often small cellulose 
content, the cost of bleaching and otherwise preparing the fibre for paper making was 
prohibitive. The report of the Select Committee set up to investigate the problems of 
Britain's paper manufacturers in 1861 noted that : 
"the committee have directed their equal attentions to inquiry as to the 
possibilities of applying any new fibre as a substitute for the refuse material 
now in use for papermaking purposes, and find that great efforts have been 
made to discover some material of this nature, but as yet without success; and 
although they see no reason to doubt that straw and other fibrous substances 
may form a supplementary part of the material for paper-making the great 
comparative expense of chemically reducing these raw fibres presents difficulties 
in Cuba. Successful experiments have been made by local papermakers on the fibre 
of the bamboo cane and on some of the creeping parasite plants indigenous to Cuba. 
18 See Munsell. 
19 The Times, August 30,1873. 
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to their becoming a substitute for refuse material now used. "20 
Of all the materials straw offered the most potential to British papermakers it being 
readily available in many regions and close at hand. Some manufacturers did begin 
using straw during the early to mid nineteenth century but really only out of necessity 
since the quality of paper produced from the material was very inferior to that from 
rags being hard and brittle offering a poor colour. It was only suitable for low grade 
packaging and carding materials although it was used to supply the requirements of 
some newspapers both in Britain, where The Morning Star was made of straw paper, 
and in the United States. 21 Quite apart from the poor quality of paper made entirely 
from straw, or even when mixed with rags, supply was not necessarily as easy as might 
have been thought. John Evans in his report to the Select Committee pointed out that 
in some counties there were clauses in the leases which compelled the tenants to 
consume the straw on their own land. 22 In his testimony to the Committee William 
Thomas who was manufacturing paper from straw at his Soho Mills near High 
Wycombe, replied to a question in which he was asked if straw was in abundant 
supply: 
"No; and if another straw manufacturer were to set up a mill on the same 
stream where I am I believe it would so enhance the price of straw that we 
23 should not be able to work it at a profit at all". 
Although the price of straw was much cheaper than rags it did tend to fluctuate greatly, 
"at some times it is 30 shillings a ton and at others £4. "24 John Evans stated that he 
had heard of instances "where the manufacture of paper of straw had been commenced 
20 Report of the Select Committee, p. 270. 
21 Report of the Select Committee, Submission by Mr Frederick Magnay, p. 16. 
Munsell notes that "The Ledger, a Philadelphia daily paper having a very large 
circulation, perhaps 20,000 or 30,000 a day, was printed on paper made principally 
from straw..... It was manufactured by Fienour and Nixon at Manayunk, by what was 
denominated Melliers process, by which, it was claimed, paper could be made of 
almost any vegetable fibrous substance", p. 134. 
22 Ibid., p. 11. 
23 Ibid., p. 47. 
24 Ibid., p. 42. 
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and then discontinued or been incapable of being extended on account of the dearness 
of straw, resulting from the demand created"Y In addition the levels of waste in the 
manufacture of paper from straw was extremely high, one ton of paper requiring 
anything between three or four tons of straw, while the cost of preparing and bleaching 
could reach anything between five and six times the cost of similarly treating rags. 26 
Wood was another source which held out some promise, but the mechanical processes 
which were developed, despite the improvements made by Keller and Voetter, 27 
produced a poor quality pulp the use of which was largely limited to brown paper and 
wrappings. It was not until after 1866, when Tilhman took out his patent for the 
chemical production of pulp from softwoods, that this material gained ground in the 
paper industry. 28 
3.3 Thomas Routledge and Esparto Grass 
In Britain by the early 1860's, a promising alternative to rags was already gaining 
widespread acceptance thanks largely to the perseverance of Thomas Routledge who, 
though not originally a paper maker, had become interested in the search for new raw 
materials in the early 1850's. Born in 1819 the son of a wine merchant, Routledge 
joined a company in South Wales when he left school where he applied his scientific 
training to the extraction of copper from its ores. While with the firm he met the 
Marquis of Bessano who was at the time greatly involved in the search for a substitute 
to rags in the manufacture of paper. Routledge became interested in the subject and 
Z5 Report of the Select Committee, p. 10. 
26 Ibid., p. 42. The Encyclopaedia Britannica (1859) noted that "... straw... costs 
only about £2 to £3 a ton; but we believe that the cost of bleaching it will make the 
amount £16 or £18 in all; and when to this is added the fact that.. . not one 
half or even 
one third of the weight of straw employed is got back in paper, and that the paper is 
necessarily much more brittle than that from rags there appears no great advantage in 
using it". 
Z' Education Committee of the Technical Section of the British Paper and Board 
Maker's Association, Inc. (1950) p. 18. 
28 See, for example, Clapperton (1955) p. 4. 
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spent a good deal of his time at the Royal Botanic Gardens in Kew where he began 
working with esparto, or alfa, grass. Although he himself rapidly became aware of the 
potential of esparto he quickly realised that the only way to really prove its utility was 
to make paper on a mill scale and so it was that in 1854 he rented a small mill at 
Eynesham, near Oxford. His choice of mill was not made at random. Eynesham had 
been experimenting with other fibres for some time but without any notable success. 29 
Esparto grass was not new to the paper industry and Routledge never claimed he was 
the first to introduce the material to papermaking. The first patent for making paper 
from esparto was probably taken out by Miles Berry in 1839 followed by another in 
1853 in the name of Jules Dehau of Paris and one in 1854 by James Murdoch. 30 
Routledge was, however, undoubtedly the first to take it beyond the experimental stage. 
In 1856 he brought out his first patent for the extraction of cellulose from the material 
and in the same year began full scale production of pulp from his mill at Eynseham. 
He did not find immediate success with his new process, the early products of which 
were considered a poor substitute for rags. 31 John Carlisle, of C. E. and J. G. Potter, 
papermakers in Lancashire, had experimented with esparto in the mid 1850's but the 
tests were a failure even with the expert help of a French chemist after initial work on 
their own account proved fruitless. 32 Carlisle did not believe esparto would provide 
papermakers with a viable alternative to rags for papermaking and said as much even 
29 See, for example, Watson, G. (1957) The Search for Papermaking Fibres - 
Thomas Routledge and the Use of Esparto Grass as a Papermaking Fibre, Papermaker 
26. Reid notes that Routledge had said at a meeting of the Society of Arts in 
November 1856, that the proceedings of the Royal Agricultural meeting at Oxford in 
1852 had been printed on paper made from twitch or squitch grass at the Eynesham 
mill. Reid, J. (1948), Some Contributions to the History of Esparto, Proceedings of 
the Technical Section of the British Paper and Board Makers Association 29. 
30 Evans, Joan (1955) The Endless Webb, John Dickinson and Co. Ltd. 1804-1954 
London: Jonathan Cape, p. 109. 
31 Carter, Harry. (1967), p. 204 notes that the ledger of Wolvercote mills records 
a single payment to Routledge in August 1857 the material being found unsuitable. 
32 Report of the Select Committee, p. 60. 
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in 1861 to the Select Committee. 33 
In the latter years of the 1850's, though, the acute shortage of rags became critical for 
British paper manufacturers which to were increasingly forced to resort to the 
importation of rags from Europe (see Table 3.3). Imports of rags rose by almost 270% 
from 9414 tons in 1855 to 25,287 tons in 1863. 
Table 3.3 British imports of rags, 1855-1868 (in tons) 
Year Tons Year Tons Year Tons 
1855 9,414 1860 16,122 1865 18,264 
1856 10,284 1861 19,587 1866 - 
1857 12,196 1862 21,966 1867 18,399 
1858 11,379 1863 25,287 1868 17,860 
1859 14,598 1864 23,732 
Sources: Trade and Navigation of the U. K. with Foreign Countries and British 
Possessions for the Years 1855 to 1859. British Parliamentary Papers 1860, LXIV; 
1861, LX; 1862, LVI; 1863, LXV; 1864, LVII; 1865, LII; 1866, LXVIII; 1867, 
LXVI; 1868, LXVII. 
Although supplies came in small amounts from many countries, the principal sources 
came from, or via, a number of European countries, notably Russia, Germany, France 
and Italy. Thus, in 1863, of the 25,287 tons imported, Prussia accounted for 6,643 
tons (all linen rags); Hamburg, 3,348 tons (of which 2,233 tons were linen rags, the 
remainder mainly cotton); the Italian States, 3,141 tons; and France, 2,349 tons. 
During the late 1850's, however, many European countries, in an effort to protect raw 
material supplies for their own industries, imposed either heavy duties or, as in the case 
33 Carlisle felt that the paper produced was of a similar quality to that made from 
straw, being brittle and expensive to reduce and bleach. He was not convinced that 
esparto could be a total substitute for rags although conceded that it may be of some 
use as a mixture with rags, in the same way that straw was. Report of the Select 
Committee, p. 60. Likewise experiments done at Hollins Mills, on which £3,000- 
£4,000 was spent, proved a failure even after the help of a French chemist. See Reid, 
p. 234. 
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of Belgium and Spain, prohibitions on the exportation of rags. In France, for example, 
the duty amounted to £4 17s 6d in 1861, in Holland the tariff was £8 8s 4d, while from 
the Zollverein the export levy was £9 3s. 34 
British paper manufacturers pointed out that this gave their French and German 
competitors a competitive advantage over them of £5 and £9 respectively. Indeed, as 
it took between one and a half tons of rags to produce a ton of paper, the true 
differential was in the region of £7 and £14 per ton for the finished product. 35 The 
Times36 complained that the French export duty in as much as it enhanced the 
purchase cost of French rags to British mills, was "equivalent to a bounty paid out of 
his pocket and into that of the French competition". " 
What made the situation worse for the British paper trade was that in a trade treaty with 
France in 1860 the Government proposed to abolish the Customs duty of 2.5d a pound 
on imports of foreign paper which at Id a pound above the Excise duty (also to be 
abolished) paid by British manufacturers on their output had provided a form of 
protection against imports. 38 In October of 1861, all duties on paper were abolished. 
The result was that the price of British paper fell by some 10% between March 1860 
and March 1861 causing "a loss on the working of some mills and for others to go on 
half time". 39 One manufacturer, Mr Benjamin Brown, of Kent, reported to the Select 
Committee that the regulation of duties had "reduced my profit so low that at the 
present moment I am unable to tell whether I have any profit at all; and I am carrying 
on my mills in the hope that some relief may arise from this investigation and that the 
34 BPP (1861) LVIII, "Return of the names of those countries in Europe which 
permit and prohibit the free export of rags, or impose a duty". 
35 The Times, Wednesday, June 15,1864 "The Paper Trade". 
36 Ibid., p. 7. 
31 The Times, Saturday, January 30,1864, p. 6. 
38 Ironically, British paper makers had been calling for the abolition of the 1.5d 
excise duty for many years, seeing it as a "tax on knowledge". Evans (1955) p. 103. 
39 BPP (1861) XI, Report from the Select Committee, p. 231. 
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Government may see the necessity of obtaining either free trade on rags, or reimpose 
the ld per pound import duty from those countries who refuse our equitable 
demand". 40 
3.4 Esparto Introduced to British Paper Making 
Although many of the claims from manufacturers were undoubtedly exaggerated (the 
number of licences granted for the production of paper actually increased in 1861) the 
measures forced many to take more seriously the possibilities of using different raw 
materials. And it was to esparto and to Thomas Routledge that many turned. 
Routledge himself had not been idle in the intervening years and had spent a great deal 
of time and money in refining his process to be commercially viable. In 1860 and again 
in 1861 he brought out new patents which greatly improved the quality of paper 
produced. 41(see Appendix 1) 
At the International Exhibition of 1862 Routledge was awarded a medal for his esparto 
paper the citation of which reads: 
"Numerous patents have, as might be expected, been taken out for the treatment 
of this plant. Those by Mr Routledge would appear from the increasing 
employment of this material, to be the most useful, effectual and economical. 
Judging from the specimens of paper exhibited from Mr Routledge, and 
manufactured by him at his mills at Eynsham, near Oxford, exclusively from 
esparto, as well as from the other specimens of paper manufactured at various 
other mills employing his process, in which esparto is used as a blend ordinary 
rag material, the results are very satisfactory, demonstrating that a new material 
has at length been brought into use, meeting this long desired requirement both 
as regards quality and economy" . 
42 
In fact paper made from esparto was to become renowned for its quality being on a par 
to, and for certain important uses, better than that produced from other materials 
40 Ibid., p. 348. 
al His earlier patent involved the use of an alkaline solvent containing more lime 
than was necessary to make it caustic and the washing of the fibres in a bicarbonate 
solution, while in that of 1861 he used a solution containing only enough lime to make 
it caustic. See Carter (1967) p. 203. 
42 The British and Colonial Printer and Stationer, August 15,1895, p. 10. 
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including rags. 
"Esparto papers are distinguished by their refined, silky texture and bulk and 
close uniform surface or finish. This latter quality, after this bulkiness, is their 
most outstanding characteristic and makes them eminently suitable for fine 
printings and other papers required to take a fine impression from plates. The 
best body paper for surface coating are mostly made from esparto because it is 
so light, body paper of about 50% esparto being preferred. The fibres are very 
absorbent, taking and retaining a high proportion of resin size and may be made 
into quite a hard and "tinny" paper. Esparto papers are easily watermarked 
very regular in expansion and contraction, and unsurpassed for offset paper. 
The fibres readily absorb colours and brilliant tints may be produced". a3 
Routledge decided that instead of the traditional route of charging users a royalty for 
his invention, he would make his secret freely available but on the condition that those 
who wished to adopt his process buy their semi-processed material (or pulp) : 
"I speedily found that the papermakers largely looked to my secret as calculated 
to ameliorate the then depressed conditions of the [paper making] trade. In 
1860, and subsequently, 88 parties, all large papermakers, signed agreements 
[with Routledge]. The first agreement was signed by Mr Rawlings in 1860". 44 
Routledge defined the conditions which a new material should fulfil : 
(1) It must yield a paper of good quality at low cost and with uniform success. 
(2) The supply must be constant and unvarying at low price, not liable to fluctuate. 's 
These conditions he claimed were: 
"met by esparto and contracts have been arranged at prices not much above the 
cost of hay in this country or the cost of freight and charges alone of any fibre 
imported from the colonies or the East Indies. Supply is guaranteed from 500 
up to 3000 tons per annum and can be increased. The cost of half stuff is £10 
- £16 for partly bleached, £16 - £26 for wholly bleached. compared with rag 
half-stuff at £26 435 per ton. "16 
Partly because of effluent problems but also to increase the potential production of 
43 Labarre, E. J. (1952) pp. 91-92. 
as The British Colonial Printer and Stationer, no 824, vol XXXVII, June 11,1896, 
"Esparto and Its History, part V. 
45 Reid (1948) op. cit., p. 233. 
46 Ibid., p. 233. Prior to 1861, the excise duty applied only to paper, not to half-stuff, and this is one reason why Routledge planned to sell half-stuff to the paper 
trade. See Watson (1957) op cit., p. 4. 
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esparto half stuff (pulp) Routledge purchased, together with John Evans of Dickinson 
& Co., the Ford Mill at South Hylton near Sunderland around 1860, the new company 
having Routledge as manager and Evans as chairman. 47 Although production 
continued at the Ford Mills until it burnt down in 1887, Routledge, in 1866, joined 
forces with George Noble in the Esparto Trading Company, in which Noble was to act 
as a general broker between the esparto supply from Spain and the trade in general. 48 
The company was would up in 1876 having failed to submit returns in accordance with 
the Companies Act (1862) for the year 1875.49 
The production of paper made from esparto became a speciality of mills in northern 
England, and particularly in Scotland, where many of the pioneer consumers of the 
grass were based. This was partly because of the abundance of fresh water, coal fields 
were close at hand (esparto provided coals ships journeying to the Mediterranean with 
ballast for the return leg) and because carbonate of soda and bleaching powder had been 
produced by Charles Tennant at the St Rollox works since the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, so 
But in general British Paper producers quickly took to esparto enthusiastically on 
47 Reid, J. (1948) p. 232. It is interesting to note that Evans, whose firm had been 
experimenting with esparto for some time at their mill in Hertfordshire, had to cease 
production of half-stuff there because of problems with the effluent created in producing 
esparto pulp. See Evans, J. (1955) op. cit., p. 110. 
48 Reid notes that G. R. Noble was a pupil at ford Mills during Routledge's time 
and stayed at his home, p. 235 
49 Routledge himself helped found the Esparto Trading Company in 1866 (Board 
of Trade 31/1288/3245) along with George Noble and William Hope amongst others. 
Both Noble and Hope, the latter in partnership with Daniel McNaughton and trading 
under the name McLean and Hope, were to assume a tremendous influence in the trade 
in the succeeding years (see below). The company was wound up in 1876 because it 
failed to submit returns in accordance with the Companies Act (1862) for the year 
1875. See Walton, J. (1985), p. 954. 
50 Reid, J., op. cit., p. 235. 
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quality as well as cost grounds. " it even became extensively used in the manufacture 
of newsprint. The Times, The Daily Chronicle, The Illustrated London News, The 
Graphic, and The Sphere were just some of those which converted to esparto paper. 52 
Table 3.4 British Imports of Alfa Grass in Tons and By Value (1870-1881) 
Year Quantity (tons) Value (£) Ratio (£/ton) 
1870 103,161 - - 
1871 114,400 1,239,811 8.58 
1872 104,621 803,396 7.68 
1873 102,649 843,672 8.23 
1874 119,176 972,385 8.16 
1875 141,900 1,113,285 7.85 
1876 130,891 1,046,649 7.99 
1877 175,878 1,286,237 7.31 
1878 140,505 932,300 6.64 
1879 161,971 1,055,616 6.52 
1880 191,229 1,372,573 7.80 
1881 102,493 1,286,211 6.68 
Source: British Parliamentary Papers (1871) LXIII; (1872) LVI; (1873) LXIII; (1874) 
LXIV; (1875) LXIII; (1876) LXII; (1877) LXXX; (1878) LXXi; (1878-79) LXVIII; 
(1880) LXXI; (1881) LXXXVII; (1882 LXVIII. 
Imports of the grass to Britain rose dramatically during the 1860's (Table 3.4). From 
878 tons in 1862, they increased sharply to 19,329 tons in 1863, whereafter imports 
s' In 1856 a ton of esparto sold at £4 while the price of cotton was £8. See The 
British and Colonial Printer and Stationer, August 15,1895, p. 10 and BPP (1861) XI, 
Report from the Select Committee, p. 293. 
52 One newspaper owner, Mr Edward Lloyd, whose titles included Lloyds Weekly 
London Newspaper, and later The Daily Chronicle, imported his own grass directly to 
his mills on the Medway from Algeria where by 1871 he was reputed to own 180,000 
acres of land for the sole supply of his publications. See Walton, J. (1985). 
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continued to climb at a remarkable rate. In 1864, imports were almost double the 
previous year's level at 43,403 tons, reaching 52,324 tons in 1865, and 69,468 tons in 
1866 and after dipping slightly to 55,073 tons in 1867 reached 95 828 tons the 
following year. 
As a corollary to this, and despite the continued expansion of paper production in the 
U. K., imports of rags declined (Table 3.2). From 25,287 tons in 1863, they fell to 
23,732 tons in 1864,18,264 tons in 1865,18,399 tons in 1867, and only 17,860 tons 
in 1868. 
3.5 Spanish Grasses 
All but a tiny fraction of this consumption of esparto was met by Spanish grasses which 
flourished in the coastal region around Barcelona, Malaga, Sevilla and Aguilas. 
Because the grass held little or no economic value for any other agricultural activity, 
British companies, including The Esparto Trading Company, had little difficulty in 
obtaining from the Spanish Government the rights to the exploitation of the grass 
growing over large areas of the country. These concessions were given on payment 
of an annual rent plus an additional sum for each ton exported. British firms and 
merchants flocked to the region encouraged by the prospects for profit which the 
rapidly increasing level of demand promised. 
Within a few years, however, the scale of demand together with imprudent methods of 
collection and continued political unrest in Spain had created severe problems of 
supply. As early as 1865 the Tullis Russell firm of paper manufacturers warned that 
they had heard "of some merchants closing their accounts with Spain on account of its 
unsettled political state. Let this be kept in mind". " Four years later the firm's 
esparto supplier in Aberdeen wrote complaining: 
"You have no idea of the great loss I have sustained by short weight and bad 
quality... It is difficult to get justice from these Spanish merchants...! have had 
so much trouble and difficulty in connection with esparto this year". 54 
53 Ketelby, C. D. M. (1967) p. 111. 
54 Ibid., p. 111. 
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As supplies became a problem prices rose sharply by £3, to £10 a ton between March 
1869 and September 1870.55 The market report of Lynn and Co. in March 1870 
noted that: 
"Owing to the continued scarcity of this fibre the market maintains the firm 
character reported in the last circular and prices still ride high.... Our most 
recent advices from Spain... announce an advance of at least 10s per ton on the 
extreme rates already paid and the market is so sensitive that the appearance of 
an additional buyer upon the spot is a sufficient cause for an immediate rise in 
prices". " 
3.6 North African Grasses 
Routledge, himself, came to the opinion that the supply from Spain was becoming so 
difficult that it would soon become unviable to purchase from there, largely on the 
grounds of imprudent collection methods. He estimated that it took at least fifteen 
years to reproduce esparto from seed and that it was certain to become exhausted in 
Spain. During the 1870's, while not abandoning esparto (he continued, on his own 
account and in collaboration with others, to apply for patents to improve the treatment 
of esparto even until the 1880's) Routledge turned his attention to other vegetable 
matter, principally bamboo, which he, erroneously, with hindsight, believed would take 
over from esparto as an important material in the manufacture of papers' 
Demand for esparto continued to rise in succeeding decades with imports climbing to 
103,161 tons in 1870 and 144,441 tons in 1871. To meet the demand merchants 
increasingly turned their attentions to alternative sources of supply which were found 
along the southern shores of the Mediterranean in the north African countries of 
Algeria, Tunis, Tripolitania and, to a lesser extent, Morocco. Routledge never claimed 
any rights over north African grasses since he was confident of supplies from Spain, 
and apprehensive of developing contacts with north African countries. The grass, 
however, grew abundantly in the higher plateaux of north Africa from Morocco in the 
west and into the vast alfa fields of Algeria and further to Tunis and Tripolitania in the 
55 Ibid., p. 111. 
56 The Times, March 31,1870 p. 9. 
57 Reid, J., op. cit., p 235. 
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east. 
But Morocco, Tunis, and Tripolitania in these early years held few attractions for 
British traders, for whom they remained "the Barbary States", controlled by 
governments hostile to Europe and Christianity. Algeria, however, as the only north 
African country where Europe had asserted her dominance, was somewhat different. 
Algiers had been annexed by France in 1830 since when it had been governed through 
a French staffed administration directly from Paris. One of France's principal aims in 
Algiers was to encourage as far as possible, the exploitation of the country's resources 
by French nationals, or "colons". 
But with regard to the alfa trade, other considerations came to the fore. From 1830, 
France had been struggling desperately to subjugate the whole of the country, 
particularly the remoter areas traditionally less inclined to pay much attention to central 
authority even before French annexation. It was in these areas, though, that much of 
the alfa grew. For France, its collection provided unique opportunities to help pacify 
the turbulent tribes of these regions by encouraging links with European trade. 
To the French, this land was of no economic value, and anything which promoted order 
and European influence among the tribes was to be encouraged. If substantial profits 
could be extracted from such otherwise worthless land, then so much the better. If it 
was not to be Frenchmen who would take the land in this trade, then at the least, 
growing as alfa grass did in the poorest soil of the country, its collection would not 
deprive Frenchmen of valuable cultivable acreage. 
The French administration did everything in its power to aid the development of the 
trade in terms at least as favourable as those experienced in Spain. The French ceded 
the rights of exploitation of alfa growing in arch, or tribal land, to foreign 
companies. 58 
5S In 1873, for example, a total of over 300,000 hectares of tribal land in the high 
Plateau of the Department of Oran were concede to aM Debrousse, who formed the 
Compagnie Franco Algerienne, a concession subsequently extended to 700,000 
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For many years most of the Algerian tribes inhabiting the esparto districts would have 
little or nothing to do with the trade. They considered the employment nothing more 
than menial labour. Furthermore, intense dislike and distrust of French and other 
European parties made the tribes largely antipathetical, if not hostile to the companies' 
operations on land which they had always regarded as theirs since time immemorial. 
Thus, for many years, the collection and preparatory work on alfa before shipment was 
done by migrant Spanish labour, generally from the esparto districts of Spain, and 
therefore already skilled in the methods of collection. 
3.7 Conclusion 
The severe shortage of raw materials for the production of paper and paper products, 
mainly caused by increased demand consequent on increasing industrialisation, 
urbanisation, the expansion of education, had created the conditions by the mid 
nineteenth century in which innovation was both required and flourished. The repeal 
of the advertising tax in 1853, the abolition of the stamp duty in 1855 and of the paper 
and excise taxes in 1861, encouraged the increased demand for paper. Such increasing 
demand outpaced the availability of raw materials producing increased costs at a time 
of reduced selling prices. Thomas Routledge is owed a great deal for his pioneering 
work in persevering with his experiments and refinement of the process of converting 
esparto grass into a cost effective, and high quality alternative to rags in the 
manufacture of paper. Such an unlikely resource was to become a staple of the British 
paper industry for the following 100 years despite the introduction of wood pulp to the 
industry. 
hectares. 
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Chapter Four 
The Beginnings of the Alfa Trade in Tunisia 
4.1 Introduction 
With demand for esparto from the British paper industry increasing rapidly during the 
late 1860's and encouraged by the ease with which Algerian grasses were being 
exploited, British commodity brokers began to seek new opportunities in the material 
further afield. As the known esparto resources in north Africa stretched to the far east 
of Algeria, the obvious place to start was in Tunisia. Thus it was that in 1871 the 
British firm of McLean and Hope, which claimed to be the world's largest shipper of 
alfa grass, wrote to the British Consul in Tunis, Richard Wood, enquiring as to the 
geographical extent of the grass in the country and to the possibilities of its profitable 
exploitation on a large scale. 
Wood, knowing nothing of the material himself, but ever eager to promote British 
interests in the country, immediately contacted his consular agents along the southern 
coast urging each of them to submit their assessments of the grass in their respective 
districts. Even McLean and Hope were quite taken aback by Wood's reply which they 
found : 
"... astonishing and quite overreach our highest estimate as we could not hear 
of more than 25 ships for that trade (9,000 - 10,000 tons)". ' 
Wood was himself delighted with the possibilities of an important new branch of British 
commerce in Tunis. Enthusing at length about the resource he wrote in a letter to Lord 
Granville at the Foreign Office that : 
"... notwithstanding the 
brought to the market, 
Regency. "2 
very small quantity [of esparto grass] which was 
Esparto grass exists in unlimited quantities in the 
But the mere existence of esparto grass in Tunisia was no guarantee of its successful 
' FO 335/133/3 McLean & Hope to Wood, July 11,1871 
2 FO 335/127/2 Tunis, September 18,1872. 
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exploitation as a raw material for Britain's paper industry. Esparto grass, which was 
indigenous to north Africa, had, for centuries, played an extremely important economic 
and ecological role in the regions where it grew. In Tunisia these were regions 
populated by semi-nomadic and nomadic tribes living a subsistence way of life based 
on animal husbandry. These regions and their inhabitants were only marginally linked 
to the increasingly market orientated economy of the settled populations of the coastal 
belt. Travel amongst the tribes of the interior was dangerous and contacts few. 
Politically, as was discussed in Chapter Two, the tribes enjoyed a high degree of 
autonomy from the central government in Tunis. 
Of course similar problems faced the merchants in neighbouring Algeria when attempts 
were first made to develop a trade in esparto and these were rapidly overcome. But 
the Tunis of 1870 was an altogether different proposition to Algeria at the same period. 
In Algeria the French staffed Administration went to great lengths to facilitate ease of 
access to the country's esparto resources, offering very cheap concessions to the rights 
to esparto on common ("arch" or (tribal)) land to foreign businessmen and a number 
of other inducements to promote the exploitation of a resource which would, otherwise, 
have provided little value to the country. French interests in Algeria were as much 
motivated by political as economic reasons, the grass growing in tribal regions where 
French political control was still weak even after 35 years of formal Metropolitan 
control. Bringing the distant tribes more fully into the broader economy and increasing 
their dependence on external business interests was seen as a useful means of extending 
French political authority in these regions. 
In Tunis, by contrast, the Beylical government had neither the means nor the will to 
attempt to offer similar conditions to merchants and businessmen. The Bey, 
beleaguered by financial crises and beset by constant and increasing foreign 
encroachment on his sovereignty, was unable even to guarantee merchants' safe passage 
into the interior. The possibility of his offering the rights to exploit esparto on tribal 
land was remote in the extreme and attempts to do so would have been political suicide. 
Conditions for the development of any large-scale trade in esparto grass in Tunis gave 
few grounds for optimism. 
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4.2 Terminology - Esparto and Sparte 
It may be worthwhile, at the outset, to clarify the terminology used in the esparto trade. 
The term esparto reflects the trade's Spanish origins (indeed for many years, even after 
the introduction of north African grasses, the material was often referred by British 
papermakers as Spanish grass). Confusion arises in north Africa where esparto grass, 
or more properly stipa tenacissima, is often mistaken for a similar plant, lygeum 
spartum. This latter was termed sparte by the French but which the Arabs of north 
Africa called halfa maboula or sennagh. Halfa maboula, which the Spanish knew as 
albardine, has slightly different qualities to esparto known to the Arabs as halfa 
roussiya or guedim. 3 To the uninitiated the difference between the two may not be 
immediately apparent although it should be possible, particularly during the season of 
growth in early spring and summer, to distinguish between the yellow-green hue of true 
alfa (esparto), from the blue-green colourings of lygeum sparte (sparte). On closer 
inspection the dissimilarities become more obvious the latter being characterised by 
smaller, stiffer leaves and generally growing to a height up to 40 cm, while the former 
has longer, finer, leaves often growing to 70 cm or more. 
Geographically the two plants enjoy quite different habitats and, although both could 
be used in the manufacture of paper, this was always the exclusive reserve of esparto. 
Throughout this work the terms esparto and alfa are used interchangeably to denote the 
material which was used in the manufacture of paper. 
4.3 Sparte (Lygeum Spartum) 
Much less hardy than alfa grass, sparte is less widespread in Tunisia and although 
found in relatively limited amounts in many parts of the country it is more at home at 
low elevations near the coast where the higher humidity and damper soils suit it best. 
In Tunisia it was, and is today, most commonly found in the south in the immediate 
3 See, for example, De Kerambiec (1909), also, Fleury, V. (1900). In fact the 
terminology in north Africa is somewhat more varied than this. Monchicourt comments 
that in the High Steppe alfa is called, by the Arabs, halfa and sparte sennah while in 
the low steppe alfa is called guedin or halfa roussiya, sparte, in these regions, being 
referred to as halfa maboulah or just halfa. Monchicourt, C. (1906) p. 39. Fleury, op. 
cit., p. 54, points out that in the south the berber name, el an, was also widely used. 
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hinterlands of Sfax, Gabes and Zarzis 
While never used in the manufacture of paper (at least not in Britain) sparte was, and 
had been for centuries, extensively used in the small (korbou), the special baskets used 
for holding the pulp of crushed olives during the pressing process (chamis), and a 
whole range of mats. Other items commonly made from sparte were sandals 
comprising a simple sole fastened to the foot by two or three thongs which were 
pressed between the toes, passed around the foot and fastened in front. Rope and 
cording was also widely made from sparte but there were literally hundreds of objects 
made from the material its use limited only by the imagination. 
Again alfa and sparte could be used interchangeably for such items although sparte was 
preferred because it was easier to work than alfa. Many tribesmen used alfa grass 
where sparte was unavailable to make these goods for their own consumption or for 
barter but some people specialized in the production and commercialization of goods 
from sparte, the people of the Kerkennah Islands off the coast at Sfax being particularly 
renowned for their skills in this regard, often travelling as far as Tripolitania for 
supplies of the material. Their production was not only directed towards local 
requirements, and a good proportion of their output was destined for markets 
throughout the Mediterranean basin. Indeed, when Wood made reference to the "very 
small quantity" of alfa having been brought to market he may have been referring to 
sparte in its raw state or already worked which was commonly purchased by Sicilian 
merchants for export to Trapani, Genoa and other towns on the Italian coast where it 
was used to make nets for the tuna fishing industry. 
4.4 Esparto (or Alfa) Grass 
Alfa grass (stipa tenacissima) is a rushlike plant indigenous to Spain and north Africa 
although also found elsewhere in the Mediterranean basin. ' The parent stock, or base 
of the plant which appears like a stiff wiry clump is perennial and the leaves, which can 
Much more commonly found elsewhere in the Mediterranean are lygeum spärtum 
and dins, a similar plant. 
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grow from anything between 15 and 140cm, are of annual growth. The leaves grow 
from the stem which, to reduce moisture loss, curls round itself to form a thin, curved 
tube. The junction of the annual growths with the stem is called the "atochon" .5 
The 
atochon first appears in December or January continuing to grow until the spring when 
the ear appears. The flowering occurs in April or May, the ripening in May or June. 
When ripe the leaves may be pulled from the root which remains in the ground to grow 
again the following year. 
The germination of the seed takes place in the autumn. When growing from seed the 
growth process is extremely slow and it can take up to fifteen years for the plant to 
reach maturity. Propagation is usually achieved by creeping underground stems which 
grow outwards from the parent plant and creates another clump close by which itself 
then spreads outwards and so on. The plant, therefore, is very capable of reproducing 
itself without the need for germination as long as it is not over-harvested. Over- 
harvesting in Spain and the length of time re-generation from seed would take was the 
principal reason why Routledge moved away from esparto in the 1870's, devoting more 
time to experiments with other plants, principally the bamboo. But, if treated well, the 
plant benefits from prudent harvesting which improves the quality of the leaves for 
papermaking. 
4.5 The Geographical Extent of Alfa Grass in Tunis 
Much hardier than sparte, alfa is supremely well suited to the difficult environmental 
conditions which prevail over much of north Africa. Requiring little water and resistant 
to wide variations in temperature, the plant grows best on thin, siliceous or limestone 
soils. Moisture tends to inhibit its growth and its preferred location is at higher 
elevations inland in areas of low humidity and where annual rainfall is between 400mm 
and 100mm. Thus, although found in some parts of the Tell, it is much more 
widespread south of the Dorsale mountain range which separates the more 
Mediterranean climate of northern Tunisia from the desert and semi-desert south 
(Figure 4.1). 
5 Anon., The British and Colonial Printers and Stationers 1895, p. 10. 
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Figure 4.1 Alfa steppe. Source: Mensching, H. (Ed. )(1985) Afrika - Kartenwerk, 
Serie N: Nordafrika Berlin: Gebrüder Borntraeger 
Alfa grass is, par excellence, the vegetation of the steppe where it predominates over 
large areas almost to the exclusion of all other plant life. The largest expanses of alfa 
are to be found in the high steppe around the towns of Kasserine, Feriana and 
especially Sbeitla about 150km from the coast. A continuation of the alfa growing in 
the Departement of Constantine in eastern Algeria the grasses of the Tunisian High 
Steppe are tall and luxuriant more so than that found elsewhere in Tunisia and indeed 
most of north Africa. At around 800m above sea level, with low humidity and rainfall 
averaging below 400mm per annum the grass, here, is in its element : 
dans les environs de Sbeitla surtout, les touffes serrees les unes contre les 
autres couvrent toute la surface du sol sur les montagnes qui sont boisees et 
dans quelques rares enclaves sans grande etendue qui sont les terres de labour 
des indigenes de la region. L'alfa est la dans sa veritable station, a 800 ou 900 
metres au dessus du niveau de la mer, et y donne les plus beaux produits"6 
As Monchicourt observed so thick does it grow in this region that travel through the 
wiry clumps can be difficult and slow. ' 
Further east in the low steppe to the south and south east of Kairouan and particularly 
around the sebka Sidi el Hani and Hadjeb el Aouin considerable quantities of alfa grow 
over huge expanses of land. Larger amounts, however, are found further south along 
the chain of mountains stretching from Gafsa to a point some way inland from Skira 
and as far north as the immediate hinterland of Sfax. In this area alfa grass was 
especially prevalent on the mountains such as Djebel Aiacha, Djebel Majoura, Djebel 
el Hafay, Djebel Mezzouna, Djebel Maknassi (Sened), Djebel Ayacha and Djebel Bou 
Hedma further east. 
Moving progressively southward towards the desert, alfa grass becomes increasingly 
less evident and tends to be restricted more to the higher lands. It is found, albeit in 
limited amounts, in the sparsely populated lands along the mountains on the northern 
edge of the Chott el Fedj and Chott Djerid and also in the mountains of the Matmata 
6 Fleury, V. (1900) p. 58. 
' Monchicourt, C. (1908) p. 39. 
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in the far south. Although of more retrained extent even in the Matmata mountains, 
alfa grass is a significant resource in that region and is but the western extremity of the 
extremely large alfa fields of Tripolitania. 
Alfa grass thrives under climatic and environmental extremes in which few other plants 
are able to survive and as such, tends to grow almost to the exclusion of almost all 
other vegetation. In these regions it is a plant of great ecological importance. The 
clumps of grass help bind the soil together ameliorating the worst effects of wind and 
water erosion which periodically afflict these regions of Tunisia, particularly in summer 
and autumn when the threat of the hot dry mistral winds and of flash floods are at their 
greatest. In addition the plant provides much needed shade in lands largely devoid of 
cover, under which a variety of small grasses are able to grow which form the principal 
fodder for the livestock of the semi-nomadic tribes people. The dead leaves of the alfa 
plant also provides a humus which nourishes the thin soils such that other grasses are 
able to grow. A common practice of the tribes was to burn the alfa grass in late spring 
to allow their animals easier access to the young shoots of grass growing in the shade 
of the alfa plant. Alfa grass itself, although seldom sought by animals through choice, 
also offers a source of food of last resort for many animals deprived of alternatives 
during severe drought! Although sheep would never eat it under any circumstances 
the camel, goat and horse would turn to it in extremis. 
4.6 Initial Scepticism of the Development of a Trade in Alfa Grass 
Despite the awareness as early as 1870 of the geographical extent of alfa grass in 
Tunisia there was also a widespread appreciation that its exploitation on an economic 
scale was not going to be easy. The areas where the grass grew were inhabited, 
largely, by nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes. As discussed in Chapter Two, these 
tribes continued to enjoy, even in the 1870's, a high degree of political autonomy from 
the Beylical government. Although the Bey's representation amongst these tribes had 
increased with the expansion of the Caidal structure of governors, particularly during 
8 The horse would only ever eat the roots of the alfa plant, while the camel, goat 
and ox would eat, the only usually as a last resort, the young spring shoots. Fleury, op. 
cit., p. 57. 
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the nineteenth century, this was designed more as a means of improving the efficiency 
of tax collection from these tribes and of formalizing thereby their allegiance to his 
government, than it was an attempt to increase the power of his authority to govern 
them directly. 
The position of Caid was usually purchased by wealthy individuals who viewed it as 
a commercial proposition based, mainly, on the income generated from tax collections. 
They seldom lived amongst the tribes they governed. The tribes themselves were 
largely hostile to the notion of the authority of the central government and despised the 
Caids as being both foreign to their tribe and as agents of the state as well as for the 
widespread abuses of power which the Caids were responsible for. 
Lacking any real and effective authority over the tribes of south and central Tunisia, 
the Beylical government was not in a position to offer similar preferential conditions 
to merchants wishing to develop a trade in alfa grass in the country which were made 
available in Spain and Algeria. In Algeria, the French administration offered merchants 
cheap concessions to the exploitation rights of alfa growing over large areas of tribal 
land. This was not a feasible proposition for the Beylical government in Tunis. Since 
to the tribes, the rights to the land they inhabited was God-given and inalienable, it was 
not for the secular authority of the Bey to offer it or rights to its natural resources to 
anyone else. For the Bey to have attempted it would have been would have been 
political suicide. Without the military means of enforcing it could only have alienated 
a large section of the tribal population and would have resulted in immediate uprising 
amongst tribes who retained a significant degree of military power. At a time when 
the Beylical government was in severe financial difficulties and faced with the very real 
threat of political annexation by one of the foreign powers, the possibility of a 
widespread revolt by the tribes was inconceivable. 
In Tunis and Tripolitania (apart from a brief and singularly unhappy period in Tunis 
between 1881 and 1887, see below) there could be none of the huge concessions of alfa 
lands which characterized the trade in Spain and Algeria. In the former the 
development of a trade in alfa grass would depend on merchants' ability to persuade 
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the tribes to collect the grass in sufficient quantities to be economically viable. This 
was a daunting prospect for many contemporary observers. Commercial activities in 
the Regence were heavily concentrated in the agriculturally more favoured north of the 
country and in the towns along the southern coast such as Mahdia, Sousse, Sfax and 
to a lesser extent Gabes and Djerba. Although direct economic ties between any of 
these towns with the tribes of the south and central interior did exist they were irregular 
and very restrained. Overwhelmingly subsistence oriented, these tribes had little desire 
or need to trade with the settled populations of the coast. For the merchants and 
townspeople of the coast the tribes were seen as hostile. Travel through these lands 
was considered dangerous and few native townspeople, let alone European `infidels', 
would even contemplate a journey into the interior without a heavily armed escort for 
fear of attack from the tribes. Personal safety even with explicit local government or 
beylical authorization could never be guaranteed. This was not merely a perception but 
based on experience. There was a large number of caravans from Sousse but 
particularly Sfax and to a lesser extent, Gabes, which periodically traversed the country 
carrying indigenous products and European manufactured goods and colonial produce 
for sale in the towns of the interior of Tunis such as Gafsa, Tozeur and Nefta, as well 
as for towns more distant markets in Tripolitania and Algeria. These were by no 
means immune from attack and were constantly harried by tribesmen throughout their 
journey. Despite armed escort even the best defended of these met, occasionally, with 
mishap or disaster. ' The numerical diminution of these caravans from the 1850's is 
a mark of the scale of the security problem in the south of the country. Most of the 
trade which did exist between the tribes and townspeople did so within the protective 
cordon of the city walls. 
Although the potential was widely recognized there was a great deal of scepticism 
9 There are numerous examples of these in the archives. One such caravan, 
returning to Sfax from Tebessa in Algeria in 1873 with 40,500 francs in gold received 
from sales in the market in the Algerian town, was attacked while travelling through 
lands belonging to the Hammama tribes, its drivers mercilessly murdered and money 
and animals stolen. The caravan had been organised and backed by a number of 
Maltese merchants in Sfax. Aix en Provence, 25 H 18, Le General de Division aM 
le Gouvernor General, Constantine, January 29,1873. 
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concerning the feasibility, at least in the short term, of a large scale trade in alfa grass 
in Tunisia. Edward Carleton the British consular agent at Sfax was not alone in his 
feelings when he wrote, in early 1871, that : 
"... it would be possible to reach 150,000-200,000 cantars [about 10,000 
imperial tons] but without speculation and development in the hinterland and no 
transport (camels or carts), it would be too expensive as one would first have 
to pay a man two copper piastres for a days work. In order to reach the desired 
quantity I believe that we must first send a man into the hinterland, a reliable 
person, but we must have the support of the local government which would 
guarantee the safety of body and possessions" . 
10 
4.7 Perry Bury Company First to Trade in Alfa 
Apparently unbeknown to British consular officials, the Liverpool firm of Perry Bury, 
which had for many years been trading in north Africa mainly in the export of olives 
and olive oils, was already, at the time of Mclean and Hope's request of Richard 
Wood, in the process of pioneering the collection and exportation of alfa grass in both 
Tunisia and Tripolitania. In Tunisia Perry Bury's business was based in Sousse and 
Sfax, two of the most important olive growing areas and the principal commercial 
centres in the south of the country. They were also, in 1871, the ports closest to the 
alfa districts which already had customs posts and from which, therefore, exports were 
permitted by the government. 
Sousse was the port nearest the alfa growing in the high steppe on the lands occupied 
by the Fraichiche and Madger tribes while Sfax was nearer the alfa districts in the south 
central low steppe and the far south. 
The company operated initially by entering into contracts with individual merchants 
whose job it was to arrange for the collection and delivery to the coast, of enough grass 
to fulfil the pre-arranged contracts with produce brokers in Britain. Most agreements 
were made with Italian and Maltese merchants of long standing and already involved 
in small scale import/export activities in the country. Although these merchants were 
'o FO 335/125/1 Carleton to Wood, Sfax, January 14,1871. Response to Wood's 
initial request for information to provide Mclean and Hope. 
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well versed in trade and trading practices amongst the coastal populations, as Europeans 
their links with the interior tribal peoples beyond the immediate sedentarized coastal 
areas was very limited. Thus these individual merchants in turn engaged, as and when 
required, a number of native Arab and especially Jewish brokers, often on a profit 
sharing basis which was common to the region at that time. These brokers would deal 
directly with tribal units, negotiating terms for the collection of alfa grass and for its 
transportation to the coast. Sometimes the grass would be collected at a pre-arranged 
point in the hinterland and the brokers would organize transport to the ports of Sousse 
and Sfax, but more common was to include the transportation in the agreement with the 
tribes. 
Perry Bury met with almost immediate success in their early dealings in alfa grass 
indeed so successful were these initial contacts with some of the most feared tribes in 
the country that even the most outspoken sceptics of the trade were forced to admit that 
their worst fears were unjustified. Hence Carleton's more optimistic letter written only 
three months after his cautious response to Wood's original circular : 
"The crop is extremely good and it is said that up to 60,000 cantars have 
already been gathered and that much more is expected from Gabes and other 
localities in the region so that I no longer feel that it is necessary to have local 
government support or a roads insurance. "" 
Such was the scale of the trade that even at Sousse and Sfax which were, in the context 
of the Tunis of the day, important centres of trade, the problems of storage of the 
material quickly became acute. No adequate storage facilities existed which could cope 
with the quantities of grass which began arriving in these ports from the interior and 
a variety of transhipment points along the southern coast. Alfa grass is a bulky 
material and space was required as the grass had to be initially dried and then kept dry 
prior to its being baled and then shipped. 12 Given the crucial importance of keeping 
11 FO 335/125/1 Carleton to Wood, Sfax, April 14,1871 (translated from the 
Italian original). 
12 "... when [alfa grass is] damped with water a process of fermentation sets in due 
to the action of albuminous compounds upon the starch, gum sugar and woody fibre 
and such, aided by a process of eremacausin due to the oxidisation of the organic 
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the grass dry yet near to the port for ease of embarkation onto the ships space had to 
be rented in covered accommodation within the town walls. The obvious threat of fire 
posed by the large amounts of grass stored in close quarters within the town provoked 
a public outcry in both Sousse and Sfax, mainly from European residents fearing for 
their own safety and that of their houses, businesses and merchandise located close by. 
Ironically in both towns British (mainly Maltese) voices were to the fore in condemning 
the practice. Incensed, they wrote to Wood asking for his intervention in persuading 
the local government officials to enforce the removal of the grass to a safe distance 
from the towns. Requesting clarification of the problem Wood received a letter from 
his vice-consul at Sousse, Stevens, in which the scale of the problem was highlighted: 
"The total deposit of sparto at present stands at between 60,000 and 70,000 
cantars [about 3,500 tons] and the only available stores out of town in the hands 
of 4 Italian merchants can hardly contain 15,000 cantars so that the quantity 
actually stored by merchants of different nationalities, comprising many 
Tunisian subjects, within these walls and in the inhabited quarter of the town 
amount to 50,000 cantars and this quantity every day increasing. "13 
Wood immediately instructed Stevens to enter into discussions with the local 
Governor's representatives to try and find an equitable solution to the problem and, 
after protracted negotiations, both agreed that 
".. unless something is organised providing proper storage for esparto in some 
isolated part of the town it would be unfair and impracticable to oblige them to 
remove the esparto without indicating a proper place they can use". 14 
Stevens suggested the old rubbish dump situated just outside the town walls to the east 
but this was vetoed by local government officials and it was left to individual merchants 
to make their own arrangements. Perry Bury rented a plot of land immediately outside 
the town walls close by the jetty where they erected a yard and outbuildings serving as 
constituents by the oxygen of the air, give rise to the heating of the esparto fibre.... " 
and "... when such processes take place in the wet or damp grass stored in 
bulk ... will... lead to the spontaneous combustion of the grass". British and Colonial Printer and Stationer no. 819, vol. XXXVII, no. 19, May 7,1896, p. 15. 
13 FO 335/125/1 Stevens to Wood, Susa, September 8,1871. 
14 Ibid. 
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offices and stores, which were completely enclosed so as to minimise the risk of fire 
spreading in the event of an accident. 
At Sfax, where similar problems and protests emerged, Perry Bury again responded by 
renting a plot of land between the town and the sea upon which they built their yard 
and installed their presses. 
Perry Bury, which was not only the first company to engage in the alfa trade in Tunis 
but also by far the largest, received the full backing of British consular officials for 
their operations. This was given for a variety of reasons. For the Consul Wood, a 
zealous, and formidable, defender of British interests against those of the other Powers, 
the alfa trade, which was almost entirely carried on for British requirements, offered 
considerable opportunities to strengthen his country's and, it must be said, his personal 
standing in Tunis at a time of increasing rivalry amongst the consular representatives 
of Britain, France and Italy. Although, unlike the other two countries, Britain had no 
interest in formal annexation of the country, there continued the strong desire to 
buttress the country's independence within the loose framework of the Ottoman Empire 
in keeping with Britain's overarching policy on the Eastern Question. Britain hoped 
that greater British commercial involvement in Tunis would offer a convincing 
counterbalance to any threat of annexation by France or Italy based on the grounds of 
safeguarding the commercial and financial interests of their own nationals. At the same 
time Wood, a fervent believer in the need for rapid economic development within Tunis 
as a means of turning around the financial dependence on foreign capital, viewed the 
new trade as a means of generating much needed tax income for the Beylical 
government. 
At Sfax, Carleton's motives for backing the trade were, perhaps, a little more personal, 
seeking as he did, the appointment of his son to the British consular staff in the 
country: 
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"Should this enterprise... take its due course, as no doubt it must, I hope that we 
British Consular Agents may not be forgotten, assuring you for my part that 
I 
will use my utmost zeal and activity in furthering the views and interests of the 
promoters of such an enterprise". " 
Thus, when Perry Bury discovered that the tribes, instead of plucking the new leaves 
from the stem, were cutting the plant at the roots and thereby unwittingly destroying 
it, Wood immediately instructed Carleton to meet with Assuna Gelluli, Caid of Sfax, 
who promised that he would: 
"... take the necessary measures in order to caution the Arabs by means of their 
shiks [cheikhs] and hlifas [khalifas], to be careful in picking up said grass 
without destroying the roots.. 1116 
4.8 Exports of Alfa Grass from Tunis 1870-1881 
Despite the initial problems of storage the first year of the trade in alfa grass was an 
outstanding success dealings with the tribes being a good deal easier than most had 
expected. Nevertheless it is highly unlikely that exports even approached the 15,000 
tons which Wood claimed for the period July 1870 to June 1871. " British trade 
statistics make no mention of imports of alfa grass from Tunis in 1870 although 1,126 
tons were classified as originating from unspecified countries other than Algeria and 
Spain. '8 The following year imports from Tunis and Tripoli combined are given as 
11,569 tons although if imports from Malta, which almost certainly originated in north 
Africa, are included, the true figure was probably as high as 14,850 tons. In his report 
on the trade of Susa for 1872, British Vice-Consul Dupuis put exports of alfa grass at 
13,000 tons for 1871 and 1872 although it is unclear if this includes shipments from 
Susa alone or whether it includes returns from the consular agency at Sfax which was 
15 FO 335/125/1, Carleton to Wood, Sfax, April 27,1871. 
16 Ibid. 
17 FO 335/127/2 Wood to Lord Granville, September 18,1872. 
18 The British Consul General in Tripoli, Drummond-Hay put alfa exports from 
that country at just 2,500 pounds sterling in 1870. Report on the Trade and Commerce 
of Tripoli for the Year 1870. 
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also under Dupuis authority. 11 The latter may be the case since the statistics of the 
Financial Commission which began with the levying of an export duty of 1/2 piastre 
per quintal in July 1871, state the trade from July to December 1871 as amounting to 
4,181 tons and 9,907 tons for the full year 1872 from the country as a whole a total 
2° close to that given by Dupuis. (See Table 4.1) 
Table 4.1 Tunisian Alfa Exports 1871-1881 
Quintals Tons 
July - December 1871 83,301 4,181 
January - December 1872 197,366 9,907 
January - December 1873 200,478 10,063 
January - December 1874 182,978 9,184 
January - December 1875 233,631 11,728 
January - December 1876 434,691 21,820 
January - June 1877 306,232 15,371 
October 1878 - October 1879 17,627 
October 1879 - October 1880 24,153 
October 1880 - October 1881 28,903 
Sources: 1871-1877: Quai d'Orsay, Correspondence Politique, vol. 44, Inspection 
General des Finances a M. A. E., August 27,1877; 1878-1881: AGT, E 76/1 Releve 
Statistique des Exportations d'Alfa effectuee dans la Regence de Tunis de 1878 a 1887. 
It is difficult to understand how Wood arrived at his figure for exports of 15,000 tons 
between July 1870 and June 1871. The most likely reason for his exaggeration is that 
he was trying to force the Financial Commission to lower the export duty which it had 
initially fixed at 1/2 piastre per quintal in July 1871 but which it then raised to 1 piastre 
19 British Parliamentary Papers (1873) LXIV, Report on the Trade and Commerce 
of Susa for the Year 1872. 
20 Until July 1871 no export tax was levied on alfa grass. See FO 335/125/1, 
Stevens to Wood, Susa, May 10,1871. 
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per quintal in November of the same year. Both moves were extremely unpopular with 
local merchants engaged in the alfa trade as they were with Wood who viewed them 
as unjustifiably measured specifically at British interests in the country. Wood 
commented that the increased duty, which amounted to some 20% of the plant's value, 
had the effect "by enhancing the price, to lessen the exportation, which amounts to only 
11,500 tons from July 1871 to June 1872". 21 
There may have been some truth in Wood's claim that the alfa grass could not carry 
the burden of export taxes levied upon it since, after great pressure from Wood on 
behalf of the merchants engaged in the trade, the duty was lowered at the end of 1872 
to 1/2 piastre per quintal. 22 The question of export duties was an important one in the 
Tunisian alfa trade in the nineteenth century particularly from the 1880's when the 
market price for alfa in Britain plummeted dramatically. This will be discussed in 
Chapter Seven. 
Despite the sometimes large discrepancies in statistics of alfa exports from the country, 
it is clear that these early years in the trade were extremely successful. Shipments 
reached level which few would have imagined possible at the outset. By 1881 exports 
were close to 29,000 tons and alfa had become one of the country's top three exports 
by value, and by far the most important in terms of volume. 
4.9 The Geography of the Alfa Trade 
As mentioned above the alfa trade in Tunis in these early years was centred on Susa 
and Sfax. This was partly because they were the centres where Perry Bury, the 
pioneers of the trade, were based, and also because they were the only ports close to 
the alfa regions which enjoyed the benefit of customs posts. But the success of the 
21 FO 335/127/2 Wood to Granville, September 18,1872. 
ZZ "The impossibility of competing with Tripoli where this article also abounds and 
where a duty of only 1% is levied... has induced the Finance Commission to reconsider 
its decision [to raise the duty] and to propose to the Government to reduce the duty 
from 20% to 10% and there is every possibility that it will accede". FO 335/127/2 
Wood to Granville, Tunis, September 18,1872. 
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trade during the early 1870's especially, had as much to do with the quality of grass 
found in the country as to any other reason. The quality of paper was largely, though 
not entirely, a function of the length of fibre found in the raw material. Alfa grass, in 
general, had a very short length fibre when compared with woollen and cotton rags, 
one of the reasons why it was originally considered a doubtful substitute in the 
manufacture of paper. Over time, as the processing of alfa fibre was refined by 
Routledge and others, this became less important than the other qualities which alfa 
paper possessed, namely its opacity and absorbency as well as its relatively low price 
and greater availability. In the early 1870's, however, when the use of alfa was still 
in its infancy, quality was a very important factor in demand for alfa grass. One of the 
advantages that alfa from Tunisia had over its north African rivals was that it was of 
a superior quality. This was particularly so of grass shipped from the port of Susa 
which originated in the high steppe. It was the quantitative and qualitative decline in 
Spanish production, together with increasing demand for the article, which had created 
the need for new sources of supply of alfa grass to feed British paper mills. Spanish 
alfa grass, which as late as 1869 accounted for 95% of British imports of the material, 
by 1878 made up only 27% of Britain's alfa imports (See Chapter Seven). The grass 
from the Tunisian high steppe was uniquely placed to exploit the problems in the 
Spanish trade in the early 1870's since it was widely regarded as second only to the 
finest Spanish grasses in terms of quality for the manufacture of paper. 
Susa therefore, because of the avowed quality of its product, quickly became the 
undisputed centre of the Tunisian alfa trade from its very inception. Again, the data 
available, as with most statistics used to highlight the alfa trade in these early years, 
are somewhat less than reliable and those given below are intended as guides rather 
than quoted as hard fact. Tunisian customs statistics do not detail exports by port until 
the early 1880's. Nevertheless, as set out in Table 4.2, the use of customs data for the 
country's total exports, and British consular figures for individual ports of embarkation, 
give an idea of the relative importance of each in the overall trade. 
Although some of the grass shipped from Susa originated in the low steppe close to the 
port, the majority came from the high steppe around the towns of Sbeitla, Kasserine 
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and Feriana. At around 150km from Susa the exploitation of these grasses was 
expensive due to the costs of land transportation by beast of burden over such a 
distance; nonetheless the price premium achieved was more than sufficient to offset the 
Table 4.2 Exports of Alfa from Susa as % of Total Alfa Exports 1871-1875 (in 
tons) 
Year Total exports Susa exports Susa as percentage of total 
1871 4,181 - - 
1872 9,907 5,000 50 
1873 10,063 7,206 72 
1873 9,184 5,231 57 
1875 11.727 7,683 65 
Sources: Total Exports : Correspondence Politique vol. 44 
Susa Exports : Reports on the Trade and Commerce of Susa 1872, 
1873,1874 and 1876. 
higher costs incurred in its exploitation during the 1870's at least. 23 In 1876 the 
export duties levied on grass shipped from Susa were tripled to 1.5 piastres per quintal, 
while those at Sfax were only doubled to 1 piastre per quintal; as the market price of 
alfa in Britain dropped markedly during the 1880's, alfa grass from Susa was priced 
out of the market. This will be discussed in Chapter Seven. 
Further south the trade at Sfax was to some extent limited by the success of the alfa 
trade at Susa during the first years of the trade, since the grass arriving at the port was 
of an inferior quality to the Susa article (although it compared favourably with Algerian 
and Tripolitanian grasses). Another reason may simply have been that Perry Bury's 
existing business was stronger in Susa than it was at Sfax. In any case trading in alfa 
from Susa was somewhat easier than at Sfax because the alfa grass came from a 
relatively well defined area and was collected by a smaller number of tribal units, 
23 In 1872 Susa quality grass sold for £7 per ton in Britain while that from Sfax 
sold for only £5 per ton. FO 335/127/2 Wood to Granville, September 18,1872. 
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almost always from the Madger and Fraichiche tribes. By contrast the grass arriving 
at Sfax came from much more disparate sources covering a vast extent of territory 
reaching inland from the port almost as far as the Algerian border, and as far south as 
the Matmata mountains. Its collection required dealings with a large number of tribes 
and tribal units. 
Nevertheless the alfa trade at Sfax had one obvious advantage over its northern 
counterpart: although the grass grew over a wider area much of it was located relatively 
near to the coast. It was to prove easier, more efficient and ultimately less expensive 
to bring the alfa to collection points along the coast by camel or donkey from the 
hinterlands whence, after being weighed, dried and baled, the grass was taken by 
lighter to Sfax. Thus Perry Bury, and later other, smaller companies which began 
trading in the grass in Tunis such as Arbib, Nahum and Hassan, would send out their 
brokers to these strategic points on the coast where little camps were set up for that 
purpose. The principal shipping station was at Gabes which, although a tiny little 
town, was the most important trading centre on the mainland of southern Tunisia. 
Other were at Shebbah (or Chebba) 35 miles to the north of Sfax; Skira (or La Skira) 
50 miles to the south of Gabes; Zarat 25 miles further south and Gourine (or Green) 
(Figure 4.2). Besides these there were those of lesser importance like Bou-Grara, a 
small but sheltered little bay in the Lac de Bibans between Djerba and the mainland, 
and Zarzis, close to the border with Tripolitania. Each of these little transhipment 
points had its own fairly well defined catchment area from which supplies of grass were 
drawn. At Zarat most of the alfa was delivered by the Haouia and Mzareth tribes; 
however, much of the grass was procured from amongst the Zraoua, the Ouled Aissa 
ben Rached fraction of the Beni Zid and the Beni Zelten, Haddache and Toudjane of 
the Ouerghemma tribe occupying the Matmata mountain range, as well as from a 
number of fractions of the Ouderna, notably the Beni Barka, Ghoumrassen and Douiret. 
Gourine was supplied by the little maraboutic tribe of the Mahboul and by the Rebenten 
tribe, whereas the Hazem frequented Skira. 24 
24 See S. H. A. T., report on the Matmata by the Officers of the Affaires Indigenes. 
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Figure 4.2 Main towns and ports 
Facilities and accommodations at these places were of the most rudimentary nature. 
At Gourine, for example, the brokers lived in tents while those at Zarat occupied three 
small huts. 25 In 1874 Vice Consul Dupuis bemoaned the fact that as alfa is: 
"... an article of considerable bulk, it is to be regretted that greater facilities are 26 not met with by the collectors of it on the coast for packing and storing". 
No-one was willing to incur the expense in constructing sheds which could have 
provided adequate protection for the grass if sufficient supply and demand could not be 
guaranteed on an on-going basis. This was still in doubt in the early 1870's. Even 
three years after the trade's inception the only improvement which Dupuis could report 
was but a partial response to the problem: 
"... more care is now taken in stacking [the bales of alfa grass], experience 
having taught them how liable it is to perish in the wet season, exposed as it is 
to the open air for wants of proper sheds and storage". "' 
Even at Gabes of which Carleton wrote in 1871 that it was "... about becoming a most 
important place for the great quantities of sparto it produces", facilities for the trade 
were extremely limited and poor. 28 Although there were some sheds at the town these 
were located on the banks of the river Akariat, about a mile inland from the sea and 
severe problems were faced attempting to ship the grass to the coast for loading onto 
the lighters which would take it to Sfax for export: 
25 Ibid. 
26 FO 335/132/7, Commercial Report for Susa, January 1,1874. 
27 Ibid. 
28 FO 335/125/1, Carleton to Wood, May 1871. 
147 
"... considerable trouble is experienced by them [the alfa merchants] in bringing 
the grass down when the sea is at all rough, on account of the bar formed by 
the accumulation of sand at the entrance. It sometimes also happens that 
navigation is altogether suspended from the choking up of the passage for the 
waters, and the sand has to be cleared away at considerable cost and labour. 
It is to be noted too that loaded boats can only pass freely up the river during 
the ten days at neap tide, and empty ones during the five days at spring 
tides. X29 
The alfa trade on the southern coast while significant, was of lesser significance 
during 
the first half of the 1870's than that at Susa, though again it is difficult to quantify. 
Table 4.3 is an attempt at estimating Sfax's alfa exports by simply deducting British 
consular estimates of grass shipped from Susa, from Tunisian customs data of the 
country's total alfa exports: 
Table 4.3 Estimated Alfa Exports from Sfax 1871-1875 (in tons)30 
Year Total Tunisian 
exports 
Sfax exports Sfax as a percentage 
of the total 
1871 4,181 - - 
1872 9,907 4,907 50 
1873 10,063 2,857 28 
1874 9,184 3,953 43 
1875 11,727 4,044 34 
Source : Correspondence Politique, vol. 44. 
The true level of alfa exports from Sfax is, however, impossible to know during this 
period. In his Report on the Trade and Commerce for Tunis for the Year 1873-1874 
Wood put exports of the grass from Sfax at between 7,000 and 8,000 tons. This would 
appear to be a gross exaggeration even allowing for alfa exported to countries other 
29 British Parliamentary Papers (1878) LXXIV, Report on the Trade and 
Commerce of the Port of Susa for the Year 1877. 
30 Clearly the calculated figure of exports from Sfax would include alfa shipped 
from Gabes from 1874. See below. 
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than Britain which were in any event very limited. " In 1875 Wood, while giving no 
estimates of volume, put Sfax's exports of the grass at £15,900 compared with £29,040 
at Susa. 32 If we assume that the average value of grass from Sfax was £5 per ton this 
would equate to exports of close to 6,000 tons, giving the port a little over 50% of the 
Tunisian market. 
4.10 The Opening of Gabes to International Trade 
By 1874 the inexorable rise in British consumption of alfa grass, the continued decline 
in available supplies from Spain, together with the growing popularity of lower quality 
but cheaper grasses from Algeria and Tripolitania where the trade was expanding 
rapidly, led Tunisian merchants to develop the exploitation of the alfa in the far south 
of the country. Perry Bury, the most important traders in the material in Tunisia, was 
at the forefront of these changes. Encouraged by the opening of Gabes to international 
trade with the creation of a customs post there in 1874, Perry Bury set about 
re-organizing its business interests in the country with the aim of stepping up its 
operations in the far south. Gabes, along with Susa and Sfax, was to form an 
important part of a new business structure for the company which would enable it to 
better respond to changing conditions in the world market, and to fluctuations in local 
supplies. Susa, which was projected to remain the company's most important centre 
of business, was to be at the head of the new structure. Here the company appointed 
a Maltese merchant, William Galea, as managing director with responsibility to control 
and direct all of the company's business affairs in the Regency. 
Although the Liverpool firm were to continue to purchase grass from independent 
merchants and also to place contracts with them for the delivery of specific quantities 
and qualities of the plant to the firm's yards, their plans for expansion in the south 
required a more permanent personnel to arrange for the collection, storage, drying and 
pressing of the material, as well as to overseas the chartering and loading of ships for 
31 Report on the Trade and Commerce of Tunis for the Year 1873-1874. 
32 Report on the Trade and Commerce of Tunis for the Year 1875, British Parliamentary Papers (1876) Vol. LXXVII. 
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final export to the U. K.. At Sfax the company chose an influential British merchant, 
Edward Leadbetter, to fulfil these functions. Another trader, of Maltese origin, was 
similarly employed at Gabes where considerable expense was incurred in upgrading 
facilities to make the centre suitable for alfa exports. 33 The firm constructed a large 
fenced alfa yard consisting of a house and extensive sheds close to the marina. While 
the other merchants engaged in the alfa trade at Gabes continued to group around the 
existing storage points on the river Akariat, Perry Bury, by locating on the coast, was 
able to bypass entirely the laborious, time consuming and costly procedures which had 
previously hampered their business on the river. From their new yard lighters could 
load and unload, making many trips per day either charging the cargoes of the ships 
which would travel directly to Britain or, alternatively, taking the grass to Sfax where 
it could be combined with other stocks there to make up a cargo. Martel notes that in 
1874 four large steamships loaded 1,195 tons of grass for the first direct shipments to 
Britain from Gabes. 34 Despite this, loading at Gabes remained difficult due to the 
shallowness of the water at the little port. Ships had to anchor a couple of miles 
offshore and about 12 miles to the north. 
Similar investment was undertaken by Perry Bury elsewhere. At Gourine, for example, 
25 miles south of Gabes, it "purchased" on payment of a long term rent, a band of 
terrain tkm wide and twice as deep, completely encircling the settlement within which 
lay the only suitable loading place on the coast. 35 
During the decade to 1881 Susa retained its position as the country's most important 
centre of export for alfa grass. This was, however, a situation which was to change 
dramatically in the following years. Susa had benefitted from its status as a supplier 
of quality alfa to the British market. By the middle of the 1870's, as British demand 
grew and as Spain's contribution to British alfa imports declined, market sentiment 
33 Each of the company's representatives continued to trade on their own account. 
Leadbetter was an important trader in olive oil, for example. 
34 Martel, A. (1965) p. 156. 
35 S. H. A. T., MR 3211, Rapport sur les Mehabeul, Bureau des Affaires Indigenes. 
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changed to one of quantity and price rather than quality. This became increasingly so 
from the mid 1880's, from which time Susa ceased to enjoy the pre-eminence in the 
Tunisian trade of these early years. This point is covered more fully in Chapter Seven. 
4.11 Conclusion 
Alfa grass had for many centuries played an important role in the Tunisian economy 
and society. But before the development of demand for the plant from British 
paper-makers its significance was more ecological than economic. As the principal 
vegetation cover in the desert and semi-desert environment of south and central Tunisia, 
alfa grass had a major influence in helping maintain environmental equilibrium. It 
helped bind the soil together, ameliorating the worst effects of wind and water erosion 
and providing much needed shade; it also served as humus formation, which enabled 
the growth of the small grasses that provided the livestock of the land's inhabitants a 
source of food. In a country bedeviled by drought, and where groundwater was scarce 
alfa grass also furnished many animals a source of nourishment as a last resort. Prior 
to 1870 the direct economic benefits of alfa were largely limited to its use in the 
small-scale production of artisanal, domestic products some of which were exported 
throughout the Mediterranean. 
The pace in the growth of British demand for alfa during the late 1860's created the 
conditions for the emergence of an export trade in Tunisian alfa grass. Yet despite the 
country's enormous resources in the material there was a great deal of scepticism 
amongst local merchants as to the feasibility of developing a large-scale trade at that 
time. Unlike Algeria and Spain, the Tunisian government was unable to offer some of 
the preferential concessions which so characterised the trade in these other sources of 
the grass. Moreover, in Tunisia the grass grew in regions very weakly integrated into 
the increasingly outward looking coastal economy. Inhabited by nomadic and 
semi-nomadic tribes, these were regions where few coastal merchants had experience 
of doing any kind of business. The through caravan trade which did exist was under 
constant threat of attack from tribesmen and many were those who came to grief during 
journeys through the interior of the country. Apart from this the infrastructure for 
trade in such a bulky material as alfa grass did not exist and the distances over which 
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the grass would have to be carried over land without roads were often daunting 
In spite of all the problems, there developed throughout south and central Tunisia from 
1870 a strong and vibrant trade in the material, almost all of which was exported to 
Britain for the manufacture of paper and paper products. Perry Bury, the pioneers of 
the trade in the Regency as they were in neighbouring Tripolitania, established a strong 
network of trading posts and of merchants and brokers throughout the alfa growing 
districts with such success that Reid was able to report of one of his journeys in the 
country in 1882 that "... the name of one English firm, Messrs Perry Bury and Co. of 
Manchester, seemed to be on the lips of all the traders in the Gulf of Hammamet". 36 
But as early as 1873, British Vice-Consul Dupuis could report that alfa grass was, 
"... amongst the very foremost resources of this country". 37 
Although available data on trade and commerce in the country in the pre-Protectorate 
period are few and often contradictory, even when they come from the same offices, 
as is the case with many British consular reports, there is no doubt that the alfa trade 
which developed was of importance, even using Tunisian Customs figures which are 
at the lower range of contemporary estimates. The rate of growth in the trade was little 
short of astonishing given the doubts which many had at the inception in 1870. 
Within the space of a decade, exports had reached the remarkable level of almost 
29,000 tons per annum. This represented something in the region of 300,000 man days 
of hard labour taking the average collection of one person in one day at 100kg. 38 By 
36 Reid, T. W. (1882). The French Consul General in Tunis wrote with regards 
the firm "... les etablissements considerables d'Halfa crees par la maison Perry Bury a 
Sousse, a Sfax et a Gabes la placent au premier rang du commerce etrangere dans cette 
Regence". Correspondence Politique, vol 64, esidence Francaise a Tunis a M. le 
President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, November 22,1881. 
37 FO 335/163/2 Report on the Commerce and Navigation of the Port of Susa for 
the Year 1873. 
" Experienced Spanish workers could reportedly collect up to 300 kg per day 
while the collectors in Tunisia rarely achieved 200 kg per day. This, however, was for 
male labour while women and children, who were almost exclusively occupied in the 
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the end of the decade alfa grass was one of the country's most important items of 
foreign trade, indeed in the year July 1879 to June 1880 it was by far the most 
important export by value (See Table 4.4. ). 
Table 4.4. Tunisia's Principal Exports July 1879-June 1880 (Piastres) 
Olive oil 2,267,169 
Wheat 938,347 
Barley 101,556 
Alfa grass 4,135,374 
Source : AGT Serie E, carton 76, dossier 1, "Douanes", Rapport de M Paul Cambon, 
Resident General de la Republique Francaise, 1886, (Tunis, Imp. Francaise) p. 23. 
Up to this point the discussion of the alfa trade in Tunisia has not really touched upon 
the reasons why any such trade, let alone one of such magnitude, should be established 
and indeed have flourished in the country at this time. The existence of external 
demand is not sufficient an explanation for the rapid rise in the trade in alfa. The 
central question remains as to why the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes of southern 
Tunisia which, as discussed in Chapter Two, have been characterized by the degree of 
their political independence and economic self-subsistence, should so actively and 
willingly participate in a commerce directed by Europeans in the coastal towns. This, 
together with an attempt to understand the impact on the southern tribes of their sudden 
and direct incorporation into, not just the national, but also the international economy, 
will be discussed in the following chapters. 
"... the stipa tenacissima appears destined to be the great civilising influence in 
North Africa" . 
39 
collection of grass in the country, could only collect between 50 kg and 100 kg each 
day. See Fleury, V. (1900). 
39 Playfair, Lt. Col. (1877). 
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Chapter Five 
A Marginal Socio-Economic Environment 
5.1 Introduction 
Aside from its sheer scale and rate of growth, what is perhaps most remarkable about 
this new branch of commerce in alfa grass, and what sets it clearly apart from 
established mercantile activities in Tunisia, is the fact that its success and development 
depended heavily on the participation of the tribal populations of the south and central 
regions of the country. Yet, as was discussed in Chapter Two, the prevailing view of 
such a tribal, pastoral and subsistence orientated society is one which emphasizes its 
inherently egalitarian social principles and relative lack of economic and social 
stratification. If one accepts this then the sudden, brusque emergence of a trade which 
for the first time and on a large scale linked the tribes, not only with the settled 
populations of the coast but also directly with the capitalist world economy, becomes 
difficult to comprehend. This is particularly so when it is considered that in Tunisia, 
unlike in neighbouring Algeria, there was no overt political action or state coercion to 
ensure tribal participation in the trade. Indeed the Government, the International 
Finance Commission and later the French Administration did very little to encourage 
the trade and, as will be discussed below, probably even hindered its competitiveness 
on a world scale through the maintenance of very high export duties. Why, then, 
should the tribes orientated to subsistence production enter into economic relations of 
such magnitude with European traders for whom they had hitherto exhibited little but 
contempt and often open hostility? 
5.2 The Motivation for Alfa Collection 
The single most important defining characteristic of tribal participation in the alfa trade 
in Tunisia was that the collection of the grass carried amongst the tribes, a very 
pronounced social stigma; it was universally considered the most demeaning of 
activities: 
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"... le fait d'arracher et Waller vendre 1'alfa... est consideree comme une besogne 
quelque peu degradante"' 
No doubt this was partly because despite its ubiquitous presence in the south it had little 
economic value except in the humble activity of craft production and, exceptionally, for 
the grazing of animals when no other pasture was available. But more than this 
collecting alfa grass was widely perceived as a manifestation of failure in the kinship 
society, a sign of weakness and of subservience to the infidel European merchants on 
the coast to whom it was sold. Patriarchal and warrior-like, the tribes maintained a 
proud, popular tradition, no matter how real or tangible, of independence from the 
central government and a strong sense of the cultural differences which separated them 
economically and socially from the settled populations. Peripheral to, though by no 
means isolated from, the developing market economy of the coastal regions, the tribes 
lived a subsistence existence in which wealth and prosperity were counted in the size 
of the family and of the animal herds they owned. ' The lives of the tribes centred on 
their livestock which was always their principal preoccupation. Monetary income was 
far from being an important or common goal of the tribes and the use of money as a 
medium of exchange was highly unusual even by the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Psychologically difficult to accept, the collection of alfa grass was also problematical 
in practical terms given the natural rhythms of tribal life since the plant was only really 
ready for gathering from early summer once the leaves had reached maturity. But the 
summer months were extremely hot and dry and the collection of alfa involved long 
hours of arduous work under the hot summer sun in regions largely devoid of shade. 
Moreover summer was a period when most tribes undertook the annual transhumance 
in search of pasture for the animals. These movements rarely took them to districts 
well endowed with alfa since the grass was not, in itself, the fodder of choice for any 
animal even though the young shoots of grass which grew in its shade did provide an 
important source of nourishment for a short period during spring and summer. 
' S. H. A. T., Bureau de Renseignements (1885) Rapport sur le Neffet. 
Z Monchicourt, C. (1906). 
156 
Migratory movements of the tribes inhabiting the best alfa districts tended to be from 
south to north rather than from the interior towards the coast. The requirement for 
transporting the material for sale in the coastal depots and towns on the backs of camels 
and mules could entail return journeys in excess of 200km in length which was a 
gruelling prospect for any beast, more so if adequate pasture was not found on the way. 
Finally, the pull factors encouraging tribal participation in the trade were negligible, 
the remuneration from the sale or transportation of alfa being minimal: 
"... it is a poor material and barely sufficient to make up for the loss of the 
[cereal] crop". ' 
The decision to engage in the collection of alfa, or provide for its transportation, was 
not the result of a positive and rational choice between alternative returns to labour. 
It was never considered, and for the tribes at least, could never have provided a means 
of accumulating wealth. On the contrary the sale of alfa grass was almost always the 
product of economic need, of poverty, of destitution, a last resort in times of penury: 
"... tribes only collect it [alfa] in years of scarcity when successive years have 
brought them deficient crops. "' 
The success of the alfa trade in Tunisia was more than anything a function of poverty 
and economic deprivation. 
5.3 A Marginal Economy 
After a tour of Tunisia undertaken in 1890, Amos Perry gave the following description 
of the market on the island of Djerba in the south of Tunisia: 
3 British Parliamentary Papers (1874) LXXVI, Report on the Trade and Navigation 
of Susa for the Year 1873. Drummond-Hay wrote of the amount paid to alfa collectors 
in Tripoli in 1876 that "it is difficult to comprehend how camels and men can work for 
so little" citing the price per camel load as 8 shillings for grass brought from the 
interior at three days march (six days round trip). Report by Consul General 
Drummond-Hay on the Trade and Commerce of Tripoli for the Year 1876. 
4 FO 335/163/2, Report on the Commerce and Navigation of Susa for the Year 
1876. 
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"Donkeys were braying, sheep were bleating, cocks were crowing and men 
were shouting. Glancing upon the scene from the windows, they beheld a 
motley multitude of men and animals some of them coming upon the ground 
and apparently struggling with others to get possession of the best stands. 
There were camel loads of charcoal brought from the continent across the 
shallow strait at the southern point of the island. There were bronzed faced 
men urging forward camels that were laden with the rich product of the Gereed 
[Djerid]. There were donkey loads of fruit and vegetables from neighbouring 
rural districts. There were men, women and children trudging along with their 
baskets full of the products of their respective industries. As, however, the 
exhibitors and salesmen gradually found their places in the turmoil and the 
uproar diminished a few animals alone continued to rend the air with their 
hideous and plaintive cries". 5 
Although Djerba was located in the very south of the country, Perry's portrayal of a 
vibrant market flush with the produce of many regions and from a variety of industries 
bears little resemblance to the reality of life amongst the majority of the population of 
the tribes on the continent. Whether or not the market scene depicted by Perry reflects 
a prosperous community in Djerba or not, the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes, just 
a short distance away across a narrow stretch of water, lived a precarious and 
sometimes miserable existence eking out whatever meagre return they could from the 
and and hostile environment they inhabited. 
Subsistence-orientated, the economic activities of the tribes were largely adaptations to 
the harsh environmental conditions which prevailed throughout south and central 
Tunisia. Extensive pastoralism was the pillar of the economy. In the northern steppe, 
amongst the Fraichiche, Madger and Zlass, sheep rearing predominated while further 
south in the more and zones the goat and the camel became increasingly prevalent. 
Although some tribes, such as the Ouled Sidi Tlil in the high steppe, were almost 
continually on the move because of the lack of adequate pasture on their lands, summer 
transhumance was only undertaken out of necessity, the tribes preferring whenever 
possible, to stay on their own territory during the summer months. ' But more often 
5 Perry, A. (1891). 
6 S. H. A. T. MR 1323, dossier 19, Notice sur la Confederation des Fraichiches, du 
Village de Feriana et la Tribu de Ouled Sidi Tlil. 
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than not the lack of rainfall and the poor state of pastures in high summer led the tribes 
to move further afield in search of nourishment for their animals. The tribes of the 
more and southern regions tended to move more frequently, over greater distances and 
for a longer duration than did those of the northern steppe. These were not vague 
movements but followed traditional inter-tribal relationships based on reciprocity or 
kinship. In the north of the high and low steppe, the summer transhumance from the 
steppe to the Tell was matched by a corresponding movement in winter from the Tell 
to the steppe where winters were milder and winter pasture more abundant. 7 
Agricultural production was very limited amongst the tribes. Average annual rainfall 
was almost everywhere below the 400mm minimum considered necessary for regular 
and successful dry cereal farming, and harvests also suffered from an unequal 
geographical and temporal distribution of precipitation. Combined with large seasonal 
and diurnal temperature variations and unpredictable winds, the potential for good crop 
yields was limited, particularly given the, lack of groundwater for irrigation, the low 
level of production techniques and thin soils. 
The land sown by the tribes was limited to the more fertile fields and those which were 
most favoured by the first autumn rains which, in helping break-up the hard soil, 
reduced the need for ploughing. The hardier barley crop was, in general, preferred to 
wheat because it was more resilient to climatic variations and could be harvested at 
least a month before wheat. The shorter length of time between sowing and harvesting 
reduced the risk that the crops could be compromised by the early appearance of the 
sirocco winds or of the locusts which was an ever-present hazard in the south from 
early summer. 
If the autumn rains arrived on time and in the right amounts, the winters were not too 
cold, and the spring rains adequate to allow the young plants to reach maturity, a good 
harvest would be assured and this was a time of rejoicing and celebration. That grain 
which was not consumed, used to pay taxes or exchanged for other products with 
Clarke, J. I. (1956). 
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neighbouring tribes or villages, was stored for consumption during the summer and to 
provide seed for sowing the following autumn. 
But such years were the exception in southern Tunisia. In describing the disastrous 
conditions which prevailed in 1877 British Vice-Consul Dupuis wrote: 
"It is generally said on this coast [Sousse] that but one year of really good crops 
can be reckoned out of every seven years, the rest being average ones or total 
failures. The truth of this assertion has been singularly enough verified these 
years past. The passage of winds, the south and south-east in particular (the 
hot, dry, sirocco winds) as regards their earliness or tardiness towards the fall 
of the year, when they predominate, it is affirmed, influences the fall of rain 
and also foreshadows the nature of the crops likely to result. Their too long 
delay in appearing before, or dominance after, the period of a general breaking 
up of the weather in the northern shores of the Mediterranean and their 
continuance beyond the middle of October as a rule (the case in 1876) is not 
considered favourable. They help to stave off atmospheric moisture and delay 
labour in the field beyond the period when copious rains, so essential to soften 
the ground, are to be expected; those which do occur later not being sufficient, 
and are, besides, too chilling for seed to germinate. "8 
Cereal production was a lottery for the tribes who were fatalistic about the outcome of 
their harvests commonly referring to wheat and barley as "Mi'ma", which means 
"manna from heaven". 9 Although the tribes sowed whatever area of land their 
resources would allow the fate of their harvests was almost entirely dependent on the 
capriciousness of climate. Most of the time harvests were either nil or mediocre and 
yields often very low. 
Except in years of exceptional or good rainfall, the south of Tunisia, generally, did not 
produce enough cereals for its own needs and the tribes had to secure the balance of 
their requirements elsewhere. 10 For many southern tribes the opportunity to work 
8 British Parliamentary Papers (1878) LXXIV, Report on the Trade and Commerce 
of Susa for the Year 1877. 
9 Timoumi, H. (1975) p. 62. 
'0 S. H. A. T., MR 1323, dossier 19, Notices sur Hadgeb-el Aioun et les tribus 
Madjeur et Ouled Radhouane, April 11,1887. The report comments that in 1886 the 
Ouled Radhouane harvested only 20,000qx of wheat and 26,000qx of barley which was 
160 
in the grain harvests in the Tell to the north provided a precious means of acquiring 
cereals. Because the cereal crops were both more reliable and better yielding in the 
more temperate climate of northern Tunisia and, as the wheat harvest there took place 
a month after that of barley in the south, the annual movement of southern tribes to the 
Tell with their animals was also an opportunity to work in the harvest. When yields 
were good in the north the tribes could earn up to one tenth of the harvest, although 
when poor, or when the offer of work was too great, this could be reduced to as little 
as one twentieth. " 
Cereals were not only the main article of subsistence of the population but they were 
also an extremely important means of exchange for other products which the tribes 
lacked. Thus, every winter, dozens of caravans of camels loaded with grain converged 
on the oases in the Djerid and Nefzaoua where they exchanged grain, which was 
produced in minimal quantities in the oases, against the dates which were grown there 
in abundance. For the tribes the dates were a significant foodstuff in spring and 
especially summer being both portable, highly nutritious and requiring little preparation 
prior to consumption. 
The main wealth of the semi-nomadic and nomadic population was, of course, their 
animals and these were sold in the coastal markets and on those in interior usually to 
buy grain or to help pay taxes. The people of the little oasis of Tebbouba, on the coast 
south of Gabes, for example "font un assez grande commerce de bestiaux avec les 
fournisseurs de viande de Gabes". " In spring the fleeces of sheep and goats were also 
sold by the semi-nomads: 
"Le commerce de lain se fait beaucoup plus generalement en dehors du marche 
periodique car eile est souvent et en grande partie, vendue sur pied a des 
Algeriens de Tebessa principalement qui, a cet effet, au printemps, au moment 
de la tonte, parcourent la region, allant de douar a doaur. Les operations 
"absolument insufficants pour les besoins de la tribu". 
" Timoumi, H., op. cit., p. 68. 
12 S. H. A. T., MR 1323, dossier 15, Notice sur les Tribus des Gheraira, des Hamerna, des Hazem et Aleya. 
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portent dans ce cas sur la lain de troupeaux entiers estimee d'apres le nombre 
de toisons"13 
In the southern oases of the Djerid and the Nefzaoua the sedentarists purchased wool 
from the nomads of the Beni Zid, Merazigue and Hammama tribes usually in exchange 
for dates. Renowned for the quality of their textiles the weavers in the oases found a 
ready sale to neighbouring tribes and to coastal merchants: 
"Ils cedent les tissus aux juifs qui viennent de Gabes passer plusieurs mois dans 
le pays, en echange des calottes rouges, de chaussures, de cotonnades, depices 
et menu objets. Les juifs drainent aussi dans les memes conditions, les houlis 
fabriques chez les pomades". 14 
But most tribesmen had sufficient wool only for their own requirements to make 
clothes, such as capes (burnous and haik) and only the better off with more animals and 
surplus wool commercialised it. 
The economy of southern Tunisia was not strongly commercialised even in the period 
immediately following the French occupation. Production was rarely undertaken for 
purposes of sale and only items surplus to the tribes immediate consumption needs were 
sold or exchanged. Given the rural base of the economy, transactions tended to 
fluctuate depending on climatic conditions although taxation also had a powerful 
influence (see below). Exchange was more important than direct market sale partly 
because of the charges levied on transactions in officially sanctioned markets. Also 
prices tended to be higher on the coastal markets for goods produced in the interior. 
Grain grown in the north and brought to the southern ports was more expensive than 
going directly to the producing regions which were, anyway, often the destination of 
tribes seeking pasture for their animals. Those nomads of the Nefzaoua, for example, 
who owned camels "vont au loin, chercher leurs grains sur les marches de Sbiba, du 
13 S. H. A. T., Mr 1323, dossier 6, Tribu des Ouartan, December 21,1886. 
14 S. H. A. T., Mr 1323, dossier 186bis, Nefzaoua, June 1887. 
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Kef, de Kairouan et chez les Fraichiches". '5 
5.4 The Effects of Drought on the Tribal Population 
A single year of poor crops or inadequate pasture, or even a succession of mediocre 
crops was seldom a source of major concern for the tribes since a variety of 
mechanisms existed, besides the storage of grain to help ameliorate the social and 
economic impact of short-term crisis. Dates, for example, could be purchased by the 
tribes on credit from the villagers of the Djerid, and these could be exchanged in the 
north of the country for grain. This would provide for immediate consumption 
requirements while awaiting the outcome of the spring harvest when the debts would 
normally be repaid. " The Tellien regions were also a very significant resource for 
the southern tribes as a source of pasture, grain and work and helped to offset short 
deficits in the south. 
But years of severe drought caused tremendous difficulties for the rural population for 
not only were subsistence problems magnified but also their ability to maintain their 
capital, their livestock, and find seed to sow the following year's grain crops were 
greatly diminished. All the tribes' resources were intimately linked to climate in 
general and excessively dependent on the capriciousness of rainfall in particular and if 
cereals were the most susceptible to unfavourable climatic conditions it was only a 
matter of degree. The animals also suffered greatly from an extended period of 
deprivation of food and water. A poor harvest in 1876 which resulted in a reduction 
of land area sown by the southern tribes in the autumn of that year and a lack of 
rainfall which continued into 1877, caused acute subsistence problems for the 
population of the south. The failure of the harvest in spring of 1877 was exacerbated 
by an almost complete lack of pasture in the southern districts, the dry lands parched 
by the early arrival and prolonged presence of the sirocco winds: 
15 S. H. A. T., MR 1323, dossier l8bis, Nefzaoua, June 1887. 
16 MAE, Correspondence Politique, Rapports Mensuelles, September 1894: "Par 
suite de l'abondance de la recolte des cereales dans le nord de la Regence et dans le 
Department de Constantine, bon nombre de gens du Djerid se sont rendus dans ces 
regions pour recouvrir le montant des ventes de dattes faite a credit". 
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"In the autumn of 1876 very little seed was sown and it would be difficult to 
name a place on the immediate coast where wheat or barley ripened, or even 
came up to any height. The pastures also suffered and were quite inadequate 
to support the cattle a great number of which perished. As the spring of 1877 
advanced the Arabs were forced to migrate, abandoning their lands the 
sterility of which afforded neither sustenance for themselves nor food for their 
cattle. The greater number proceeded to the northern provinces where the crops 
had been partially good; and many sought the towns, and thus spread misery, 
employment being difficult to find. With the augmented population the value 
of labour fell to its minimum and the interior nearly became depopulated of its 
Arab tribes. In the neighbourhood of Sfax the coast for 100 to 150 miles 
around to the south was quite deserted. "" 
Although it is impossible to know the extent of the loss of livestock during years of 
extreme and widespread drought, such as 1877, the French Bureau de Renseignements 
noted in the south in 1895, by no means as severe as 1877 or 1888, an average loss of 
25 %, camels being the only animals to escape relatively unaffected. 18 
Moreover in 1877, as in 1888, the effects of the drought were also felt in the northern 
provinces of the country not just the south. If the Tell provided many southern tribes 
a vital lifeline in years when drought struck the south, access to the pasture there was 
not accorded to all visitors. Although describing a later period when the extension of 
cultivated land in the north reduced the amount of pasture available to immigrants, 
Monchicourt writes of the antipathy of the population of the Tell towards the seasonal 
migrants: 
"... les Telliens, m'a-t-on repete a satiete dans cette steppe, sont des gens sans 
grandeur d'ame et sans cour. N'exigent-ils pas un droit d'achaba (paturage) 
variant autour d'un sou par tete et par mois? Ne gardent-ils pas jalousement le 
moindre brin d'herbe? Ne se plaignent-ils pas sans cesse avec les autorites des 
plus petites empietements? ". 19 
When crops and pasture were particularly poor in the north the capacity of the Tell and 
17 British Parliamentary Papers (1878), LXXIV, Report on the Trade and 
Commerce of Susa for the Year 1877. 
18 MAE, Correspondence Politique, Rapports Mensuel, April 1895. 
19 Monchicourt, C. (1906) p. 189. 
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the willingness of the people there to absorb large numbers of men and animals from 
the south was much diminished. In 1877, for example, amid fears of violent disputes 
over access to limited pasture between the tribes of the north and south the government 
tried to control and limit movement to the Tell. A request from the Caid of the 
Fraichiche, a tribe in the northern high steppe which habitually pastured in the Tell 
during the summer, to allow his people to move north with their livestock was turned 
down by the Prime Minister. Instead the Fraichiche were only allowed to send their 
most impoverished fractions northwards which had to be split into five groups each 
headed by a tribal notable and which were permitted to locate solely on five distinct 
areas determined by the government. 20 
After successive years of drought and crop failures, or during years such as 1876/1877 
and 1888/1889 when drought visited the whole of the country including the northern 
provinces, the southern tribes were left with little to fall back on within their own lands 
and limited opportunities for finding work and pasture in the north. 
Inevitably with pasture difficult to find and markets flooded with animals for sale, the 
value of animals and animal products fell during years of drought, and for the tribes 
this was compounded by the equally inevitable rise in the price of grains. 21 The 
problem was further complicated if, as often happened, the grain crops in Tripolitania 
also failed as occurred in 1887. In that year the Controleur Civil of Djerba reported 
the arrival of a merchant from Benghazi with 100,000 francs to purchase grain, pushing 
the price up from 75 to 125 piastres per caffiz. 22 
Without a grain crop and with the possibility of, at best, a much reduced income from 
the sale of their animals mere subsistence became paramount. One of the only natural 
20 Smida, M. (1970) p. 199. 
21 S. H. A. T., Bureau de Renseignements, dossier 28, Tribu des Matmata, April 19, 
1886. The report notes that in the drought afflicted southern mountains of the Matmata 
in 1886, value of sheep and goats fell by three quarters. 
22 M. A. E., Nouvelle Serie, vol 45, Vice-Consul et Controleur Civil, Djerba, July 
29,1887. 
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resources which was largely impervious to low rainfall was the prickly pear, or barbary 
fig, which was an important source of nourishment for both animal and human 
populations alike. Its geographical extent, however, was limited mainly to the northern 
low steppe it being susceptible to the extreme cold which was often experienced in the 
high steppe in winter. The lands of the Zlass tribe were particularly abundant in the 
prickly pear and provided the tribe, and the Hammama who pastured there in summer, 
an appreciable resource in difficult years. Although sold in the coastal markets the fruit 
was not a significant means of generating income for the tribes and was used much 
more simply as a source of sustenance. 23 It was not, however, one which could 
support the entire animal and human populations. Many were forced to resort to 
desperate measures just to ensure survival during such crises: 
"In the straits to which the Arabs were reduced their principal diet consisted 
often of bread made with barley meal mixed with olive cake, preserved locusts, 
and prickly pears... locusts were collected during the night from the trees which 
they bore down with their weight, and carried to the villages where they were 
boiled in brine and, after being dried in the sun, were sold openly on the market 
and eaten as shrimp are with us". 24 
But if immediate subsistence needs were paramount under such circumstances the tribes 
also had to find seed for the following year's crop without which subsistence problems 
would only be aggravated and prolonged. 
Some were able to take out loans from merchants and traders in the coastal towns and 
villages with which to procure food and seed but these were always given under 
guarantee of property or the future harvest and always at high rates of interest: 
4 
23 Monchocourt, C. (1906). 
24 Report by Vice Consul Dupuis on the Trade and Commerce of Susa for the Year 
1877, op. cit.. Dupuis continues: "the locust is not generally eaten in Mohammedan 
countries from choice; but when it is considered that dog's flesh is consumed here it 
is not surprising that, under the circumstances, the locust should be openly sold as an 
article of food". 
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"La situation de notre caidat s'est deterioree du fait de nous transacciones en cas de besoin avec les usuriers, qui sont les commercants a Sfax, et qui nous pretent 
a un taux de 33% pour six mois... Quand on se trouve dans la necessite ceci 
arrive en printemps et en hiver, il nous en fait des avances sur la recolte des 
cereals qu'on leur rend a tres bas prixi25 
Such loans could easily lead the borrower into a vicious circle of debt and debt 
repayment. If the harvest against which the loan was taken out was good grain prices 
would fall and repayments would be higher than the prevailing market value since the 
advances were calculated on the value at the time the loan was taken out. If the harvest 
was poor new loans would be necessary but these would be at the higher prices 
reigning under these market circumstances. The operation was similar to that 
frequently resorted to by the olive growers of the Sahel: 
"[the merchant] invests, say, 1500 piastres for 100 metals of oil at 15 piastres 
per metal, price at its minimum in good years, delivery at the olive crop. 
Should it fail and the oil not be forthcoming, the 100 metals of oil are reckoned 
at the new market prices, say 35 piastres, and the sum figures, in consequence, 
in the new deed as 3500 piastres for 233 metals of oil at the old rate, to be 
delivered next season". 26 
This practice, of long standing in the country, had, by the 1870's, led to the widespread 
indebtedness of the Sahelian olive growers. While never a common feature of the tribal 
economy, mainly because of the difficulty faced by the lender in enforcing repayment 
because of the mobility of the people, such transactions were not altogether unknown. 
The effects of famine caused by successive years of drought was often made worse by 
the appearance of disease which could ravage the starving population. In Chapter Two 
we reported Valensi's belief that the size of the country's population may have varied 
by as much as a factor of two between periods of prosperity and periods of natural 
calamity. In the nineteenth century, which was marked by a number of severe natural 
disasters the excessive fiscal exactions of the Beylical government inflicted 
25 M'Halla, M. (1978), p. 97. 
26 13PP (1878), LXXIV, Report on the Trade and Commerce of Susa for the Year 
1877. 
167 
immeasurable damage on the population already suffering from severe drought. In the 
aftermath of the tax increases imposed in 1863 and 1864, which left much of the 
population economically exhausted, the exceptionally bad drought of 1867 and the 
cholera and typhoid which ensued was reported to have taken the lives of thousands 
throughout the country. Although impossible to verify and certainly an exaggeration, 
1867 was without doubt a year of tremendous human tragedy throughout Tunisia. One 
lady correspondent of The Times graphically reported on the situation in Tunis itself 
thus: 
"They have had two years of no rain and besides a plague of locusts; they have 
lost every means of living and I have seen numbers of them daily too much 
exhausted and too near death to be able to rise and buy bread with the money 
given to them .... I saw the Irish famine but it was not nearly as bad as what I 
saw at Tunis" . 
27 
The French officers of the Bureau de Renseignements believed up to three quarters of 
the Fraichiche tribe may have perished as a result of the famine and the disease which 
ensued. 28 
Drought, famine and disease were almost endemic in Tunisia and kept a Malthusian 
check on population growth and economic development. For the survivors there 
remained the need to buy seed for sowing the new harvest, and time for the herds to 
regenerate. There also remained taxes to pay and mouths to feed. 
Under these circumstances, despite the negative perception of alfa collection, the hard 
work involved and the minimum income earned from its sale, the alfa trade brought a 
means of survival to many of the tribes in southern Tunisia. Uniquely amongst the 
country's natural resources, alfa grass was to a great extent resistant to extremes of 
rainfall and temperature, to strong winds, hailstorms and even locusts. Moreover it 
was not a crop in the sense that it required neither planting, maintenance nor attention 
and regenerated itself naturally. It grew wild over vast tracts of territory otherwise 
27 The Times, March 17,1868, p. 44. 
28 S. H. A. T., Bureau de Renseignements, carton M 1323, dossier 19, "Notice sur 
la Confederation des Fraichiches, le Village de Feriana et la Tribu de Ouled Sidi Tlil". 
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largely devoid of vegetation or of reliable economic and ecological resources. Always 
available and free to whosoever wanted to make use of it the country's rich and 
renewable alfa reserves were transformed, almost overnight, from a minor resource of 
limited economic value, to one of paramount importance to many tribes in times of 
hardship: 
"This fibre is of inestimable value to the natives when other crops failed as it 
grows through good years and bad years. The Arab falls back on this resource 
chiefly in times of scarcity when successive years have left them without their 
usual provisions of grain and when their flocks and other means of meeting 
taxation have been reduced". 29 
Alfa grass became a precious resource amongst a population almost entirely at the 
mercy of climate: 
"During the failure of the olive and other food crops it saved, I am told, the 
natives from utter starvation". " 
Britain's Consul General in Tripoli, Drummond-Hay reported a similar role for alfa 
grass in his district: 
"... the cutting and transportation to the coast of this article of commerce has, 
in these two years of scarcity, proved a godsend to the starving population, as 
many as 600 camel loads a day arriving at this port from the surrounding 
country". " 
The Tunisian tribes never collected, transported or sold alfa grass unless they were 
forced to by dint of necessity and to a large degree the supply of alfa was "regulated 
according and in inverse ratio to the grain crop". " When the grain crop was good, 
and pasture adequate for the animals, "the Arabs, who are naturally indolent, will 
Z9 FO 335 164/1, Report on the Trade and Commerce of Susa for the Year 1885 
30 FO 335 132/1, Commercial Report for Susa, January 1,1874. 
31 FO 160/86, Report on the Trade and Commerce of Tripoli for the Year 1873. 
32 British Parliamentary Papers (188) LXXVII, Report on the Trade and Commerce 
of Tripoli for the Year 1888. 
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abandon the not very remunerative occupation of cutting and transporting esparto". 33 
The early 1870's was fertile ground for the start of the alfa trade in Tunisia following 
the disaster of 1867/1868 and the mediocre performance of agricultural production in 
the early years of the decade. 34 But the first year of good rains in 1874 witnessed 
a downturn in exports of grass. At Sousse, for example, where 39,400 imperial 
quarters of wheat and 18,114 imperial quarters of barley were exported in 1874, 
shipments of alfa fell by nearly 30% to 5,231 tons compared to the previous year. 35 
Although without doubt an exaggeration to link the level of alfa collection solely to the 
grain harvest (see Chapter Seven) there was a clear relationship between the two. 
While, in itself, an imperfect measure of the state of the population in rural Tunisia, 
using cereal exports as a surrogate for climatic conditions bears out the importance of 
alfa to the tribes in years of economic difficulty. 
Table 5.1 Wheat, Barley and Alfa Exports from Sousse, 1874-1876 
Wheat 
(Imperial 
Quarters) 
Barley 
(Imperial 
Quarters) 
Alfa 
(Tons) 
1874 39,400 18,114 5,231 
1875 9,760 15,212 7,683 
1876 245 - 8,476 
Source : BPP (1877), LXXXIII, Report on the Trade and Commerce of Susa for the 
Year 1876. 
33 Ibid.. 
34 Wood wrote that while investigating the potential of the alfa trade in the 1870's 
as requested by McLean and Hope, "some English parties commenced to purchase it 
[alfa grass]; and as at that period the crops had failed the Arabs immediately turned 
their attention to its collection and abundantly supplied the market with it". FO 335 
127/2, Wood to Granville, September 18,1872. 
3s FO 335 132/1, Commercial Report for Susa 1874. 
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Taking again the example of Sousse, shipments of alfa increased markedly in 1875 and 
particularly in 1876 when grain exports slumped (see Table 5.1). 16 
Poor crops in 1876 were followed by a complete failure of the harvest in the south and 
a mediocre crop in the northern provinces in 1877 (see above) and during this period 
alfa exports increased sharply peaking, as described in Chapter Four, at 29,000 tons 
in 1881 although. In general the 1870's was a period of prolonged climatic and 
environmental crisis in rural Tunisia and the level of alfa exports in this period reflects 
that. 
Table 5.2 Exports of Wheat, Barley and Alfa Grass 1886-1891 (Kg 100's) 
1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 
Wheat 443,175 413,447 57,496 256,166 686,996 656,025 
Barley 210,209 348,709 19,984 107,138 561,824 584,402 
Alfa Grass 125,756 140,553 216,088 255,615 210,002 146,632 
Source: Regence de Tunis, Protectorat Francais, Direction Generale des Finances 
(1897) Statistiques Commerciales de la Tunisie 
Although the 1880's was a much more prosperous decade for the Tunisian population 
than the preceding ones the latter years was another period of exceptionally bad climatic 
conditions, similar in severity to 1877. In 1888 the harvest failed completely in the 
south while the north was only marginally less affected by the lack of rainfall. Table 
5.2 shows the sharp reduction in cereal exports from Tunisia in 1888 and 1889. Wheat 
and barley exports, which combined exceeded 65,000 tons in each of the two preceding 
years, slumped to only 7,500 tons in 1888 and a little over 35,000 tons in 1889. More 
dramatically, perhaps, the level of cereal imports surged in these years reaching 5.5 
36 In his report on trade at Sousse in 1876, Vice Consul Dupuis warned ".. at this 
date the country is as dry as midsummer and seed that is sown is now mostly lost. If 
the worst anticipations are to be realised there will remain only to the impoverished 
many, as a last resort to save them from starvation, the esparto grass and this due to 
British trade". British Parliamentary Papers (1877), LXXXIII, Report on the Trade and 
Commerce of Susa for the Year 1876. 
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million francs in 1888 from less than 100,000 francs in 1886 and 1887 (Table 5.3). 
The severity of the agricultural crisis was instrumental in pushing alfa exports up by 
Table 5.3 Imports of Cereals by Port 1886-1891 (Francs) 
Port 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 
Tabarka - - - 395 - 810 
Bizerte - - - 10,320 - - 
Goulette 30 31 510,306 179,301 150 150 
Tunis 5,756 5,602 1,248,770 1,210,023 159,503 418,166 
Ghardi- 
maou 
- - - 3,989 - - 
Sousse 695 1,684 896,446 461,896 289 193 
Monastir - - 293,656 105,158 - - 
Mahdia - - 290,558 201,932 300 - 
Sfax - 6 1,228,887 878,307 118,836 9,911 
Gabes 66,189 55,989 779,547 844,151 75,713 1,116 
Djerba 23,863 13,306 223,560 314,644 77,318 67,907 
Total 97,743 76,609 5,503,552 4,331,264 439,572 559,483 
Source : Regence de Tunis, Protectorat Francais, Direction Generale des Finances, 
Direction des Downes, Statistique Commercial de la Tunisie, Importation-Exportation, 
Annees 1885-1891 (Tunis, Imp. Francaise, 1897) 
over 50% on 1888 and in 1889 shipments of the material reached over 25,000 tons, a 
figure only once achieved (in 1881) in the preceding 17 years since the alfa trade 
began. 
5.5. Reactions to Supply Problems by Alfa Merchants 
Although by no means a simple relationship, the collection of alfa grass undoubtedly 
increased in years when crops and pasture were poor and especially after successive 
years of economic hardship amongst the tribes. For the merchants this posed a problem 
since it was extremely difficult to foretell the possible level of purchases of grass from 
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the tribes. In good years one would expect a similar phenomenon to that which 
occurred in Tripoli in 1878: 
"... the Arabs who bring it [alfa] down to the coast found more profitable 
employment in the year as reapers, the wheat and barley crops having proved 
abundant in the esparto districts. These crops, moreover, being raised 
principally by the men who are usually employed in the carriage of esparto, 
much of their time was taken up in the gathering of their harvests and, as a 
consequence, less grass came to the market. 37 
Large fluctuations in supply, and particularly unexpected variations, created difficulties 
for the local merchants who signed contracts with British commodity brokers which 
provided for the delivery of specific quantities of grass at agreed prices, and on a 
predetermined date. Space on ships had also to be contracted and as these were 
generally filling their cargo on the homeward leg of a journey which brought them to 
the southern Mediterranean to sell mainly coal, sometimes iron ore, their timing offered 
little margin for error. Usually paid for in a lump sum in advance, if sufficient grass 
was not available on the arrival of the ship either the cost of the cargo paid for a full 
load had to be borne by the reduced shipment or alfa would have to be purchased, at 
whatever cost, in order to complete the load. This was what occurred at Tripoli in 
1888: 
"Merchants experienced great losses... in esparto owing in a great measure to 
their own imprudence in having vessels chartered before they had collected and 
prepared sufficient cargoes for them. It not infrequently happened that a ship 
arrived before the shipper had collected a cargo and he was then obliged to pay 
almost ruinous prices for it". " 
To counteract such problems the alfa merchants employed a variety of techniques to 
ensure some degree of continuity in supply and stabilise prices. As in most commercial 
enterprises stock holding was an unavoidable evil of the alfa trade. The arrival of grass 
at the collection points and shipping stations was unpredictable just as the chartering 
3' British Parliamentary Papers (1878/79) LXX, Report on the Trade and 
Commerce of Tripoli for the Year 1878. 
38 Report on the Trade and Commerce of Tripoli for the Year 1891. See also 
Appendix 2 which is a copy of a contract entered into by Perry Bury for the shipment 
of alfa grass. 
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of ships to Britain was never entirely reliable whether due to weather conditions or 
normal delays in the loading and unloading of the vessels' principal cargo on the 
outward leg of the journey to the Mediterranean. In between the arrival of grass from 
the interior and its dispatch to Britain there was all the manipulation of the material, 
cleaning, sorting, drying pressing and baling required to make the grass ready for 
shipment. 
But the existence of stocks was also a reflection of speculative purchasing by the 
merchants. When supplies of grass were plentiful the buyers' leverage over the tribes 
increased significantly and the prices offered for grass would diminish. Merchants 
would often buy grass, uncovered by contracts with British brokers, in years of severe 
drought in the hope of realising a higher profit in the future. At the same time they 
were able to use a range of other techniques with which to exploit, in a ruthless 
fashion, the poor tribesmen hoping to procure resources through the sale of alfa. Such 
measures, which included a variety of deductions made on the weight of alfa brought 
to the market, commissions and other extra-official charges levied on the tribes, or 
simple extortion, were so widespread in the trade as to make the nominal purchase 
price offered to the tribes almost meaningless. Arriving at the collection point or 
shipping station, often after a long journey from the interior, the tribes were in no 
position to bargain prices with the merchants who often operated as a cartel to keep 
prices down. At Gourine, a little bay in the far south, Perry Bury and the Arbib house 
were represented on the spot by Eliaau and Braham Cohen "de sorte que ces 
commercants forment une Sorte de societe, dans lequelle les parts varient avec les fonds 
avances "39 Perry Bury, however, was clearly the dominant partner in the commercial 
agreement, renting a large amount of land around the crude port facilities such that "nul 
ne peut debarquer chez lui sans payer redevance""40 
Understanding that whatever grass was brought in was bound to be offered for sale, the 
merchants sought to extract the maximum value from the tribes. Non-monetary 
39 S. H. A. T., MR 1321. 
40 Ibid.. 
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transactions, which were more common than cash sales, were often achieved, not by 
a simple exchange of grass for goods, but through the delivery of bonds to the seller 
(see Chapter 6). A practice more widespread in the twentieth century, the use of 
bonds, or promissory notes normally redeemable for merchandise at a store belonging 
to the alfa merchant, or a close associate, not only saved the merchants an up-front 
cash payment, but allowed them to recover some of the value paid for alfa by 
furnishing goods, at elevated prices, to a captive market (see Chapter 8). Rarely did 
the tribes emerge as winners in the strict business equation of cost and value in the alfa 
trade. Although those collectors, lacking animals with which to take the grass to the 
market and who had, therefore, to pay third parties for transportation, understood 
perfectly the relationship between cost and final income, for most tribes the cost of 
collection was a question of time and effort while the value of alfa was a function of 
subsistence needs. 
Practices such as those outlined above, were used by merchants to reduce prices paid 
to collectors to a minimum but they could only be successful when supply outweighed 
demand. This was not always the case. Under these circumstances the merchants tried 
to encourage the tribes to furnish alfa grass by sending their brokers out into the 
countryside to offer tribes payment in advance of delivery: 
"Advances are made for that which is yet to be pulled and got ready for transfer 
to the coast. Buyers are sometimes sent out to an Arab encampment which 
serves as a centre and take with them money or goods (the latter generally), oil 
and cloth (last year barley) which they barter for the grass and bring to the 
coast". 41 
In order to guarantee that the grass would indeed be delivered, payments were often 
made via the notables of the tribal group or through the Caid who would redistribute 
the income amongst those who participated. This form of operation had the added 
advantage to the merchants that if sufficient quantities of grass were not forthcoming 
pressure could be put on the Caid to comply with the agreement. It was, of course, 
in the Caid's interest to see his people receive additional income since they were his 
41 Report on the Trade and Commerce of Susa for the Year 1877. 
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main source of wealth via the taxes levied on them. An example of this is type of 
operation is examined in the following chapter with respect to the Mehedba tribe near 
Skhira. 
Sometimes these contracts with tribes were longer term than the immediate harvests if 
the merchants had committed themselves to supply contracts with British brokers or if 
it was felt that a significant price advantage could be obtained during years when some 
tribes were experiencing economic difficulty. In April 1885 the French house of 
Grawitz, also acting for Perry Bury, entered into a contract with the Ouled Aziz 
fraction of the Hammama tribe which, at 7 piastres per quintal, provided the tribe with 
80,000 piastres in advance for a commitment to deliver grass to the company's yard 
over the following 18 months. 42 
Such contracts were not always successful however. In 1877, for example, a Maltese 
merchant from Tripoli, Gaetano Falzon, negotiated terms with the notables of tribes 
inhabiting the mountains close to the Tripolitanian border, for the delivery of 2,000 
cantars of alfa (about 100 tons) to the little port at Bugrarah. The grass arrived two 
months late, incurring significant additional expense for the merchant as his boat, and 
its crew, was laid up on the coast for the whole period. Despite holding a legal 
contract signed by all parties and repeated requests to local government officials and 
British consular staff, Falzon never received compensation. 43 
Although advance payment and contracts with tribes to supply alfa did not always work 
without problems they did help soften the peaks and troughs in supplies of alfa created 
by sharp variations in environmental and economic conditions in the interior of the 
country. 
42 AGT Serie E, Carton 233, Dossier 10, M. le Directeur des Douanes aM le 
Directeur des Finances, June 7,1885. This contract was at least in part, provoked by 
the uncertainty regarding alfa collection in the country arising from the concession 
accorded the Franco-English Esparto Fibre Supply Company. See chapter 6. 
a3 AGT Serie Historique, carton 28, dossier 414. 
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5.6 The Collectors 
If the overall supply of alfa grass from the tribes fluctuated from year to year, higher 
in years of severe drought, lower during periods when the level and distribution of 
rainfall were more favourable, there was, nonetheless, throughout the trade's existence 
until the end of the nineteenth century, an apparent base volume of collections reflected 
in a certain stability of exports of the material which, in "normal" years, hovered 
around 14,000 tons per annum. In a year of especially bad drought in the south not all 
regions or tribes were similarly affected just as when rainfall and pasture was generally 
good local or regional exceptions were common. After the severe difficulties caused 
by the drought of 1887,1888 and, to a lesser extent, 1889, in 1890 there was a marked 
improvement in environmental conditions throughout the southern districts. Pasture 
recovered and crops and yields generally improved. But in the region of Gafsa the 
copious rains which fell did so in the form of heavy rainstorms which, combined with 
strong winds, caused the destruction of thousands of animals swept away in the ensuing 
floods, and damaged countless homes and date palms. During a tour of inspection in 
the region, the officers of the Bureau de Renseignements wrote of the little village of 
Sekket: 
"la population ... est dans la misere; 
des annees consecutives de secheresse ont 
cause la ruine de tous les habitants et oblige un grand nombre d'entre eux 
d'emigrer pour subvenir aux besoins de leurs families. 68 individus sont 
actuellement a Gafsa, dans les villes du nord de la Regence et en Algerie". " 
The Ouled Maamar, alone, was reported to have lost 4,000 sheep and goats in the 
tempest in the aftermath of which the tribe's "terrains de parcours ne presentent que 
de paturages maigres et de peu etendue, les terres laborables leur font defaut". 45 In 
a land where water was such a precious resource such storms were a cruel, if not 
entirely exceptional, irony. 
Regional variations in the severity, or benevolence, of climatic conditions together with 
44 AGT Serie A, carton 196, dossier 1, "Rapport etabli a la suite de la tournee 
executee du 24 Janvier au 10 Fevrier dans les tribus du Djebel, Ouled Aziz, Oulad Sidi 
Abid Hamadi, et dans les oases du Djerid". 
45 Ibid.. 
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the mechanisms used by merchants to stabilise supplies meant that there was little 
likelihood of a complete cessation of alfa collection throughout the country. Most of 
the tribes of south and central Tunisia slipped in and out of alfa collection depending 
on their immediate economic circumstances and needs: 
"L'alfa est une denree avec laquelle chacun est toujours sur de faire un peu 
d'argent; c'etait donc principalement le besoin de numeraire qui determinait la 
plus ou moins grande activite de la recolte". ab 
Some, however, tended to be, if not specialists, at least more regular participants in the 
alfa trade. There was what could almost be called a "hard core" of tribesmen, living 
constantly on the edge of poverty, for whom alfa grass was more than a just a useful 
short term source of income but rather an almost constant economic necessity 
Perhaps the most important tribes collecting the grass were those of the Hammama and 
the Mehedba the former inhabiting the region around Gafsa, the latter located in the 
hinterlands of Skhira on the coast between Sfax and Gabes. The reason for the 
importance of alfa to the Mehedba may have been to some extent specific to that tribe. 
Located closest to the alfa yards of the Franco-English company the problem of 
transporting the grass to the coast for sale was relatively insignificant even if the 
average number of camels belonging to the members of the tribe was only one. 47 In 
addition a large part of the tribe had actively participated in the rebellion against the 
invasion of French troops in 1881. Several years exile did not exonerate them from 
the taxes which they should have been paying in Tunisia and these had accumulated 
over the years to form a considerable sum of debts due on their return (see Chapter 6). 
The effects of government taxation had a significant impact on the tribes' economic 
situation in both prosperous and hard times but was a particularly heavy burden in years 
of drought when the tribes resources were heavily depleted. While the achour (tax on 
grains) and the kanoun (tax on olives) varied with the state of the harvests the medjba 
(or poll tax) which was by far the heaviest fiscal charge levied on the semi-nomads, 
46 De Lanessan, J. (1917) La Tunisie 2nd edition Paris: Felix Alcan. 
47 S. H. A. T., MR 1323, dossier 17, Tribu des Mehedba, January 12,1886. 
178 
was fixed and had to be payed irrespective of the economic circumstances of the tax 
payer. Wholly unpopular with the population the sharp increase in the level of the 
medjba, which rose 72 piastres in 1863, was the immediate cause of the rebellion in 
1864. Although it was soon reduced to 27 piastres, it was augmented to 33 piastres in 
1870,40 piastres in 1871 and 47 1/4 piastres in 1872.48 Amongst the Fraichiche 
tribes in 1885 the medjba charge was more than three times higher than taxes paid on 
the grain crops a reflection both of the weakness of crop yields and, perhaps, the 
onerousness of the poll tax: 
Table 5.4 Taxes paid by Fractions of the Fraichiche in 1885 
Tribe Medjba Achour 
Ouled Ali 53,120 19,475 
Ouled Nedji 48,280 15,800 
Ouled Ouezzez 68,560 12,662 
Ouled Sidi Tlil 19,320 4,000 
Source: S. H. A. T., MR 1323, dossier 19 "Notice sur la Confederation des Fraichiche, 
le Village du Feriana et la Tribu de Ouled Sidi Tlil. 
This was far from unusual in southern Tunisia due to the relatively low level of grain 
production. The tribe of Kooub and El Gouazine, paid only 2,000 piastres tax on their 
wheat production against a medjba of 45,640 piastres. 49 Amongst the Matmata tribes 
in the far south of the country one report'estimated the medjba at well over half of the 
tribes' entire annual income (see Table 5.5). 
Clearly this equilibrium between income and expenditure could not but be severely 
affected in the event of a failure of the olive and/or cereal crop in which case purchases 
of wheat and barley would increase(at higher prices) and the important revenues earned 
48 Journal Officiel Tunisien, "Notice sur la Tunisie", May 19,1881, in MAE, 
Memoirs et Documents, Tunis 1880-1881. 
49 S. H. A. T., MR 1321, dossier 1, "Tribu des Kooub et El Gouazine. 
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from the sale of olive oil would be curtailed. With the medjba fixed, the only 
significant opportunity for raising income would be greater sales of animals (at lower 
prices) or the collection of alfa grass. In circumstances in which subsistence was a 
problem and given the need to find seed for sowing the upcoming crops, the 
requirement to pay the medjba was a prime motivator in the collection of alfa: 
"n'y a-til que les indigents ou ceux qui sont presses pour le paiement des impots 
qui se livrent a ce genre d'industrie"so 
Table 5.5. Estimate of the Annual Income and Expenditure of the Matmata in 
1886 (in piastres) 
Income Expenses 
Oil 52,024 Barley 14,536 
Camels 10,640 Wheat 34,095 
Horses 6,000 Medjba 67,500 
Mules 2,250 
Oxen 5,000 
Sheep 8,640 
Goats 14,000 
Alfa 19,200 
Total 117,804 Total 116,131 
Source : S. H. A. T., carton MR 1323, dossier 28, "Tribu des Matmata", April 19, 
1886. 
Many tribes simply could not find the wherewithal to pay these taxes when they fell 
due. Again in the Gafsa region, blighted by two successive years of drought followed 
by severe storms in 1890, much of the population had been unable to pay the current 
years taxes let alone those of the previous years' The population of the settlement 
50 S. H. A. T., Bureau de Renseignements, "Rapport sur le Neffet", 1885. 
51 At Sened only 114 of the 233 men on the medjba register had paid the tax for 1888 while only 148 of 260 had done so at Djebel Aziz. At Mech the population still 
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of Mech was in a similar position: 
"ne peuvent payer les impots et comptent sur la recolte de cette annee pour se 
1 iberer" 
. 
52 
Likewise amongst the Ouled Aziz fraction of the Hammama tribe the French officer 
who toured the region reported that: 
"les impots rentrent avec difficulte et ne pourront etre completement payes avant 
la prochaine recolte". 13 
The accumulation of tax arrears obviously compromised the tribes ability to recover 
quickly from economic difficulties in subsequent years since payment was obligatory. 
In the Gafsa region at this time the numerous requests from the population for 
liberation from tax obligations fell on deaf ears. 
In fact, although the French recognised the importance in reforming the old Beylical 
tax structures "qui ruinent l'agriculture et conduisant au depeuplement de la Regence", 
there was little immediate change in taxes during the early years of the Protectorate. 54 
Having taken over a country deeply in debt, one which required considerable 
infrastructural investment both for political and economic reasons, and with the 
increased strains placed on its finances by the new administrative and military personnel 
installed by the French, there was an unwillingness to reduce the level of direct taxation 
of the population. Indeed initial efforts to change taxation focused on measures 
designed to permit a reduction in export duties rather than anything which would have 
owed half the tax for 1888. None had managed to pay anything for 1889. AGT Serie 
A, carton 196, dossier 1, Report on the Situation.. . de Gafsa, op. cit.. 
52 Ibid.. 
53 Ibid.. 
sa AGT vol. 74, Cambon to Challemmal-Lacour, cited in Mahjoubi, A. (1977), 
p. 228. 
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directly alleviated the fiscal pressures on the native population. 55 Partly as a result 
the income from export duties fell from 3,120,000 piastres in 1881-1882 to 2,384,050 
piastres in 1885-1886. Yet total government fiscal receipts increased during these years 
from 23,753,330 piastres to 34,200,276 piastres. 56 Part of this increase came from 
the more effective collection of direct and indirect taxes levied on the population. 
Remarkably, despite the impoverishment of the whole south in 1888, the Administration 
pushed ahead with plans to submit all the southern tribes to regular taxation. By decree 
of July 29,1888 the Ouerghamma tribes of the Akara, Khezour, Ouderna and Touazine 
were to pay taxes the first two the medjba the latter to the Driba, or collective tax, 
fixed at 64,000 piastres for the Ouderna and 100,000 piastres for the Touazine. 57 The 
military authorities in the south vehemently opposed the move believing the taxes an 
excessive burden on the population and viewing them as a potentially destabilizing 
influence in the delicate political cauldron of southern Tunisia. The Government, 
however, remained adamant and resolute that taxes had to be levied. In February 1889 
the Governor of the Aradh, the region to the south of Gabes, was forced, under heavy 
and repeated pressure from the Director of Finances, to call on local officials to ensure 
the prompt return of taxes from the southern tribes. 58 
Taxation tended to have a disproportionately heavy impact on the poorer tribesmen in 
the same way that during years of drought the loss of 4 animals out of a herd of 10 
was, from a subsistence point of view, a much graver concern to a poor family than 
was a reduction of 40% of a wealthier family's livestock. The better off, or the well 
connected, often paid less taxes than the poor and illiterate of no social standing who 
ss In 1884 a decree was passed to abolish the taxes paid on agricultural produce 
on their entry into the towns and export duties on wheat, barley and vegetables were 
eliminated while duties paid on olive exports were reduced. Mahjoubi A. (1977) op. 
cit.. 
56 ibid.. 
57 MAE, Correspondence Politique, Rapport Mensuel, July 1888. 
58 MAE, Correspondence Politique, Rapport Mensuel, February 1889. 
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could be ruthlessly exploited by the Caid and his staff. 59 
In the Matmata mountains it was the Hamerna and the blacks (traditionally the lowest 
rank in tribal society) of the Rebenten tribe who exploited alfa most regularly. 60 The 
Hamerna which, like its neighbours the Hazem, Gheraira and Aleia, experienced 
difficulties year after year in surviving on the resources of their livestock and the oases 
they inhabited, one report commenting that 1886 was the fifth successive year without 
a grain crop due to lack of rainfall. 61 To supplement meagre incomes some travelled 
each year to Tunis, or into the northern cereal growing regions to work as labourers 
while others with a little more wealth bought a few goods with which they set off 
exchanging for wheat and other products sometimes as far as Bone in Algeria. The 
opening by Perry Bury of a little alfa yard at Zarat brought a new source of income to 
the inhabitants and even offered some members of the Aleia the opportunity of regular 
labour in preparing and handling the alfa brought to the yard before it was shipped to 
Gabes or Sfax for export. 
5.7 Conclusion 
The and and semi-arid environments of south and central Tunisia provided the 
inhabitants of these regions little in the way of economic security and stability. 
Climate, and especially rainfall, played an inordinate role in determining the prosperity 
of the tribes, all their resources being intimately linked to the timing, distribution and 
level of rainfall. Extensive pastoralism was the only truly viable economic activity for 
the bulk of the population. Although of secondary importance to livestock, agricultural 
and horticultural production was a vital source of nourishment for the tribes as it was 
59 The inequality of the tax burden is evident elsewhere in the country. In the 
oases of the Djerid, for example, Henia demonstrates that landowners crippled with 
debts commonly resorted to signing contracts with wealthier inhabitants in which the 
former, in exchange for immediate, and often derisory, income, accepted the latter's 
own tax obligations in perpetuity. See Henia, A. (1985), op. cit.. 
60 S. H. A. T., carton MR 1323, dossier 15, "Notice sur les Tribus des Hamerna, 
des Hazem et Aleia". 
61 ibid.. 
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also an important means of exchange for other products. While the tribes sowed 
whatever land their resources would permit, the grain crop was particularly sensitive 
to, and dependent on, climatic conditions and harvests were generally highly irregular 
and low yielding. Years of good harvests were far outweighed by those of mediocre 
ones or of total crop failures and the south in general was perpetually deficient in 
cereals for its subsistence requirements. The northern provinces, the Tell, provided the 
tribes a vital source of pasture and of work during periods of low rainfall in the south 
and was a fundamental mechanism by which some form of equilibrium was maintained 
amongst the pastoral nomads. 
But drought conditions were a constant threat and during such years, or after successive 
years of highly unfavourable rainfall in the south, subsistence problems for the tribes 
could become severe. This could be further complicated when drought also affected 
the north, thus limiting both the availability of pasture for southern tribes and reducing 
the offer of work in the harvests there. The tribes had little left to fall back on except 
the sale of some of the animals which survived. Prices for livestock and animal 
products inevitably fell precipitously under these conditions while the cost of purchasing 
grain rose considerably. The effects of famine, often compounded by virulent disease, 
had a devastating impact on both the human and animal populations of Tunisia. 
The development of the trade in alfa grass brought a precious, and much needed, 
source of income to the tribes of southern Tunisia. Although widely perceived as being 
an almost humiliating activity the collection of alfa provided all the tribes a means of 
procuring, albeit meagre, resources under conditions of extreme economic duress. A 
naturally self perpetuating resource, alfa grass became, after the establishment of the 
trade in the material with Britain, the only significant and dependable economic 
resource available to the southern tribes in years of severe and widespread drought and 
saved many from starvation: 
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"Of so incalculable benefit has it been to the natives as to render them almost 
independent of the corn crops, the failure of which formerly entailed great want 
and misery, if it did not cause a famine. The consequent increase which has 
taken place in the rate of wages has attracted many Arabs and blacks to the 
localities where it is pressed and prepared for export, who are thus able to earn 
an ample livelihood in return for their work. The development of this trade has 
indirectly affected all other trades and industries. Many Christian and 
Mohammedan artisans who formerly could scarcely find employment now carry 
on a thriving business. Altogether esparto has been a great boon to the Arabs 
and an advantage to European residents". 62 
For the mainly Maltese and Jewish brokers, and the trading houses which employed 
them, the alfa trade also brought a significant new source of income, particularly 
important when other branches of commerce, almost entirely agriculturally based, were 
in suffering from the effects of drought. The financially bankrupt Beylical government 
equally benefitted considerably from the alfa trade not only directly from the tax levied 
on the export of the material which helped reduce the shortfall caused by lower export 
duties raised from the country's other natural products, but also by enabling the 
recovery of taxes from the population of the interior (see Chapter 7). 
Government taxation of the tribes had a material influence on the economic well being 
of the tribes in the nineteenth century and was an important motivation for tribal 
participation in the alfa trade even in years of favourable climatic and environmental 
conditions. Many tribes resorted to the sale of alfa simply to pay taxes owing to the 
government. The extension and more effective extraction of taxes under the French 
administration proved a stimulus to the collection of alfa amongst the poorest tribes for 
many of which the income generated from its sale became a regular and constant 
necessity. 
One report from the Bureau de Renseignements indicates that for some tribes the 
collection of alfa grass had to some extent replaced the need for cereal production: 
62 British Parliamentary Papers (1878), LXXIV, Report by Consul General 
Drummond Hay on the Trade and Commerce of Tripoli for the Year 1877. 
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"La culture etait autrefois beaucoup plus prospere qui aujourd'hui, eile tend a 
diminuer encore, notammenet chez les Ouled Amran; il faut en chercher la 
cause dans 1'exploitation de l'halfa. Cette plante existe en effet sur le territoire 
en tres grande quantite et constitue pour les Madjers une source de benefices 
faciles. L'on comprend donc aisement etant donnee surtout le caractere 
naturellement parraseux de l'arabe qu'il abandonne le penible travail des champs 
pour une exploitation tout a la fois moins fatiguant, plus lucrataive et d'un profit 
plus assure". 63 
We believe this view is entirely erroneous and, even if true of the particular time when 
the study was undertaken, could have been nothing but an aberration. The collection 
of alfa grass was almost entirely a reflection of poverty and need and was never a 
permanent alternative to either animal rearing or other agricultural activities. 
The level of alfa exports achieved during the nineteenth century is testament to the 
degree of economic distress endured by many tribes whether caused by environmental 
factors or fiscal pressure. Almost uniquely amongst the natural resources of southern 
Tunisia alfa grass could be relied upon at all times by those lacking alternative means 
of subsistence or of paying taxes. 
63 S. H. A. T., MR 1321, dossier 24, Tribu des Madger. 
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Chapter Six 
The Alfa Trade 1881-1887 
6.1 Reaction to the Occupation in the South 
Until the signing of the Treaty of the Bardo in May of 1881 military activity had been 
exclusively concentrated in the north of the country. Elsewhere the population 
remained relatively calm, encouraging the French to cut their occupying forces by 
two-thirds to 10,000 men. ' Almost immediately after this action, however, resistance 
to the French occupation began to increase again in the north and, more seriously, to 
spread amongst the semi-nomads of the south and centre of the country as news of the 
invasion filtered through with the arrival of tribes from the north fleeing the French 
advance. Attacks on the sedentary populations of the Sahel which refused to become 
involved in any opposition to the French forces increased markedly. At Susa it was 
reported that a group of Hammama tribesmen delivering alfa grass to Perry Bury's yard 
ran off crying "let us fight the French and gain Heaven". 2 
By early June, amidst rumours of an imminent French attack on the holy town of 
Kairouan and on Sfax, the revolt against both Europeans and Beylical officials, who 
were regarded as conspirators in the French invasion, became widespread amongst the 
nomads. Many refused to pay their taxes or recognise their caids. 3 Meetings of 
different tribes were held to discuss the situation and decide their response. The 
growing insurrection centred on Sfax where the tribes found ready support from the 
Arab citizens of the town. The spark which ignited their pent up anger was the arrival 
of a French ship "Le Chacal" at Sfax on June 26. The Arabs reacted by attacking the 
European population forcing many to embark on the Chacal to escape. It was after this 
episode that anti-French sentiment broke out into open revolt. Fractions of the 
1 Arnoulet, F. (1984) p. 108. 
2 FO 335/151/1, Galea to Reade, June 26,1881. 
' Karoui and Mahjoubi cite the case of the Methalith tribe near Sfax which demanded 
a new Caid. The authorities in Tunis acceded but his replacement never took office. Rejected 
by the tribe he returned to Tunis. Karoui, M. and A. Mahjoubi (1983) p. 98. 
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Hammama, Zlass and Beni-Zid tribes arrived at Sfax to join the war against the 
infidels. After the Chacal incident there emerged a leader, Ali ben Khalifa, Caid of 
the Neffet tribe, who was to unite the tribes against the French and the government. ' 
The French response to the Chacal incident was swift. The naval bombardment of the 
town began on the fifth of July with 6000 soldiers troops being landed on the 
sixteenth. 5 The town was quickly taken and order restored. 
But the defeat at Sfax merely served to intensify the struggle against the French. 
Almost all the tribes of the south and centre of the country were now involved in a full 
scale rebellion. The Ouerghemma moved north to join the Hammama, Zlass, Neffet 
and Fraichiche in the Sahel and around Kairouan destroying property and attacking 
government troops and the local sedentary population. 
The scale of the uprising entrained the French authorities to organise a second military 
expedition in the country from October 1881. Three columns of troops were 
constituted each of which was to cross different parts of the country to join up at 
Kairouan, where occupation was achieved without a struggle. From Kairouan the 
French troops moved south towards Kasserine, Gafsa, the Djerid, Gabes and Zarziz, 
pushing the insurgents further and further south and finally into refuge in Tripoli. 
Martel estimates the number of Tunisians in Tripolitania at between 120,000 and 
140,000.6 Almost all were from the tribes of the south and centre of the country, few 
of which did not have at least some of their number refuged in the neighbouring 
Wilayet. 
4 Until the Chacal incident ben Khalifa continued to be loyal to the government 
exhorting the Arabs to stay calm and not to become involved in any unrest. The reasons for 
his rapid, and complete, change of heart are unknown. Ibid., p. 97. 
5 Ayadi, T. (1981) p. 178. 
6 Martel, A. (1865) p. 290. 
189 
6.2 The Alfa Trade During and Immediately after the Occupation 
The alfa trade in Tunis was seriously disrupted by the French occupation and its 
aftermath amongst the tribes of the south and centre. Perry Bury's yard at Sfax was 
completely destroyed in the struggle for the town and their properties at Skhira and 
Gourine plundered. ' Considerable advances made to the tribes prior to the uprising 
were lost. More importantly the flight of much of the tribal population into Tripolitania 
severely reduced the potential for collections. In 1882 exports fell by more than 60% 
from the previous year to only 12,697 tons while the following year only 12,593 tons 
were exported. ' 
But quite apart from the upheaval caused by the invasion, two other factors threatened 
the prosperity of the trade in Tunis during the 1880's. The first was the creation of a 
large private concession of alfa exploitation rights to a single company. The second, 
and in the long term more serious, was the sharp fall in world alfa prices from the 
middle of the decade. 
6.3 The Duplessis Concession 
Early in 1881 a retired French army captain and holder of the Legion d'Honneur, M. 
Rene Duplessis, managed to extract from the Prime Minister of Tunis, with the forceful 
backing of the French consul, a contract which surrendered to him for a period of 99 
years the sole rights to the exploitation of alfa grass growing over a large, but 
ill-defined, extent of land in the mountains of the Ouerghemma, El Ayacha, Madjoura, 
Bou Hedma and Heddedj. The concession, the first of its kind in Tunis and, unlike 
similar arrangements in Spain and Algeria, at no cost whatsoever to the incumbent, was 
ratified by Beylical decree on June 13,1881 just one month after the signing of the 
Treaty of the Bardo. 
The reaction to the news amongst the alfa traders in Tunis, was one of great dismay. 
FO 335/152/2 Balzan to Reade, November 5,1881 and FO 335/151 anon., June 26, 
1881. 
8 British Parliamentary Papers (1888) XCIX, Report on The Trade of Tunis for the Year 
1887. 
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The mountains concerned were some of the most productive sources of alfa in the 
country and supplied the major part of the country's alfa exports. Many felt that the 
Bey, in granting a concession of these district, had effectively created a monopoly 
control over the country's alfa resources to the detriment of all. 
British paper producers in Britain were also greatly concerned about the concession. 
Already suffering from price increases in alfa grass resulting from the Bou Amra tribal 
rebellion in Algeria and the tribal uprising against the French occupation of Tunis, they 
were fearful lest the elimination of competition in the Regency might work to push 
prices up still further. They were also anxious that an important source of grass for 
the British market should not fall into the hands of their French competitors. The 
British Papermakers Association wrote to Lord Granville warning that: 
"... among the projects which have received the official support of the French 
Consul General in Tunis, M. Roustan, is one for creating a monopoly of all the 
Esparto Grass in the Regency, with the view of entirely diverting the trade 
from British merchants, in whose hand it has almost exclusively been up to the 
present time. Since the disturbances in Tunis and northern Africa, the trade in 
esparto which now forms the most important material for the manufacture of 
paper, has almost completely ceased, and should the trade, on restoration of 
order, be impeded by the imposition of arbitrary export duties, the 
manufacturers and consumers of paper in this country will materially suffer". ' 
Britain's Consul General, Reade, was acutely aware of the trade's importance to British 
interests in Tunis itself. In 1881 shipments of alfa were valued at some £250,000, 
accounting for a large percentage of Britain's exports from the country and employing 
a considerable number of British merchants. Coming so soon after the French invasion 
Reade saw the decision to grant the concession to Duplessis as nothing more nor less 
than a French inspired conspiracy designed to undermine British influence at the 
Beylical palace. In his response to a Foreign Office request for further information on 
the matter, Reade wrote: 
I FO 102/157, The Papermakers Association to Lord Granville, London, November 16, 
1881. 
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"I need hardly say that this extraordinary transaction will act very prejudicially 
on our commercial interests in this country and is regarded here as a blow 
especially directed at one of the most important items of the British export trade 
of Tunis". " 
The French Resident General, Roustan, repeatedly denied the accusations either that the 
concession constituted a monopoly or that it was directly aimed at disrupting British 
trade. In reply to Perry Bury's fears in this regard, communicated to him through 
Reade, Roustan was adamant that "... il n'a ete concede aucun monopole de la nature 
susmentionee". 11 Yet the widely held view that the Tunisian government, pressed by 
French authorities, was actively engaged in compromising British interests in the 
Regency received further credence in March of 1882 when the British firm of Surtees, 
Hough and Law were refused a concession, on similar terms to that given to Duplessis, 
of alfa growing in fourteen different and distinct areas of the south: 
1. Sbeitla 8. Matmata 
2. Zlass 9. Bneselten 
3. Shereesh (Zarzis) 10. Beniaiscia 
4. Jbel Huaia (Haouia) 11. Skhira 
5. Bni Zid 12. Aiseia 
6. Figuia 13. Green 
7. Jbel Zraua 14. Zarat 
"... and any such other districts as it may please your Highness". 12 
Although such a view was understandable given the general political and economic 
climate prevailing in Tunis in the aftermath of the French occupation, there was, in 
fact, no French conspiracy of the type claimed by British critics of the concession. 
French influence had indeed been brought to bear on the Tunisian government to 
"encourage" it to block the British firm's request, but this pressure had not been 
motivated by any misplaced sense of national pride or nationalistic prejudice. Indeed, 
'o FO 102/157, Reade to Granville, Tunis, March 2,1882. 
11 FO 335/156/1, Roustan to Reade, Tunis, February 13,1882. 
12 FO 335/136/4, Hough to the Prime Minister of Tunis, no date, enclosed in a letter 
from Alfred Mattei to Reade, March 25,1882. It is worth noting here that Hough was able 
to list 14 districts which he believed lay outwith the existing Duplessis concession since some 
year later, after he had taken over the rights to that concession (see below), he was to claim 
that many of these districts did indeed fall within the boundaries of the concession. 
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were it not for the fact that the Duplessis agreement had been agreed before the French 
invasion and that, under the terms of the Treaty of the Bardo the Bey's sovereignty 
remained intact (the French military presence was officially described as a measure of 
support for the Tunisian government's struggle to control unruly elements of the 
population), the Resident General would have had it revoked immediately. While 
legally bound to uphold the Duplessis contract and accept it as a fait accompli, he 
could, and did, prevent any further such concessions of a similar nature. This reflects 
a deep, and growing, concern felt by both French civil and military authorities in the 
country over the threat which such concessions posed not only to the immediate, and 
extremely delicate, relations with the turbulent southern tribes but also, and more 
importantly, to the long term stability of the south on the eventual repatriation of the 
tribes to their lands. Furthermore, the south of Tunis was strategically vital to the 
French government in Algeria where the current Bou Amra rebellion was merely one 
in a constant 'tide of civil unrest in the country which many believed was propagated 
by support from Tunisian tribes which directed a large flow of guns and ammunition, 
landed clandestinely along the southern coast of the Regence, to Algeria. Prolonged 
unrest along the border could only serve to heighten tensions within Algeria. 
It should be remembered that the French consular officials had vigorously supported 
Duplessis's application for the concession largely with the aim of strengthening French 
influence in the country. This, of course, was standard French policy designed to 
enhance her claim to be the only Power whose interests warranted political 
aggrandisement, if not outright political annexation. Yet the original, perhaps 
ostensible, plan of limited intervention was already giving way to thoughts of more 
formal control, a move only supported by the need for greater military involvement to 
combat mounting unrest in the south. The tribal uprising presented the French force 
with a major problem particularly given the stipulation by the government in Paris that 
the establishment of a Protectorate should not place any strain on metropolitan 
resources. 13 Furthermore, public opinion at home dictated that there could be no 
question of a prolonged military campaign to pacify the country, or a large army of 
13 Mahjoub Ali, (1977) p. 57. 
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occupation, as had occurred in Algeria. 
Yet the operation of the concession could only serve to heighten anti-French feeling 
amongst precisely that part of the population whose reaction to the French intervention 
had been the strongest. This was because the concession struck at the very heart of one 
of the most fundamental underpinnings of tribal society: the collective "ownership" of 
culturally and historically defined areas of land by individual tribal units. In signing 
over the rights to the exploitation of the alfa resources growing on tribal land, the Bey 
had unilaterally usurped the tribes' hitherto unchallenged and previously inalienable 
rights of ownership, presaging thereby, even if only symbolically in the first instance, 
the forced and effective political domination of the semi-nomadic populations by the 
central authority. 
In the long term such an outcome was clearly in the French interest since not only 
would it ensure the full incorporation of the south into the political structures of the 
country as a whole, but would also give them pre-emptive rights for future colonisation 
of the land. Hence Roustan's claim, in reasserting that a monopoly of alfa collection 
had not been created, that, "... par cet acte, le gouvernement [of the bey] a simplement 
depose a titre du seul et legitime proprietaire des produits de terrains qui lui 
appartiennent". 14 
William Galea, Perry Bury's principal north African representative and by now also 
Britain's Vice-Consul at Susa, was quick to counter this, however, pointing out in a 
letter to Reade, that: 
"At present esparto is bought from individual Arabs, each tribe gathers the 
esparto in its respective mountains, and sells it in the market, and no merchant 
has ever hired a mountain for his own exclusive account. I consider that when 
this concession will be known to the Arabs it will be a serious matter as they 
will find themselves no longer proprietors of ground and mountains which they 
have considered for generations their own" . 
's 
14 FO 335 156/1 Roustan to M. 1'Agent et Consul General Reade, Tunis, March 20, 
1882. 
is FO 335 155/1 Galea to Reade, Susa, April 15,1882. 
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It did not require Galea's intimate knowledge of the tribes to understand this point. 
The French authorities' ability to maintain this position was based largely on an almost 
complete lack of knowledge of the true extent of the concession which had been only 
vaguely referred to in the contract. The French authorities, as ignorant as everyone in 
this respect, were happy, for the time being, to exploit the public confusion which 
surrounded the deal, particularly as Duplessis himself had made no move in the 
intervening period which could have been construed as indicating an interest in 
capitalising on his good fortune. As long as this apparent indecision on the part of the 
concessionnaire prevailed there was little to threaten Roustan's position. Yet matters 
were already beginning to get beyond the French authorities' control. 
Duplessis, it seems, never had any intention of entering the commerce in alfa grass. 
For him, as with many of his French contemporaries, Tunis was a country eminently 
suited to speculative business ventures, especially in land. His contract with the 
Tunisian government was considerably more attractive than most in that it had cost him 
precisely nothing. Furthermore, with demand for alfa fibre continuing at high levels 
(it was by far the most common raw material used in the manufacture of paper in the 
UK) and with difficulties of supply creating major problems for British consumers, the 
concession of some of the most productive alfa lands in Tunis offered a lucrative 
potential to anyone with the will and expertise to exploit them. 
Duplessis' opportunism was to pay off handsomely. Surtees, Hough and Law, 
aggrieved but not disheartened by the bey's reaction to their own proposals, entered 
into negotiations with Duplessis for the transferral of his contract to them. Talks 
progressed swiftly and on April 6,1882, agreement was reached in principle, whereby 
Duplessis would cede his rights in their entirety to the British firm on condition that it 
should set up a new company to manage the concession. In return, the Frenchman was 
reported to have received a guarantee of 35% of net profits arising from the working 
of the concession. 16 
16 AGT E 233/10 Alfa, Tribunale Arbitrale, March 5,1884. 
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It is possible the French were unaware of this new deal although their silence on the 
subject may have reflected a desire to keep news regarding the concessions as secret 
as possible. Speculation in Tunis, however, was rife. On hearing of the unconfirmed 
reports regarding the deal with the British firm, the Foreign Office instructed Reade to 
withdraw, instituting further pressure on the Bey for the abolition of the contract. 
London was less concerned with the idea of a concession, on whatever scale, as it was 
with the prospect of French control over what had become an important source of raw 
material for Britain's paper manufacturing industry. It did nothing however, to appease 
the large and varied groups of merchants and brokers and their personnel operating in 
Tunis itself for whom the trade in alfa grass was a significant business commodity. 
With little information available from British sources, and none forthcoming from either 
the Tunisian government or French officials, alfa traders were living off a diet of 
rumour and counter-rumour. It was to try and find out more about the concession that 
a partner in the firm Perry Bury, Mr James Doughane, was dispatched from Liverpool 
to Tunis from where he was to travel to Tripoli for talks with some of the Arab 
insurgents who had fled the alfa regions of Tunis for the sanctuary of Tripoli. 
Doughane arrived at Susa on the 21st of April, 1882 where he was met by Galea and 
the two men left for Tripoli by steamer. 
On arrival they had little difficulty in arranging meetings with many of the refugees, 
including their leader, Ali ben Hlifa. The intelligence they gathered from their many 
discussions was profoundly disturbing to them, as it was to the French whose worst 
fears appeared to be realised: 
"I had a good deal of conversation with the different classes of Tunisian 
insurgents at Tripoli, and I observed that the lower classes are tired of 
remaining there.. . but the higher class is.. . continually persuading them that the Sultan is strengthening himself and after-wards will fight the French; this all 
comes from Ali Bunhlifa". " 
With regards the concession itself, the news was bleak for the Tunisian alfa traders. 
17 FO 335 155/1 Galea to Reade, Susa, May 11,1882. 
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Galea and Doughane discovered that while only five mountains were mentioned in the 
concession, the contract apparently gave to Duplessis the rights to collect alfa grass on 
five chains of mountains, comprising in total over sixty mountains, giving him 
therefore, a veritable monopoly in the trade from the Tripoli frontier to a point well 
north of Sfax. '8 
More disturbing for the French was the news that: 
"The revolutionaries are aware of the concession and their revolutionary feelings 
are stronger than ever and they assert that the Bey not only sold them to the 
French, but has also sold their homes and property". 19 
By this time the French had already received similar information from the country's 
Consul at Tripoli in the form of a report which stated: 
"On noun a rapporte depuis deux mois environs ... que tout 
le territoire compris 
depuis les montagnes derrieres Sfax jusqu'aux celles des Ouerghemas au sud de 
Zerzis, c'est a dire un espace que ne comprend pas moms d'une semaine du 
marche a cheval a ete donne en concession pour 99 ans a une francais du nom 
de Blazi [Duplessis] qui a desormais le monopole exclusif de 1'exploitation de 
1'alfa. Voyez sur le cart le nombre de tribus, de villages, de campements, de 
jardins, de cultures constant sur cette territoire peuple d'au moms 150,000 
habitants, l'alfa servit de paturages a leurs bestiaux et eile etait aussi une Brande 
resource comme matiere a recolter et a vendre aux marchands europeens du 
littoral on leur a assure que a l'avenir le concessionnaire aura seul le droit d'en 
deposer, des lors plus de terrains de parcours pour les troupeaux, plus de 
commerce de 1'alfa. Mourir de faim chez nous ou en Tripolitaine, mieux vaut 
rester ici independents et attendre des evenements puisqu'on nous promet le 
secours du sultan pour rentrer en posession de nos droits traditionnels dont on 
a dispose contre notre gre". 20 
Roustan now found his position seriously compromised. The vagueness in the wording 
of the contract which had hitherto been the great strength of the French's persistent 
18 FO 102/157 Perry Bury to Sir Charles Dilke, HM's Under Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, Liverpool, May 23,1882. 
19 FO 335 155/1 Galea to Reade, May 11,1882. 
20 First Annex to Despatch of December 21,1885. Direction Politique no. 337, 
Correspondance Politique, No. 88. Extract of a letter from M. Feraud to Ambassador of the 
Republique of France in Constantinople, Tripoli, May 29,1882. 
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assurances that a monopoly had not been created, now became a major liability, for it 
was now clear that it was not the French who determined the exact extent of the 
concession; rather it was ultimately dependent on the interpretation of the 
concessionnaire. This was of lesser significance as long as Duplessis showed no desire 
to become actively engaged in working the concession but now, with the arrival of the 
British firm who exhibited every intent to actively exploit it, it became a more serious 
problem. The company, after all, was unlikely to interpret it in any way unfavourable 
to its commercial interests. 
Moreover, the French authorities were now fully aware of the tribal opposition to the 
concession and preoccupied with the likely repercussions on their attempts to encourage 
their peaceful return. Of particular concern was the region bordering Tripolitania 
which for centuries had been the source of constant disputes and unrest centring on 
deep seated antagonisms between the Tunisian tribes of the Ourghemma confederation 
and those in Tripolitania, notably the Nouail. 
Security in this region was vital to the French not only because its continued resistance 
was expensive in terms of money and personnel, but also because it was a major source 
of contraband of arms for the tribes of southern Algeria. With limited resources, 
security in the south would depend on an alliance with part of the population, and the 
Ouerghemma tribes were the most powerful of the area and the most strategically 
located: 
"Il est evident qu'avec le concours de cette puissante tribu, on pourrait exercer 
une surveillance efficace sur toute la partie occidentale de la frontiere 
tripolitaine, que s'etende de la mer a Ghadames et empeche ainsi la contrabande 
de guerre qui s'y fait continuellement au detriment de la prosperite et de la 
securite de 1'Algerie et de la Tunisie... " Z' . 
At the same time as keeping the arms trade in check, effective control of the region 
was important for the re-establishment of the caravan trade with the interior of Africa 
which remained a goal of the French: 
21 Memoires et Documents, Dossier 4, Min. de la Guerre a M. le Minister des Affaires 
Etrangeres, Paris, September 19,1881. 
198 
"Cette securite des parcours donnerait une importance considerable a un grand marche 
permanent qui serait etabli a Ouargla et dont M. Feraud demande, avec raison, la 
creation pour aggrandir notre commerce avec le Soudan au detriment de Tripoli". 22 
But with the Ouerghemma tribes in open rebellion from March 1882,23 the French 
were forced to revise their stance on the issue of the concession. The complacency 
which had hitherto characterised their policy on this matter now gave way to insistent 
efforts to find a way of ameliorating the more onerous terms, and potentially most 
damaging consequences of the contract. 
It was not long before a convenient legal loophole was discovered in the contract. It 
appeared that no decision which directly affected the management of the Revenues 
Conceded could be executed without the prior approval of the International Financial 
Commission. As the revenues from the export tax on alfa grass came under the 
Commission's jurisdiction the contract should have been submitted to it for ratification. 
This had not been done and the Resident General was thereby provided with the 
opportunity of modifying the agreement. 
Neither Duplessis nor Surtees, Hough and Law were at all happy about this move, 
since the contract had been legally ratified under the terms of the Beylical decree, now 
almost one year old. Nevertheless such was the French opposition to the deal that a 
compromise was reached whereby any new arrangement would be made without 
prejudice to the concessionnaire's rights under the original contract. 
The most important clause incorporated into the modified Beylical decree of June 14, 
1882 was the exclusion of the Ouerghemma mountains. The region's contribution to 
the alfa trade, relative to that of the other areas, was anyway limited and was not a 
significant loss to the economic potential of the concession. The four other main 
clauses which the French insisted on including in the new agreement were as follows: 
22 Ibid. 
23 Karoui and Mahjoube (1983) p. 183. 
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1. A delimitation of the remaining districts had to be made by competent agents 
appointed and approved by the Tunisian government. 
2. In order to minimise tribal hostility to the concession traditional rights of pasture 
and usage of the local populations had to be fully respected. 
3. At least 10,000 tons of grass per annum would have to be exported by the company 
for the first three consecutive years of operation. This was designed to ensure stability 
of tax revenue collected from alfa exports which was an important source of income 
for the Government. 
4. The newly created French Tribunal alone was to mediate and arbitrate in any cases 
of litigation arising from the concession. 
These, and other minor alterations, were accepted by all parties directly concerned and 
on the 20th of September 1882, the rights of the concession were transferred to the 
newly created Franco-English-Tunisian Esparto Fibre Supply Company Limited 
[hereafter referred to as the Franco-English Company]. 24 
The little port of Skhira was chosen as the site of the firm's esparto yard and was to 
form the centre of its operations in Tunis. Lying some fifty miles south of Sfax, Skhira 
had previously only been used by alfa merchants as a shipping station principally 
because no customs post existed in the town. Nevertheless, as Galea readily admitted, 
it was an ideal location for an alfa centre with one of the deepest and most sheltered 
anchorages on the southern coast. The concession provided for the loading of alfa at 
Skhira for direct transportation to the UK. 
The firm's establishment at Skhira, and its attempts to forge business links with the 
surrounding population, provide us with a clear example of the degree of social and 
economic disequilibrium of tribal Tunisia and the methods by which European traders 
were able to exploit this. 
6.4 The Mehedba tribe 
The company's initial attempts to arrange for the collection of grass by local 
24 FO 335/1 R. Watson Surtees to Granville, London, January 7,1884. 
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populations centred on the Mehedba tribe inhabiting the region around Skhira, including 
Bou-Hedma Mountain. The Mehedba tribe had taken part in the rebellion against 
French forces in large numbers and a considerable number were still in Tripoli. 
Though their hostility indicated a virulent anti-French sentiment, deeply held and 
strongly displayed, it was undoubtedly also a reflection of serious economic problems 
which had beset the tribe for many years. The need to pay taxes to the bey weighed 
heavily on their meagre resources and the tribe as a whole had been having great 
difficulties in meeting these obligations. 25 
In order to make these payments, many had contracted extensive debts with European 
merchants in Sfax. These were collective in nature and were guaranteed by the sheikhs 
and notables of the tribe. The large scale emigration to Tripoli manifests, in part, a 
desire to rid themselves of the vicious circle of debt and debt repayment in a desperate 
attempt to halt a continuous downward spiral to destitution. Yet refuge in Tripoli did 
not divest them of their responsibilities to their various creditors. At some point they 
would have to return and, by the middle of 1882, there seemed little prospect of a 
French military defeat. 
On their return the tribe was to be faced with payment of these debts and with their 
on-going fiscal obligations unchanged. During the early years of the Protectorate the 
tax regime was little altered and continued to weigh most heavily on the poorest 
sections of society. The mejba, or capitation tax, which was not paid by the citizens 
of Tunis, Kairouan, Sousse, Sfax and Monastir, was still exacted from the tribes and 
had to be remitted irrespective of the size of the harvest. The other main taxes, the 
achour on cereals and the kanoun on olives, even rose slightly under the French 
between 1883 and 1886.26 
Although the French wanted to lower the tax burden on the country in general, seeing 
it as a hindrance to economic development, they found themselves unable to do so 
25 S. H. A. T., carton MR 1323, Report no. 17, Tribu des Mehedba, August 10,1885. 
26 Mahjoubi, A. (1977) p. 230. 
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because of the need to ensure stable income for the Treasury. As d'Estournelles de 
Constant pointed out, 
"Comment payer les depenses, si reduites fussent-elles, et la dette que nous 
garantissons, si sous pretexte d'en ameliorer le regime (des impots), nous 
commencions par supprimer le peu de recettes qu'on pouvait tirer du pays". 27 
Furthermore the abuses in the collection of taxes by the government's representatives, 
the Caids and their subordinates the Khalifa and Sheikhs, continued largely unchecked 
throughout the decade of the 1880's. 
Alfa grass provided the tribe with virtually the only means to acquit themselves of their 
debts and in many cases, the debts had been taken over in their entirety by alfa 
merchants to be repaid fully in alfa grass: 
"... les obligations des Mehedbas envers le commerce ont toute la meme origine: 
cette tribu pauvre eprouvant chaque annee des difficulties pour acquitter le 
montant des impots; des maisons se livrait au trafic de l'alfa leur faisaient alors 
des avances remboursables en alfa a un taux determine". 28 
Given that these debts were collective in nature, a key factor in establishing favourable 
commercial transactions with the tribes would be the support of the caid, in this case 
Noury Ben Belgacem. The caid, of course, had a vested interest in involving his tribe 
in the alfa trade, since much of his income rested on their economic prosperity and in 
particular, on the tribes ability to pay its dues to the government of which the Caid 
retained 10%. He also collected the taxes paid on alfa exports at the port of Skhira and 
clearly had an interest in maximising trade. 29 
But Noury also had a more personal reason for welcoming the Franco-English 
Company. He himself had incurred substantial debts, including one for 7,825 piastres 
with two Sfax merchants, Paolo Camilleri and Guisseppe Farrugia. For this sum he 
27 Cited in ibid., p. 229. 
28 S. H. A. T., carton MR 1323, Report no. 17, Tribu des Mehedba, August 10,1885. 
Z9 This however was transferred to Gabes in 1884 at the request of General Allegro. 
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had mortgaged his share of a house at Skhira and a garden in Sfax belonging in equal 
halves to himself and the Italian merchant, Salvatore Giardina. When the debt fell due, 
the creditors instituted legal proceedings for the sale of the properties. At this point 
William Galea, acting on behalf of Perry Bury which already traded from the port, 
intervened with the aim of reinforcing obligations for the collection of alfa to his 
company. Galea liquidated Noury's debt with his creditors, receiving in return the title 
deeds to the properties concerned. In the mean-time however, the rebellion intervened 
and the trade in alfa at the port, as elsewhere, all but stopped. 
With the purchase of the Duplessis concession in April 1882, the Franco-English 
Company instructed Alfred Mattei, a Tunisian lawyer resident in London, to go to 
Tunis with the aim of purchasing such land and property as was necessary to begin 
operations in the country. Mattei first purchased Giardina's share of the house at 
Skhira and then bought Noury's, paying him the 7,825 piastres with which he could 
free his debt with Galea. In effect the Caid was transferring his allegiance to the 
Company which had been awarded the concession. Having the Caid of the Mehedba 
as a "satellite" would be of great value in future dealings with the tribe. 
On the day of Mattei's arrival at Skhira, Noury sent messengers to all the sheikhs and 
notables of the tribe and the following morning, the 7th of May, he handed Mattei, in 
their presence, the possession of the property, "... the religious prayer having been said 
and the ceremony performed by the ecclesiastical dignitaries present" . 
30 
Having explained the purport of the concession and the object of the Franco-English 
Company to those present, Mattei "was assured by the Arabs of their friendly 
disposition and their willingness to work the alfa in conjunction with the Company". 31 
It could hardly be otherwise and the Company immediately set about exploiting its 
position with regards the Mehedba tribe. 
ý0 FO 335 155/1 Mattei to Reade, Tripoli, June 12,1882. 
31 Ibid.. 
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In November of the same year, following the creation of the Franco-English Company, 
Hough arrived in Tunis to arrange for the delimitation of the four mountains. The 
journey from Sfax to Skhira, which took three days, was undertaken with a military 
escort of 120 soldiers and a train of 200 camels laden with supplies, some of which 
were intended as an inducement to members of the Mehedba tribe still in exile, to 
return. 32 
While approval of the delimitation by the government was awaited, the firm sought to 
publicise their venture in Britain among consumers and investors alike. At a meeting 
of papermakers and other interested parties in Manchester on the 17th of January 1883, 
Mattei claimed that from the Bou-Hedma Mountain alone, some "30,000 tons of esparto 
grass could be exported annually". 33 Moreover, the Company was confident that a 
tramway could be laid from Bou-Hedma to Skhira which would ensure, together with 
hydraulic presses, that the grass could be delivered in Liverpool for £3 8s per ton as 
against £7 5s, the price reigning in 1882.34 
In accordance with the June 14 decree of 1882, the Company's exclusive rights to 
exploit the alfa in the mountains prescribed by the contract, would only commence after 
their delimitation and the publicly announced ratification by beylical decree. The first 
of these mountains, Bou-Hedma, already the largest supplier of alfa grass in the 
Tunisian market, was sanctioned by decree of the 13th of August, 1883.3' 
6.5 The Railway 
The approval of the other three mountains, however, was to prove more problematical. 
The major stumbling block was the railway, regarded by the Franco-English Company 
as an essential element in their business strategy. Article I of the original contract 
32 AGT E 233/10 Governor of the Mehedba to the Prime Minister, November 1882. 
33 The Times, "Esparto Fibre for Paper Making, " Wednesday, January 17,1883, p. 7. 
34 Ibid.. 
35 Journal Officiel Tunisien, September 6,1883, p. 2. 
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empowered Duplessis to construct either a railway or a tramway from the districts 
conceded to Skhira on the condition that it was used solely for the transportation of 
grass. However, when the concession was put forward for modification, the French 
authorities were preoccupied with the problem of security in the south and the expense 
which effective policing would involve. Limited resources dictated that French policy 
would concentrate on deploying troops at specific, geographically strategic locations in 
the south, mainly the larger towns. 
These garrisons, however, were isolated, difficult to provision and costly to maintain. 
A railway network passing through these regions and linked to the coast and to Algeria, 
would enable the French to retain a small military presence in the south, yet also ensure 
that reinforcements and supplies could be quickly brought in should the need arise. A 
priority, therefore was a railway linking the strategically vital Gafsa with the coast and 
with the Algerian rail network. 
Clearly the expense involved in such a project would be enormous and place a serious 
strain on the country's Treasury. The Resident General, therefore, sought to evaluate 
the possibility of defraying some of the costs by using the planned line from 
Bou-Hedma and extending it to Gafsa and beyond. Thus Article 2 of the modified 
contract omitted the option to the concessionnaire of a tramway while retaining the 
word "railway, " stipulating that: 
"... the Government reserves to itself the right of demanding the establishment 
of a public sequence of passengers and goods traffic on the line already 
constructed... when after due enquiry, its necessity shall be ascertained". " 
Thus when in February, 1883 the Company proposed plans for the construction of a 
light railway, or tramway, considered sufficient for its needs, the Resident General 
refused unless the firm agreed to a wider gauge and greater load-carrying capacity37 
to ensure compatibility with the Algerian railways. 
36 FO 335 160/1 Surtees to HM's Consul at Tunis, October 27,188. 
37 MAE Correspondance Politique, vol. 88,1885. 
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6.6 Trading Problems for the Franco-English Company 
While the litigation over the railway dragged on, during which time the ratification of 
the delineation of the remaining districts provided for by the concession was withheld, 
the trading performance of the Franco-English Company was extremely poor. The 
firm's exports in 1883 amounted to a mere 3,222 tons of alfa grass, well short of both 
its own projections and the stipulated minimum to satisfy the terms of the contract. 38 
Deprived of the exclusive rights to the production on the other mountains, the Company 
soon resorted to ruthlessly exploitative measures on Bou-Hedma in an attempt to 
increase collections and at the same time reduce expenses to a minimum. In April, 
1884 the Caid of the Mehedba complained to the prime minister that the Company paid 
his people only four piastres for each Tunisian quintal of grass taken to its yard at 
Skhira, while the Hammama tribesmen, who remained outwith the delimited territories, 
received between seven and eight piastres per quintal. 39 
At the same time the French were receiving complaints from various of those with 
whom the Franco-English company were trading regarding problems for the payment 
of grass delivered. 
"On pretende que la compagnie Franco-Anglaise qui exploit le massif de 
Bou-Hedma, donne lieu a des plaintes au sujet des retards qu'elle apporte dans 
ses paiements", 40 
In fact the firm was one of the most seriously affected by the lack of Tunisian coinage 
in circulation in Tunis ensuing from the establishment of the French Protectorate. 
6.7 Problem of Coinage 
The government in Paris and its administration in Tunis, earnestly sought the country's 
38 FO 335 166/3 Hough to Reade, Tunis, May 17,1886. 
39 MAE, Correspondance Politique, vol 88, Caid of Mehedba to Prime Minister, April 
10,1884, annexe to Despatch of December 21,1885, Direction Politique, no. 337. 
40 MAE, Correspondance Politique, Rapports Mensuel des Territoires du Sud, 
November, 1883. 
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entry in the Union Latine in order to standardise and improve business relations with 
France and Algeria. They aimed to achieve this however, gradually, with the minimum 
of disruption to local trade: 
"Le but auquel on doit tendre en Tunisie, au point de vue de la circulation 
monetaire, est evidemment, d'y introduire progressivement le regime etabli en 
France, en Algerie et en Italie. L'identite du Systeme monetaire facilite en effet 
les relations commerciales reduit a des proportions sans importance des cours 
du change, enfin fait disparaitre un agio, qui constitue sans doute, une source 
de benefice pour un nombre restreint de speculateurs, mais represente une Sorte 
de contribution prelevee par eux sur la masse des consommateurs et de 
producteurs". 41 
The integration of the Protectorate into the Union Latine would pave the way for the 
expansion of French capitalism in Tunisia. Since 1881 the two monetary systems had 
co-existed to the detriment of French business, since the French currency still did not 
have a legal exchange value in the country. Furthermore the people of Tunisia 
distrusted the new currency, preferring to use only Tunisian, or other, coinage which 
they were accustomed to. 42 As a result the exchange rate rose to "excessive levels 1143 
making it extremely difficult for traders to procure sufficient amounts of piastres to 
carry on their businesses. For those such as the Franco-English Company, dealing 
directly with the tribes the problem became acute. The firm 
"... se vit refuser par ses ouvriers la monnaie divisionnaire francaise qu'elle 
avait apportee en grande quantite a Skhira; et laissait son personnel sans solde 
au detriment de son exploitation et de la tranquilite publique; eile dut se mettre 
a la recherche de monnaies tunisiennes qu'elle ne parvint a se procurer qu'a 
grande peine et a grands frais". " 
41 MAE Finances (Monnaies-Banques-Credit Foncier) tome I: octobre 1880- mars 1887, 
Annexe a la Depeche no 1, du 5 janvier 1887, adressee par le Ministre des Finances aux 
Affaires Etrangeres. Note concernant la circulation monetaire en Tunisie, p. 168. Quoted 
in Summit, C. (1983) p. 57. 
42 The French had experienced a similar situation in Algeria, where even after fifty years 
of rule, the tribes continued to prefer dealing in a variety of other coinage which they used 
and trusted, rather than the French paper money. See Correspondence Politique vol 77, 
Extrait du Report de la Residence Francais a Tunis au MAE, June 11,1883. 
43 Ibid.. 
44 Ibid.. 
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However, in comparison with other merchants operating in the country, the 
Franco-English company was in something of a privileged position in that it held the 
exclusive rights to the alfa collected on Bou-Hedma. The tribes of the district had no 
alternative outlet for their grass. As a consequence, instead of paying cash to the 
tribes, the Company proffered promissory notes on receipt of alfa which were 
redeemable in two months but only for goods stocked at the firm's own yard at Skhira. 
It was able, therefore, to avoid to a large extent the need to purchase local currency. 
Furthermore, the goods for which these bonds could be exchanged were sold at 
exorbitant rates. 45 
Nevertheless, despite or perhaps because of these measures, the Company's business 
slumped further in 1884, exports of alfa grass falling sharply to only 1,988 tons. Given 
that the contract stipulated minimum annual exports of 10,000 tons, the firm was facing 
the prospect of seeing its concession annulled by default. The Company naturally 
blamed the continuing legal wrangle with the French authorities over the proposed 
railway which was also delaying the delimitation of the remainder of the concession. 
As this dispute was not of their making the Franco-English Company brought, in March 
of 1884, a legal action against the Government for damages and ten years lost profits, 
amounting in total to 9,750,000 francs. 46 They also sought the exclusion of the period 
of the dispute from the terms of the contract. 
6.8 Legal Proceedings 
Although Cambon, the French Resident General, offered to allow the construction of 
the tramway on the condition that the legal proceedings against the Government were 
dropped, the Company persisted. On March 5,1884, the Tribunal Arbitrale found in 
favour of the Company on the question of the railway, stating that it could not be held 
to construct a railway or tramway on more onerous terms than those outlined in the 
Beylical Decree of June 1881. Moreover the Tribunal upheld the Company's request 
that the period of dispute, from February 1,1883 until April 30,1884, should be 
as AGT Serie E, carton 233, dossier 10, Various Correspondence. 
46 Ibid. 
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withdrawn from the time-scale of the contract which was to re-start on May 1,1884. 
However, as no formal request for approval of the tramway had been submitted, the 
Tribunal decided that the Government could not be held responsible for any losses 
sustained by the firm and the claim for damages was refused. 47 
Yet it was only one year later, in April, 1885 that the firm finally did submit formal 
proposals for the construction of a light tramway on the Lartique system (purchased 
from a Belgium contractor) and not until October of 1885 that the French authorities 
finally gave its approbation to the project subject to certain stringent conditions. 48 
Furthermore, although during his visit to the country in April, when the plans for the 
tramway were submitted, Hough had also under-taken a delimitation of the mountains 
concerned with agents approved by the government, this had yet to be sanctioned by 
October, 1885 at which point the firm sent their lawyer, Alfred Mattei to Tunis to 
increase pressure on the government to force their ratification. Although the 
government relented, it demanded that a new delimitation be made. 
6.9 The Delimitation of Madjoura, Heddadj and El Ayascha Mountains 
Throughout this period the other alfa merchants continued to conduct their affairs 
normally, arranging with tribes outwith Bou-Hedma Mountain for the delivery of alfa 
to yards on the coast. They were, however, careful not to fall foul of the terms of the 
Franco-English Company's concession and where any possible doubts as to the legality 
of their activities arose, clarification was sought from the French authorities. Thus in 
April, 1885, the French merchant, J. H. Mattei (no relation to Alfred Mattei), on 
behalf of the Marseille firm, Grawitz et Fils, itself acting for Perry Bury, asked the 
government's permission to enter into a contract with various fractions of the Ouled 
Aziz of the Hammama confederation for the collection of 80,000 piastres (£2,000) 
47 AGT E233/10 Tribunal Arbitral du mars 7,1884. 
48 AGT E 233/10. The agreement, dated October 7,1885 stipulated that the tramway 
would have to be completed within nine months. The delay in submitting plans for the 
tramway may in part be due to the failure of discussions with a British firm on a light 
railway. See FO 335 166/5, Report of FETEFSCL, April 14,1886. 
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worth of grass to be delivered over a period of 18 months. The terms of the contract 
clearly stipulated that all the grass would be collected outwith the mountains conceded 
to the Franco-English Company. The French Director of Finances agreed and 
approved of the deal which was duly registered at the French Consulate in Sfax on July 
15,1885.49 
Subsequently, the firm purchased from the Caid of the Souessi tribe, a house and land 
opposite the yard belonging to the Franco-English Company at Skhira where they 
erected a hydraulic press. Alfred Mattei, however, considered that the land belonging 
to the Hammama tribe as a whole did in fact constitute part of the concession and 
instructed the Justice of the Peace at Sfax to seize the possessions of Grawitz at Skhira, 
including 700 tons of grass already delivered. 50 
During the delimitation of the mountains undertaken in early November in the company 
of the chief engineer of the French administration, Nouette, and Hartmayer, the 
Controleur Civil of Gafsa, Mattei, with the apparent approval of his French 
companions, made every effort to halt all sales of grass to any but the Company's 
representatives at Skhira. The Caid of the Hamama was instructed to tell his people 
that their contract with Grawitz was illegal and that henceforth all the alfa on their land 
belonged to the Franco-English Company alone. Guards were placed along the 
northeastern edge of the concession to stop, and redirect to Skhira, any caravans 
heading for Sfax. 51 The Caid of the Aroua even imprisoned the driver of one caravan 
who refused to obey these instructions. 52 
The effect of these measures on the trade of Sfax was a dramatic decline in alfa 
49 "Proces des Alfas. Jugement rendu le 5 mars 1886 par le Tribunal de Tunis, entre le 
Franco-English Tunisian Esparto Supply Company, Limited et MM Grawitz et Pils, " 1886. 
Bone: Imprimerie Typographique. 
so Ibid.. 
s' FO 335 165/5 Leonardi to Sandwith, Sfax, February 13,1886. 
52 AGT Series E, carton 233. 
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exports. Leadbetter, Perry Bury's agent at Sfax, reported that purchases from the 
Hamama tribe alone fell sharply from 5,000 tons in 1883 to 4,000 tons in 1884 and to 
only 1,900 tons in 1885. Similar decreases were noticed in deliveries of grass by the 
Agareb, Fraichiche, Zlass and Madger tribes. In total Perry Bury's exports from Sfax 
declined by more than fifty percent from 6,200 ton in 1883 to only 2,750 tons in 1885 
(Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1 Alfa purchases made by Perry Bury at Sfax (Tons) 
Tribe 
1883 1884 1885 
Hamamma 5,000 4,000 1,900 
Agareb 350 150 300 
Zlass, Madger, 
Fraichiche 
850 550 550 
Total 6,200 4,700 2,750 
Source: Correspondance Politique vol. 88,9th annexe "Achats de sparte par divers", 
Leadbetter to Resident General, Sfax, December 21,1885. 
Sixteen merchants at Sfax complained bitterly of the firm's abuses and the apparent 
complicity of Novette and Hartmayer: 
"... depuis deux mois environs, grace aux agissements de la Franco-Anglaise, 
les Amenunas ne paraissent plus sur le marche de Sfax et que le manque 
d'arrivages de sparte sur notre marche se prononce de plus en plus surtout 
depuis que M. L'Avocat anglais Mattei, et M. le Controleur civil de Gafsa, se 
rendus aupres des Amemas pour les amener a reconnaitre que leurs montagnes 
devaient faire partie de la concession de Bouhedma". 13 
The Resident General sympathised fully with the merchants' point of view although he 
denied and allegations of duplicity on the part of the two French representatives in the 
delimitation. In a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs he made it plain that the 
complaints: 
s3 MAE, Correspondance Politique, vol. 88,10th Annexe a la depeche du 21 decembre 
1885. Direction Politique no 337, Letter dated December 10,1885 to M. le Consul de 
France et Controleur Civil de Sfax. 
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"... sont fondees de tous points, sauf bien entendu, en ce que concerne la 
regularite des operations de delimitation et 1'attitude de M. Hartmayer, mais 
1'acte de concession ne me permet pas d'y faire droi. Ce deni, qui m'est 
impose, sera je crains, l'origine de graves difficultes dans un prochain 
avenir". sa 
It is clear that Hartmayer's view on the concession differed greatly from that of the 
French administration. In allowing the most generous interpretation of the delimitation, 
Hartmayer was trying to compensate for what he saw as the loss of economic potential 
caused to the Franco-English Company on Bou-Hedma Mountain which had suffered 
greatly from over-cropping. The administration's policy on territorial concessions in 
general, and that of the alfa resources in particular had not changed since the original 
objections to the latter raised some three years earlier. 
6.10 Reaction of Resident General Bompard 
Although it was felt concessions could and, in the future would, hasten economic 
development and prosperity, it was also believed that at this time they would lead to 
increased expense to the government and provoke a potentially dangerous disharmony 
amongst the different sections of society. This is evident in a letter from the Resident 
General to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1885: 
"Le Systeme des concessions territoriales peut quelque fois etre favorable a la 
richesse publique, il peut surtout en hater le developpement, au detriment 
toutefois de 1'avenir pour lequel il est toujours un embarras; mais, sans 
contredit, il est, dans le present, une source de discorde entre le individus et de 
depenses pour 1'Etat. Sous le regime de 1'expansion naturelle de l'industrie et 
de 1'agriculture, ii en est tout different. Le commerce exerce librement, 
rapproche sans constrainte vainqueurs et vaincus, confond leurs interets, etend 
les haines, fait naitre les sympathies; c'est ce role pacificateur qu'il a rempli 
dans le monde entier, c'est celui qu'il joue en Tunisie depuis plus de trois ans. 
La liberte dans les echanges, 1'egalite dans les transactions ont pu deplaire a 
ceux qui voient dans les colonies un proces livre a leurs appetits; mais c'est 
grace a 1'harmonie qui en est resultee qu'il a ete possible avec les moyens 
d'action imparfait, le personnel restreint et le modiques ressources dont dispose 
le Gouvernement Tunisien d'administrer la Regence d'y maintener fordre, d'y 
sa MAE, Correspondence Politique, vol. 88, Direction Politique no 337, Tunis, December 21,1885. 
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assurer la securite de faire face a tous les besoins d'un rapide 
developpement". 55 
Bompard believed that free trade and free exchange would protect the Arabs from such 
abuses of privileges which were now being perpetrated by the Franco-English Company 
on the southern tribes and at the same time ensure equality of opportunity to the great 
number of traders already operating in the country. The French administration was 
witnessing the exploitation of the tribes by the Franco-English Company and Bompard 
could only see this intensify with the expansion of the extent of the concession. The 
burden would fall squarely on the shoulders of the poorest sections of the tribal 
population for whom alfa was a necessity for survival and for whom, therefore, the 
value of alfa was largely unrelated to European price fluctuations. Thus: 
"Elle suffit aux indigenes pour qui le temps n'a pas de valeur et dont les 
chameaux seule occupaient une partie de l'annee. Elle ne saurait suffrit a une 
administration europeenne laquelle meme avec un privelege ne peut que ruiner 
les indigenes sans tirer elle-meme grand profit de leur ruin". " 
While safeguards against exploitation existed within the terms of all concessions, 
territorial or otherwise, these were largely unheeded with regards that of alfa since, 
"... une pareille clause, en matiere d'exploitation de 1'alfa est, en effet, 
inapplicable; son execution rendrait la concession illusoire. Les veritables 
privileges du concessionnaire [est]... l'avilissement de la main d'oeuvre par la 
suppression de la concurrence... ". S" 
This explains the Resident General's reaction to the Comte de Nesmoud's request in 
November 1885 for an alfa concession on similar terms to that enjoyed by the 
Franco-English Company, covering the Aradh region in the far south, which the 
administration refused in re-stating its position quite clearly: 
ss MAE, Correspondence Politique vol. 88, Bompard a MAE, December 21,1885. 
56 Ibid 
57 Ibid. 
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"Les difficultes qui resulteraient de 1'exercise d'une concession seraient 
particulierement graves ... dans... l'Arad. Le bon vouloir des Ouerghemmas est indispensable a la tranquilite de la Regence entiere; pour la troubler ils n'ont en 
effet, qu'a laisser traverser leur territoire par des bandes de pillards de la 
frontiere tripolitaine de sorte que leur inertie seule est un danger; c'est 
pourquoi, afin de s'assurer leurs concours, le gouvernement tunisien leur a fait 
la remise des impots". 58 
While there were undoubted commercial advantages to the creation of an alfa 
concession in the Aradh, these were far outweighed by the political ramifications such 
a move would have: 
"Dut une concession d'alfa dans 1'Arad presenter des avantages commerciaux, 
les mouvements politiques qui en resulteraient sont tell qu'elle ne doit, en aucun 
cas, etre octroyee. "59 
In fact the delimitation of the concession and the business methods of the 
Franco-English company were already causing great concern amongst the southern 
tribes: 
"Mais, il n'en existe pas moins un vif mecontentement a Sfax, a Gabes et dans 
les tribus, qui se trouvent atteintes dans leurs interets par les dernieres 
operations de la Commission chargee de delimiter les terrains alfatiers concedes 
a la Compagnie Franco Anglaise". 60 
Prices offered by the company continued to be inferior to those offered on the open 
market. Leadbetter reported to the French Consul at Sfax that while the Company was 
paying the Hammama tribes 6.5 piastres per quintal with a 25% deduction made to 
cover the weight lost during the drying process, they would have received at Sfax 6.5 
piastres without this deduction being imposed. Leadbetter calculated that this 
represented a loss to the Hammama of 150,000 piastres per annum (£3,750) which the 
" Correspondence Politique vol. 88, Direction Politique 337, Bompard to MAE, 
December 21,1885. 
s9 Ibid.. 
60 MAE, Nouvelle Serie, vol. 281, Rapport Mensuel, January 1886. 
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Company took as additional profit. 61 The Mehedba tribe also protested strongly against 
the low prices being offered by the company at Skira. 62 
6.11 The Ratification 
Given the Resident General's view of the concession, Hartmayer's generous 
interpretation of its territorial extent is difficult to understand and whether or not he 
acted with the former's consent is unclear. Whichever is the case, the delineation had 
been made in strict accordance with the terms of the contract and the government had 
little option but to accept it. Further delay risked renewed litigation with the 
Franco-English Company and a potentially expensive settlement. The delimitation was, 
therefore, ratified by Beylical decree of December 21,1885.63 
The Franco-English Company was jubilant with the outcome, triumphantly declaring 
it "a vindication of the Board's position from the start", 64 the boundaries containing 
"... an area of about three million acres inhabited by many Arab tribes amongst 
whom are the powerful Hammamas who have worked the esparto for many 
years and who are now collecting grass for the Company". 65 
The concession's limits bore little resemblance to those in the original contract although 
it should be noted that the objections now raised against it were almost exactly the same 
as those put forward when the agreement with Duplessis came to light. An article in 
the French language newspaper, La Lanterne summed up the opinion of many when it 
wrote: 
61 Correspondance Politique, vol. 88, Direction Politique 337, Leadbetter to Zichel. 
62 MAE Nouvelle Serie, vol. 281, Rapport Mensuel, December 1887. 
63 Journal Officiel Tunisien, December 25,1885. 
64 FO 335 166/5 Report of the FETEFSC Ltd., April 14,1886. 
65 Ibid.. 
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"Il est officiellement etabli que sous pretexte de delimiter une concession que 
comprenant quatre montagnes et ne s'etendant pas sur cent mille hectares, on 
a livre a la Compagnie anglo-tunisienne un territoire de plus d'un million 
hectares contenant plus de cinquante montagnes". 6 
Once again the alfa merchants raised questions of a monopoly which, they claimed, 
would have been in breach of the terms of the Anglo-Tunisian Commercial Treaty of 
1875. But while receiving the support of British consular officials on this point, the 
Foreign Office in London refused to sanction protests to Tunisian authorities on this 
point since, as the Ouerghemma mountains remained outwith the concession, it could 
not constitute a true monopoly. 
While technically correct, London's position infuriated British merchants in Tunis since 
the great majority of their supplies came from land included within the concession. 
Perry Bury wrote to the Marquis of Salisbury complaining that, 
"... if this delimitation is allowed to pass unchallenged, it will convert the 
esparto into a veritable monopoly which will be in the hands of the 
concessionnaires and ourselves and other esparto merchants will find our trade 
ruined and the large sums we have laid out for carrying on the trade absolutely 
lost" . 
67 
Not only was the repayment of these advances in jeopardy, but the merchants also faced 
the prospect of being unable to fulfil contracts with brokers in the UK for which the 
transportation had already been arranged and paid for. 68 Shortly after the decree the 
merchants at Sfax complained that: 
66 La Lanterne, May 3,1886. 
67 FO 881/5334, Confidential Papers, January 21,1886. 
68 "... la nullite du marche de Sfax les mettaient dann 1'impossibilite de remplir les 
engagements pris en Europe et que bientot its verraient arriver sur le rade de Sfax des 
navires auxquels ils ne pourraient rien donner. " Tenth Annexe to Despatch, etc., December 
10,1885,16 Sfax Merchants, MAE Correspondance Politique, vol. 88,1885. 
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"... extending the boundaries of the conceded mountains has nearly driven us altogether 
from the market and if this decree is not modified we shall have greatly to reduce our 
establishments and perhaps... withdraw from the Regency altogether". " 
But it was by no means just the Sfax trade which was threatened by the decree, for the 
concession also included 160,000 hectares of land belonging to the Zlass, the principal 
suppliers of grass to Sousse, and 165,000 hectares of Beni Zid land which furnished 
Gabes. 70 
The Tunisian alfa trade was paralysed by the concession exports falling from a 
post-rebellion peak in 1883/84 of 21,995 tons to only 13,779 tons in 1886/87, the 
latterly barely above the levels of the years 1881-1883 when a large number of Arabs 
were in Tripoli (see Table 6.2). Many merchants were forced to lay off workers and 
scale down their operations in the country. 71 
Table 6.2 Tunisian Exports of Alfa Grass 1878/79-1886/8772 
Year Tons Year Tons 
1878/79 17,909 1883/84 21,995 
1879/80 24,540 1884/85 18,286 
1880/81 29,366 1885/86 15,400 
1881/82 12,697 1886/87 13,779 
1882/83 12,593 
Source: Report on Trade of Tunis for 1887, Sandwith. 
But the Franco-English Company hardly benefited from its near monopoly position, 
69 FO 102/168 Perry Bury to Sandwith, January 9,1886. 
7° FO 102/168 Sandwith to Roseberry, January 14,1886. 
71 See for example, AGT, E 233/10, Anonymous trader to Controleur Civil, Sfax, 
February 10,1886. 
72 Report on Trade of Tunis for 1887, Sandwith. 
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partly because of its own actions in dealing with the tribes and partly due to favourable 
climatic conditions in the south of the country and a continued fall in the value of alfa 
in the UK which will be examined in the following chapter. The firm's exports were 
only 4,010 tons in 188573 and 5,635 tons in 1886.74 The Company's combined 
exports for the three years 1884-86 were only 11,633 tons, well short of the 30,000 
tons defined in the contract as the minimum allowed during the first three years. As 
a result the French were able to announce the abrogation of the concession by decree 
of July 31,1887; despite repeated attempts by the Franco-English firm to overturn the 
decision, it was stripped of all the benefits which it had enjoyed. 75 
6.12 Conclusion 
The creation of a concession for the exploitation of alfa in the Regency posed a number 
of serious problems for the new French authorities. The most important, of course, 
was its effect on the peace and stability of the tribal populations of the south and centre 
of the country. Not only was the region of great strategic importance because of its 
proximity to Algeria where tribal unrest, supported by a contraband trade in arms and 
ammunition from Tunisia and by cross-border co-operation between Tunisian and 
Algerian tribes, continued to pose a grave threat to French authority; it was also crucial 
for the establishment of the Protectorate in Tunis. The massive uprising against the 
French invasion was a clear sign of the extent of indigenous hostility to foreign 
intervention. Unlike in Algeria, though, there was no possibility of a large and 
permanent military presence in the country to maintain order. In Tunis this would have 
to be achieved by bolstering and extending the existing administrative structures and by 
avoiding unduly antagonising relations with the tribes. This was clearly going to be no 
easy task. 
However much the process of integration of tribal society within the political and 
73 FO 335 166/3 Hough to Sandwith, May 7,1886. 
74 Controleur Civil, Sfax to M. le Ministre Resident General de France a Tunis, May 
17,1887. AGT Serie E, carton 233, dossier 10. 
75 Journal Official Tunisien, August 4,1887, no. 187. 
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economic structures of the country as a whole had progressed, it was far from 
complete, a fact manifested in its reaction to the French invasion. The creation of such 
a concession covering much of the south hardly helped either the process of integration 
or even the establishment of peaceful relations. The tribes viewed it as an attack on 
their inalienable rights to their property and a further subversion of local autonomy to 
central government. The French were keenly aware of the problems which such a 
concession could create in the south but were forced to accept it because it had been 
legally ratified by the Bey before the establishment of their Protectorate. 
Despite being able to exclude the mountains of the Ouerghemma from the terms of the 
concession and confirming the rights to pasture of the tribes on the land, the operation 
of the concession soon gave rise to serious threats to order as the Franco-English 
company began to abuse its privilege by offering lower prices than the other traders and 
by paying with bonds and not cash. Threats made to tribes by the company's 
employees against collecting for the account of anyone other than the company only 
heightened tensions amongst the tribes as they found themselves unable to deal freely 
in their grass. 
The concession, and the Franco-English Company's methods in working it, also 
threatened livelihoods of the many established alfa merchants who found it increasingly 
difficult to procure grass from outside the vast territory conceded. Substantial advances 
paid to the Arabs before the ratification of the contract were lost and heavy costs of 
chartering ships to fulfil contracts in Britain were sustained. Exports fell to levels well 
below the peak achieved in 1881 in spite of continued high demand in the U. K.. 
The abolition of the concession, which was met with universal approval in Tunisia, 
brought great hopes for a resurgence in the flagging fortunes of the alfa trade in the 
country. And indeed trade statistics of the years immediately following the suppression 
of the concession would appear to justify these hopes. In 1888, exports rose by 54% 
to 21,268 tons, and by a further 20% in 1889 to 25,159 tons, the second highest level 
ever recorded. While falling back slightly in 1890 to 20,669 tons, exports remained 
high. 
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This boom however, was short lived. In 1891, exports fell back to 14,429 tons at 
which level they were to remain until the end of the period under study in 1896. In 
fact, far from being a sign of the beginnings of a long term prosperity in the trade, the 
excellent exports achieved between 1888 and 1890 actually reflect the severity of the 
agricultural/pastoral crisis in the country during these years and only served to paper 
over the trade's fundamental weakness, i. e. the continued fall in the value of alfa. The 
return of better harvests in the 1890's at a time of falling prices made it difficult to 
persuade the tribes to collect the grass. The problems for Tunisian alfa merchants were 
considerably exacerbated by the maintenance of high export duties which weakened the 
competitiveness of Tunisian grass in the UK market place where abundant supplies of 
cheap Algerian and Tripolitanian grasses were augmented by a rapid rise in imports of 
cheap wood pulp from Scandanavia. 
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Chapter Seven 
International Competition and its Effect on the Geography of the Tunisian Alfa 
Trade 
7.1 Introduction 
The ending of the Duplessis concession in 1887 brought about a resurgence in business 
confidence in the future of the trade amongst Tunisian alfa merchants, an optimism 
which, on the surface, was justified in the succeeding three years to 1890, during which 
period exports of alfa rose sharply, almost reaching the record levels achieved 
immediately prior to the establishment of the Protectorate. 
But the success of these years was largely attributable to the severity of the drought and 
consequent economic distress of much of the population of the southern districts. The 
underlying trend of exports was clearly one of stagnation. 
Tunisian production was coming under increasing pressure in the international market 
as a result of changes in the balance of supply and demand for raw material inputs in 
the British paper industry. In fact, growing competition from wood pulp began to 
check the trend of rising consumption of alfa grass from the late 1880's and this, 
together with much higher production of the grass in Algeria and Tripolitania, 
heightened competitive pressure and drove prices in Britain downwards. Tunisian 
output, small in comparison to that of her neighbours, was least able to adapt to 
changing international circumstances constrained as it was by both a high cost base and 
an excessive export duty. 
7.2 International Competition and Price Pressure 
British imports of alfa grass remained high during the decade 1887-1896 averaging 
205,297 tons each year compared to only 145,978 tons per annum between 1872 and 
1881 (Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1). The peak, however, was reached in 1888 when 
Britain imported 248,836 tons of the material. Thereafter imports began to decline and 
by 1896, reached only 187,289 tons, a lower volume than that achieved in 1880 and 
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Table 7.1 British Imports of Alfa Grass 1872-1881 and 1887-1896 by volume and 
value 
Year Volume (tons) Value (pt) Average value 
(pt per ton) 
1872 104,621 803,396 7.68 
1873 102,649 843,672 8.22 
1874 119,176 973,383 8.16 
1875 141,900 1,113,285 7.85 
1876 130,891 1,046,449 7.99 
1877 175,878 1,286,237 7.31 
1878 140,505 932,300 6.64 
1879 161,971 1,055,616 6.52 
1880 192,493 1,372,573 7.13 
1881 191,229 1,286,211 6.73 
Total 1,461,313 10,712,122 
Average 146,131 1,071,212 7.33 
1887 200,116 962,049 4.81 
1888 248,836 1,270,324 5.11 
1889 217,256 1,090,266 5.02 
1890 217,028 1,154,722 4.82 
1891 212,666 1,033,938 4.86 
1892 212,967 1,029,901 4.84 
1893 185,450 870,431 4.69 
1894 184,960 819,265 4.43 
1895 186,408 791,236 4.24 
1896 187,278 796,683 4.25 
Total 2,052,965 9,709,815 
Average 205,297 970,082 4.73 
Sources: Figures for 1872-1881 from British Parliamentary Papers (1873) LXIII; 
(1874) LXIV; (1875) LXIII; (1876) LXII; (1877) LXXX; (1878) LXXI; (1878-79) 
LXVIII; (1880) LXXI; (1881) LXXXVII; (1882) LXVIII. Figures for 1887-1896 
from Cross, C. F. and E. F. Bevan, (1900) p. 384. 
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1881. While even this was still above levels of most years since the trade began, it is 
clear that demand was beginning to slacken towards the end of the 1880's. 
What is perhaps most striking from the data in Table 7.1 is the very marked decline in 
the average value of alfa imports into Britain. This is evident even in the years of 
continuous growth between 1871 and 1881 which, while showing an average for the 
whole period of £7.33, suffered a fall from £8.22 per ton in 1873 to only £6.73 per ton 
in 1881, a reduction of 18 percent. The decline, however, was much more severe after 
that date with an average value of £4.73 between 1887 and 1896 closing the period at 
£4.25, almost 50 percent below the grass's value in 1873. 
In the period former to 1881 the decline in average value per ton can be attributed 
mainly to increasing imports from the new sources of alfa in north Africa and the 
diminishing importance of Spain. In the early years of the trade British demand was 
almost entirely met by Spanish production renowned for its quality and high yield of 
cellulose. But with continuing political uncertainty and problems of over-cropping 
becoming more serious in Spain, the rapidly rising demand for the grass in Britain 
could only be met by securing supplies from north Africa. Although of inferior 
quality, it was also lower in price and as prices for paper in Britain were suffering 
continuous downward pressure, many manufacturers embraced the new articles with 
enthusiasm. The Papermakers Circular of August, 1876 noted that: 
"Paper-makers show more and more a disinclination to give the prices asked for 
Spanish.... Indeed so largely has the high rates for Spanish compelled the 
adoption of other descriptions that many consumers having therefore adapted 
their trade to the use of these will not again resort to Spanish unless a reaction 
may bring the Spanish to a more reasonable figure, especially considering the 
extremely low prices now only attainable for paper of fine, and indeed, all 
qualities. " 1 
Thus while in 1869 Spanish grass accounted for 95 % of British imports, this had fallen 
to only 27 % by 1880, the steepest fall in market share being in 1877 (see Table 7.2). 
The Paperrnakers Circular and Rag Merchants and Wholesale Stationers 
Weekly Gazette and Price Current, No. 50, vol. V, August 15,1876, p. 4. 
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Price rather than quality had become the market's main imperative by the middle of the 
1870's as consumers in Britain turned more and more to the coarser, lower yielding but 
cheaper grasses of north Africa. 
During the 1880's, however, competitive pressures intensified with the increasing use 
of wood pulp for the manufacture of paper. From only 75,533 tons in 1887 British 
imports of wood pulp had reached 327,080 tons by 1896 by which date it had outpaced 
Table 7.2 British Imports of Spanish Alfa by Volume and Percentage of Total 
Alfa Imports (1865-1880) 
Year Quantity 
(tons) 
Percent of 
the total 
Year Quantity 
(tons) 
Percent of 
the total 
1865 47,239 90 1873 53,926 53 
1866 65,859 95 1874 54,242 46 
1867 50,378 91 1875 56,474 39 
1868 92,927 97 1876 45,499 35 
1869 82,355 95 1877 43,394 25 
1870 72,835 71 1878 37,892 27 
1871 80,472 56 1879 44,091 27 
1872 55,909 53 1880 51,413 27 
Source: BPP (1866-1881) 
alfa imports in both volume and value. 2 Although wood pulp was not to entirely 
replace either alfa or rags in the British paper industry until the second half of the 
twentieth century, its dramatic growth during the nineteenth century stimulated 
competition in the alfa trade and drove down prices. Thus between 1880 and 1895, 
prices for all qualities of alfa in the British market fell by about fifty percent (Table 
7.3). 
2 Cross and Bevan, (1900) p. 304. 
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Table 7.3 Selected Prices for Alfa Grass in the British Market (Spot Prices of Alfa 
(£. s. d/ton) in London (cif)) 
Year Spain Algeria Sousse Sfax/Gabes Tripoli 
1874 8/05/0 7/00/0 7/10/0 - 6/00/0 
1875 10/00/0 6/10/0 8/00/0 - 5/10/0 
1876 11/10/0 7/05/0 8/15/0 6/12/6 5/10/0 
1877 9/00/0 6/00/0 7/10/0 5/05/0 4/10/0 
1878 7/00/0 5/15/0 7/00/0 5/10/0 4/15/0 
1879 7/10/0 6/00/0 7/05/0 5/15/0 4/10/0 
1880 9/10/0 5/15/0 7/15/0 5/15/0 5/00/0 
1881 9/10/0 6/07/6 7/05/0 5/10/0 5/10/0 
1882 8/10/0 6/15/0 7/10/0 6/15/0 6/10/0 
1883 8/05/0 5/07/6 7/02/6 5/15/0 5/00/0 
1884 7/05/0 4/17/6 - 5/05/0 4/17/6 
1885 7/00/0 4/17/6 - 5/02/6 4/12/6 
1886 5/05/0 4/02/6 - 4/05/0 3/12/6 
1887 5/07/6 3/16/3 - 4/02/6 4/02/6 
1888 5/12/6 4/07/6 - 4/12/6 3/13/9 
1889 5/12/6 3/12/6 - 4/02/6 3/17/6 
1890 5/15/0 3/15/0 - 4/02/6 3/16/3 
1891 5/05/0 3/16/3 - 4/01/3 3/15/0 
1892 5/15/0 3/17/6 - 4/00/0 3/10/0 
1893 5/12/6 3/10/0 - 3/15/0 3/07/6 
1894 4/12/6 3/00/0 - 3/13/9 3/02/6 
1895 4/10/0 3/00/0 - 3/10/0 3/05/0 
1896 4/07/6 3/01/3 - 3/12/6 2/15/0 
1897 4/07/6 3/00/0 - 3/05/0 2/15/0 
1898 4/15/0 2/17/6 - 3/00/0 2/15/0 
Source: Paper Makers Circular and Rag Merchant and Stationer's Gazette and Price 
Current 
Note: Where no London price available, Newcastle has been used. All prices quoted 
are from the month of August. 
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The sharp fall in the value of alfa, which became more marked from 1885, resulted in 
an intensification of competition amongst the three north African producers. Tunisia, 
the smallest supplier, found itself increasingly less able to compete with her neighbours 
which were able to maintain, even increase, output despite a reduction in prices offered 
to the collectors in line with the falling value of alfa in the British market. 
7.3 The Trade in Algeria 
As discussed in Chapter Three, Algeria was the first country, outside of Spain, to 
supply alfa to the British market. Small scale collection began, using Spanish 
immigrant labour, in 1862/1863; but it was not until 1870 that production began to 
flourish (see Table 7.4). 3 
Algeria's resources in alfa were vast. Although growing over large areas in the 
Department of Constantine and to the south of Algiers to a lesser extent, by far the 
most important source was the Department of Oran where the plant covered huge areas 
of land. 
The French government was quick to see the benefits of the alfa industry in Algeria. 
Economically it provided considerable wealth to the country and to the underprivileged 
regions and inhabitants in particular. Politically, commercialization in general was seen 
as the best means of integrating the tribes into the nation-state, of breaking down ethnic 
ties and promoting territorial boundaries. 
But it was also realised at an early stage in the development of the trade in Algeria that 
the income earned from alfa grass would not only facilitate the tribes' tax payments but 
also save the government a significant amount of expense during years of drought and 
famine in the tribal regions by reducing the amount of subsistence support and loans 
to a population deprived of any other means of procuring income. 
3 Spanish labour was quickly phased out for practical reasons as much as cost. See 
Association de l'Afrique du Nord, (1890), "Le Commerce de 1'Alfa, " p. 12. 
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"... les indigenes s'y adonnent de plus en plus et dans les annees calamiteuses 
que certaines regions ont traversee. Cette industrie a sauve de la famine de 
nombreuses tribus auxquelles la secheresse ou les sauterelles avaient enleve tout 
moyens d'existence. "4 
Alfa grass was seen as a fundamental resource, commercially and politically, in the 
tribal regions of Algeria and the French government was keen to maximise the 
commercialisation of the plant by offering adequate incentives to encourage merchants 
to develop a large scale trade. But it also recognised that a strong measure of 
government control was required to protect the Arab collectors from exploitation by the 
foreign merchants and to preserve the alfa itself from over-harvesting, a problem which 
had crippled the Spanish commerce and one which was already raising concern in the 
early 1870's in Algeria. 
In Algeria the French chose to institute a system of concessions, in which the rights to 
alfa on huge areas of tribal land were granted to foreign companies at a nominal rent 
of OF 10 per hectare and per annum. The tribes inhabiting land conceded under this 
system retained only the right to gather alfa on their territory for their own 
consumption, any alfa collected for commercial purposes had to be sold to the 
concessionary. This was an enormous benefit for the Algerian merchants involved in 
the trade since, although it did not guarantee supplies (the inhabitants were not forced 
to collect grass) it eliminated the effects of competition in the internal market and thus 
stabilised prices at a very low level. 
As the lands nearer the coast began to suffer from the effects of over-cropping in the 
early 1870's the government was able to tie in the offer of larger concessions further 
inland with the requirement that the concessionary be liable for the construction of 
railways from the coastal ports. Thus the Compagnie Franco-Algerienne, the largest 
company in the Algerian trade, was given a concession in 1873 covering 300,000 
hectares (later extended to 700,000 hectares), in the high plateaux of Oran and built 
4 Ibid., p. 12. "Trois millions de Francs sont ainsi deverses chaque annee sur des 
regions bien desheritees. " 
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Table 7.4 Alfa Exports from Algeria 1870-1898 (metric tonnes) 
Year Alger Oran Constantine Total 
1870 21 42,469 - 42,490 
1871 40 60,758 - 60,838 
1872 280 43,374 - 43,654 
1873 511 44,754 - 45,265 
1874 692 57,387 - 58,079 
1875 265 56,106 20 56,391 
1876 543 57,903 254 58,700 
1877 1,563 66,159 1,034 68,756 
1878 120 59,378 616 60,114 
1879 1,999 60,240 351 62,590 
1880 3,035 75,930 1,930 80,895 
1881 4,396 49,932 6,855 61,183 
1882 6,995 72,841 5,664 85,500 
1883 6,137 68,851 9,172 84,160 
1884 3,321 82,023 11,129 96,473 
1885 2,249 88,264 6,031 96,544 
1886 2,421 74,964 3,562 80,947 
1887 899 80,959 1,322 83,180 
1888 n/a n/a n/a 75,517 
1893 n/a n/a n/a 68,535 
1894 n/a n/a n/a 81,882 
1899 n/a n/a n/a 96,100 
Sources: 1870-1887: Association de l'Afrique du Nord (1890) "Le commerce de 
`Alfa'. 
1888-1899: Bulletin de l'Agriculture et du Commerce (1900) no. 17, "L'exploitation et 
le commerce de l'alfa en Tunisie". 
lines from Arzew on the coast, where it had established its base, to Mecheria and Ain 
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Sefra via Sarda in 1879. Similarly the Compagnie de 1'Ouest Algerienne constructed 
lines from the coast to Tlemcen and Ras-el-Ma via Sidi-Bel-Abbess 
The construction of these lines gave a significant boost to the trade in Algeria by 
allowing the exploitation of alfa fields which would otherwise have been left largely 
untouched. It also overcame (in fact delayed) the problem of over-cropping of the alfa 
growing near the coast: 
"A mesure que s'epuisaient les terrains en alfa, les plus rapproches du bord de 
la mer, les lignes de penetration construites par la Compagnie 
Franco-Algerienne, puis par la Compagnie de 1'Ouest Algerienne, ont permis 
1'exploitation des regions de plus en plus eloignees en sorte que la production 
de ce departement se maintient a un chiffre considerable". 6 
The cost of transportation was probably the single most important expense involved in 
the alfa trade in all the north African countries and the new railways not only opened 
up new, and larger, areas to exploitation they also enabled large volumes to be brought 
to the coast in a cost effective manner. The system of concessions also considerably 
helped to keep costs down by eliminating the threat of local competition and assuring 
the concessionaries a stable resource base. By 1888 concessions for alfa covered 1.5 
million hectares of land in Algeria. ' 
Alfa grass in Algeria was big business, volumes justifying large investments in 
infrastructure and hydraulic presses which helped reduce freight charges to the U. K. 
By 1876 Algerian exports to Britain already exceeded those of Spain and the country 
was to maintain its pre-eminence as the principal supplier of grass to the British market 
until well into the next century (see Table 7.4). 
5 Bouchwalder (1879) p. 26. 
6 Ibid. p. 8. In 1885 the total area farmed out under concessions was 1,095,583 
hectares. By 1888 this had risen to 1,534,583 hectares. Ibid. p. 8. 
Association de 1'Afrique du Nord (1890) p. 10. 
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7.4 The Alfa Trade in Tripolitania 
The alfa trade in Tripolitania began at the same time as that in Tunis, in 1870, but it 
was, from the beginning, of an altogether much greater magnitude. Unfortunately 
British import statistics combine Tripoli with Tunisia until 1881, from which date they 
were reported separately. Nevertheless an indication of the scale of the commerce in 
the Vilayet is given in Table 7.5 where the exports until 1880 have been calculated by 
subtracting Tunisian government export data from British statistics for the two countries 
combined. British Consul General Drummond-Hay noted in 1877 that: 
"... by far the most important branch of trade is that of esparto. Ten years ago 
it was not so much as known, but owing to the great and continued demand for 
it in England it has rapidly increased, and may be said now to engross the 
attentions of nearly every merchant and trader, and afford labour and 
occupation to the major part of the inhabitants. " 8 
Ten years later Drummond-Hay reported that alfa accounted for 76% of the country's 
total exports by value. 9 
Despite the fact that the alfa grass of Tripolitania was of the most inferior quality and 
without the benefits of either railways or concessions the grass sold at a significant 
discount to that from other countries on the British market. Undoubtedly an export 
duty of only 1% ad valorem helped keep costs down as did the early use of hydraulic 
presses which resulted in a material reduction in freight charges on shipment to 
Britain. 10 Moreover the grass grew relatively near the coast, along the Djebel 
Nafousa to the south of Tripoli, which made transportation to the ports of Tripoli and 
Khoms, from where roughly equal amounts were exported, easy and relatively 
8 British Parliamentary Papers, (1878), LXXIV, p. 789. Report on the Trade and 
Commerce of Tripoli for the Year 1877. 
9 British Parliamentary Papers (1889), LXXV. Report on the Trade and 
Commerce of Tripoli for the Year 1887. 
'o British Parliamentary Papers (1883) LXXII Report on the Trade and Commerce 
of Tripoli for the Year 1882. The first presses, installed in 1881 by the British Esparto 
Company, were reported to have cost 500,000 francs. These presses, however, by 
compressing the bales into smaller volume for weight reduced freight costs by around 
40 per cent. 
232 
inexpensive. This was particularly so when purchases began, in 1877, from the little 
Table 7.5 British Imports of Alfa Grass from Tripolitania 
Year British imports from Tunis 
and Tripoli combined 
Tunisian exports British imports 
from Tripoli 
1871 11,569 - - 
1872 10,011 - - 
1873 13,791 - - 
1874 18,670 - - 
1875 43,597 - - 
1876 44,708 - - 
1877 75,771 - - 
1878 60,478 - - 
1879 68,910 17,627 51,283 
1880 76,110 24,153 51,957 
1881 83,335 28,903 54,432 
1882 - 12,497 49,672 
1883 - 12,395 50,037 
1884 - 21,649 33,930 
1885 - 17,998 62,149 
1886 - 15,157 55,944 
1887 - 13,562 50,973 
1888 - 21,268 69,626 
1889 - 25,159 54,700 
Sources : British Imports : volumes LVI (1872), LXIII (1873), LXIV (1874), LXXIII 
(1875), LXXII (1876), LXXI (1878), LXVIII (1878/79), LXVIII (1882), LXV (1883), 
LXXVII (1884), LXIV (1884/85), LXXX (1887), XCVII (1888), LXXV (1889). 
port of Zleiten 15km to the east of Khoms and 75 km from Tripoli. Zleiten was nearer 
the alfa districts than the other two ports and merchants were able to make purchases 
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there at much lower prices. '1 
In general, however, the tribes of Tripolitania appeared willing to accept much lower 
prices than the collectors in Algeria and especially Tunisia. " This may have been 
because environmental conditions were more severe than those prevailing in the 
neighbouring countries. 
As a supplier of alfa grass to the British market Tripolitania rivalled Algeria in terms 
of output despite the much smaller geographical extent of the grass. The competition 
of Tripolitanian alfa was an important factor in the reduction of alfa prices in Britain. 
7.5 The Effects of Price Pressure on the Tunisian Alfa Trade 
Throughout the nineteenth century Tunisian alfa exports were dwarfed by those of her 
north African neighbours and compared unfavourably with even the Spanish trade 
despite the latter's many problems. Certainly the geographical extent of the grass in 
Tunisia was much less than that of Algeria or Spain, yet not of Tripoli which 
consistently produced and exported more than twice as much of the material. 
After its spectacular initial growth during the 1870's the Tunisian trade underwent a 
period of stagnation, even decline, during the last two decades of the century, exports 
only approaching the peak of 1881 during years of extreme drought and famine such 
as occurred in 1888 and 1889 (see Table 7.5). Tunisian alfa grass was clearly losing 
out in the competition to supply the British market. While the trade in Algeria enjoyed 
the benefits of concessions and railways and that in Tripolitania from the proximity of 
its grasses to the coast the Tunisian merchants possessed few advantages in an 
increasingly competitive and price sensitive British market. The Tunisian trade was 
" British Parliamentary Papers vol LXXIV (1878), Report by Consul-General 
Drummond-Hay on the Trade and Commerce of Tripoli for the Year 1877. Zleiten 
was a dangerous anchorage for ships, particularly in the winter months, and most grass 
was transported to Khoms or even Tripoli for final shipment to the U. K. 
12 "The camel load sells for about 8 shillings to 12 shillings and it is difficult to 
comprehend how camels and men can work for so little", BPP vol LXXXIII, (1877), 
Report on the Trade and Commerce of Tripoli for the Year 1876. 
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hampered by a relatively higher cost base than its competitors a function of an 
excessive export duty but more importantly of the inaccessibility of the main alfa 
districts from the coast. These became increasingly important issues as price pressure 
intensified. 
The cost of both internal transport and freight to the UK was the single most important 
expense in the alfa trade in all countries. This was because of the high bulk to weight 
ratio of the material. Hydraulic presses, helped reduce the cost of transport by 
allowing a greater compression of the grass. As noted above the cost of such presses 
were high and while the volumes of grass in both Algeria and Tripolitania justified the 
expense that in Tunisia was insufficient to allow a profitable amortization. 
In Tunisia the problem was compounded by the distance of the principal alfa districts 
from the coast. The richest source of alfa was in the high steppe around the settlements 
of Thala, Feriana, Kasserine and Sbeitla. At over 150 km from the coast these were 
also the furthest alfa regions from the ports of shipment. Without the benefit of 
railways the only means of transportation from the interior was the camel, which could 
carry only up to 250 kg of grass, or the donkey, which was limited to 150 kg burden. 
The alfa merchants, therefore, had either to arrange and pay for bringing the grass to 
the ports or simply relied on the tribes to do so. But this would involve the tribes in 
return journeys to the port of Sousse of as much as eight days. Many tribes were 
unwilling to leave their animals for such a long period of time particularly in summer 
when all the animals would be in transhumance. Their movements rarely took the 
tribes of the high steppe near to the coast the preferred destination being the Tell where 
both pasture and work could be found in summer if circumstances required. Given the 
meagre returns from the sale of alfa the prospect of a long journey was far from being 
attractive. The collection of alfa, as discussed in Chapter Four, was almost entirely 
limited to tribes for whom little alternative income was available. But these were also 
the least likely to have animals with which they could take the grass to the ports. For 
these tribesmen the transportation of their grass could be entrusted to those who 
possessed animals but at a cost. This cost had to be offset against the income from the 
sales of the grass. When prices fell too low the cost of transportation, whether paid 
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for by the merchants or by the tribes, could eliminate any economic benefit from the 
sale. This was not a great issue in the early years of the Tunisian alfa trade since 
prices in the British market were high. Moreover, the grass from the Tunisian high 
steppe was of a much superior quality to other Tunisian or north African grasses and 
second only to the best Spanish grasses. This grass, which was exported from Sousse, 
commanded a price premium at a time when quality considerations were still a 
determining factor in the purchase decision of British papermakers. As Sousse's only 
direct competitor, Spanish grass, began to' suffer from a deterioration in quality and a 
reduction in availability, the alfa from the Tunisian high steppe provided consumers a 
satisfactory alternative. The grass of the high steppe, having found a niche in the 
market, dominated the early years of the Tunisian trade exports from Sfax, and later 
Gabes, being of only secondary importance. 
But from 1874 and more markedly after 1877, prices in the British market suffered a 
heavy fall as a result of increased competition from other sources of alfa and from 
greater use of wood pulp. The value of the Sousse article fell by over 13 % in 1877. 
This grass had relatively limited price flexibility because of the cost of transport. In 
1876 the problem was exacerbated when the Government tripled the duty on grass 
exported from the port while doubling it on grass shipped from Sfax and Gabes. To 
remain competitive the only possible option was to reduce prices offered to the 
collectors. In 1877 Perry Bury complained that : 
"The greater part of the Esparto brought to Susa for sale has to be carried from 
a considerable distance that it does not pay the Arab a fair hire for his camel 
and for the labour of pulling unless he obtains a price which the merchant, 
under the weight of the present heavy duty, cannot afford to pay. For this 
reason large tracts of esparto land lie every year unharvested, and so much 
wealth is lost to the country. For example, the district around Sbeitla produces 
vast quantities of esparto of the best quality which even under the old duty used 
to be brought to market, but this region is four days journey from Susa, the 
price does not now remunerate the Arab and only a small portion is brought to 
Susa when the pressure of extreme poverty is felt. "" 
13 FO 335 144/2, James Douglanne, for Perry Bury, to Wood. November 9, 
1878. 
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And Vice-Consul Dupuis commented, also in 1877, that: 
"The remoteness of supplies, the difficulty of conveyance overland, the absence 
of roads, the obstruction in the way of transportation, and the heavy taxation 
almost caused the stoppage of the trade on this coast in 1877, even in the face 
of the misery there was in the country. "" 
Alfa exports from Sousse fell from 7,476 tons in 1876, the last year of the old duty, 
to only 3,176 tons in the first ten months of 1877 and Perry Bury reported the 
withdrawal of every alfa merchant from the trade at the port except itself. " 
Similar, though less severe, problems were experienced at Sfax after the duty was 
doubled. Sfax was supplied by the Mehedba tribe, which collected grass close to the 
port, the Beni Zid further west, and the Hammama which occupied the land around 
Gafsa. The Hammama were some of the most avid participants in the trade no doubt 
because of the harsher environmental conditions they had to endure. This tribe, in fact, 
was almost as far from Sfax as the Fraichiche and Madger tribes were from Sousse. 
Table 7.6 shows the cost of a ton of alfa at the quayside in Sfax in 1877. 
The two striking features of the information in Table 7.6 are the importance of 
transport costs and of government charges. According to Dupuis, when other taxes 
paid to the Government were included about 22% was rendered to the State and "when 
prices are reduced to their minimum even a much as 28% is often recoverable. 1116 
While accurate comparisons with Algeria and Tripoli are impossible without 
information on other government charges there, the difference in the export tax alone 
was considerable, only 1% ad valorem being levied in both countries. When freight 
rates to the UK were added, at between thirty and fifty shillings per ton (some ten 
'a British Parliamentary Papers (1878) LXXIV Report on the Trade and Commerce 
of Susa for the Year 1877. 
Is FO 335 144/2 Doughane to Wood, November 9,1878. 
16 British Parliamentary Papers (1878) LXXIV Report on the Trade and Commerce 
of Susa for the Year 1877. 
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Table 7.6 Costs Per Ton of Alfa at the Quayside in Sfax in 1877 
(British Pounds Sterling) 
£. s. d. 
To the Arabs who bring it in 0.18.0 
Agent's expenses and those of remittances 0.4.6 
Hire of camels to bring it to the coast 1.10.6 
Expenses at coast station, shipping it loose in boats 0.6.2 
Government charges for notaries 0.0.61/2 
Government charges for weighing grass when received 0.0.8 
Government charges for weighing grass when shipped 0.0.8 
Freight for bringing loose grass to a shipping station 0.8.6 
Payment to Government weigher 0.0.3 
Charges for cleaning, pressing and agency 0.15.7 
Notaries and asst. to weigher when shipping bales 0.0.8 
Government charges for weigher when shipping 0.0.8 
Government duty of export 0.10.41/2 
Total 4.17.1 
Source: British Parliamentary Papers, Report on the Trade and Commerce of Susa for 
the Year 1877. 
shillings higher than that paid in Algeria and Tripoli, mainly because of their 
installations of hydraulic presses) the profit margin, on a selling price of £5.00 - 
£6.00 per ton in the UK, was clearly minimal (see Table 7.3). 
In 1877 because of the fall in prices in Britain Perry Bury were forced to reduce the 
offer to the tribes from 48s 6d per ton to only 36s per ton and Perry Bury intimated the 
withdrawal, from the trade at Susa, of every alfa merchant except itself: " 
" FO 335 144/2 Doughane to Wood, November 9,1878. 
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"... the British market now being supplied with Algerian grass at cheap prices 
and as only low ones could be given to the Arabs in the face of the new duty 
vis 4 shillings less per camel load, they were loathe to bring it in at this 
reduction.... Everyday more and more the competition of Algerian grass is felt. 
The quantities in the Oran district seem inexhaustible". " 
Yet in subsequent years exports at Sousse and Sfax actually increased and the feared 
decline of the trade did not materialize. After 1877 prices stabilized, albeit at the lower 
level, and the years to 1881, when exports peaked at over 29,000 tons, were marked 
by continued drought in much of the south and centre. Many collectors were forced 
to accept the prices offered by the merchants. Although the data in Table 7.7 are of 
dubious veracity since they are at divergence with both British import statistics and 
Tunisian customs records they do indicate the prosperity of the alfa trade at Sfax and 
Sousse until 1881, a point supported by anecdotal evidence and other British consular 
reports. 
Table 7.7. Tunisian Alfa Exports by Port 1880 and 1881 
Port 1880 1881 
Sousse 12,162 9,933 
Sfax 15,679 12,538 
Gabes 7,377 5,440 
Zarzis 188 550 
Total 35,406 26,461 
Source : British Parliamentary Papers, vol LXXIV, 1883, Report by Consul General 
Reade on the Trade and Commerce of Tunis for the Years 1880-1882. 
If it was too early in the late 1870's to write off the alfa trade at Sousse or at Sfax, the 
problems they faced in these years were harbingers of more difficult times ahead. 
Taxation and transport costs were to take on a new dimension during the 1880's when 
alfa prices in the UK fell sharply. 
18 Ibid.. 
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7.6 Government Taxation of Alfa Exports 
The tax on alfa exports was a bone of contention with merchants from the moment of 
its inception. Initially the commercialisation of the grass was so sudden and unexpected 
that there was no tax levied by the government. But after only a few months a tax of 
one-half piastre per quintal was levied and this was increased again in 1872 to one 
piastre per quintal provoking widespread dissatisfaction amongst merchants who felt 
that "... even under the ordinary rate [i. e. one-half piastre] British houses cannot afford 
to buy as profit can scarcely be obtained". " The tax was reduced to one-half piastre 
again in 1872. 
In 1876, however, the government, at the behest of the Financial Commission, doubled 
the duty levied at Sfax and tripled it at Sousse. The measure was, predictably. a 
response to the government's financial difficulties. 
The Financial Commission was set up in 1869 to oversee and manage the repayment 
of the Tunisian Government's debts for which it was accorded the rights to the income 
generated from a number of sources. These, of which there were 29 separate items, 
came to be known as the Revenues Conceded. 
The minimum annual income estimated and agreed by government and Financial 
Commissioners, to guarantee the repayment of capital and interest owing to creditors, 
was 10,840,000 piastres (6,500,000 Francs). 2° Any shortfall was to be bridged by a 
contribution from the government's own sources of income. But between 1869 and 
1877, in only two years, those of 1873-74 and 1874-75, were the Revenues Conceded 
sufficient to cover the minimum stipulated for debt repayment. In the remaining years 
the Government was forced to make good the shortfall. As is evident from Table 7.8, 
these payments were substantial. 
19 FO 335 127/2 Wood to Granville, September 18,1872. 
20 Correspondence Politique, vol. 44. 
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Table 7.8 Government Payments to the International Financial Commission to 
assure the Repayment of Loan Liabilities 
Year Amount paid 
(piastres) 
1870-1 5,000,000 
1871-2 4,321,000 
1872-3 2,500,000 
1873-4 2,392,964 
1874-5 3,482,755 
Source : Quai d'Orsay, Correspondence Politique, vol 44. 
In fact the years when Government contributions were required were those marked by 
economic distress. The explanation for this is not difficult to find: many of the 
Commission's revenues, particularly its most important single source of income, the 
tax on exports, were heavily dependent on the state of agriculture. When agriculture 
was depressed the whole basis for trade was greatly undermined causing a sharp 
reduction in the Commission's revenues. It could hardly be otherwise given the 
economy's overwhelming dependence on agriculture. 
The problem for the Bey was that his own government's income was similarly affected. 
Of its five main sources of revenue, only that of the mahsoulats, or tax farming 
concessions, mainly granted in the towns, could be considered anything remotely close 
to stable since they were sold to individuals at auction at the start of each year. Even 
in this case it is true to say that their value would decline considerably after successive 
years of bad harvests or low agricultural output in general. Of the others, the dime, 
or tax on grain production, the kanoun on the olive harvest (partly destined to the 
government) and the income generated from land belonging to the government (the 
Royal Domain) varied directly with the state of the harvests. 
The last, and by far the most important, was the medjba, or capitation tax, which, 
while theoretically fixed, would in practical terms also fluctuate since the population's 
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ability to pay was directly related to their economic well-being 
The Bey, then, having to procure additional funds at a time when revenues were at 
their weakest, was caught in a financial stranglehold. The political ramifications which 
a default on its obligations to its major foreign creditors entailed, were a constant 
preoccupation. 
It is therefore easy to see the attractions of an increased export tax. Alone amongst the 
country's agricultural resources, alfa grass was resistant to, even flourished under, 
drought conditions under which circumstances it not only provided a means of ensuring 
subsistence for the tribes but also enhanced their ability to pay taxes. The payment of 
the medjba together with the duties raised on exports bolstered flagging government 
revenues in years when other commercial activities were in decline. In 1881, for 
example, the export duty on alfa alone raised 691,009 piastres which represented nearly 
one third of total export duties earned. " 
Of course the decision to raise the level of taxation was based on the belief that the 
collection and exportation of alfa were largely unaffected by government charges. This 
view was supported by historical precedent, the reduction of the duty in 1872 having, 
according to government statistics at least, no impact on export volume, but merely 
resulted in lower tax revenue (see Table 7.9 and Figure 7.2). 
Nor for that matter did the increase in 1876 have any braking effect on the trade in 
general, the subsequent years to 1881 being the most successful in the short history of 
the Tunisian alfa trade. But, as discussed above, these were years of low rainfall, poor 
crops and pasture and of general commercial malaise. The alfa trade was able to pass 
on additional costs to a population deprived of other means of income in the form of 
lower prices. During the 1880's however, British market prices for alfa fell 
dramatically as a result of improvements in the treatment and adoption of wood pulp 
Z' AGT, Serie E, 76/1. "Douanes", Rapport du M. Paul Cambon. Export duties 
raised in 1881/1882 were 2.2 million piastres. 
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in the manufacture of paper. As prices fell, margins throughout the producer regions 
came under increasingly heavy pressure. 
Table 7.9 Alfa Exports and Taxes Received, 1871-1881 
Year Tons Export duty 
raised (piastres) 
Period 
1871 4,181 45,573 July - December, 1871 
1872 9,907 132,96522 January - December, 1872 
1873 10,063 106,239 January - December, 1873 
1874 9,814 91,489 January - December, 1874 
1875 11,727 116,815 January - December, 1875 
1876 21,820 253,13523 January - December, 1876 
1877 15,070 317,464 January - June, 1877 
1878 n/a n/a n/a 
1879 17,627 409,928 October 1878 - October 1879 
1880 24,153 580,196 October 1879 - October 1880 
1881 28,903 691,009 October 1880 - October 1881 
1882 12,497 301,722 October 1881 - October 1882 
1883 12,395 290,651 October 1882 - October 1883 
1884 21,649 489,812 October 1883 - October 1884 
1885 17,998 448,312 October 1884 - October 1885 
1886 15,157 364,110 October 1885 - October 1886 
1887 13,562 321,537 October 1886 - October 1887 
Source: 1871-1877 Inspection Generale des Finances a MAE, August 27,1877, 
Correspondence Politique, vol. 44. 
1878-1887 AGT, E76/1, Releve statistique des exportations d'alfa effectuee dans la 
Regence de Tunis de 1878 a 1887. 
ZZ Duty lowered from 1 piastre/quintal to 1/2 p/qt by end of 1872. 
Z' Duty raised to 1-1/2 per quintal in Susa; 1 p/qt in Sfax and southern ports. 
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7.7 The Impact of Price Reduction on the Geography of the Alfa Trade 
From 1883 the fall in the value of alfa in Britain was continuous and the pressure on 
production costs in all the supplier countries became serious. This created severe 
problems even in Algeria. Table 7.10 shows the cost of a tonne of alfa before 
shipment to the coast from the Departments of Oran and Constantine. Even with the 
very low prices paid to collectors (which the system of monopoly concessions 
facilitated), the profit to the merchant, on an f. o. b. selling price at the quai of 70 
francs, was a maximum of 25 francs from which all transportation costs, by railway 
or beast of burden, had to be deducted. 
Table 7.10 Costs of Production in Algeria in 1890, before Transportation to the 
Coast (francs) 
Oran Constantine 
Tebessa Batna & 
Setif 
Purchase 25 25 25 
Loss in drying 6 6 6 
Handling costs 10 8 8 
Rent of land 1-1 'h 3 21h 
General costs 1-1'/s 3 5 
Total 44 45 46'/2 
Source: Association de I'Afrique du Nord, (1890) p. 12. 
The final profit accruing was rarely above 12 francs, usually lower, and was reported 
to be as low as 3F90 per tonne at Tebessa. 24 One report even suggested that the 
Compagnie Franco-Algerienne was operating at a loss when the true costs of its railway 
were accounted for. 
Z4 Association de I'Afrique du Nord, op. cit., p. 13. 
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"Cette Societe a la charge d'un chemin de fer qui, si je suis bien informe, 
laissee une insufficience de recettes de 1,000,000 francs par an. Pour combler 
ce deficit chaque tonne d'alfa sur les 40,000 exportees doit payer 25 francs 
outre ses frais de transport". 25 
In Tripolitania, too, described as the "champ du bataille du commerce de l'alfa"Z6 
because of its low cost base and high production volume, losses were sustained in 1890 
with only a slight improvement in 1891.27 The reason, ironically, was "principally 
due to the hydraulic press packing establishment. . here being too numerous 
for the 
requirements of the trade". " 
Table 7.11 Costs per Tonne of Alfa Exported from Sfax in 1885 
Cost in French francs 
Collection 37.50 
Pressing 12.50 
Export tax 13.50 
Freight to the U. K. 18.25 
Total costs 82.25 
Source : Association de 1'Afrique du Nord, (1890), p. 12. 
In Tunisia the problems posed by falling world market prices had become no less 
serious. Table 7.11 shows the estimated costs per tonne of alfa shipped from Sfax in 
1885. To this had to be added transportation costs from the interior to the ports of 
embarkation (and in the case of Sousse, a further 8 francs in export duty): 
25 MAE, Correspondence Politique, vol. 88, M. le Resident General a Tunis a M. 
le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, December 21,1885. 
26 ibid.. 
27 BPP, (1892), LXXIV. Report on the Trade and Commerce of Tripoli for the 
Year 1891. 
28 Ibid.. 
246 
"The decline in the value of esparto has been continuous and has now reached 
so low a point as to be barely remunerative, being only £3 12 shillings a ton. 
As the export duty amounts to 12 shillings a ton and 17 shillings a ton according 
to the fineness of the fibre it is not surprising that the falling off in the value of 
the trade should have amounted to more than 40%. 29 
Yet in 1885 Tunisian grass was selling for 125 francs per tonne in Britain. By 1892 
its prices had fallen to 80 francs per tonne. 30 
Table 7.12 Tunisian Alfa Exports by Port 1886-1896 (tons) 
Year Susa Sfax Gabes Other Total 
1886 772 7,753 1,997 1,853 12,375 
1887 775 6,351 2,365 4,362 13,824 
1888 1,015 8,364 2,742 9,147 21,268 
1889 2,365 7,747 4,112 10,395 25,159 
1890 1,549 5,007 4,943 9,170 20,695 
1891 395 2,170 4,889 6,975 14,429 
1892 1,013 3,891 6,456 7,543 18,903 
1893 778 1,515 4,504 6,830 13,630 
1894 822 1,015 4,453 8,059 14,349 
1895 964 1,115 4,001 4,654 10,734 
1896 709 921 5,535 7,478 14,643 
Source : Regence de Tunis, Protectorat Francais, Statistiques Commerciales, op. cit., 
Annees 1886-1896. 
A measure of the seriousness of the situation is provided by the example of the 
Franco-English Company which as far back as 1883, had promised potential investors 
that the laying down of a railway line and of hydraulic presses would enable it to 
deliver grass to Liverpool at £3 18 shillings per ton against the prevailing market rate 
29 Report on the Trade and Commerce of Tunis for the Year 1886. 
3o La Depeche Tunisienne, September 14,1897. "L'alfa tunisien". 
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at that time of £7 5 shillings. 31 By the 1890's the market price for Tunisian grass had 
reached this level yet neither the railway nor hydraulic presses had been erected. 
Indeed uncertainty over the future prospects of price and volume requirements in the 
British market, because of the rapid increase in consumption of wood pulp, discouraged 
merchants from investing large amounts of capital in projects which would undoubtedly 
have reduced the cost base. Margins were too tight and volume insufficient to enable 
the amortisation of such an investment. 
The only concession the government made was the reduction in January, 1888 of the 
export tax levied at Sousse to that prevailing in the southern ports. 32 But the trade at 
Sousse had already all but disappeared during the 1880's, and neither the reduction in 
taxes nor even the drought of 1888 could revive its flagging fortunes (see Table 7.12 
and Figure 7.3). 33 
With prices at a minimum the collection of alfa became concentrated in areas near to 
the coast where transportation costs could be kept down: 
"Toutes les tribus du centre, Zlass, Madjer et Hammama ont du renoncer a 
1'exploitation de leur resource naturelle car leur eloignement de la cote ferait 
absorbe par le transport de 1'alfa tout a benefice qu'elle pourrait en tirer". 3a 
The Perry Bury company noted, in a letter to Richard Wood in 1887, that: 
"Whilst the fine grasses of Susa has been gradually disappearing from the 
English market the exportation of coarser grasses shipped at Sfax and Gabes has 
largely increased as the superiority of the quality to Tripolitanian grasses is 
recognised" . 
35 
31 The Times, January 17,1883, "Esparto Fibre for Papermaking" . 
32 MAE, Memoires et Documents, Dossier 6, Decree of January 29,1888. 
33 Although of the alfa exports classified in "Other" in Table 8.10 2,212 tons in 
1888 and 200 tons in 1889 came from the Caidat of Souessi, near Sousse, which would 
normally have been attributed as exports from Sousse. 
34 Proces-Verbaux de la Conference Consultative, 1891, p. 33. 
3s FO 335/144/2, Perry Bury to Wood, Susa, November 9,1887. 
249 
In fact by the early 1890's, even the trade at Sfax had fallen into a steep decline. 
While in 1886 the port accounted for over 60% of the country's total alfa exports, by 
1896 this had declined to only six percent. During the period 1886-1890 the value of 
alfa exported was 25% of Sfax's total exports. Between 1891 and 1896 alfa grass 
represented less than five percent of the port's exports by value. 
Yet if Sfax declined in importance as a port of shipment, not all the tribes of the centre 
which had previously supplied the town stopped collecting grass as the Conference 
Consultative had implied. Many undoubtedly did, unwilling to accept lower prices 
being offered for the time involved (or in the cases where animals had to be rented 
from other people, unable to sustain the cost incurred). But others began to take alfa 
across the border to Tebessa in Algeria. Thus in 1889 Alexander Cau, ex-magistrate 
in Tebessa, established an alfa yard at the town which received deliveries from the 
districts around Kasserine, Sbeitla and Feriana. Much of this was supplied by the 
Ouled Ouzez fraction of the Hammama tribe which also took grass to the southern ports 
of Tunisia. 36 In 1888, which was a extremely bad year for crops and pasture in the 
south, the Ouled Ouzez, the Ouled Sidi Abid, the Ouled Ali, Ouled Hidge, Ouled Sidi 
Tlil and Ouled Nadji, all sold alfa in Algeria despite the fact that the prices offered 
were as low as 3F for 100 kg. 37 
Other tribes simply switched their supplies to ports closer to them irrespective of the 
price being offered. Many of the Hammama tribesmen, instead of taking their grass 
to Sfax, began to patronize the ports of Skhira and Gabes. Between 1886 and 1889, 
36 AGT, Serie E 79/1, Various Correspondence. Cau paid only 2F 83 per 100 
kg including import duties into Algeria. Despite the very low prices offered, the 
transportation to Tebessa was less time consuming. 
37 All these tribes complained of the need to pay the export duty on the alfa they 
took to Algeria which "absorberaient les fonds et les interets". The Director des 
Finances replied to these mentioning "Quioque cette situation merite d'etre prise en 
consideration mais en repondant a cette demande ou s'engagerait a repondre a plusieurs 
autres de ce genre adresees recemment par plusieurs caids de la Regence". Again the 
Direction des Finances was concerned of the effect on budgetary receipts resulting from 
a reduction, or moratorium, of export duties. See various letters in AGT Serie E, 
Carton 16, Dossier 5. 
250 
Gabes and those ports classified under the heading, "Other", which was principally 
Skhira, accounted for nearly 52% of the country's total alfa exports. During the years 
1890-1896 this figure had risen to nearly 80%. 
The centre of gravity moved southward as the pressure of price took on greater 
significance. Environmental conditions were more marginal in the far south than they 
were in the high steppe where the tribes could also count on finding work and pasture 
in the Tell. In addition the grass in the south grew nearer the coast and caused less 
disruption to traditional transhumance movements which often took the tribes northward 
and close to the port of Gabes. Camels too were much more abundant in the south than 
they were in the high steppe, itself a reflection of the more difficult climatic and 
environmental conditions. 
Table 7.13 The Principal Exports of Gabes as a Percentage of the Ports Total 
Exports by Value 1892-1896 
Article 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 
Alfa grass 70 58 38 46 64 
Wheat 1 - 9 11 - 
Barley 5 - 33 13 - 
Woollen 
goods 
9 15 12 14 17 
Animal skins 2 6 2 4 5 
Dates 2 2 4 8 2 
Source : Regence de Tunis, Protectorat Francais, Statistiques Generales..., op. cit., 
Annees 1892-1896 
As the possibility of a resurgence in the alfa trade at Sousse and Sfax ebbed during the 
late 1880's and 1890's alfa merchants increased their activities in the far south. 
William Galea, manager of Perry Bury's Tunisian operations, had to ask increasingly 
for more leave of absence from his post as Vice-consul at Sousse because "... more than 
ever my business is calling me to the south as the esparto trade is nearly disappeared 
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at Susa". 38 
As a result during these years alfa grass became ever more important to the economy 
of the southern districts. At Gabes (Skhira was almost entirely a centre for shipment 
of alfa, exporting little else and importing almost nothing) it accounted for up to 70% 
of total exports, the only other items of any significance being barley in years of good 
crops, and woollen goods (see Table 7.13). 
To some extent, dependence on alfa grass as a source of income for the southern tribes 
may have been a product of increasing commercialisation. Between 1886 and 1896 the 
foreign trade at Gabes increased by nearly 120% from 1,248,277 francs to 2,739,038 
francs. The development of external trade and of internal commercialization of the 
economy was strongly promoted by French authorities, particularly the military, which 
it regarded as a means both of economic development and of achieving political 
stability. To promote security and in an attempt to fix the semi-nomadic populations 
in a defined territorial space close to military and administrative centres, the French 
created a number of local markets at strategic parts throughout the south. New markets 
were created at Medenine, Tatahouine and Ben Gardane in the far south as well as at 
other points further north to act as centres for the sale and purchase of goods. 
With the introduction of tax payments in money rather than goods from 1894, produce 
sales of animals, grain, olives and other goods at these markets increased markedly. 39 
Despite, perhaps partly because of this, the trade balance deteriorated during the 
1890's. 4° 
During the 1890's purchases of refined cereal products such as flour and of luxury 
38 FO 335 177/7, Galea to Drummond-Hay, Sfax, June 17,1892. 
3ý Fozzard, A. (1988) p. 91. 
ao The trade deficit at Gabes averaged over 560,000 francs between 1890 and 
1896. The value of alfa exports averaged 507,000 francs during the same period. 
Regence de Tunis, Protectorat Francais, Statistiques Commerciales, op. cit., 
1892-1896. 
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items such as "denrees coloniales", i. e. tea, coffee, sugar and tobacco, increased. The 
importation of the latter rose from 89,248 francs in 1886 to 544,146 francs by 1896. 
Similarly imports of flour grew from 16,231 francs to 346,608 francs during the same 
period. In 1896, these two classifications of products made up nearly 50% of Gabes's 
imports. 
Does this indicate a significant change in local consumption patterns? This is difficult 
to say with any certainty. Certainly much of the increased imports of luxury items 
were then re-exported by caravan to the Sahelian regions to the south. 41 Some too 
would have been consumed by the French officials garrisoned or stationed in the south. 
This may explain how part of the trade deficit was financed, as would the scale of the 
contraband trade in these items and in arms. 
It is, however, unlikely that alfa grass stimulated a change in the consumption patterns 
of the tribes of the south, at least during the nineteenth century. 42 In fact, alfa grass 
continued to be the resource of the poor and the increases in collections of the material 
in the south more a reflection of greater activity on the part of the merchants. Prices 
offered for the collection of alfa fell considerably. If, according to Table 7.9. the 
tribes were paid 3F 75 per 100 kg of grass by 1900 this had fallen to only 1F 50 at 
Sened. 43 Lower prices may, perversely, have stimulated collections amongst the very 
poor who had little alternative source of income although they were undoubtedly a 
disincentive to many tribesmen. 
As prices fell, concern for those who by necessity habitually collected and sold the 
41 Caravans took 1,195,700 kilos of sugar and 5,500 kilos of coffee to the Algerian 
Sahara in 1897. E. Fallot, (1899), p. 18. 
42 Fozzard, A. (1988) p. 99. Fozzard notes that it may have had more of an 
influence in the twentieth century as addiction to tea, for example, became more 
widespread. 
43 Fleury, V., (1900), op. cit., p. 69. This price was after the opening of the 
Sfax-Gafsa railway and exemplifies how many tribes were willing to accept lower 
prices if the distance of transportation to the market was reduced. Sened, supplied by 
the Hamamma tribes of the far west, was 150 km from Sfax. 
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grass as a means of subsistence, increased. 
"... in consequence of the low prices ruling in Great Britain and exorbitant duty 
amounting to nearly 35 % this important branch of trade with Great Britain has 
been severely damaged in the southern districts.... The decline of the trade is 
also prejudicial to large numbers of the nomad population who gather the grass 
for conveyance to merchants engaged in the business on the coast. "" 
The government's failure to respond positively to repeated requests for a further 
reduction in the export tax was seen in many circles as proof that France was following 
a policy designed to favour French interests over those of other foreign nationals. 
During the years 1890 and 1896, alfa had fallen to sixth place in the country's exports 
by value, behind wheat, olive oil, barley, tree bark, live animals and only just ahead 
of wine. In sharp contrast to alfa, these goods had benefitted from either a reduction 
or elimination of export duties and had further gained by the conditions of the new 
customs law of 1890 which allowed significant quantities of cereals and other goods to 
enter France free of import duties. Alfa grass, traded by British merchants and shipped 
almost entirely to Britain, continued to suffer a duty representing around 30% of its 
value: 
"France does not give any encouragement to the trade by a reduction of duty 
because it is seen to be one of the few branches of exports in British hands and 
also because the nomad population who are the main sufferers cannot make their 
requirements be listened to. "45 
There is undoubtedly an element of truth in this and some members of the Conference 
Consultative (an advisory body, much like a Chamber of Commerce, composed of 
foreign nationals) spoke out to this end during its inaugural meeting at which the 
problems of the alfa trade were addressed. "' One member, however, pointed out that, 
"On a dit que 1'alfa va en Angleterre, mais il ne faut pas oublier que la benefice 
as Report on the Trade and Commerce of Tunis for the Year 1891. 
as FO 335 177/7 Commercial Report for Susa for the Year 1892. 
46 Proces-Verbaux (1891) op. cit.. 
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economique est pour celui qui vend et non pas pour celui qui recoit". 47 
There is no doubt that lower prices were beginning to affect the Arab collectors of the 
grass who relied on it for much needed income. But the Director of Finances viewed 
a possible reduction in export duties as a question of fiscal resources: 
"La commission indique que l'alfa devra etre Fun des premiers produites 
degreves; il accepte cette situation. Mais il s'agirait d'un degrevement qui 
calcule sur les exercises 1305,1306,1307 (1888,1889,1890) monterait a 
290,000 piastres et il faut evidement tenir compte de la sitiation budgetaire. X48 
Although agreeing to the need for a reduction of taxes, the Director of Finances did not 
agree that the benefits from this would necessarily flow through to the people who 
needed it most, but that it would simply add to the profits of the merchants. 
Nevertheless pressure continued to mount for a reduction of duties in the late 1890's 
not simply from the merchants, but also on behalf of the tribes: 
"Depuis assez longtemps, les populations du Sud Tunisien reclaimaient une 
detaxe qui donnait des facilitees plus grandes a 1'exportation de l'alfa si 
justement appelee `la resource des nomades pauvres"'. 19 
It was only in 1897 that the Director of Finances finally agreed to a reduction from IF 
27 to OF 50 per metric quintal a move which, at last, brought the Tunisian alfa trade 
into line with those in Algeria and Tripolitania. Though the merchants had, for many 
years, called for reductions in the export duty as a pre-requisite to levelling the 
competitive playing field, the implementation of lower tariffs in 1897 failed to stimulate 
the Tunisian alfa trade as many had hoped. 50 While shipments rose from 14,886 
tonnes in 1896 to 18,186 tonnes in 1897 and 24,442 tonnes in 1898 by 1899 they had 
47 Ibid., p. 100. 
48 Ibid., p. 35. 
La Depeche Tunisienne, February 27,1897. 
50 La Depeche Tunisienne of September 14,1897 reported that with the tax 
reduction there was good reason to believe that "cette industrie [alfa] va renaitre". 
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fallen back to 14,157 tonnes. 51 
7.8 Conclusion 
Alfa grass remained one of Tunisia's foremost exports during the late 1880's and 
1890's much as it had in the late 1870's. Between 1886 and 1896 alfa grass never 
ranked below 8th amongst the country's principal items of export, a remarkable 
achievement for an article of such low unit value. (see Table 7.14) 
Table 7.14 Alfa Exports by Value (Francs) 1886-1896, as % of Total Exports and 
Ranking Relative to Country's Principal Exports 
Year Alfa Grass Total Exports Alfa as a percentage of total Rank 
1886 1,509,072 19,211,387 7.86 4 
1887 1,686,636 20,351,736 8.29 4 
1888 2,160,800 16,616,396 13.00 3 
1889 2,556,150 20,918,785 12.21 2 
1890 2,100,020 37,396,723 5.61 4 
1891 1,466,320 39,343,174 3.73 6 
1892 1,920,510 37,202,504 5.16 6 
1893 1,386,080 29,685,323 4.67 5 
1894 1,457,870 36,932,766 3.95 5 
1895 1,091,320 40,579,703 2.69 8 
1896 1,488,640 34,507,532 4.31 7 
Source: Regence de Tunis, Protectorat Francais, Direction Generale des Finances, 
Direction des Douanes (1897) Statistiques Commerciales de la Tunisie, Annees 
1886-1896. 
There were, however, clear signs of stagnation in the alfa trade during the late 
nineteenth century exports, in volume terms, levelling off at around 14,000 tons and 
increasingly significantly only in years of widespread drought. 
s' L'Exploitation et le Commerce de l'Alfa en Tunisie, Bulletin de l'Agriculture 
et du Commerce, no 16, July, 1900. 
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But even under these conditions the scale of the trade never approached either the 
production capacity of the land nor the level of exports achieved in either Algeria or 
Tripolitania. While in Algeria in 1893 there were 161 alfa yards in operation there 
were just 12 in Tunisia. " Export volume represented scarcely ten percent of the 
country's production potential of between 200,000 and 300,000 tonnes. 
International market conditions were certainly influential in the relatively poor 
performance of the Tunisian alfa trade. British consumption of alfa grass declined in 
the late nineteenth century mainly because of the increasing adoption of wood-pulp in 
the manufacture of paper and paper products. As a result competition amongst the alfa 
producing countries intensified and the value of alfa in the British market fell steeply. 
Although the fall in the value of alfa, the imposition of high government charges and 
the stubborn maintenance of an excessive export duty on alfa limited the profit margins 
of Tunisian merchants and restricted their ability to offer higher prices to collectors, 
there is little evidence that the burden of these high local costs had any significant or 
far-reaching impact on the overall scale of the trade in Tunisia. Even when the export 
duties were reduced there was no noticeable rise in the level of exports. Nor indeed 
is there anything to show that higher prices offered to collectors had any real, direct, 
impact on the scale of collections. In fact the prices offered the tribes in Tunisia were 
consistently higher than those in neighbouring Algeria and Tripolitania where merchants 
margins were also much reduced with the declining market value of alfa. 
The real determinants of the size of the alfa trade in all the producer countries of north 
Africa were the degree of economic distress amongst the potential labour force and the 
difficulties of transportation to the point of sale. 
In Tripolitania where environmental conditions in the main alfa districts were more 
severe than in most of Tunisia and Algeria drought, crop failures and lack of pasture 
were a much more common condition of the pastoral existence. Alfa played an 
52 Fleury, V., (1900), op. cit., p. 64. 
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enormously important role in maintaining economic and social equilibrium. The 
distance of the alfa districts from the coast was also less, particularly after the opening 
of the little port of Zleiten. The camel was much more common in Tripolitania and the 
seasonal migrations of transhumance often took the tribes northward towards the more 
fertile areas along the coast. 
In Algeria alfa grass was first exploited near to the coast in the Oran district but when 
these resources began to suffer exhaustion the granting of concessions and the 
construction of railways facilitated the exploitation of the most important alfa regions 
in the high plateaux. 53 Concessions gave merchants a monopoly on the purchases and 
helped assure a stable volume of collection which justified the investment in hydraulic 
presses and railways. 
In Tunisia the stagnation of the alfa trade in the nineteenth century can be attributed to 
the social and economic viability of the tribal society in general and to the disruption 
which long distance transportation caused to the pastoral way of life. The tribes' main 
concern, after their own subsistence, was the well-being of their animals. Their 
seasonal migrations in search of pasture took them northward to the climatically more 
favoured northern provinces where work could also be found in the harvest. Diverting 
animals and men on a long trip eastward to the coast, a return journey of up to eight 
days during which, particularly in years of drought, pasture could never be assured, 
was a poor incentive for the meagre reward offered from the sale of alfa. 
The availability of animals and the distance and time involved in taking the grass long 
distances to the coast for sale was a more important inhibiting factor to the more 
widespread participation of the semi-nomads in the alfa trade than was price. In the 
high steppe camels were relatively scarce, Jean Poncet estimating around 9,000 
s3 The railway from Souk-Ahras to Tebessa in the Department of Constantine near 
the Tunisian frontier was completed in May 1888 and gave a new impetus to the alfa 
trade in this region which had hitherto been stunted by the cost of land transport. The 
railway provided the grasses of Constantine a means with which to compete with those 
of Oran. Fleury, V., (1900), op. cit., p. 65. 
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amongst the tribes of the Fraichiche and Madger in 1885.54 This obviously placed 
limitations on the potential volume of collections. 
Although the value of, or the price paid for, alfa grass was seldom the principal 
determinant in engaging in the alfa trade the fall in prices from the mid 1880's did have 
an effect on collections in Tunisia. For those who had to rent animals from third 
parties the cost of doing so began to outweigh the income earned from the collection 
and sale of grass. In fact the cost of transport was often higher than the amount paid 
for the collection of grass. Thus while some of the tribes of the high steppe such as 
the Ouled Sidi Tlil, Ouled Abid and Ouled Ouezzezz continued to sell alfa either on 
Tunisian markets or in those of Algeria which were closer, most desisted from trading 
in alfa except under extreme economic duress. ss 
As a result the collection of alfa grass became limited to the very poor, or those living 
near, or with easier access to, the coast. The merchants changed their commercial 
emphasis to concentrate on the southern regions where their presence and activity 
increased during the 1880's. Indeed while the grass of the high steppe all but 
disappeared from coastal markets, that from the south increased. Not only were camels 
more abundant amongst the southern tribes but their seasonal transhumance generally 
took them northward close to Gabes. Environmental conditions were also more 
difficult in the south, rainfall being lower and less regular than in the high steppe and 
access to the Tell more difficult. 
For the vast majority of tribesmen engaged in the trade, alfa continued to provide the 
means of subsistence and of paying taxes when alternative sources were unavailable or 
lacking. The decision to make tax payments in money rather than kind in 1894 
obviously promoted the importance of alfa in the south but so too did the increased 
activity of merchants deprived of business to the north. It may also have been that 
sa Jean Poncet, Paysages et Problemes Ruraux en Tunisie, p. 222. 
ss Alfa grass was also collected and sold in Tunisia by tribes from Tripolitania and 
Algeria which came in search of work, pasture or food. 
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lower prices stimulated higher sales from the very poor tribes close to the coast, higher 
volume making up the shortfall in income. 
But while the importance of alfa grass to the southern tribes increased during the late 
nineteenth century its importance to the general level of economic activity declined. 
The trade did not assume the magnitude of that of her neighbours. 
This was a situation which was to change rapidly in the early years of the twentieth 
century with the construction of railways through the main alfa regions. This 
considerably reduced the social and economic barriers to the collection of alfa. But the 
potential labour force was also broadened by the very marked deterioration of the 
economic situation of the Tunisian tribes, particularly from the mid 1920's, as the old 
complementarity of the relationship between the tribes of the steppe and the Tell began 
to disintegrate. With the commercialization of the Tunisian economy of the twentieth 
century land under cereal culture in the north increased sharply at the expense of 
pasture. The Tell, which had hitherto provided a natural safety valve for the 
climatic insecurity of the southern tribes, became less accessible to their seasonal labour 
and transhumance. As a consequence alfa grass was transformed in the twentieth 
century from a complementary resource of last resort, into a central underpinning to 
the maintenance of a pastoral society become increasingly untenable both socially and 
economically. 
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Chapter 8 
The Alfa Trade in the Twentieth Century 
8.1 Introduction 
If the Tunisian alfa trade could be described as stagnant during the nineteenth century 
the first half of the twentieth century was one of almost unbridled boom. British 
imports of alfa grass began to increase again as demand for paper products grew, and 
although the consumption of wood pulp expanded, paper made from alfa grass fortified 
its position as the prime material of choice for quality paper. 
In Tunisia the construction of railways from the ports of Sousse and Sfax to the 
interior, crossing all the most important alfa growing districts facilitated the cost 
effective movement of much larger volumes of the material to the ports. By reducing 
the time and distance involved in the transportation of the grass from the fields where 
it was pulled to the point of sale the railways also widened the potential labour force. 
Camels or mules could be used because of the shorter distances; more journeys to the 
market could be made with less effort even the cost of hiring animals was made more 
affordable. 
Yet while the new railways undoubtedly provided the engine for the trade's rapid 
expansion in the twentieth century the fuel came from a marked deterioration in the 
economic situation of the semi-nomadic tribes of south and central Tunisia. Increasing 
commercialization of the economy and its greater integration into the world economy 
accelerated social change in the northern regions where the ethnic foundation of tribal 
society continued to be undermined, though at a more rapid pace than in the nineteenth 
century. In the more fertile north production became increasingly driven by market 
demand, both local and foreign. The area under cereal cultivation expanded rapidly 
and land was transformed into a commodity, the value of which did not cease to rise 
until the late 1920's. Agricultural activities came to take precedence over animal 
husbandry and the availability of pasture declined. The requirement for seasonal labour 
in the harvests of the north also fell more rapidly from the 1930's with agricultural 
mechanization. 
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As a result the old symbiotic relationship between the people of the steppe and the Tell 
deteriorated sharply. The northern tribes became less willing, and less able, to accept 
the seasonal immigration of men and beasts from the southern tribes because of the 
threat to their crops. Access to work and pasture in the Tell, which had for centuries 
provided a natural safety valve for the climatic insecurity and environmental instability 
endured by the southern tribes, became more and more restricted and controlled by 
government authorities. A growing population in the south was forced to depend on 
the limited economic and ecological resources of their own land. Although the area 
under cereal cultivation increased significantly in the south, as it did in the north, much 
of it was on poorer land since the most of the best lands were already in use. With no 
development in the means of production, crop yields fell and the economic 
consequences of harvest failures, made more likely, were magnified. Faced with this 
the southern tribes which, unlike their northern counterparts, continued to rely 
fundamentally on animal husbandry, increased their ownership of livestock. But the 
reduced access to pasture in the Tell, and the diminishing availability of pasture in their 
own regions, made pastoralism an ever more marginal activity. 
Under such circumstances the importance of alfa grass became paramount. Alfa grass 
was transformed, during the twentieth century, from a resource of last resort to a 
central pillar for the maintenance of pastoralism in southern Tunisia. Alfa grass 
replaced the Tell, as the principal means of survival for an economy and society 
rendered unsustainable when shorn of the safety net hitherto provided by the northern 
regions. 
The collection, sale and export of alfa grass from Tunisia increased sharply during the 
twentieth century and as reliance on the material increased concerns were raised by the 
authorities about not only the effects of exhaustion of the resource through 
over-harvesting, but also the exploitation of the collectors by the foreign merchants. 
8.2 The Construction of Railways in the South and Centre 
The desire for the construction of railways linking the interior of the south and centre 
with the coast had been a goal of the French administration since the establishment of 
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the Protectorate in 1881. For many years this was motivated by political 
considerations, the need for rapid deployment of troops being seen as a prerequisite to 
peace and good order amongst the tribes. The cost of such a project was, however, 
deemed too high a burden for the Tunisian Treasury to sustain particularly given that 
the economic potential of these regions were extremely limited. 
Besides the ill-fated and small-scale project of the Franco-English Company in the 
1880's it was not until the discovery of huge phosphate deposits near Gafsa in 1887 that 
any serious discussion took place as to the possibility of constructing railways in the 
south. Even then it was only when the French resident General, Massicault, spoke out 
strongly on the importance of the phosphate reserves to the country in 1890 that any 
real attempts at securing finance for the project was made. ' Rather than underwrite 
the cost of building a railway to the coast the French Administration offered the line 
to private capital and the project was finally awarded to the Compagnie de Gafsa 
formed by an amalgamation of the Banque Mirabaud and the Companie Mokta el 
Hadad. The Compagnie de Gafsa was to build the line entirely at their own cost and 
risk. 
The choice of the railhead at the coast, which offered immense direct and indirect 
economic benefits to the successful bidder, gave rise to an intense competition amongst 
the towns of Sfax, Gabes and Skhira. Although the Government was not to finance the 
cost of the new line it had an important say in the final choice of the route. As a 
railway would confer significant benefits to landowners close to it, the Administration 
sought to ensure that the line crossed land which had the potential for settling French 
colonial agriculturalists. Neither Gabes, which was anyway unattractive because of the 
high costs involved in constructing adequate port facilities, nor Skhira which had 
excellent potential for a port, offered any real possibility of Colonial agriculture. 2 In 
' Douggi, N. (1983) p. 14. 
2A port at Gabes could only be constructed with great difficulty and at a high 
cost: "la cote est uniee, tous les vents apportent du sable et la presence d'un oued est 
un inconvenient de plus. Sans doute on pourrait, a coup d'argent, y constituer un port 
de toutes pieces, mais les sacrifices necessaires ne seraient pas pour l'heure en rapport 
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the end Sfax, which was anyway the largest of the towns with the best organised group 
of lobbyists, was chosen mainly because of the 300,000 hectares of land close to the 
town which was already under development for French settlement. 
The first stone of the station at Sfax was laid in April 1897, and only two years later, 
in 1899, the 246 km of line between the port and Metlaoui, where the phosphates were 
mined, was officially opened. 
In 1905 the line was extended to Redeyef, close to the Algerian border and some 45 
km from Metlaoui, after the discovery of rich phosphate reserves there the previous 
year. 3 In 1912 Tozeur, an oasis in the Djerid and the country's principal source of 
date production, was linked to Metlaoui by which time the Compagnie de Gafsa 
controlled a network some 365 km in length. 
In 1902 further phosphate reserves were found at Moulares only 20 km from the line 
Metlaoui-Redeyef but in according the Compagnie de Gafsa the exploitation rights, the 
Administration stipulated that these resources had to be shipped, as with those from the 
mine at Redeyef, to the port of Sousse via a line which was to be constructed from that 
port to Moulares. This railway, of 310 km in length, had little economic justification, 
since it crossed land devoid of mineral wealth and occupied by tribes which participated 
only marginally in the economy at large. 4 By ensuring that the phosphates of Moulares 
be shipped to the coast at Sousse on the new line, the Administration hoped this would 
help offset the costs of the project and provide a reasonably assured income to the 
avec les avantages obtenus". Ibid., p. 16. In later years the land of the Mehedba, as 
with other habuous properties near Skira, were given over, in part, to French 
colonization. 
3 The phosphate reserves at Redeyef were richer than those at Metlaoui. 
4 Because of this the railway from Sousse to the interior was funded by the 
Government rather than private capital. 
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operator, the Compagnie Bone-Guelma. s 
The railway from Sousse, which was already operating to Kairouan, was extended to 
Feriana in the high steppe in 1908 and to Moulares in 1910. The completion of this 
line resulted in the connection of most of the country into a cohesive rail network 
which was to link to the Algerian rail system at Tebessa. 
8.3 The Alfa Trade in the Twentieth Century 
The construction of the Sfax-Gafsa and the Sousse-Feriana railways heralded a new era 
in the Tunisian alfa trade. The railways crossed the most important alfa growing 
regions of the country and allowed a mass movement of grass from the interior to the 
coast at a much lower cost than was the case with animals. ' More importantly for the 
collectors the railways meant that merchants could establish collection points, near the 
railways, much closer to where the grass grew diluting the problem of transport over 
long distances: 
"on peut prevoir que l'ouverture du chemin de fer Sfax-Gafsa, qui traverse les 
principaux peuplements, va donner a 1'exploitation de 1'alfa l'importance a 
laquelle cette industrie ne pouvait pretendre tant qu'elle avait pour unique 
moyen de transport les caravans se rendant en cinq jours environ du centre a 
La Skira, a Sfax, a Gabes". ' 
The Government offered alfa merchants land on either side of the Sfax-Gafsa railway 
5 The cost of transport charged by the Compagnie Bone-Guelma on the line to 
Sousse, at 9F 05 per tonne in 1910, was far higher than that incurred using their own 
line to Sfax (2F 50 per tonne). The Compagnie de Gafsa only wanted the exploitation 
rights at Moulares to stop any competitor obtaining them. The start of operations at 
Moulares incurred many millions of Francs in costs for the company at a time when 
market conditons made the mine unprofitable quite apart from the additional 
transportation costs to bear. Ibid., p. 36 and p. 41. 
6 From the time of the construction of the Sfax-Gafsa railway direct exports of alfa 
grass from Gabes declined sharply. This did not mean the end of collections in the far 
south since much was still brought to the town and taken by lighter to Sfax. However, 
a new railway linking Sfax and Gabes, built after World War I made the exploitation 
of the alfa in the far south a more economic proposition. 
Fleury, V. (1900), op. cit., p. 65. 
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close to the stations where they could construct their yards for the collection and 
preparation of alfa before being made ready for transport to Sfax. The stations 
themselves (Figure 8.1) were nothing more than stop-off points where the engines could 
take on water, but the new alfa yards at Mizzouna (Mezouna), Sened, Maknassy and 
Zannouch, for example, encouraged the development of little centres of commerce and 
population where none previously existed. On the Sousse-Feriana line alfa yards were 
established at Hadjeb, Djilma, Sbeitla, Kasserine, Thelepte and Maagen bel Abbes, 
amongst others. ' 
The alfa yards created along the railways immensely increased the potential labour 
force for the collection of the grass by effectively bringing the market to where the 
grass grew. Journey times for most tribes were considerably reduced and for those 
who had to hire animals the cost of taking the grass to the new yards was much lower. 
Even those who had only mules but no camels could take part in the commerce. 
Although the years 1902-1912 were ones of prolonged and severe drought in the south 
and centre of the country, the sharp rise in the level of exports during the early part of 
the twentieth century is testament to the importance of the railways in facilitating the 
collection and commercialization of alfa grass. Exports of alfa which had been only 
14,000 tonnes in 1899, prior to the opening of the line from Sfax-Gafsa had, by 1907 
reached 30,000 tonnes and had risen to almost 58,000 tonnes in 1914 once the 
Sousse-Feriana line became operational (see Table 8.1 and Figure 8.2). 
Exports fell sharply during the war years when British paper production was heavily 
reduced and although they climbed back to 57,000 tonnes in 1920 they declined again 
in 1921 and 1922, a reflection of oversupply in Britain where the value of alfa fell to 
only £3 per tonne. With average freight rates of £2 per tonne there was no market for 
more grass. These were also years of excellent agricultural conditions in the south and 
8 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Seance du Chambre Mixte de Commerce 
et d'Agriculture du Centre, July 2nd, 1931. 
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Figure 8.1. Railways and alfa markets, 1936/7. Source: see text 
centre of Tunisia (although in the north of the country the crops were extremely 
poor). ' There was, therefore, little supply of alfa grass from the tribes. In the region 
of Thala at the end of 1921 the Controleur Civil reported stocks of 50,000 tonnes of 
alfa and that of the thirteen British alfa houses at Thelepte, only four kept their 
agents. 1° Given the level of exports in the following year (20,523 tonnes) there was 
very little collection of grass made. 
Table 8.1 Tunisian Alfa Exports 1907-1939 (Tonnes) 
Exports Year Exports Year Exports 
1907 30,074 1918 2,032 1929 94,043 
1908 41,634 1919 25,268 1930 76,799 
1909 48,477 1920 57,206 1931 85,830 
1910 38,834 1921 17,464 1932 65,960 
1911 50,979 1922 20,523 1933 61,263 
1912 52,514 1923 44,089 1934 84,196 
1913 49,319 1924 78,089 1935 84,196 
1914 57,630 1925 81,998 1936 109,403 
1915 32,333 1926 89,729 1937 99,195 
1916 23,932 1927 84,245 1938 129,409 
1917 17,001 1928 63,769 1 11 
Sources : 1907-1916, L'Alfa Tunisien, (1917), (Tunis, Societe Anonyme de 
L'Imprimerie Rapide), p. 4. 
1917-1929: Annabi, op. cit., p. 26 
1930-1939: Annabi, op. cit., p. 10. 
From the mid 1920's, however, the trend in alfa exports was clearly rising and by 
9 The years 1920-1922 were excellent years for crops and pasture in the south 
while the north suffered from severe drought. See Timoumi, H. (1975) op. cit., p. 
159. 
'o AGT Series A, carton 94, dossier 7, Controleur Civil at Thala to Resident 
General, December 14,1921. 
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1938, after a slight decline during the Depression years, exports of the plant reached 
a new peak of 129,409 tonnes. 
But the very strong growth in the scale of the alfa trade in Tunisia from the mid 1920's 
can not be explained simply by the existence of railways since these had been operating 
for some time. Undoubtedly the diversion of Tripoli's alfa to Italy had a significant 
impact on the supply of the British market as did stronger measures of control to avoid 
the exhaustion of the plant in Algeria. These occurred at a time of growing British 
demand for alfa grass (apart from a few years during the Great Depression) even in the 
face of greater competition from wood pulp. " Indeed paper made from alfa (or 
esparto paper as it continued to be called in Britain) did not necessarily compete 
directly with wood pulp papers because of the quality differential which allowed esparto 
papers to command a price premium in the market: 
"While wood-pulp soon outstripped esparto in quantity of production, the 
standard of British esparto papers became a kind of idea which the wood pulp 
papermakers strove to imitate. In this way esparto set a standard which has had 
a powerful influence on the economics of British paper-making. The 
paper-maker and the printer both knew what could be done with esparto when 
wood pulp was still in its infancy, and the modem manufacturers of wood pulp 
and wood pulp papers owe more to the esparto standard than they may realise 
at the present day. At the one end of our industry we have the advocates of 
speed and cheapness of production, making printing papers on high speed, new 
machines, who follow a standard of quality which has its limits.... In this way 
the manufacturer of esparto papers provides a balancing factor which has always 
had the effect of keeping British paper-making up to a high level of 
excellence". 12 
While increased British consumption of alfa and the diversion of Libyan output to Italy 
may have enabled, much as the railways had done, an expansion in the Tunisian trade 
they could not, in themselves, have accounted for the sharp growth experienced in the 
collection of alfa amongst the tribes from the mid 1920's. As to all intents and 
 British imports of alfa grass which had been 205,000 tons in 1913, had risen to 
311,211 tons in 1938. See The Paper-Maker and British Trade Journal, (June 1957). 
Improvements in the processing of alfa for use in paper-making meant that, by the early 
1950's one ton of paper required only one ton of alfa. Ibid., p. 490. 
12 Strachan, J. (1933) op. cit., p. 24. 
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purposes, free trade persisted in the Tunisian alfa trade (see below) during these years 
the increased activity in alfa collections can only be explained by either increased prices 
offered by the merchants or by a deterioration in the economic situation of the tribes 
themselves. 
Rising British demand for alfa, and the effective closure of supplies from Tripolitania 
after the Italian occupation, pushed the F. O. B. value of Tunisian alfa up from 60 F per 
tonne in 1908 to 246 F per tonne in 1937.13 As a result prices paid to collectors in 
Tunisia also increased at the beginning of the twentieth century. From 1F 50 per 
100kg in 1900 the prices offered collectors had risen to 14 F by 1923 and even reached 
as high as 29 F in the late 1920's. 14 This was, however, a period of sharply rising 
prices in the Tunisian economy in general grain prices more than tripling between 1914 
and 1921 alone. 15 
But these prices for paid alfa in Tunisia are little more than indicators of what was 
finally received by the collectors of grass as income since all the alfa merchants 
employed a variety of means to reduce the net payment, i. e. what the collector took 
home after the sale. The tribes were often forced to pay government charges which 
should have been covered by the merchants, deductions for weight were made, weights 
were frequently understated, prices were fixed amongst buyers (see below). 
In any event during the economic crisis of the 1930's when the strongest growth in 
exports was recorded, prices declined, apart from a brief period in 1937 when a French 
alfa house tried to eliminate British competition in the market by artificially inflating 
prices. In 1933 the tribes were being paid a maximum of 12 F for each 100 kg on the 
13 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 1, Conservateur des Eaux et Forets a M. le 
Directeur des Affaires Economiques, April 30,1937. 
'a AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, "Rapport: Le Chef de Poste de Police a 
Controleur Civil a Thala, 1926. 
is The price of 100 kg of wheat which was between 26 and 30 F in 1914 had risen 
to 100 F by 1921. Mzali, M. S., (1921) p. 6. 
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official market at Thala and as low as 5F 50 at private yards. 16 By 1936 prices on 
official markets had fallen to between 6F and 8 F. 17 Many tribesmen entered into 
contracts to sell alfa to merchants, or agents of alfa houses, at much lower prices than 
these, however, during the 1930's. Thus some tribesmen of the Beni Zid agreed to rent 
an area of land to a M. Picard, of the Societe Franco-Tunisienne Alfatierre, for only 
4F per tonne of alfa collected, payable at every month end. 18 
While the decline in the "real" value of alfa undoubtedly stimulated increased collection 
from those for whom it provided a main source of income the "boom" from the mid 
1920's was the direct result of the more general deterioration in the economic situation 
of the tribes of the south and centre of the country. 
8.4 Development of Tunisia's Foreign Trade during the Protectorate 
Although the integration of Tunisia into the international economy predated the 
establishment of the French Protectorate in 1881 the period of French rule witnessed 
a strong acceleration in this process. While before 1881 the value of foreign trade 
never exceeded 23 million francs, this rose sharply thereafter (See Table 8.2). 
Successive legislation of the French authorities in Tunisia was designed to intensify 
links with the Metropolitan economy in which Tunisia was to become a source of 
primary, mainly agricultural, produce and a consumer of French manufactured goods. 
The customs law of 1890 provided for the importation into France of a variety of 
16 AGT Series E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Rapport du Capitaine Boiseaux, 
Commandant de la Section de Sousse, May 1st, 1933 and AGT Series E, Carton 64, 
Dossier 11, Controleur Civil de Thala to Resident General, October 9th, 1923. Prices 
fell further to only around 7 Francs in 1936. 
17 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Conservateur des Eaux et Forets a 
Directeur des Affaires Economiques, April 30,1937. 
18 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, May 10,1933. Another parcel of two 
lots of land was rented to M. Picard at 3F 50 per tonne in February 1933 in the same 
conditions. 
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Tunisian goods, almost entirely agricultural produce, free of import duties. 19 Of these 
only cereals were allowed entry free of quota restrictions. 20 
Table 8.2. Tunisian Foreign Trade (Million Francs) 
Year Value Year Value 
Average of 1881-9 54.5 1918 337 
1898 97 1919 488 
1901 104 1920 973 
1902 117 1922 1300 
1903 155 1924 1530 
1904 160 1926 2650 
1907 206 1929 3350 
Source : "Notice General sur la Tunisie (1881-1921), Residence general de la 
Republique Francaise (Imprimerie du Centre-Toulouse) 1922-1929. Mhalla, M., op. 
cit., p. 403. 
The culmination of France's protectionist policy in this regard was the implementation 
in 1928 of a "Customs Union" in which trade in almost all goods between France and 
Tunisia were liberated from both import duties and quotas. 21 The 1928 law, however, 
was aimed more at assuring French Metropolitan manufacturers a guaranteed market 
in Tunisia at a time of increasing protectionism in the world economy : 
19 This was followed by decrees in 1904,1914 and 1915. See "Notice General sur 
la Tunisie, op. cit., pp. 309-310. 
2° (20) The decree of 1890 had a profound influence on Tunisia's trade flows. In 
the year 1885-1886 France accounted for only 13 % of Tunisian exports. By 1921 this 
had risen to 60%. "Notice General sur la Tunisie", op. cit., p. 314. 
Z' This, like preceding legislation, excluded wine and salt from the benefits tax free 
entry into France. 
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"... le commerce metropolitain ne jouit pas, dans la Regence, d'une situation 
suffisamment privilegiee. Les importations d'origine et de provenance 
francaises en Tunisie, atteignent, rarement, avant la guerre 60% des 
importattions totales alors qu'elles depassent 80% en Algerie. Les 
revendications formulees a cet egard sont particulierement fondees a une epoque 
ou il importe a un si haute point de permettre a 1'exportation francaise de creer 
de nouveaux debouches et de veiller a ce que la concurrence etrangere, des a 
present si active, ne le supplant pas sur un marche qui est 
legitimement devolu. "22 
Tunisian imports from other countries were, in contrast, burdened with prohibitively 
high import duties. 
Although during the 1930's the Tunisian economy was severely affected by the sharp 
downturn in the level and terms of her foreign trade, the 1920's was a period of rapid 
expansion in agricultural and mineral output. The pace of growth in exports was not 
too dissimilar to that experienced by imports and although the trade deficit continued 
to rise during the decade this was balanced by strong capital inflows mainly from 
France. 
Grain production was, perhaps, the principal beneficiary of successive customs and 
trade agreements between France and Tunisia. Clearly both production and exports 
were affected by climatic conditions and local requirements as well as by external 
demand. 23 Table 8.3 shows the level of production and exports for wheat and barley 
between 1911 and 1920. 
But the 1920's witnessed a much stronger growth in agricultural production as both 
internal and external demand increased and prices rose. The production of wheat and 
barley increased from an annual average of 3 million quintals between 1920 and 1924 
to 5.1 million quintals between 1925 and 1929.24 
Z2 Notice General sur la Tunisie, op. cit., p. 312. 
23 Tunisian production, even in years of good harvest, was insufficient to satisfy 
local requirements which gave rise to imports, usually of lower quality grains. 
24 M'Halla, M., op. cit., p. 394. 
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Table 8.3. Production and Exports of Wheat and Barley 1911-1920 
Year Wheat Barley 
Production Exports Production Exports 
1911 2,350,000 611,464 2,900,000 1,315,016 
1912 1,050,000 161,316 670,000 270,714 
1913 2,220,000 138,405 2,050,000 834,529 
1914 600,000 9,415 700,000 31,511 
1915 2,250,000 155,524 1,070,000 217,951 
1916 1,500,000 112,933 1,070,000 70,440 
1917 1,990,000 1,412 1,700,000 70,440 
1918 3,250,000 211,498 2,850,000 550,410 
1919 1,900,000 863,636 1,200,000 1,397,559 
1920 1,422,000 48,106 570,000 139,782 
Source : "Notice General sur la Tunisie", op. cit., pp. 315-316. 
The general economic prosperity of the 1920's accelerated the process of 
commercialisation throughout the tribal regions of Tunisia but it both impacted, and 
was paralleled by, processes of social change which differed markedly between the 
climatically more favoured northern regions and the environmentally disadvantaged 
south and centre. 
8.5 Economic and Social Change in Northern Tunisia 
The marked rise in agricultural production during the 1920's was achieved, not so 
much by improvements in production methods, but rather by an increase in the 
cultivated area. More and more land was brought into agricultural production. The 
area of land under cultivation in 1881 was estimated to be between 700,000 hectares 
and 800,000 hectares. 's This was exceeded by 1892 and by 1911 a little over 1 
million hectares of land throughout Tunisia was devoted to agriculture. This expansion 
25 M'Halla, M., op. cit., p. 390. 
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occurred in both the northern provinces and the southern and central regions of the 
country 
Table 8.4. Land under Cereal Cultivation in Tunisia (hectares)(annual average) 
Northern Tunisia Southern Tunisia 
1920-1924 1925-1929 1920-1924 1925-1929 
Hard wheat 310,949 382,199 186,022 247,680 
Soft wheat 45,751 63,788 534 1,932 
Barley 156,197 192,183 236,290 303,723 
Total 512,877 638,170 422,846 553,135 
Source : M'Halla, M., op. cit., p. 392. 
In northern Tunisia the extension of cultures reduced the amount of pasture available 
for animal rearing and agriculture gradually came to supersede livestock as the principal 
economic activity of the tribal population. Grain production became increasingly driven 
by market considerations rather than subsistence needs as demand, both local and 
external, and prices, rose. The French created a whole series of new markets 
throughout the country in an effort not only to facilitate the commercialisation of 
produce but also with the aim of encouraging the tribes to have stronger ties to specific 
territorial points, something which would make the control and administration of the 
pastoral population easier and more effective. The traditional practice of storing excess 
grain resulting from good harvests as a security against the possibility of future deficits 
was largely abandoned. 
Parallel but linked to increasing commercialisation of production, the social ties which 
bound the northern tribes underwent a profound transformation. More regular 
cultivation of land accelerated the process of tribal disaggregation and of sedentarization 
of the semi-nomads of the north, a process which had been underway since long before 
the establishment of the Protectorate. As was discussed in Chapter Two, the northern 
tribes had, since at least the seventeenth century, begun to establish legal titles to the 
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land they occupied. 26 At first this was at the level of the tribe in seeking to 
differentiate their land from those of neighbouring tribes but gradually they reached 
down the tribal ladder to fractions and sub-fractions of the tribe and eventually to 
individual families. From the late nineteenth century land became a commodity with 
a value which increased as its availability diminished with the establishment of titles 
and as it's commercial potential was enhanced. Uncultivated, fertile land in the north 
of the country which was selling for 100 F per hectare in 1900 had risen to as high as 
between 1500 F and 3000 F by 1930.27 
Land, at least agricultural land, became increasingly identified with units smaller than 
that of the tribe and, instead of communal distribution and exploitation, individual or 
family ownership and usage developed. There was a progressive, if, to some extent, 
unconscious change amongst the people of the Tell from a collective identity to a more 
individual social consciousness, from an ethnic social base to one defined more by 
territorial limits. This process was further enhanced by the French Administration 
which, from the late nineteenth century, sought to eliminate as many ethnic cheikhats 
as possible replacing them with those based on geographical boundaries. Thus in the 
Caidat of Teboursouk of the 39 cheikhats in 1890 20 were abolished and in the Caidat 
of Kef 23 of the 41 cheikhats were eliminated. " 
The French administration's policy of appropriating land to encourage French 
colonization also stimulated the proliferation of property titles as tribes sought to 
counter the threat of eviction from land the tribes had occupied and worked for 
centuries. 29 
Z6 Monchicourt, C. (1906) p. 44. 
27 M'Halla, M., op. cit., p. 294. The value of land was growing at a much faster 
rate than prices of the agricultural product of the land giving rise to land speculation 
on the part of native Tunisians and large foreign companies. 
28 Ibid., p. 200. 
29 Public Habous had to provide at least 2000 ha per annum for French 
colonization (see C. Sammut (1983)). 
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The policy of the French Administration in Tunisia with regards land and 
landownership was almost entirely dictated by the need to provide a means with which 
land could be transferred into the hands of French nationals, colons. For the French, 
existing Muslim property law was insufficient to provide the necessary security of 
ownership which would be required for French settlers. This was evident even in the 
pre-Protectorate period. When the Societe Marseillaise de Credit Industriel et 
Commercial bought the Enfida estate from General Kherredine objections were raised 
in so far as legislation requiring that neighbouring landowners be given a right of 
preemption on the sale was ignored. " 
The administration, therefore, sought to establish a clear and coherent property law 
which would protect indigenous landholders but which, more importantly, would 
facilitate the transfer of land to French settlers while providing the latter sufficient legal 
protection from disputes arising under Muslim law. Paul Cambon, French Resident 
General in Tunisia between 1881 and 1886 wrote: 
"Pour attirer et retenir les capaitaux il importe de proteger les acquereurs de 
terres contre leur ignorance de la langue, des lois et des usages du pays, de 
mettre les proprietaires a 1'abri des revendicatons imprevues, en un mot 
d'assurer la facilite et la securite des transactions". 31 
Originally the French had hoped that the very large properties bought by large French 
institutions (and politicians) would form the basis of colonization. But in fact many of 
these were speculative purchases much of which were sold to Italian immigrants. The 
failure of this "private" colonization gave way from 1892 to officially sponsored 
colonization in which the French Administration was to manage French settlement and 
provide the land and finance necessary to attract French farmers. 
To achieve this the Administration had to acquire the land which could be provided to 
settlers. While in Algeria lands were simply confiscated and given freely to French 
colonizers in Tunisia a variety of means were employed to find suitable properties. 
3o Sammut, C. (1983) p. 87. 
31 Cited in Sammut, C. (1983) p. 89. 
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Thus from 1898 the administrators of the Public Habous, i. e., lands which were given 
over with inalienable and perpetual rights in the name of religious foundations, had to 
provide at least 2000 hectares of land per year to the Direction de 1'Agriculture for the 
needs of colonization. 32 In addition, in 1896, all the "terres mortes" of the country 
were appropriated by the French Administration. These were deemed to include the old 
estates of the Bey. Until 1896 these estates did not belong to the Bey who only had the 
authority to grant usage rights (which transformed them into "terres vives") to his 
subjects. Much of these lands were already occupied by Tunisians paying rent to the 
owner or the principal renter who then sub-let. The effective dispossession of rights 
enjoyed for generations led many, in fear of seeing their land expropriated in a similar 
way, to establish legal ownership of their lands since traditional rights of usage were 
not deemed, in the case of Beylical estates, sufficient to justify continued occupation. 
Prior to World War I in many cases the existing occupants of these lands were either 
evicted or only allowed to continue to rent land until it was allotted to colons. The 
needs of the native occupants of the soil were largely ignored. But from the early 
1920's concerns that this policy could only result in the creation of a disaffected mass 
of landless labourers, gave way to a policy of "fixation au sol des indigenes". 33 Parts 
of the Domainal land were offered to indigenous families whom it was hoped could be 
transformed into small landholders. In 1921 the Secretary General of the Tunisian 
Government wrote: 
"Que le gouvernement suive cette politique pendant les annees a venir l'agitation 
politique aura disparu dans les campagnes. Transformer le petit agriculteur en 
un petit proprietaire c'est assurer dans 1'avenir a la France une population 
conservatrice... que se tiendra loin des aventuras". 3a 
Between 1920 and 1934 106,976 hectares of land, mainly on the state's domain, were 
32 Sammut, C. (1983) p. 150. See also Cannon, B. (1985). 
33 M'Halla (1974) p. 301. 
3a Cited in M'Halla, M., op. cit., p. 301. 
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allotted to native cultivators, a figure which had risen to 173,696 hectares by 1938.31 
8.6 The Terres Collectives 
The decision to "domainalise" (or classify as State Domain) the "terres morte" gave rise 
to a further problem: what to do with land occupied by the tribes. Outside the State 
properties land which showed evidence of regular cultivation or improvement by man 
was deemed private even if no legal title was taken out. This was the case for almost 
all the land in northern Tunisia where population densities were relatively high and 
where climate and commercial factors encouraged a more regular agriculture and a 
more sedentarized population. In the south and centre of the country, however, only 
a very small proportion of territory could be deemed to have been regularly cultivated 
and hence privately owned. These regions were the preserve of extensive animal 
husbandry: 
"Il existe a l'interieur de la Tunisie et principalement dans le Centre et le 
Sud... de vastes etendues de territoire sur lesquelles des tribus sedentaires ou 
semi-nomades exercent des droits d'usage et de jouissance. Le sol de ces 
territoires est depuis des siecles en la paisable possession des occupants, qui en 
tirant parti par la culture des cereales, le parcours des bestiaux, 1'exploitation 
des peuplements d'alfa ou des brousailles, etc. Chaque tribu ou plus exactement 
chaque fraction de tribu a ainsi son territoire separe. Elle y campe, eile en 
utilise les terrains de parcours pour le paturage des animaux. Toutes les annees 
a l'epoque des pluies, les douars se transportent sur les parties du sol qui ont 
ete les mieux arroses, et il st, d'apres des usages immemoriaux, procede a 
1'occupation par les families des parcelles susceptibles d'etre mise en valeur. 
Chacun laboure et ensemence son lot pour son compte personnel. II n'est pas 
fait le culture en commmun. Apres le recolte, les driots d'occupation prennent 
fin pour renaitre sur d'autres point la saison suivante". 36 
Although not regularly cultivated these were lands occupied and exploited by tribes for 
many generations. These vast lands required a definite legal status both to protect the 
tribes themselves from a sale instigated by only some of it's members at the expense 
of the wishes of the others, and to protect potential French purchasers. A decree of 
January 14,1901 ordered the creation of a commission to define the geographical 
3s M'Halla, M., p. 312. 
36 Resident General au Ministredes Affaires Etrangeres, January 27,1900, cited 
in Sammut, C. (1983) p. 156. 
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extents of tribal land and to determine the legal status of the occupants and the 
conditions in which it could be determined private property. 
The results of the commission's studies were that amongst the Madger tribes in the high 
steppe most of the land was deemed private. Amongst the neighbouring Fraichiche a 
much smaller proportion of land was considered private. The amount of what came to 
be termed "collective" land increased towards the south, the Hammama, for example, 
having been determined as having almost no private land. Some of these lands, at 
Maknasy, Kasserine and Gammouda, for example, were declared State Domain and 
the occupants only retained their old rights until allotment was made. Other land, such 
as that near Sbeitla, which was well irrigated, was bought by the State for future 
colonization. 37 
The difference between private and collective land was more than one of a simple 
definition. Collective land could not be sold and therefore could not be the object of 
French settlement. But neither could it be used as a mortgage for loans with which the 
land could be improved. Indeed loans from agencies set up to aid the indigenous 
populations in times of severe economic difficulty, such as the Societe Indigene de 
Prevoyance (SIP) would only provide credit against property titles. 38 
Without ownership of their lands the tribes of southern Tunisia had little chance of 
improving production techniques or of raising the quality of their livestock. They could 
neither sell their lands to raise capital nor access mainstream sources of credit. They 
were, therefore, left with little alternative but to exploit their own lands using 
traditional techniques. As both the animal and human population increased this 
inevitably forced the tribes to exploit more and more, increasingly poorer quality, land 
37 See Timoumi, H. (1975), op. cit., p. 121-191. 
38 This was equally true of land deemed private but which had not yet been legally 
registered by the owner. Many occupants of such lands did not register their properties 
because of the cost involved: "L'Indigene dont les proprietes ne sont pas immatricules, 
ne peut s'addresser aux etablissements du credit qui lui feraient des avances des 
conditions raisonables". L'Avenir de Sousse, March 6,1904. 
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for both pasture and crops. 
The vast majority of tribesmen depended, during years of drought, on "prets de 
subsistance" which were loans of grain offered by the Government. These were 
designed only to meet the immediate subsistence needs of the population and were 
distributed only under extreme conditions. The other main recourse was to usurers 
which charged heavy rates of interest. 
8.7 Economic Deterioration in South and Central Tunisia 
The tribes of south and central Tunisia lived an essentially pastoral way of life. 
Cereals were important but secondary to livestock. Yet while nomadism and 
semi-nomadism were adaptations to the often harsh and unpredictable environmental 
conditions of the region, animal husbandry was scarcely less dependent on climate than 
the cereal crops. The effects of drought, particularly when widespread or prolonged, 
on the tribes were severe. Of course the need to pay taxation only exacerbated the 
subsistence problems of the tribes. 
Alfa grass played an important role during the nineteenth century in enabling many 
tribes to find the additional resources they needed for survival. But without in any way 
minimizing its importance to the tribes, until the late nineteenth century, alfa grass 
provided a supplementary income to a relatively limited number of tribesmen. A far 
more important resource to the on-going viability of the tribal society as a whole was 
the northern Tell. The Tell had for centuries provided many tribes the possibility of 
finding both work and pasture at all times but which became particularly important 
when the crops or pasture were poor in the south. 
But the extension of agricultural land in the north from the late nineteenth century, the 
proliferation of private property, and the increasing degradation of ethnic tribal social 
ties, meant that the old symbiotic relationship between the tribes of the north and those 
of the south, between the steppe and the Tell, were to become increasingly more 
strained during the first half of the twentieth century. In fact the first decade of the 
twentieth century severely tested these relationships. This was a period of prolonged 
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dryness in the south. The increase in alfa collections during these years was, therefore, 
caused not just by the opening of the new railways but also by severe economic 
pressures in southern Tunisia. Indeed so intensive did the collection of the grass 
become, especially close to the railways, that the Administration, fearing the imminent 
exhaustion of the resource, decreed in 1904 that there would be a close time of four 
months each year during which neither the collection, transport or sale of alfa would 
be permitted. 39 But although this was repeated each year until 1911 it was, in every 
case, suspended because of the receipt of numerous complaints from merchants, and 
from tribes deprived of all other means of subsistence: 
"Or l'interdiction de la vente d'alfa nous portera un grand prejudice car c'est 
avec son prix de vente que nous comptons payer nos impots et nos dettes et 
entretenir mes families"' 
The Direction de l'Agriculture, in announcing the suppression of the decree in 1908 
commented that it was with the aim of: 
"... venir en aide aux populations des regions alfatieres du Centre et du Sud de 
la Regence eprouvees par la secheresse persistante de l'annee 1907". al 
In 1910, however, the Direction de 1'Agriculture warned that the suspension of the 
close period of previous years was: 
39 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Decret du 19 Septembre, 1904. The 
decree provided for severe fines for infractions. 
40 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Bel Hassem ben Mansour and others of 
Gafsa to Prime Minister, August 20,1906. 
4' AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Arrete de le Directeur de 1'Agriculture, 
du Commerce et de la Colonisation, November 28,1907. But in 1910 the Directeur 
commented of the repeated suspension of the decree that this was done "au grand 
detriment des peuplements qui apres avoir souffert de la secheresse eux aussi etaient 
soumises a une exploitation intensive. C'est ainsi que de vastes etendues sont dans un 
etat voisine de la ruine et qu'il conviendrait d'y suspender toute exploitation pendant 
plusieurs annees". AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Direction de l'Agriculture..... 
January 7,1910. 
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"... au grand detriment des peuplements qui apres avoir souffert de la secheresse 
eux aussi etaient soumises a une exploitation intensive. C'est ainsi que de 
vaster etendues sont dans un etat voisine de la ruine et qu'il conviendrait d'y 
suspendre toute exploitation pendant plusieurs annees". 42 
In fact the Resident General overruled the department's request for a close time to be 
imposed in 1910 in commenting: 
"En effet dans le Sud deja tres eprouve en 1909, la situation s'est encore 
aggravee et il est a prevoir que les indigenes devront secourees a nouveau". 43 
But the severity of the crisis of the first decade of the twentieth century was intensified 
by the growing opposition of the northern tribes to accept large numbers of people and 
animals from the south seeking work and pasture for their animals. Thus in 1905 the 
notables of the cheikhats of Sidi El Sebet told the Caid that a great number of nomads: 
"ont envahi leur territoire pour y paturer leurs bestiaux et ou ils ont commis de 
grands degats et qu'ils ont appris que d'autres nomades sont egalement en routes 
vers leurs territoires". « 
The French Administration established the requirement of the tribes of the south that 
they seek permission from their Caids before moving northward in an attempt to control 
the scale and destination of the seasonal emigrants. This was not always successful. 
In 1910, for example, 3000 people of the Souessi in the low steppe moved north of 
which only 600 were authorised by the Caid. The Caid reported that "qu'il West restee 
dans le caidat que les riches et les enfants en bas age et les personnes infirmes". 45 
But the attempts to limit the numbers of animals originating in the steppe from reaching 
the north had serious implications for the southern tribes for they had few alternatives. 
42 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Direction de 1'Agriculture..., January 7, 
1910. 
a3 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dosier 11, Ministere General a Directeur de 
1'Agriculture, January 15,1910. The decision was at least partially in response to the 
loss to the Treasury caused by the inability of tribes to pay their taxes. 
44 M'Halla, M. (1978) p. 281. 
45 Ibid., p. 283. 
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While the income from alfa could help purchase grains for consumption or for the 
future harvest or to replace animals lost to the drought, it could not solve the tribes' 
immediate problem of saving their animals from starvation. In 1906 the Controleur 
Civil vehemently opposed the decision to limit the transhumance: 
"Je signale d'une maniere particuliere a votre attention les serieux 
inconvenientes que presente cette mesure prohibitive pour les indigenes du 
Controle de Thala, dont eile trouble les traditions imemoriales au plus grand 
prejudice de leur existence materielle si precaire. Les cultures qu'ils possedent 
sont peu etendues en egard a la dinette de l'annee derniere et a la difficulte 
qu'ils ont eu a se procurer des semences; elles produiront les rendements peu 
satisfaisants sur un grand nombre de points par suite de la penurie des pluis en 
autone ou des degats causes tout recemment par la grele. Dans ces conditons 
ce serait les mettres dans un grand embarras et accroitre encore leur misere que 
de leur fermer 1'acces des controles voisins; ce serait en outre, faire supporter 
a... plusieurs milliers d'individus, le poids de la faute, tres grave il est vrai, 
mais imputable seulement a une Bande d'energumenes, depourvus pour la 
plupart de toute attache avec la masse des interesses". a6 
The Controleur Civil at Beja reported in 1914: 
"Je ne pourrai plus empecher ces affames et leurs troupeaux lamentables, de 
prendre, ou ils la trouvant, leur subsitence. Les gens du sud ont penetre de 
vive force chex les colons et s'y ont installe avec leurs betel malgre la defense 
fait pretendant avoir le droit de vivre". 47 
So serious had the problem become that in 1913 a circular was sent to all Caids in the 
south calling on them to "arreter autant que possible le transhumance qui s'est accrue 
depuis quelque temps". 48 
In 1908 at the Congress de 1'Afrique du Nord it was noted in respect of the tribes of 
south and central Tunisia: 
a6 Timoumi, H. (1975), p. 182. 
47 M'Halla, M., op. cit., p. 283. 
48 M'Halla, M., op. cit., p. 283. It was reported that two thirds of the population 
in the hinterland of Sousse had migrated northwards in 1914. 
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"Pendant longtemps les habitants de ces contrees ne se sont gueres livres qu'a 
1'elevage.... Mais la paix francaise a favorisee un augmentation de la population 
trop nombreux maintenant pour vivre du regime pastoral.. . et bientot ne suffront 
plus aux besoins des tribus qui les occupent". a9 
But until the 1920's there was still sufficient pasture and work in the north to continue 
to accept large numbers of nomads from the south in most years. From the 1920's, 
however, the population began to increase more rapidly as did the amount of land under 
cereal cultivation. 50 In 1924 which was an average year for harvests in the north, the 
Resident General asked the Controleur Civil for information on the state of the pasture 
in their districts their capacity to accept immigrants from the south. " In the Caidat 
of Ouled Ayar, situated on the southern limit of the Tell it was reported that due to the 
" scale of cereal sowing there was very little pasture and even the animals of this district 
would be moved further north: 
"... Ies champs de cereales ne laissent guere d'espaces libres pour le paturage et 
le pacage dans les recoltes donne lieu a des frequents incidents qui degenerent 
presque toujours en rixe [fights]. La venue d'autres troupeaux etrangeres 
risqueraient donc d'aggraver cette situation". " 
a9 M. Gounod, cited in Housset, L. (1939), Le Statut des Terres Collectives, p. 
51-52. 
so Many semi-nomads from Gabes, Gafsa and Thala, finding access to the Tell 
difficult, crossed into Algeria in search of pasture but they also caused problems 
amongst the Algerian tribes: "... les caravans remontent du Sud de la Tunisie ont, en 
effet, devance les nomades algeriens et elles ne laisseront plus a ces dernieres de quoi 
nourrir leurs betes sur les maigres paturages ou elles auront sejourne. " AGT Serie A, 
Carton 279, Dossier 1, Le Gouverneur General de l'Algerie aM le Res General de 
France a Tunis, July 6,1924. 
s' In the south the degree of economic distress was great. The Caid of the 
Hammam wrote to the Prime Minister in 1923 that "... la situation economique de mon 
caidat est actuellement les plus mauvaises et menace d'avoir de graves consequences 
si on ne s'empresse d'y remedier. En effet, la misere regne dans tous les points du 
caidat et les indigenes, reines par les mauvaises annees precedents et la perte de leur 
betail... se trovant ... 
desarmes contre la famine et beacoup d'entre eux sont reduite a se 
nourir d'herbes pour ne pas mourir de faim". Cited in Timoumi, H. (1975) op. cit., 
p. 233. 
52 The Controleur Civil of Maktar, cited in M'Halla M., op. cit., p. 287. In the 
neighbouring Caidat of Ouled Aoun the state of pasture was better but even there "les 
recoltes couvrant la majeur partie du territoire, ne laissent pour le paturage que des 
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Even when allowed to pasture their herds in the north the southern tribes were forced 
to pay, from the late nineteenth century, a levy called "achaba" which was charged for 
each animal for each month. The free pasture rights which had for long prevailed were 
replaced with this charge which until 1910 was between 0F 50 and 1F per head per 
month. 53 By 1927 it had risen to 5F per head each month. " 
In the south too, the area under cereal cultivation increased sharply from the end of the 
nineteenth century pushed by rising grain prices and an increasing population (see Table 
8.4 above). Amongst the Madger and Fraichiche tribes the cultivated area was 
estimated by Charles Monchicourt in 1906 to be approximately 26,000 hectares (just 
over 3% of the total land area of these tribes). " According to Jean Poncet the 
cultivated area reached 160,000 hectares in 1950.56 But this increase was only made 
Possible by utilizing less fertile land since the best lands had always been selected for 
sowing by the tribes. As the agricultural area expanded the possibility of leaving some 
fallow reduced. Often even the best lands were left fallow for at least one year, usually 
more, to allow the land to recover before being replanted. Crop yields suffered. Even 
in the land of the Fraichich and Madger situated close to the Tell, Poncet notes that 
barley yields varied from 0.7 qx per hectare to 2.3 qx per hectare which meant that the 
harvests of at least 2 of every 3 years were lost. 
57 
Further south, towards the lands of the Hammama and Beni Zid, the soil was more and 
and even less susceptible to regular cultivation. The area sown under cereals tended 
to fluctuate greatly depending on both the resources available to tribes and on climate. 
In bad years such as 1925 138,000 hectares of land were sown with cereals 
in central 
espaces a peine sufficants aux troupeaux de la region". 
Ibid., p. 294. 
53 M'Halla, M., op. cit., p. 286. 
sa M'Halla, M., p. 287. 
ss Monchicourt, C. (1906) p. 40. 
56 Poncet, J. (1962) p. 222. 
57 Ibid., p. 222. 
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Tunisia while in good years like 1932,445,000 hectares were sown. 58 But with no 
development in production techniques the impact of a crop failure on an increased 
population worsened considerably. Timoumi states that the population of the 
centre-west of the country to have increased from 136,000 in 1911 to 171,000 in 
1931.59 
Unlike in northern Tunisia where the expansion of agricultural production owed much 
to the commercialization of the economy and to rising market value of grains, in the 
south of the country it was much more the result of increasing population pressure. 
Regular and successful agriculture without investment in irrigation machines or even 
better ploughs was almost impossible in the south where crops and yields were at the 
mercy of rainfall, wind, temperatures let alone the threat of locusts. 60 
Given the insecurity of cereal harvests the tribes' livestock increased substantially as 
they sought greater security from the effects of drought. Again amongst the Fraichiche 
and Madger tribes Poncet records an increase in sheep alone from an average of around 
200,000 between 1885 and 1890 to between 500,000 to 600,000 in 1950.61 But unlike 
the earlier period by the late 1920's the ability to find pasture in the Tell had decreased 
considerably and, with the greater land area given over to cereals in the south, so too 
did the capacity of their own territories to sustain such numbers of animals. 
The situation was to worsen considerably in the 1930's. Hit hard by the effects of the 
world depression large sections of the northern population were placed on the road to 
58 Timoumi, H. (1975) op. cit., p. 390. 
s9 Ibid., p. 231. 
60 Timoumi notes that between 1920 and 1930 there were 79 hailstorms in the 
Control Civil of Thala. Op. cit., p. 232. The change, in 1909, in the tax on cereal 
production, the "achour" from one based on the size of the crop to one calculated on 
the area of land sown hit hardest those living in environmentally marginal regions. 
61 Poncet, J., op. cit., p. 222. 
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ruin by the downturn in the value of their grain products. 62 Indebtedness increased 
sharply. M'Halla calculates the debts of Tunisian agriculture at 204 million francs in 
1933 without including amounts owing to private and informal creditors which M'Halla 
believes must have been a similar amount again. 63 But while the small scale Tunisian 
agriculturalists suffered tremendously during the crisis of the 1930's, the colonial and 
larger Tunisian landowners sought to counter the slump in the value of grain by 
reducing production costs to become more competitive. Investments, with financial aid 
from Government and other public bodies and financial institutions, were made in 
agricultural machinery, tractors and harvesters which, to maximize the benefits, 
required larger land units. The 1930's were a time of concentration of property in the 
hands of a few and at the expense of the many small-holders who, many already 
crippled with debts, were unable to compete. But the mechanization of agricultural 
production in the north was to reduce the requirement for labour to a minimum making 
the possibility of the southern tribes finding work in the north even more remote. In 
1939, after almost 60 years under French Administration, Housset reported a complete 
lack of improvement in the material well-being of the southern tribes which had little 
to offer, and nothing to gain, from the Government's investment in roads, railways and 
ports commenting: 
"Chez les Bedouins des Beni Zid et des Hammama la trachome fait ses ravages, 
la disette et la faim se font sentir l'ignorance persiste, la vie est toujours aussi 
miserable". ' 
The rupture of the old order, the strong and reciprocal social and economic 
relationships which bound the tribes north and south of the Tell, had profound 
repercussions on the latter. An increased population in the south was forced, more and 
more, to rely on the limited resources of its regions. If not the only, then certainly by 
far the most important, economic substitute for the loss of access to work and pasture 
in the Tell, was alfa grass. During the 1930's in particular alfa grass became a central 
62 The price of wheat slumped from 201 F per 100 kg in 1927 to 80 F in 1935. 
M'Halla, op. cit., p. 427. 
63 M'Halla, M., op. cit., p. 448. 
64 Housset, L. (1939) p. 8. 
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pillar of the economy of south and central Tunisia. The income earned from the sale 
of alfa helped sustain a way of life which had become entirely marginal: 
... unes des conditions essentielles de 1'existence des populations du Centre et des regions circumsahariennes du Protectorat. Le prix auquel il est paye parait 
minime et ne represente pas le plus souvent celui du transport entre la nappe et 
. 
le marche sans tenir compte de la cueillette" 65 
8.8 The 1920's and 1930's - "Moralizing the Alfa Trade" 
Announced after the abrogation of the concession accorded the Franco-English 
Company, the principles of the Beylical decree of 1887, which reestablished the regime 
of absolute freedom of commerce with regards alfa grass, continued to form the 
regulatory basis of the Tunisian trade until well into the twentieth century. While it 
was hoped the operation of a competitive and free market of buyers and sellers would 
set a fair market value for the plant, the legislation also enshrined the tribes' rights to 
freely collect the grass growing anywhere in their own lands. All parties in the trade 
were to be protected from the threat of a new monopoly. 
During the 1920's and 1930's, however, the increasing reliance of growing numbers 
of tribesmen on alfa grass as a source of income led to their widespread abuse at the 
hands of a relatively small number of merchants in amongst whom most of the buying 
power was concentrated. Collusion amongst the major alfa houses in fixing the terms 
and conditions of sale was commonplace. As all the major alfa houses had agents in 
some or all of the main alfa districts, they sought to reduce prices to a minimum by 
acting as a cartel: 
"Il existe ici une entente parfaite entre les maisons d'achat... qui se partagent 
dans une stricte egalite les arrivages et pratiquent un prix concerte". 1 
In August 1927 the fourteen most important alfa houses met to fix prices for the 
forthcoming season. The prices for 100kg of top quality grass were to be fixed at 17F 
6s AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Conservateur des Eaux et Forets a M. le 
Directeur des Affaires Economiques, April 30,1937. 
66 AGT, Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Controleur Civil de Sfax aM le Resident 
General, July 23rd, 1925. 
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at Hadjeb el Aioun, 16F at Sbeitla and Djilma, 15F at Kasserine and 14F at Thelepte, 
Feriana, and Maagen bel Abbes. Lower qualities were to be offered between 2F and 
3F less to encourage the tribes to collect the best qualities. Each agent was permitted 
an equal share of the alfa brought in to the markets in which they operated with the 
following instructions: 
"Vous ne devez pas faire la concurrence ni gater le marche sous aucun pretexte 
car il ne fait absolument pas que si faute il ya celle puisse nous etre imputee. 
Si un nouveau concurrence surgisait au marche vous vous mettrez d'accord 
entre les agents presents des maisons reconnues pour mettre tout le marche aux 
prix de l'entent ci-haut fixe et en faire la repartition egale entre vous tous au cas 
ou enchere vous et acquise". 67 
There was clearly an understanding in 1927 between the alfa houses in Tunisia and the 
paper industry in the UK in an attempt to control prices: 
"Le concurrent ne pourra mettre une surenchere moindre que 1Fr a cette 
condition vous lui laisseriez prendre tout le marche; car il ya un engagement 
entre exportateurs et importateurs de ne rien acheter chez la nouvelle 
concurrence; et celle ci ne trouvait pas de debouche pour sa marchandise 
68 cessera d'elle-meme sans que noun ayons a faire des sacrificiees d'argents". 
It was difficult for many to tribes to refuse the prices offered by the merchants. The 
Controleur Civil at Thala reported that the tribes of the Ouled Sidi Tlil did not have 
enough grain to sow their crops and would be forced to take out loans with merchants 
at Feriana to make good the shortfall. He advised them to hold back their sale of alfa 
until the cartel broke and they could get a better price. 69 The cartel did, in fact, 
collapse and though all kinds of price fixing agreements resurfaced in subsequent years, 
67 Nantes, R8, Controleur Civil de Thala aM Le Resident General, September 
23rd, 1927. 
68 Ibid.. The alfa houses involved were: Cachia et Wolf (Sousse), Farrugia 
(Sfax), Zana (Tunis), Borgaud, Baziaux (Alger), Arbib (London), Scicluna (Sousse), 
Nahum Williams (London), Melca (Tunis), Logie, Morris, Cittanova, and Esparto Ltd 
(London). In addition the merchants Chalandre and Manoury were permitted to 
participate. 
69 Nantes, R8, Controleur Civil de Thala a M. le Resident General, September 15, 1927. He also noted that "Deja une maison, Nahum, s'est reserve le droit de revenir 
sur les prix fixees et de payer 20F le quintal si les arrivages d'alfa etaient insufficients". 
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as they had done previously, they were rarely successful for any length of time. But 
such overt price fixing was but one of a whole series of measures taken by alfa 
merchants to reduce costs. Prices themselves were never published but rather shouted 
out after the alfa had been inspected. The collectors were forced to leave their grass 
in the market (for which they were charged) and only then find out what prices were 
being offered effectively denying them the opportunity to go to another market if he 
was dissatisfied. 70 
Perhaps the most serious abuse directed at the tribesmen by the merchants, and one 
which generated numerous complaints to French officials, was the weighing procedure. 
Technically all transactions in alfa, as with other commerce in the country, had to be 
done on an official market and the weighing done by a public weigher. In practice 
much of the trade took place on unofficial markets i. e. the merchants' alfa yards and 
their was little independent monitoring or control: 
"... sur le marches d'alfa de Maknassy, Zannouch, Sened et Gafsa, les acheteurs 
pour la plupart israelites, achetent parfois l'alfa sans passar par le marche 
officiel et sans recourrir aux services de peseur publique. Malgre les mesures 
prises dans cette circonscription pour eviter de tels abus, de nombreuses plaintes 
parviennent a ce Controle Civil et signalent les agissements des acheteurs qui 
exploitent l'ignorance des bedouins pour les tromper sur le poids des charges 
d'alfa apportees par eux". " 
Even on the official markets, however, collusion between merchants and public 
weighers was commonplace, "... les complicites entre representants des maisons d'achat 
et peseurs publiques ne sont pas douteuses". 7Z 
70 Often the prices were not even shouted in Arabic : "Les chefs de chantiers d'alfa 
ou leur employees ne font pas proceder a la criee en langue Arabe auxquel est paye aux 
cent kilos l'alfa de Sbeitla et de Djilma". AGT Series E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, 
Commissariat de Police a Sbeitla to Controleur Civil a Thala, March 31st, 1926. This 
was equally true of the market at Kasserine. 
71 AGT, Series E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Controleur Civil a Gafsa a M. le 
resident General, July 11,1925. 
'Z AGT Series E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Controleur Civil a Sfax a M. le Resident General de Tunis, July 23rd, 1925. 
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Wherever the weighing was done all purchases were subject to a deduction made by the 
merchants of 30% of the gross weight of the grass. This practice, despised by the 
collectors, was as old as the trade itself and was designed to cover the loss of weight 
in the drying process. For the collectors it meant that for every 150 kg of alfa they 
collected they received payment for only 100kg. 73 
In addition the sellers were charged by the agents a commission which varied between 
2F 50 and 5F per camel load. In January 1926, the Societe Pour la Defense du 
Commerce des Alfas de Tunisie, composed of the main alfa houses, fearing the 
imposition of new controls on their activities, announced in January 1926 that this 
commission, where charged, should not exceed 2F 50 per load. In fact many agents 
ignored the decision while others simply started to round payments down to the nearest 
whole franc i. e. if a collector should have received 10 F 77 he was in only payed 10 
F. 74 The Societe subsequently appealed to local government officials to ensure that 
the commission of 2F 50 was not exceeded, that the offer prices for alfa be shouted 
in Arabic and that payment must be paid in steps of 50 centimes, while claiming that 
"... les maisons alfatiers desirent que l'indigene ne soit pas lese et que tout ce 
qu'il lui revient luis oit regulierement donne". 75 
The French administration, which believed a more appropriate title for the Societe 
would have been "la Societe pour 1'Exploitation des indigenes vendeurs d'alfa", were 
73 "Les alfatiers emploient dans le pesage et dann le reglement de comptes des 
pratiques si singulieres, que le moins que on puisse dire des marches d'alfa c'est qu'ils 
meritent d'etre moralises". AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Controleur Civil de 
Kairouan a M. le Resident General, September 1st, 1925. 
74 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Societe Pour la Defense du Commerce des 
Alfas en Tunisie, January 26,1926. 
75 Ibid.. Charles Cohen, the most influential "independent" alfa merchant appealed 
to the Controleur Civil at Thala to enforce the regulation with regards commissions 
which, he said, were charged by, and for the account of, the agents themselves and not 
the alfa houses. Cohen's old agent, Gabison, subsequently gave evidence that Cohen 
had told him to charge commissions which were split evenly between them although his 
new agent, Glemza, Cohen had made him stop charging commissions only two weeeks before Cohen's exhortation to the Controleur Civil. 
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more than a little sceptical that the alfa houses could be relied on to regulate themselves 
or had any real commitment to improving the situation of the sellers. 76 
The Government's view was that the only way to protect the tribes' interests in the face 
of a powerful coalition of merchants was to intervene directly in the trade: 
"Les apports d'alfa sur les marches de la Regence sont faits en general par les 
nomades les plus besogneux, ignorants et illettres. Ces apports son d'autant 
plus importants que l'annee est plus mauvaises et une partie des nomades de 
l'interieur tirant leurs moyens d'existence de 1'industrie alfatiere toujours tres 
remuneratrice. Dans le Sud ou les recoltes en cereals sont souvent nulles ou 
deficitaires, beaucoup de families peuvent ainsi se procurer des moyens 
d'existance en tout temps, ce qui est un gage de securite dans les campagnes. 
J'estime donc qu'il serait tres heureux de proteger les alfatiers ignorants contre 
l'indelicatesse... des acheteurs dont 1'honnetete laisse assez souvent a desirer". 77 
It was not until 1927 that legislation was finally brought out, after much discussion, to 
"moralize" the alfa trade. The most important articles of the decree stipulated that all 
transactions in alfa could only be carried out on official markets and in the presence of 
an officially designated public weigher and that henceforth the charging of commissions 
be made illegal. 78 
But the provisions of the 1927 were largely ignored by the alfa merchants. The alfa 
trade in the early 1930's was deeply affected by the Depression. Both the value of alfa 
and the level of British imports fell. Tunisian exports fell to 66,000 tonnes in 1932 and 
61,000 tonnes in 1933. But, as with the second half of the 1920's the 1930's were 
characterised by the persistence of a buyers market. There was great pressure on the 
tribes to collect and sell alfa because of their deteriorating economic situation. Climatic 
conditions, particularly in the second half of the 1930's were exceptionally difficult 
76 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11 "Note sur le Pesage de 1'alfa", 
Secretariat Generale du Gouvernement Tunisien, January 4th, 1935. 
AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Controleur Civile de Gabes a M. le 
Resident General, October 9,1925. 
78 Similar legislation was announced in 1914 but remained a dead letter after the 
complaints of the alfa merchants. The Administration was wary of provoking a 
suspension in purchases or a collective attempt by them to force prices down. 
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while the possibility of procuring resources by working in the harvest in the Tell was 
much reduced. The impact of the Depression on grain exports and the increasing 
reliance of large northern landowners on machinery diminished the need for seasonal 
labour. 
The alfa merchants sought every means to exploit the tribes during these years in an 
attempt to reduce the prices paid for the grass. The Administration's hopes that the 
requirement for public weighers would help protect the interest of the collectors were 
quickly dashed: 
"Les peseurs jures et autre agents officiels du Controle des Transactions sont 
generalement les principaux complices de fraudes au benefice des acheteurs et 
au detriment des bedouins qui approvisinnent les marches officiels". 79 
The practice of charging commissions returned with a vengeance as did that of avoiding 
the payment of centimes. It was particularly during the periods of greatest supply i. e. 
immediately prior to the tribes' grain sowing or when harvests were bad, that the 
abuses multiplied. In a report by Captain Boisseaux of the Gendarmerie of Sousse, the 
extent of the problem was made clear. The price of 12 Francs per 100kg offered the 
collectors was purely nominal. On their arrival at the market the collectors were forced 
to pay the agents 2 Francs for each donkey load and 5 Francs for each camel load just 
to get him to buy. The public weigher then, illegally, deducted between 20 and 40 kg. 
Thus if 150 kg was brought in the weight would be given as 110 kg. The weight was 
then rounded down to the nearest 10 kg; a further 10 kg was deducted for the weight 
of the cords used to tie the bundles together and on top of this was made the standard 
30 % deduction allowed by the Government to cover the weight loss during drying. 
In addition the seller had to pay a tax of between 0F 50 and 1 Franc for unloading his 
alfa on the market, a tax of 0F 50 for the costs of handling the grass on the market 
and between oF 25 and oF 50 for the weigher. Boisseaux noted that the collector 
often had to travel a round trip of 50 - 60 km and "s'il tombent un jour de plui ou de 
grand vent ou Fon n'achete pas, ils devrant s'abriter au fondouk. Its repartiront aver 
79 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Note by M. le Director Generale de 
l'Interieur, July 22nd, 1930. 
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des dettes". 80 
An indigent collector from the Ouled Sidi Tlil, a tribe which relied heavily on the sale 
of alfa, complained that "Je suis actuellement dans la misere. J'ai arrache ces deux 
charges d'alfa en 6 jours avec 1'aide de ma femme. J'ai mis deux jours pour la 
conduire sur le marche. ". $' 
In the region of Gafsa it became common practice in years of drought for agents to tell 
the collectors that they had no more money but that they would buy at one third or even 
one half of the market value something which, by force of circumstance, was generally 
accepted by the sellers. 82 
Another commom practice of many agents was the payment in bonds rather than cash: 
"... au lieu de les payer en argent ils sont souvent payes en bons de vivres ou 
de marchandises a prendre chez les commercants du village qui sont associes 
avec les agents alfatiers". 83 
The situation had clearly deteriorated since the 1927 law and the Direction des Finances 
was stating the obvious when he wrote, in 1931, that: 
80 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, December 2nd, 1932. At Feriana 100 
collectors complained in 1933 that the agents demanded a "bonus" of 20 kg before they 
would be prepared to buy. AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Rapport du Marechal 
des Logis, Commandant de la Brigade de Feriana, March 30th, 1933. 
81 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11. He was forced to pay 1 Franc 
commission and the centimes were deducted receiving only 39 Francs for his six days 
work. 
82 AGT, Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Controleur Civil de Gafsa a M. le 
Resident General, March 15th, 1933. 
83 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Rapport du Capitaine Boisseaux, 
December 2nd, 1932. This was also reported in Medenine in the far south and on the 
markets in Gafsa. 
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"Les mesures prises jusqu'ici en vue de proteger les indigenes 
vendeurs d'alfa contre les abus dont ils sont victimes de la part 
des acheteurs s'etant revelees inoperants; il est devenu d'autant 
`plus necessaire d'y renoncer que 1'Administration parait couvrir au 
lieu de les reprimer les agissements frauduleux et dolosifs des 
acheteurs et souvent meme des peseurs publiques a 1'egard des 
vendeurs". 84 
A new commission created in 1931 to study the question and composed of the Directors 
of Finance, of Agriculture and the Interior, noted in response to a question as to the 
impact of existing legislation on the moralization of the trade that 
"... il faut, malheureusement, repondre par la negative, car les abus Wont pas 
cessee. Les pratiques employees ont simplement change et le fellah, comme par 
le passe, reste la victime sans moyens de defense". 85 
While there was universal recognition that the 1927 legislation had no impact on 
"moralizing" the alfa trade there was very little consensus as to how to confront the 
more serious problems facing the trade in the 1930's. In fact the issue of defending the 
interests of the collectors was further complicated by needs and rights of those native 
and foreign individuals who had purchased or rented Domainal land in the Steppe. The 
Government had offered these plots on state domains in the hope of encouraging settled 
agriculture. These were sold on the condition that they be at least 40 % of the lot be 
cultivated within a space of four years. But with Tunisian agriculture suffering 
severely from the effects of the Depression many were unable to cultivate the lands. 
By the 1930's European landowners "... a conquis dans les regions alfatieres des 
territoires au premier rang desquels il convient de citer le lotissement de Sbeitla". 86 
During the 1930's the Director des Finances approved numerous requests from these 
landowners seeking to escape the worst effects of the economic crisis, to set up alfa 
yards on their lands though subject to the condition that the weighing and purchase be 
84 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, November 11,1931. 
85 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, "Note Sur L'Alfa et les Efforts de 
I'Administration pour en Moraliser le Commerce", no date. 
86 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Director des Finances a M. le Director 
de l'Interieur, March 9th, 1931. 
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effected on an official market. " This was stipulation was something that few were 
willing to accept and they demanded the right to carry on whatever trade they saw fit 
on lands which belonged to them. 88 
A large number of clandestine markets were created throughout the south and centre 
the transactions on which entirely escaped the control offered by the official markets. 
Many, in fact, had been operating since before the 1927 law which had only authorised 
their continuance for one year. 
Paradoxically, the alfa yards run by these individuals proved popular with the collectors 
despite the extremely low prices offered them. The owners of the plots allowed the 
tribes to pasture their animals on the land while they collected the alfa for the owner's 
account. This was an important benefit given the increased difficulty, faced by many 
during the 1930's, in finding adequate pasture. But gathering alfa on these private 
properties also avoided long journeys to the official markets and unlike the latter where 
delays, often of several days, were common they were always assured of receiving cash 
without waiting and without therefore, the cost of resting in a fondouk. 89 Furthermore 
there were no hidden charges, no taxes paid for unloading alfa or payments to a 
87 Those requesting the right of open alfa yards on private land included The 
Societe Commercial de 1'Afrique du Nord near Kairouan, a French colon, Decaillon 
at Sbeitla, M. Chauvet at Thala and M. Chukri Boulabeche near Sbeitla. There were 
many others in the early 1930's. 
88 One French company which rented land said it had no intention of complying 
with the requirement to transport alfa from his yard to the nearest official market. Ibid. 
Many tribesmen also seeking relief from the effects of drought and poverty which were 
all-pervasive in the 1930's tried to sell or rent part of their lands to merchants. Usually 
these rents were at extremely favourable prices for the merchants although in many 
cases "collective" land was "sold" by tribes which, being illegal, were annulled by the 
Administration. See, for example, AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Direction de 
la Justice Tunisien a M. le Directeur Generale de l'Interieur, September 14,1933. 
R9 The processing of transactions on official markets was hampered by the need, 
of the public weighers and the merchants, to register and account for each purchase. 
The grass was also generally brought into the market in the afternoon and weighing was 
suspended during the night starting up again the following day. AGT Serie E, Carton 
64, Dossier 11, Controleur Civil de Thala a M. le Resident General, May 3rd, 1933. 
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weigher, and no discount of weight for drying. 90 
But the sale of grass on these private lands was not limited to alfa collected there. 
Many tribesmen collected alfa outside these plots and brought it to sale for the same 
reasons as given above. They were often much closer to the fields where the grass was 
cut than the official markets. The prices paid were, however, much lower. In 1933 
while they could have received 12 Francs per 100 kg on the official market at Feriana 
the collectors were paid only 5F - 5F 50 on the private markets. This highlights the 
great difficulty many of the poorest collectors had in obtaining transport for the alfa 
either because they had no animals or because their animals were pasturing elsewhere. 
Indeed one of the fears, in drawing up legislation, was that the closures of these 
informal markets would seriously affect the poorest collectors: 
"Il en resultera une perte seche pour les indigenes pauvres cueillent 1'alfa, 
n'ayant pas de moyens de transport. Cette reglementation causera des frais 
supplementaires a ceux qui possedent de moyens de transport. Dans certains 
parties de la zemla des Ouled Sidi Tlil il en est qui font 30 km pour vendre 
leurs charges soit 60 km aller et retour". 91 
These private markets were disliked by the major alfa houses which felt that they, in 
complying with the legislation, were being prejudiced in comparison with those who 
operated yards outwith the official markets. As a result many of the larger companies 
also set up similar yards outside the official markets, the authorities, apparently, 
incapable of enforcing the laws. 92 
90 These benefits were detailed in a survey of 100 collectors some of whom 
collected on the private domains, some selling on these private markets alfa which had 
been collected elsewhere, and some of which continued to use the official markets. 
AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Rapport du Capitaine Boisseaux, May 1st, 1933. 
91 AGT, Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Controleur Civil de Thala a M. le 
Resident General, July 8th, 1925. 
92 It was a common practice in some areas and at certain periods of the year, 
usually close to the time of sowing, for tribes to seek loans from either usurers or alfa 
merchants. The creation of new markets, or private alfa yards, in a region threatened 
the repayment of loans made to the tribes by alfa merchants on existing markets. At 
Sbeitla, for example, in 1929, three new yards were established close to the town 
bringing lively protests from several merchants : "la plupart de ces commercants ont des 
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The Administration's policy with regards the alfa trade in the 1930's was fragmented. 
In the commission set up in 1931 each of the Departments had a different view on the 
measures to take, while the various Chambers of Commerce and Controleur Civil also 
expressed differing opinions 
The two extreme views were held by the Direction des Finances, which wanted a return 
to complete freedom of trade, and the Direction de l'Agriculture, du Commerce et de 
la Colonization, which felt that all land on which alfa grew should be taken over by the 
State. In the middle was the Direction de l'Interieur which espoused the benefits of 
tighter controls on the merchants. 
The status of alfa lands in France's three north African possessions was discussed at 
the Conference Nord-Africaine at Rabat where it was agreed that a uniform legal 
regime would be applied to land covered in alfa in all three countries. Alfa was 
considered a resource of significant importance from the point of view of maintaining 
peace and stability in regions populated by semi-nomads who had otherwise little source 
of income. The threat of internal instability was felt to be real. The Direction de 
1'Agriculture believed that the alfa lands required a uniform legal definition such that 
the State could assume responsibility for managing and maintaining the resource: 
"Cette absence de statut a laisse 1'exploitation des nappes alfatieres se 
poursuivre dans des conditions qui aboutissent a leur epuisement et a une 
situation commerciale le plus souvent tres prejudicial a l'interet des populations 
autochtones". 93 
The Direction de l'Interieur responded very emphatically that the transformation of all 
alfa lands into state domain would be neither practicable nor desirable : 
relations financieres avec les indigenes et n'arrivent plus a rentrer de leur creances". AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Caid of Sbeitla to the Controleur Civil of Sbeitla, April 1,1929. 
93 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Dir. General de l'Agriculture, du 
Commerce et de la Colonization a M. le Director de l'Interieur, January 15th, 1929. 
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"Les nappes alfatieres n'interessent pas exclusivement... les terres dit collectifs. 
Elles s'etendent sur de vastes perimetres exterieurs, dans le caidats de Thala, 
de Sbeitla, de Kairouan, de la Skhira. La, la propriete est incontestablement 
privative; eile y beneficie des garanties dont 1'entourent le droits des gens, les 
lois ecrites et les tribunaux regulieres. Une declaration, pure et simple de 
domanialite, serait-elle meme assortie d'une delimitation, constituerait un acte 
d'expropriation dont la principe est arbitraire et dont les retentissements seraient 
detestables". 91 
Indeed alfa was not limited to collective land (see Table 8.5). 
Table 8.5 Distribution of Alfa Land (hectares) 
Forested domain of the state 190,000 
Non-forested domain of the state 170,000 
Collective land and habous 590,000 
Sub-total Central Tunisia 950,000 
Between Gabes and Kebili 50,000 
Matmata to Dehibat 300,000 
Sub-total Far South 350,000 
Grand total 1,300,000 
Source : AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Conservateur des Eaux et Forets a M. 
le Directeur des Affaires Economiques, April 30,1937 
It would have been impossible, even if thought desirable, to either domainalize what 
had become private land mostly in the hands of colons or to domainalize only a part 
of the collective land of some tribes. The Direction de l'Interieur believed that the 
existing legislation required only modification and stricter enforcement. It wanted to 
see the creation of sellers' co-operatives and the limitation of all landowners, in private 
land or terres collectives, to the free use of alfa for their own needs but that all 
commercialized alfa be directed through official markets. This office felt that without 
the maintenance of the rule on the use of official markets the effect would be to 
94 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Dir. de 1'Interieur a M. le Directeur de 1'Agriculture, du Commerce et de la Colonisation, no date. 
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"supprimer les apports d'alfa dans les marches officiels qui ont contribuee a provoquer 
et developper autour d'eux une vie locale plus ou moins intense". 95 
In fact the idea of sellers' cooperatives and of concessions were not new and had 
frequently been proposed during the twentieth century by administrators and the latter 
at least supported by some merchants who wanted to enter a market dominated by a few 
large trading houses. 96 Organizing the tribes into cooperatives was seen by many as 
the main means by which the interests of the collectors could be protected: 
"Il a paru possible de prevoir l'organisation de centres de ventes par les tribus 
ou groupes de tribus, et de prescrire que les apporteurs indigenes ne pourront 
vendre que par l'intermediaire oblige des mandataires designes par eux, agrees 
par l'autorite et remuneres par u pourcentage contractuel". 97 
Yet, even in 1937 when another study was done on the whole question of the alfa trade, 
it was clear that the tribes were still sufficiently cohesive to make such a goal 
impossible: 
"Elle presuppose un degre d'evolution chex les tribus indigenes, qui ne semble pas pret 
d'etre atteint, pour que, meme epaulee par 1'Administration, elles soient en mesure de 
se defendre d'egales a egaux contre les alfatiers". 98 
Finally the Direction des Finances felt that: 
95 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, November 30th, 1931. 
96 This was the view of M. Birot who was investigating the possibility of 
establishing a paper pulp factory using alfa grass in France during the First World War. 
His reason for wanting a concession was to help keep costs down given the 
uncompetitive costs associated with producing alfa paper in France because of the high 
prices of coal and chemicals. See AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, E. Birot, 
President de l'Association Coloniale a M. le Directeur de 1'Agriculture et du 
Commerce, November 12,1917. 
97 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Compte Rendu a M. le Directeur de 
l'Interieur, July 22,1930. 
98 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, "L'Alfa", Le Conservateur des Eaux et 
Forets, April 30,1937. 
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"... les abus auxquels donnerait lieu le commerce libre ne me paraissent... pas plus 
excessifs que les operations usuraires que dissimule la vente a Selem des cereals". 99 
There were many other opinions expressed in the three years before a new law was 
published but these were variations on the themes set out above. 
When finally published the decree of September 16th, 1933 was perhaps not 
surprisingly, far from radical. The existence of the public weighers was maintained 
although all charges and deductions (including the 30 % weight deduction) were 
abolished other than that covering the tare of an alfa load which was fixed at 5 kg. All 
transactions had to be in cash and the weighers were to keep a register of both the 
weight and value of all alfa transactions made. Subsequent modifications stipulated a 
number of other charges and taxes which the sellers would have to pay mainly to cover 
the costs of weighing and handling charges on the markets. 
Despite the new legislation abuses continued in the late 1930's, a report by the 
Directeur des Affaires Economiques commenting that the use of bonds rather than cash 
was still in existence in 1937 by which time 
"... il semble indispensable d'intervenir a bref delai pour proteger 1'indigene 
illettre et isole, agissant par nature en dehors de toute idea de cooperation, 
contre la coalition des acheteurs, fort habiles a tourner a son detriment toutes 
les mesures de reglementation". 10° 
The sharp deterioration of the economic situation of the tribes, particularly during the 
severe drought and ecological disaster of the late 1930's, brought renewed urgency to 
the need to find a solution to the problems of over-harvesting and the protection of the 
tribes. 'o' The huge rise in alfa exports of this period is a reflection of the crisis 
99 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, March 9th, 1931. 
10° AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, "L'Alfa", April 30th, 1937. It was also 
stated that payment was not immediate, delays having been introduced by the alfa 
houses. 
'o' In 1936, when tribes were being paid an average of 9F per 100 kg, the income from the sale of alfa "... en cette periode de vie chere, de tels prix constituent un salaire 
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amongst the tribes. In the late 1930's there were many desperate pleas from tribes 
almost begging for alfa markets to be created on their lands. 'o2 
Although further studies recommended the creation of a government-run alfa office to 
monitor and control the commerce this was never implemented because of the costs 
involved and the difficulties in establishing uniform norms which could be applied in 
private and domainal land and in the "terre collectives". 
In 1939 the Administration legislated quotas for the exportation of alfa grass in an 
attempt to avoid the plant's exhaustion. During the 1940's the persistence of 
transactions outside official markets forced the Government to accept their existence 
since, despite the low prices paid they gave collectors distant from official markets, the 
possibility of earning some money from the sale of alfa grass. So widespread had 
collections become that this was nothing more than giving in to reality since the costs 
associated with monitoring transactions was heavy and largely ineffective. 103 
8.9 Conclusion 
The construction of railways from Sfax, Sousse and later Gabes, to the interior 
provided an enormous impetus to the alfa trade in Tunisia from the early twentieth 
century. Transport by animals had always been a limiting factor in the commerce not 
only because of their limited load carrying capacity but also because the long journeys 
involved in taking grass to the coast interfered with traditional movement patterns of 
the pastoralist tribes which were habitually north-south rather than east-west. The 
railways' role in reducing distances which the tribes had to cover just to sell the grass 
on coastal markets and in permitting much larger scale movement of the material to the 
extremement mediocre". AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, "L'Alfa", April 30, 
1937. 
102 See various correspondence in AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11. The 
Controleur Civil at Gafsa requested the opening of an alfa market at Redeyef which 
"... contribuera, dann une large mesure a 1'amelioration de la situation economique dans 
cette region". Letter to Resident General, October 18,1938. 
103 See L. Charmetant and A. Louis (1950). 
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ports was fundamental to the rapid expansion of the trade in the first half of the 
twentieth century. 
But the railways were a facilitator rather than a direct stimulus to the collection of 
grass. Even in 1933 the collection and sale of alfa was still considered by the tribes 
as a degrading activity: 
"Il n'existe pas de fellahs cueilleurs-vendeurs d'alfa. Le ramassage de 1'alfa est 
considere comme une besogne humiliante en raison de fatigues qu'il comporte 
et du peu de revenus a en tirer n'est pratique par les families les plus 
misereuses ". 104 
It was not the prices offered the tribes which produced the increased collections. In 
fact prices were much lower in the period of most rapid growth in the 1930's than they 
had been during most of the 1920's. Prices were a secondary issue in determining, in 
overall terms, the level of tribal participation in the commerce. Of far greater 
importance in this regard was the economic situation of the tribes. This was equally 
true of the twentieth century as it was of the nineteenth century. What differentiated 
the two periods was the degree of economic distress. 
During the nineteenth century the southern tribes continued to have access to work and 
pasture in the northern regions. Climatically more favoured, cereal harvests and 
pasture were, in general, much better and more reliable in the north than the south. 
The north, therefore, provided the southern tribes a vital safety valve when drought, 
or other natural catastrophe, struck their own regions. But as production became 
increasingly commercialised, the area of land under cereal cultivation expanded rapidly 
in the northern regions. This limited the availability of pasture to such an extent that 
in many places it was barely sufficient to meet the needs of the animals belonging to 
the northern tribes themselves. The free access to pasture which the tribes of the south 
had once enjoyed was abruptly halted and the charge for its use continued to rise. 
104 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Controleur Civil a Gafsa a M. le 
Resident General, March 5,1933. 
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At the same time complaints from the northern tribes concerning the damage to both 
crops and pasture caused by the influx of transhumants led the Administration to 
require the immigrants to seek permits which would allow them access to the Tell. 
Control of movement was combined with limiting the movement of tribes. 
But in the harsh environment of southern Tunisia pastoralism was dependent on the 
ability to move, sometimes over long distances, in search of pasture for the animals. 
The restrictions placed on their annual migrations and the control over their 
transhumance undermined the tribes' economic base. They came to rely more and 
more on the limited ecological resources of their own regions. 
The conversion of taxes into money payments and rising prices of cereals forced the 
tribes to sow greater areas of land. But the land brought under cultivation was of 
inferior quality for cereals since the best lands were already in use. Not only did this 
affect yields but the impact of crop failure on the southern population, which increased 
considerably during the twentieth century, was magnified. 
The tribes were faced with little option but to exploit their own lands more extensively. 
The number of animals increased sharply since animals could at least be eaten or sold, 
no matter how cheaply, when circumstances dictated, although from the early 1930's 
a tax was levied on each animal. Livestock could also be replaced through natural 
regeneration. When crops failed, they had nothing left but the need to find resources 
to sow again the following year. 
Despite efforts to present the contrary, fifty years of French control had brought the 
tribal populations of southern Tunisia, described as "les plus desheritees de la 
Regence", little in the form of economic improvement. 105 The development of 
communications, which was funded in large part by the Tunisian population, had little 
Positive impact on the south and central regions: 
105 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, "L'Alfa en Tunisie", March 2,1937. 
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"Les populations bedouins sont dans un etat de denuement souvent total. La 
civilisation ne consiste pas seulement a tracer de routes, a elever les barrages, 
a jeter des ponts. Elle doit apporter du bien etre aux populations". 106 
Extensive pastoralism was incompatible with the development of capitalism. The main 
wealth of these regions, the livestock, was of the most inferior quality for which France 
had little demand. Although barley produced in the south was exported it was not a 
resource which could be relied upon. 
The growth in both the human and animal population, the extension of cereals together 
with much greater difficulties in migrating northward, placed a considerable strain on 
the limited resources of the south. As more marginal land was brought into use, the 
ability to leave areas fallow declined and the risk of crop failure increased. Pasture 
was further limited by the increased area given over to grain crops. 
The decision to classify most tribal lands in the south as collective on which the tribes 
merely enjoyed the right of usage meant that there was little possibility of consolidation 
of properties or of improvement in either agricultural techniques or of livestock. The 
land could be neither bought or sold and nor was there any opportunity to access 
mainstream credit which were always required to be backed by mortgages on registered 
private property. 
By the 1930's the economics of the tribes traditional pastoral way of life had become 
unsustainable. The annual migrations turned into a massive and constant flow of 
hungry animals and men. Timoumi notes that in 1936 and 1938 as many as 150,000 
men and 350,000 animals trekked northward in abject misery. "' 
Although resort to usurers became widespread, alfa grass became the principal source 
of income for many tribes: 
106 Housset, L., op. cit., p. 203. 
107 Timoumi, H., op. cit., p. 438. 
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"I1 convient de considerer enfin que la meilleure partie de la population 
indigenes du centre et du sud tire de 1'alfa pendant les annees de secheresse son 
unique moyens d'existence", los 
In some cases up to half the tribes' resources were reported to come from sales of alfa. 
"Il faut souligner egalement que 1'arrachage de 1'alfa constituant pour les tribus 
nomades des cheikhats des Affial et des Ouled Sidi Tlil environs la moitie de 
leurs revenus annuels". 109 
The very marked increases in exports from the second half of the 1920's is a reflection 
of the growing poverty of tribal Tunisia. 
By the late 1920's alfa grass had become the tribes' principal source of regular income 
and the main means by which the traditional, pastoral way of life was sustained even 
in the face of a clear deterioration in the economic and ecologic conditions of south and 
central Tunisia. From an important source of equilibrium in the nineteenth century, 
alfa became in the twentieth, the central support of a whole population. But it was 
nothing but a short term solution to a long term, structural problem. 
As the tribes came to place greater reliance on alfa grass they began to suffer 
increasingly from exploitation at the hands of a few, powerful, trading houses. The 
latter, and their agents and representatives, employed a panoply of means to reduce the 
prices paid to the collectors for the grass. In an attempt to protect the tribes and, it 
must be said, to ensure the maximum of revenues to the Treasury, the Administration 
brought in successive legislation to regulate the trade. These were, however, popular 
with few of the direct participants in the trade. The requirement that all transactions 
take place on official markets was criticized by many, often French citizens and 
companies, who owned or rented private lands in the Domainal properties. They were 
loathe to go to the time and expense of taking their grass all the way to official 
markets. The tribes themselves often preferred these clandestine markets which, 
108 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Controleur Civil at Gafsa to M. le 
Resident Generale, March 15,1933. 
109 AGT Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, "Note sur l'alfa et les efforts de 
1'Administration pour en moraliser le Commerce", April 1937. 
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despite the low prices offered, were closer to the areas where grass was collected and 
the actual transactions were quicker and more transparent. 
Although the Administration sought, at many opportunities, to create some form of 
uniform regulations for the country's alfa resources under the auspices of a central 
government office, this proved impossible given the existence of alfa on the domainal 
lands of the state, on private lands and on the collective lands of the tribes. The system 
of concessions was likewise discounted in Tunisia for the same reasons. Indeed it is 
interesting to note that the Tunisian tribes regularly received higher prices than those 
paid on the concessions in Algeria where official legislation determined a minimum 
price equivalent to just 4% of the price of wheat. l10 Hopes for the creation of seller 
cooperatives among the tribes were also doomed to failure mainly because of the 
habitual mobility of the tribes and the maintenance of strong ethnic social ties. 
The alfa industry in Tunisia never really developed from a commerce based on 
supplying raw material to the British market. Several attempts were made to make the 
production of wood pulp possible but these failed because of the high cost of coal and 
chemicals and the limited availability of water. "' In fact it was not until the 1950's, 
after Tunisia achieved independence from France, that a paper factory was built at 
Kasserine to use alfa grass as a raw material. 
"o Cohen, C. (1937) p. 8. Cohen felt, "... le Systeme algerien [i. e., concessions] 
n'est pas moral, n'est pas humain, tandis que celui pratique en Tunisie est 
essentiellement de liberte, de securite et de productivite", p. 5. 
"' M. Bouby, for example, established a small factory near Sbeitla in 1904 on 
12,000 hectares of domainal land on condition that they export 2,000 tonnes of alfa 
pulp per year. But this attempt failed when the Administration decided that the water 
they had intended to use be set aside for the growing urban population in Sfax. AGT 
Serie E, Carton 64, Dossier 11, Proces Verbal de la Seance du Conseil des Ministres 
et des Chefs, November 30,1907. 
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AGT Serie A carton 206/2 
Belgacem ben Amor ben Dharfa and others of Oulad Slama (Gafsa) to Prime 
Minister, August 7,1911 
Djemmaia recently charged a commission to proceed to the allotment of lands belonging 
to foundation of Sidi Aissa. As it is the moment of harvests and we are crippled with 
debts we ask you to provide us with legal aid. 
And 18/6/1913 
Djemmaia declared some years ago that our lands were part of habous of Sidi Aich. 
Decided that we pay 400 F per annum as enzel and we keep possession of our lands. 
Now this land has been delimited by French engineer and now we learn that another 
Arab wants the land and offer a higher amount to Djemmaia. We have no other lands 
and are willing to pay whatever it takes to keep it. 
Res Gen to MAE, Paris, 31 dec 1912 
Sidi Ayich is habous and occupied by five fractions always fighting over who owns 
what bit. Want to sort it out to delimit and for each. Only get 6000F for 60,000 ha. 
Also have the happy consequence "de sedentariserles tribus actuellement nomades". 
Le Delegue a la Residence General de la Republique Francaise a Tunis, a M. 
Pichon, MAE, October 2,1913 
The original wally opposed to enzel although once made him happy: 
"elles risquait, en effet, de faire echouer la mise en valeur de 60,000 ha de 
terres et, en outre, d'empecher la sedentarisation de plusieurs milliers 
d'indigenes, but que se propse le Gouvernement Tunisien". 
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusion 
This study addresses a well worn theme in the Social Sciences: how, why and with 
what consequences capitalism expands and spreads into regions and amongst peoples 
hitherto on the margins of, if not wholly isolated from, the evolving world capitalist 
economy of the nineteenth century. The study of the alfa trade in Tunisia provides a 
fascinating example of capitalist penetration in a non-capitalist (or pre capitalist) society 
for the grass grew, and was sourced from, regions of the country only marginally 
integrated into what was, even in 1870, but an embryonic nation-state. Indeed, 
although an over-simplification, the Regency of Tunis could almost be described as a 
State of two nations, the first being composed of the mainly sedentary populations 
inhabiting the climatically more favoured northern districts and the towns, villages and 
countryside along the entire coastal belt, and the second being made up of a loose 
confederation of semi-independent tribes occupying most of the interior and south of 
the country. Amongst the former, where market principles and trade, both internal and 
international, were of long standing, the rule of the central government in Tunis was 
all-pervasive. By contrast the control and authority exercised by the Bey amongst the 
nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes of the interior was weak, limited largely to the annual 
collection of taxes carried out as much for political motives as a sign of Beylical power 
as for financial, the cost of the mahalla often outweighing the revenue generated. In 
the absence of the formal organised and hierarchical structures of the central 
government social cohesion amongst the interior tribes was based on real, or perceived, 
notions of kinship and political order maintained by the bi-polar balance and opposition 
of these forces at different levels of the tribal society. Economically, production was 
overwhelmingly subsistence orientated based largely on animal husbandry and here too, 
kinship and tribal ties played the dominant role in defining relations amongst and within 
the tribes. Though by no means a single, unified self contained unit social, political 
and economic organisation and action in tribal Tunisia was very much collective in 
nature and internally orientated. Direct contact with the towns and settled populations 
in the rest of the country were few and fitful and a deep distrust permeated the tribes' 
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perceptions of indigenous and foreign traders alike. 
It was against this, somewhat unlikely, background, that the alfa trade in Tunisia began 
in 1870 amidst widespread scepticism from most contemporary observers. Yet even 
the most optimistic expectations of merchants were quickly surpassed to the extent that 
in 1881, just 10 years after contact was initiated with the tribes, alfa grass became 
Tunisia's most important export measured by value and by volume, a remarkable feat 
given the very low value/weight ratio of alfa grass when compared with the traditional, 
centuries old, staple exports of the country, grain and olive products. More astonishing 
still the alfa merchants received scant support either in the form of direct or indirect 
aid from local or regional government authorities. Largely unregulated, the alfa trade 
in Tunisia was dictated and directed by the free market principles of supply and demand 
and its success was based not on any coercive action by a concert of traders and 
government but rather on the willing participation of the tribes in the collection, 
transportation and sale of the grass to merchants. Almost overnight the tribes' were, 
for the first time, brought into direct contact with the full forces of a local and 
international market via the trade in alfa grass and their response is clearly reflected in 
the export statistics. 
At first sight the Tunisian alfa trade appears to be a classic example of the vent-for- 
surplus theory of international trade. The tribes were able to furnish a remarkable 
quantity of grass for the export markets without any apparent impact on their 
production from traditional economic activities. This is an eloquent testament to the 
degree of idle or under utilised resources of land and labour in the interior of the 
country. Yet despite this and the impressive revenues generated from the sale of alfa 
and accruing to the collectors, the trade itself did not result in self-sustained economic 
development in the regions from which the grass was sourced. Indeed, even in the 
1930's when over 100,000 tons of grass was being exported annually these regions 
remained sorely underprovided in terms of economic and social infrastructure and 
manifestly deficient with regards to any of the benefits one might have expected from 
the theoretical standpoint of classical trade theory. Clearly the topic is too complex to 
be explained with reference to narrowly economic issues and this thesis has sought to 
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provide an understanding of the origins and impact of the alfa trade in Tunisia by 
constructing an analytical framework across a broad spatial and historical canvas, one 
which is woven as much by the country's richly varied social, cultural and 
environmental threads as it is coloured by those of politics and economics. 
Perhaps fundamental to any interpretation of the alfa trade in Tunisia and to the 
motivations of the tribes in collecting the grass is the very nature of alfa itself. Alfa 
is not a crop and in this regard, if no other, the trade is unique in Tunisia as it is in 
the colonial (or post-colonial) history of the rest of Africa. Alfa grass is a self- 
regenerating natural and indigenous resource which requires no sowing or planting and 
involves no time or effort in tending. Furthermore participation in the alfa trade 
required no capital outlay on land or materials on the part of the collectors. Access to 
the grass growing on `collective' land was, to all intents and purposes, free to all 
throughout the period under study. As a consequence the tribes were never forced to 
make the decision of changing from subsistence production to export production. Alfa 
was never perceived by the tribes as anything other than a complement, rather than an 
alternative, to their traditional economic activities. Indeed participation in the alfa trade 
was universally considered by the tribes as extremely degrading. Not only was the 
work involved in the collection, transportation, and sale of alfa grass heavy and time 
consuming but the remuneration was meagre at best. It was only in extremis when 
faced with insurmountable subsistence problems or when no other alternative source of 
income was available that the tribes, as a last resort, turned to alfa. This was a role 
for which alfa grass was uniquely suited for unlike both cereal production and, to a 
lesser extent, animal husbandry, the twin staples of tribal production, it was resilient 
to, even flourished under, the harsh conditions which characterise the and and semi- 
arid environment of southern Tunisia. When drought struck alfa could always be relied 
upon to provide at least some income to help alleviate a crisis in subsistence 
production. Whereas, prior to the inception of the alfa trade, severe drought and the 
disease which inevitably came in its wake, could, and often did, have, a catastrophic 
impact on both the animal and human population alike, after 1870 the threat was much 
reduced. Alfa grass was a resource of singular utility to the tribes and it was with 
pragmatism that the tribes regarded and exploited it. 
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The scale of the alfa trade can not, therefore, be taken as an indication of the extent to 
which the tribes had accepted market principles or capitalist ethics but rather a function 
of the degree of economic distress to which they were subjected. In this regard the 
dramatic rise in alfa collections and exports in the first half of the twentieth century is 
a clear sign of how much economic conditions amongst the tribes had deteriorated since 
the end of the previous century. Greatly reduced access to the Tell for labour and 
pasture forced a growing population in the south of the country into greater dependence 
on their own lands which were becoming increasingly unable to sustain them. The 
expansion in the cultivated area was achieved only by exploiting those lands of poorer 
quality which had previously been left unused or intensifying production on the better 
soils. Not only did crop yields suffer but the quality and extent of land available for 
pasture suffered correspondingly something made worse by the fact that the animal 
population itself rose sharply during these years. The potential effects of drought on 
an increased population were made immeasurably worse and reliance on alfa grass 
increased sharply. There were few alternatives. The Government itself had no clear 
development policy to address the fundamental decline in the viability of rural Tunisia 
and the revenues earned by the tribes from the sale of alfa undoubtedly enabled the 
Government to avoid facing the urgent need for action. Much of the income earned by 
the tribes from the sale and export of alfa was siphoned off by the Treasury in the form 
of direct and indirect taxes on the population. As little of this was reinvested in the 
alfa regions themselves, the tribes' need to secure the wherewithal to pay taxes, after 
ensuring their subsistence needs were met, simply helped perpetuate the vicious circle 
in which they were caught. Even in the 1920's and 1930's when Government officials 
began to take more heed of the degree of the tribes' dependence on income from the 
sale of alfa and the abuses to which the collectors were subjected by the alfa merchants 
the Administration's action was wracked by indecision for fear of pushing the 
merchants to reduce their activity in Tunisia and thereby jeopardising the fragile 
equilibrium in the interior which the trade itself helped maintain. 
The trade in alfa grass played a curious role in the economic and social development 
of Tunisia. Without doubt it was one of the country's most important branches of 
commerce providing, by the 1930's, employment for tens of thousands of people and 
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generating up to 30 million francs of income a year for the south of the country. 
Despite this the alfa trade neither caused any far reaching social change nor did it result 
in any self-sustaining economic development in the south. Indeed instead of promoting 
the destruction of the traditional ways of life amongst the tribes the meagre incomes 
earned from the sale of alfa helped them subsidise their traditional economic activities 
beyond the point at which they could otherwise have been sustained. 
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Appendix 1. Routledge's Patents for the Treatment of Esparto' 
Routledge's First Patent 
"Letters patent to Thomas Routledge of 17 Gracechurch Street for the invention of 
improvements in the manufacture of half-stuff and paper, sealed 30th January, 1856, 
and dated 31st July, 1856. 
Provisional specification left by the said Thomas Routledge at the office of the 
Commissioner of Patents with his petition on 31st July, 1856. 
I, Thomas Routledge, of 17 Gracechurch Street, do hereby declare the nature of the 
invention for improvement in the manufacture of half-stuff and paper to be as follows 
: The invention consists in the preparation of half-stuff (paper pulp) and paper from 
Esparto or Spanish Grass and other raw fibrous substances by treating them (when cut 
to suitable lengths) with a Caustic ley, composed in the ordinary manner of soda or 
potash and lime, but containing an excess of lime - i. e. more lime being present than 
is necessary to bring the gums, resinous and siliceous matters (coating and cementing 
together all raw vegetable fibres more or less) in a soluble state. The substances, after 
being boiled in this ley, are washed in a rotating vessel, let down into a receptacle to 
steep and afterwards drained and washed and are then fit for making the ordinary 
descriptions of paper. 
For a superior quality of paper after boiling in the first ley with excess of lime, the 
fibre is drained and boiled a second time in a bath of Carbonate of Soda (washing soda) 
drained, washed and reduced to half stuff in the ordinary rag beating engine and 
submitted twice to the bleaching process, washed, treated with acid which is washed 
out and then made into paper or sold as half-stuff. 
1 Reid, J. (1948) pp. 229-31. 
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SUMMARY OF SPECIFICATION 
The esparto is cut to a few inches long. 
Ley 
I take soda (using the impure caustic carbonate known in commerce as Soda Ash, by 
preference) and quick or caustic lime from 10-15 lb. of the former and a similar 
quantity of the latter; these are boiled together in a suitable vessel with a sufficient 
quantity of water, not less than 10 times the weight of soda used, settle, decant or 
syphon off the solution and add more water so as to nearly cover the fibrous substance 
in the boiler or vessel in which boiling is to take place. 
The solution is milky from excess lime and is in that state a more effective solvent for 
gum, resinous matters etc. The above strength is sufficient for ordinary class of 
half-stuff suitable for cartridge or common printing papers. For whiter half-stuff, the 
quantity of soda with lime may be increased with advantage up to 20 or 25 lb. to one 
cwt. of material treated to facilitate the subsequent process of bleaching; or the lime 
in excess may be allowed to deposit and the ley used clear if considered desirable for 
the finer or more delicate description of fibres. 
The strength of caustic ley cannot be distinctly defined (except within the limits above 
mentioned) for every description of fibre or for any individual fibre as each will 
naturally be procured in different stages of growth and preparation; but the desired 
strength of ley may be considered determined when the fibre is found, after boiling, 
on being broken or torn asunder to present a point or jagged end and the strength of 
ley must be increased or diminished a little more or less until this point is arrived at. 
The Esparto or fibrous substances, boiled in caustic ley a 
suitable time, which is ordinarily from three to five hours, is tested as above. It is 
drained and again boiled with solution of common carbonate of soda 2-5 lb. per cwt. 
of material or bi-carbonate in less proportion. 
One hour's boiling is sufficient to liberate the colouring and gummy resinous matters 
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already disturbed but up till then incorporated with the fibres which are then completely 
disintegrated and ready to be transferred to the original rag breaking and washing 
engines, broken into half-stuff as in the case of rags. The boiling may be done in 
cylindrical rag boilers as known and practised. I employ the Lancashire Bowling-Keir, 
also Donkin's Cylindrical boiler and I also use the leys and Soda solution again and 
again until too highly charged with colour and extracted matter bringing them up to the 
desired degree of strength by adding the requisite quantity of lime and bringing them 
to standard and as they become foul, I use them in the manufacture of inferior half-stuff 
and paper". 
It concludes, "I do not therefore claim the manufacture of half-stuff or paper from 
Esparto or other fibres generally, but what I claim is the treatment of Esparto and other 
fibres by a ley containing more lime than is necessary to render alkali caustic and 
afterwards boiling and rinsing the fibre in a solution of carbonate or bi-carbonate of 
Soda. Sealed 26th January, 1857. 
In his second patent, Routledge admitted that this excess of lime formed insoluble 
compounds and he therefore abandoned the idea and claimed instead a liquor causticised 
to the extent of 60-70 per cent. 
In his third patent part of the carbonate solution is reserved and added to the remainder 
which is to be fully causticised. 
Synopses of Routledge's Patents from 1856 
Pat No 1816: 31.7.1856 
Boil esparto in caustic alkalis in presence of excess lime, then in solution of carbonate 
or bicarbonate of soda; wash, break, bleach as usual. Leys may be used again after 
adjusting strength. Bleaching may be repeated followed by wash, acidification and 
wash. 
Pat No 274: 2.2.1860 
Improvement in 1816, as excess lime formed insoluble compounds. Gently boil in 
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solution of carbonate of soda made caustic by lime to 60-70 per cent. causticity. Drain, 
wash, break up and bleach with steam and/or acid. May be passed through rollers 
before bleaching. After breaking up, it may be acidified with sulphuric or hydrochloric 
acids, but this bath is not necessary for common printings. 
Pat. No 1548: 17.6.1861 
Preparation of alkaline solutions for 274. A proportion of the soda ash is reserved and 
the rest dissolved in water and causticised and causticised by lime and steam or 
agitation. Decant after settling and add the reserved soda ash. 
Pat. No 297: 1865 
Treatment of waste liquor. 
Pat. No 532 : 25.2.1865 
Waste liquor from boiling esparto is used for lixiviating of black-ball of alkali 
manufacture and the liquor so obtained, with or without the addition of quicklime, is 
used in boiling esparto, straw and other fibres. If the liquors contain too much organic 
matter, they may be boiled down and exposed to red heat with or without the addition 
of sulphate of soda, nitre cake or the like, and calcined. 
Pat. No 1602: 13.6.1865 (with W. H. Richardson) 
Esparto liquor removed by centrifuging or by rollers. Coal 
pitch, tar etc. may be added before incineration. Sulphates may be eliminated from the 
causticised liquor by adding barium compounds. Bleaching by use of chlorine water, 
and use of acids or alkaline hypochlorites. 
Pat. No 1044: 26.3.1868 (with W. H. Richardson) 
Boiled and washed esparto is bleached in a rotary or stationary steam-tight vessel using 
team to boiling temperature. The bleach can be reduced by from two thirds to one half 
of the usual quantity. 
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Pat No. 1855: 16.9.1869 
Preparing esparto half-stuff for transport by pressing, rolling, teasing and partly drying 
warm air. 
Pat. No 748: 14.3.1870 
Boiling and washing wood in a series of vessels heated by a 
superheated steam in blind pipes, also applicable to esparto and straw. 
Pat. No 2470: 13.9.1870 
Boiling and washing esparto, etc in a series of boilers for paper stock. Bleaching in 
another series made of wood, brick, cement or stone is not carried so far as when made 
for papermaking. 
Pat. No. 2431 : 15.8.1872 
After gummy and resinous matters have been removed straw, flax, hemp, jute etc. 
heckled, willowed and carded for spinning. Retting in tanks under alkaline conditions. 
Pat. No. 6061 : 19.2.1882 
Additions to 2470 and 2431. Liquor is transferred from vessel to vessel in the series 
by pumping or by steam pressure instead of hydrostatic pressure 
Pat. No. 12427: 15.9.1884 
Digesters for use with acid liquid under high pressure or 
temperature are made entirely of lead, or of lead and antimony instead of having a 
separate lead lining. 
Pat. No. 15006: 1886 
Edge runner with hard and soft strips on the grinding surfaces. 
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Appendix 2. "Translation from the original Arabic of the concession granted by 
the Bey to Mr Duplessis for the disposal of all the Esparto grass growing in one of 
the principal districts of the Arad Province", FO 102/140, Enclosure in Mr Reade's 
despatch no 12, of March 22,1882. 
Praise be to God, 
In our capacity of guardian of the public interests, we have hereby conceded to the 
respectable Mr Rene Duplessis, the collecting and disposal of the esparto Grass in the 
undermentioned mountains, on the following conditions: 
1) The above person is authorised to collect esparto grass in the mountains called 
"Werghemma", "Yaishya", "Haddadge", "Buhedma and "Majura". He can also 
construct a road along the said mountain to terminate at the port of Sghira. The 
road shall be exclusively for the transport of the grass and for no other purpose. 
It may be a railway or a tramway for the use and advantage of the 
concessionaire. 
2) The duration of the concession is 99 years counting from the date of this decree, 
and no other than the concessionaire shall have any rights to its advantages. 
3) In the expiration of the above term, the concessionaire will have to deliver all 
the works connected with the present concession in the best possible condition, 
and neither he himself nor his successors shall have a right to any indemnity in 
respect thereof. 
4) He shall employ native labourers and pay them equitable wages. 
5) He will be subject to all established taxes and to such others as may be hereafter 
established. 
Tunis, 15 Regib 1298. 
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Appendix 3. Perry Bury ship charters (1891) 
Charter by Perry Bury of SS Loch Katrine from the Dundee Loch Line Steam Shipping 
Co. Ltd (1891) 
Charter by Perry Bury of SS Vivienne from Ballingall & Galloway (1891) 
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